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A SELECTION FROM

THE LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF THE

FIRST NAPOLEON.

VV. d 8

VOL. I.

THE LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF THE

FIRST NAPOLEON.

With Explanatory Notes.

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BY

CAPTAIN THE HON. D. A. BINGHAM,

AUTHOR OF "MARRIAGES OF THE BONAPARTES."

1700

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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PREFACE.

In the selections which we have made from the voluminous Correspondence of Napoleon we have confined ourselves to letters of general interest and such documents as throw light upon the character of one of the most wonderful men ever born. Much has already been written about Napoleon; but people still write about Cæsar. The marvellous career of both captains furnishes an almost inexhaustible mine for the student of history. Both left behind them something more than the names of their victories, something more solid than their material conquests. As we find the portrait of Cæsar in his Commentaries, so we find the portrait of Napoleon in his Correspondence. We fancy that the selections we have made will give a fair insight into the character and genius of the man who, succeeding the Revolution, re-established order in France and swept like a hurricane over the rest of Europe, destroying in his passage a great deal that was rotten. Voltaire says that the highwayman was succeeded by the conqueror, and the rapacity of Napoleon,

which stands out most glaringly in his Correspondence, betrayed his descent. He shows himself an inveterate plunderer. It will be seen that he always had peace on his lips, but war was in his heart. His professions in favour of peace were rapidly followed by bloodshed and rapine. That he alone was the author of "those big wars," which, to many, "make ambition virtue," is proved by the calm which succeeded his removal from the throne. The principles upon which he governed are no longer in favour in France; he certainly did not succeed in establishing the dynasty he was so anxious to found. Imperialism has for the moment few adherents; and yet the work of the Great Napoleon has not been obliterated; his Code, his administration, and many of his vast public works bear witness to his genius and his glory. The stranger who visits Paris must be struck with the magnificence of the monuments dedicated to his memory: the triumphal Arch, which four *régimes* helped to construct —Empire, Restoration, Constitutional Monarchy, Republic —the Column of Vendôme, the splendid tomb under the dome of the Invalides—these, and the broad avenues, the streets and the bridges called after his marshals or his victories, speak of his fame. The Legion of Honour which he founded is the only order which survives. Other capitals have good reason to remember the great soldier—Moscow and Madrid, Florence and Milan, Berlin and Vienna; everywhere traces of him in Rome, Naples, Lisbon, Cairo, Munich, and Amsterdam. By sea alone

he was powerless; no naval victory figures in the list of his triumphs. There are islands which may almost be said to belong to him — Corsica where he was born, Elba where he was confined, and St. Helena where he died.

If some of the letters we have selected exhibit Napoleon in an unfavourable light, we must remember what Dr. Johnson wrote, that—"No person ever rose to supreme power in whom great qualities were not combined with a certain meanness which would be deemed inconceivable in ordinary men." But in few heroes has this mixture been more evenly distributed. His last letter, craving the hospitality of England, and written when escape was impossible, is a sad example of this want of dignity which excited the epigram of the Abbé de Pradt and some of the severest stanzas of Byron.

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A SELECTION FROM

THE LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF THE

FIRST NAPOLEON.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF NAPOLEON.

CHAPTER I.

YOUTHFUL LETTERS AND ANTECEDENTS.

DURING the Second Empire the French Government determined to publish the "Correspondence of Napoleon I.," and a Committee, presided over by Prince Napoleon, was charged with this duty. At the outset of their labours the Committee thus addressed Napoleon III. :—

"SIRE,—Augustus placed Cæsar among the gods, and dedicated a temple to him : the temple has disappeared, his *Commentaries* remain. Your Majesty, wishing to raise an imperishable monument to the chief of your dynasty, has ordered us to collect and to publish the political, military, and administrative correspondence of Napoleon I. . . .

"Let us at once state that, in conformity with the instructions of your Majesty, we have scrupulously avoided any alteration, amendment, or modification of the originals. In declaring that his public life commenced with the siege of Toulon, Napoleon I. himself determined the starting-point for the Committee. It is at that immortal date the present publication begins."

It is objected that the public life of a man commences from the day he enters the career he has chosen, and that

Napoleon's public life dates from his first commission in the army in 1785, if not from his entry into the military school of Brienne, at the expense of the country, in 1779. The Committee was no doubt deterred from publishing the early correspondence for several reasons. It would have revealed Napoleon first of all in his character of a Corsican patriot, hating France, ignorant of the language of the people he was destined to govern; then a violent Jacobin and the friend of the Robespierres; an officer guilty of several serious acts of insubordination, which in less troubled times would have cost him his life; who only escaped being brought before a court-martial by a miracle, on the charges of desertion and levying war against the French Government; whose name was five times struck off the Army List, and who was only reinstated on the production of documents filled with inaccurate statements.

The assertion made by the Committee of not tampering with the correspondence is certainly not correct, for many curious letters have been omitted altogether, and others have been revised and corrected. This is not much to be wondered at on the part of a Committee engaged in raising "an imperishable monument." However, since the fall of the Second Empire there has been a great rummaging of the archives of the War Office, and strange matters have been brought to light and rescued from that dust in which Augustin Thierry says the national history is still hidden.

The Committee published twenty-nine 8vo. volumes, reaching from the siege of Toulon, where Napoleon acquired the rank of general, down to the second and final collapse of the First Empire at Waterloo. Before commencing the perusal of the letters we have selected, it will be well to bear in mind the following facts in connection with the most remarkable genius of modern times.

Corsica, after having been some time in the possession of the Genoese, was sold to France under the auspices of Choiseul, "the coachman of Europe," who bought it to counterbalance the loss of Canada. The Corsicans offered

a stout resistance to the French, but were finally subdued, after an expenditure of much blood and 50,000,000 francs. Paoli, the Corsican leader, had exhibited great skill, courage, and energy in defence of his native island, but in May, 1769, Corsica was definitively annexed to France. Paoli fled to England. Charles Bonaparte, the father of the future emperor, had been one of his warmest partisans, and his wife had shared with him the dangers of the last campaign. Towards the end of May Charles Bonaparte tendered his submission, and was thus brought into contact with the Comte de Marbeuf, the French governor, with whom he was soon on intimate terms.

In 1764 Charles Bonaparte, the last of his race, had married Lætitia Ramolino, the most beautiful girl in the island. In 1765 a son was born, who lived only a few months. In 1766 came a daughter, who also died young; and in 1768 a third child, who was christened Nabulione. The identity of Nabulione is enveloped in mystery. According to Charles Bonaparte, and the official historians of the empire, this child was Joseph. Recent authors reject the idea of two sons having received the name of Nabulione, and declare there was a fraudulent substitution; that Nabulione, or rather Napoleon, was born at Corte in 1768, and Joseph at Ajaccio in 1769. There is a great deal of evidence in support of this theory, and no reliable evidence against it—nothing but the assertion of interested parties. In a letter to Paoli, Napoleon afterwards alluded to the scenes of bloodshed amid which he had been born—scenes which took place in 1768, but which had ceased in 1769. On several other occasions he made allusions and declarations tending to show that he was born in January, 1768, and not on the 15th August, 1769. Joseph, too, made similar admissions, and certainly Napoleon from his childhood behaved like the eldest son. However, according to official history, Napoleon was born on the 15th August, 1769, when Corsica had become French, and as all the early documents concerning the

family were destroyed and the registers mutilated at Corte, Ajaccio, Bastia, and Marseilles, as soon as Bonaparte attained power, one must accept the official date.

The reason given for a substitution is, that when Charles Bonaparte obtained a foundation at Brienne, Napoleon was just over the age for admission, while Joseph, of a meek and retiring disposition, was unsuited for a military career. Under these circumstances Charles Bonaparte took his eldest son to the Royal Military College, passing him off as his second son.

Charles Bonaparte, after tendering his submission, became a fervent partisan of the French, was appointed one of a committee of twelve gentlemen who administered the island under the French governor, and was afterwards chosen to represent the Corsican nobility in the General States at Versailles.

In 1778, thanks to M. de Marbeuf, he received a free admission for one of his sons into the military school at Brienne, and in the month of December set out for France, accompanied by Joseph, Napoleon, and Fesch, his wife's half-brother. The party repaired first to Autun, where they were kindly received by the bishop, Monsignor de Marbeuf, the brother of the count. It was only ten years later that Talleyrand was appointed to this See.

Joseph, Napoleon, and Fesch were all put to school. Joseph and Fesch were destined for the Church, and Napoleon had to prepare for Brienne. There exists a report of his master, the Abbé Chardon, showing that the latter was very intelligent, and that he learned to speak and write French fairly in three months.

Having shown proof of his nobility for a hundred and forty years, Charles Bonaparte received the necessary papers from the Prince de Montbarey, and took Napoleon to Brienne, where, after passing in French, he left him on the 24th April, 1779, the same year that Josephine Tascher de la Pagerie married Alexander de Beauharnais.

As at Autun, so at Brienne, Napoleon was in the hands

of the clergy. The head-master was Père Louis; Père Patrault, ever afterwards held in high esteem by Napoleon, taught mathematics; Père Dupuy literature; and the ill-fated Pichegru, who, educated in a monastery, had served in America as a private soldier, gave military instruction—Pichegru, supposed to have been strangled in 1804 at the instigation of his former pupil.

Napoleon had not been long at Brienne when the taunts and arrogance of his young comrades wounded his pride. He was on the foundation; he owed everything to the royal bounty, and he had no pocket-money. Though only twelve years of age, he not only felt and resented the inferiority of his situation, but he expressed his feelings, with an amount of vigour truly remarkable, in the following letter, which is the earliest preserved specimen of his correspondence:—

"MY FATHER,—If you or my protectors do not give me the means of supporting myself more honourably in the house where I am, let me return home immediately. I am tired of exhibiting indigence, and of seeing the smiles of insolent scholars who are only superior to me by reason of their fortune; for there is not one capable of feeling the noble sentiments with which I am animated. What! sir, your son is to be the laughing-stock of some popinjays, who, proud of the pleasures they give themselves, laughingly insult the privations I endure! No, my father, no! Should fortune absolutely refuse the amelioration of my lot, remove me from Brienne, and if necessary give me a mechanical profession. By these offers judge of my despair. This letter, believe me, is not dictated by any vain desire to indulge in expensive amusements; I am not at all fond of them. I simply experience the want of showing that I have the means of procuring them like the rest of my comrades.

"Your respectful and affectionate son,

"BUONAPARTE.

"*5th April*, 1781."

Among the comrades of Bonaparte were de Dampierre, de Comminges, de Castries, and many other sprigs of the nobility, including de Bourrienne, afterwards his secretary, and Phélippeaux, who, with Sir Sydney Smith, successfully defended St. Jean d'Arc, and helped to change his destiny by barring his road to the East.

In April, 1783, Bonaparte, after a dispute with a brother cadet who had railed at him about Corsica and his father, was placed under arrest. He immediately wrote to M. de Marbeuf, the protector of himself and his family, saying:—

"Now, if I am guilty, if I have been justly deprived of my liberty, add to the favours with which you have already honoured me that of withdrawing me from Brienne and depriving me of your protection. It would be a theft to the prejudice of some one more worthy than myself to continue to enjoy that protection. No, sir, I shall never be more worthy of it. I shall never cure myself of an impetuosity, all the more dangerous because I believe the motive sacred. No matter what interest commands, I shall never have the strength of mind to see a man of honour—my father, my respectable father—dragged in the mud! On this subject, sir, I shall always feel too deeply to confine myself to complaining to my chiefs; I shall always remain persuaded that a good son ought to avenge a similar outrage. As for the favours which you have showered upon me, they will be ever present to my mind. I shall say, I acquired an honourable protection, but to take advantage of it required virtues which Heaven has refused me, &c. &c.

"NAPOLEONE BUONAPARTE."

M. de Marbeuf interceded, Bonaparte was released, passed his examinations with success, was distinguished for application, mathematics, tolerable knowledge of history and geography; was weak in Latin; "*would make an excellent sailor.*" He had acquired a taste for

a sea-faring life from having frequented the society of Corsican fishermen and listened with avidity to their marvellous stories, which greatly impressed his romantic imagination. Hence his efficiency in naval matters, and a store of knowledge never forgotten.

On the 15th June, 1784, Bonaparte despatched this long letter to his uncle Fesch, the future cardinal, on family matters:—

"MY DEAR UNCLE,—I write to inform you that my dear father is going to pass through Brienne in order to take Marianne (sister Eliza Bacciochi) to St. Cyr, and to try and re-establish his health. He arrived here on the 21st with Lucien [who was going to be a priest], who knows French, and has forgotten his Italian. . . . . I am persuaded that my brother Joseph does not write to you. When he writes to my father it is only a couple of lines. It is true that he treats me better. . . . . As for the profession he wishes to adopt, he at first, as you know, chose the Church. He now desires to serve the king, and in this he is wrong for many reasons.

"First: As my dear father remarks, he has not courage enough to affront the perils of an action; his health is feeble, and will not allow him to support the fatigues of a campaign; and my brother looks on the military profession only from a garrison point of view. Yes, my dear brother would make a good garrison officer; he is well-made, light-minded, fit for paying frivolous compliments, and with these talents he will always get on well in society.

"Second: He has received an ecclesiastical education, and it is very late to undo that. Monsignor the Bishop of Autun would have given him a fat living, and he would have been sure to become a bishop. What an advantage for the family! Monsignor of Autun has done all he could to encourage him to persevere, promising him that he shall never repent. Should he persist in wishing to be a soldier

I must praise him, provided he has a decided taste for his profession, the finest of all, and the great motive power of human affairs. . . . . He wishes to be a military man; that is all very well, but in what corps? Is it in the marine?

"First: He knows nothing of mathematics; it would take him two years to learn. Second: His health is incompatible with the sea. Is it the engineers? He would require four or five years to learn what is necessary, and at the end of that time he would be only a cadet. Besides, I think that working all day long is not in accordance with the levity of his character. The same reasons which apply to the engineers apply to the artillery, with this exception, that he would have to work eighteen months to become a cadet, and eighteen months more to become an officer. Oh! that is not to his taste. Let us see. No doubt he desires to join the infantry. Good; I understand; he wishes to pass the day doing nothing; he wishes to dawdle about all day long. And what is a slender officer of infantry? Three parts of the time a scapegrace. And this is what neither my father, nor you, nor my mother, nor my grand-uncle, the archdeacon desires: for he has already exhibited symptoms of levity and prodigality. Consequently a last effort will be made to induce him to enter the Church, in default of which my dear father will take him back to Corsica, where he will be under his eye, and will try and get him to the bar, &c.

"NAPOLEONE DE BUONAPARTE.

"P.S. Tear up this letter. It is to be hoped Joseph, with his talents, and the feelings with which his education ought to have inspired him, will decide well and become the supporter of our family."

A curious letter to be written by a younger son, aged fifteen, during his father's lifetime. The paragraph

concerning Lucien, who had forgotten his Italian, is interesting from the fact of Lucien having taken refuge in Italy later in life, and having had his children naturalised Italians.

Joseph having stood firm, it was decided that he should go to Metz or Brienne, but for the moment he returned to Ajaccio with his father. On the 12th September, 1784, Napoleon wrote the following reply to a letter conveying this intelligence:—

"MY DEAR FATHER,—As you may imagine, your letter did not cause me great pleasure; but family interests and the state of your health, which are dear to me, oblige me to approve of your prompt return to Corsica. . . . . I am delighted that Joseph has accompanied you, provided he can return by the 1st November. He can come here, because Father Patrault, my mathematical master, remains. The principal begs me to assure you that Joseph will be well received. Father Patrault says that if my brother wishes to work we might pass our examination for the artillery together. . . . . I hope you will prefer Brienne to Metz for several reasons: First, because that will be a consolation for Joseph, for Lucien, and for myself. Second, because you would be obliged to write to the principal at Metz, and that would occasion delay. Third, because it is not customary at Metz to teach all Joseph must learn in six months for his examination; consequently my brother, who knows nothing of mathematics, would be placed with children, and this would disgust him. These and many other reasons should induce you to send him here. I therefore hope, before the end of October, to embrace Joseph.

"I beg you will send me Boswell and any other histories bearing on my work. You have nothing to fear; I will bring them back to Corsica were it in six years. . . . .

"Your very humble and very obedient son,

"DE BUONAPARTE."

For many years Napoleon busied himself with his history of Corsica, which he fondly hoped would gain him fortune and renown. He laboured at it incessantly, but it was destined never to see the light.

The following letter seems to have been written in 1790, and not, as its date would lead one to infer, in 1793, the first year of the Republic. It was addressed to Abbé Raynal, a member of the Academy:—

"SIR,—It will be difficult for you to remember, among the large number of strangers who importune you with their admiration, a person to whom you have shown some kindness. Last year you talked about Corsica with pleasure; condescend, therefore, to cast an eye over this sketch of its history. I present you with the two first letters, and if you accept them I will send the remainder.

"My brother, whom I have recommended to the committee of deputies charged to bring back Paoli to the country, and to receive a lesson of virtue and honour, will hand them to you.

"I am, with respect,

"Your very humble and very obedient servant,

"BUONAPARTE,

"AJACCIO, *the 24th June (sic)*, "*Officer of Artillery.*
"*Year 1st of Liberty.*"

Lucien Bonaparte says, in his *Memoirs*, that the Abbé Raynal sent the two chapters to Mirabeau, who declared they announced a genius of the first order. They appear to form part of the Ashburnham collection One finds such passages as these in them:—

"A lover of freedom, you take an interest in the fate of Corsica, which you admire; it was called by the character of its inhabitants to enjoy liberty, and by the 'centrality' of its position, the number of its ports, and the fertility of its soil, to do a large trade. Then why have the Corsicans never been free, nor traders? Among

the curiosities of the French Revolution this is not the least. Those who slew us as rebels are to-day our protectors. They are animated by our sentiments. Man! man! you are despicable in slavery, and you are great when the love of liberty enflames you! Then prejudices are dissipated, your soul is elevated, your reason regains its empire; regenerated you are truly the king of nature."

"To how many vicissitudes are nations exposed! Is it Providence or blind hazard which governs our fate? Pardon, O God! but tyranny, oppression, and injustice devastate the earth, and the earth is the work of your hands. Suffering and care are the lot of the just man, and the just man was made in your image. . . . . What a picture is offered by modern history! Nations slaughtering each other for family quarrels, and cutting each others' throats in the name of the Ruler of the universe; knavish and greedy priests working on their imagination by means of their love of the marvellous and their fears. . . . . You felt that the history of Corsica was wanting to our literature; your friendship believed me capable of writing it. I eagerly accepted a labour which flattered my love for my country, then abased, unhappy, enslaved. . . . . The constancy and virtues of my nation will captivate the suffrages of the reader."

"I shall have to speak of Paoli, whose wise institutions for an instant insured our happiness, and allowed us to conceive the most brilliant hopes."

". . . . When the triumvirs offered to the world the hideous spectacle of successful crime, Corsica and Sicily were the refuge of Sextus Pompey. I see with pleasure my country, to the shame of the universe [England included] serve as an asylum for the last remains of Roman liberty, and the heirs of Cato," &c.[1]

[1] At this moment the head of Napoleon was full of the philosopher of Geneva, who looked upon Corsica as a kind of Utopia, where free government might be established and flourish; but in after years Jean

This history of Corsica, the fruit of so much labour, was never published. Submitted to Paoli some years later, that chief found the author too young, advised him to consult authorities, and expressed the desire not to be eulogised. Napoleon was on the point of laying his work before Necker, but changed his mind, and sent it to Père Dupuy, one of his old tutors at Brienne. The good father naturally disapproved of the sentiments of the author, found the narrative disconnected, the style and the grammar faulty, and recommended a total revision. This want of encouragement, and supervening events, prevented the publication of the MS.

On the 24th of February, 1784, Charles Bonaparte died, "the irreconcilable enemy of religion, and of the Jesuits who had despoiled his family." He departed this life at the age of thirty-eight, leaving behind him five sons and three daughters, in a state of relative destitution. He was deeply regretted, as the following letters prove:—

"PARIS, 29*th March*, 1785.

"MY DEAR MOTHER,—Now that time has somewhat calmed the first transports of my grief, I hasten to assure you of the gratitude with which your kindness has always inspired me. Console yourself, my dear mother; circumstances require this. We will redouble our solicitude, happy if we can, by our obedience, make up in some degree for the inestimable loss of a cherished husband. I terminate, my dear mother, by imploring you to calm your grief. My health is perfect, and I pray every day

Jacques was pronounced to be a bad fellow, and when Stanilas Girardin proposed to the First Consul a visit to Ermenonville to see the relics—the hermitage, the cap, the table, the arm-chair, &c.—he said, "Bah! I have no taste for such tomfooleries; show them to my brother Louis." Fourteen years had operated a great change in Napoleon's ideas about the *Contrat Social*, and other matters.

that Heaven may favour you in a similar way. Present my respects to Zia Geltrude, &c., &c.

"P.S. The Queen of France was confined of a son, called the Duke de Normandy, on the 27th March, at 7 P.M.

"Your very humble and affectionate son,

"NAPOLEON DE BUONAPARTE."

This letter and the last which he wrote to his father betrayed an amount of feeling which was seldom revealed.

In the following letter Napoleon rather over-estimated the qualities of his father, who really busied himself very little with his children. On several occasions afterwards he condemned in severe terms the political conduct of the committee of twelve, to which Charles Bonaparte belonged:—

TO M. DE BUONAPARTE, *Archdeacon of the Cathedral of Ajaccio, in Corsica, at Ajaccio, viâ Antibes.*

"PARIS, 28*th March*, 1785.

"MY DEAR UNCLE,—It would be useless to express how deeply I feel the misfortune which has befallen us. We have lost in him a father, and God knows what a father! His tenderness, his affection, alas! everything designed him to be the support of our youth. You have lost in him a dutiful and grateful nephew. Ah! you know better than I do how he loved you. *I dare even say that the country has lost in him an enlightened, zealous, and disinterested citizen.* And yet Heaven let him die; and in what a place? A hundred leagues from his native land—*in a foreign country*, indifferent to his existence, far from all he held precious. One son, it is true, was present at the terrible moment, and this must have been a great consolation for him, but certainly not to be compared to the melancholy satisfaction he would have

experienced in terminating his career in his own house, in the bosom of his wife and family. But the Supreme Being did not permit this. "His will is unchangeable; He alone can console us. At least, if He has deprived us of the person we hold most dear, He has left us those persons most capable of replacing him, &c.

"Your very humble servant and nephew,

"NAPOLEONE DE BUONAPARTE."

It is impossible on reading this letter not to recall how Napoleon himself was destined to die far from his wife, his son, mother, brothers, sisters, France, and Corsica, in another hemisphere, and with only a few faithful followers to soothe his last moments.

What were the prospects of Napoleon Bonaparte at this moment? He regarded himself as an alien. He could hardly hope for any exceptional favour. M. de Marbeuf was dead. In the ordinary course of events he would become a captain after fifteen years' service, and after another fifteen years be able to retire from the service with the cross of St. Louis and a modest pension. As it turned out, before fifteen years had passed Napoleon had shown himself one of the most consummate generals the world ever produced; he was First Consul, and had crowned a series of brilliant triumphs with the victory of Marengo. Fifteen years afterwards, instead of retiring with his cross and his pension, he was exiled to St. Helena.

However, for the moment he was a subaltern on 36*l.* a year, with 5*l.* lodging money, and 8*l.* royal bounty as a pupil of Brienne. He was ungainly in his person, unprepossessing, diminutive, and taciturn, and there was nothing attractive about him but the lustre of his eyes, which revealed the working of no ordinary mind, which seemed to gaze deep into futurity, and to read the inmost thoughts of all who conversed with him.

Having been ordered to Douai with his regiment, the

climate of that place, and family difficulties, greatly affected his imagination, as is shown by this fragment:—

"Always alone in the midst of men, I return to my quarters to commune with myself and to indulge in the vivacity of my melancholy. In what direction do my thoughts turn to-day? In the direction of death. In the dawn of my existence, I might still hope to live for a long while. I have been for the last six or seven years absent from my country. What pleasure would it not afford me to see once more my native land and my parents. . . . . What rage therefore prompts me to kill myself? What do in this world? Since I must die, would it not be better to destroy myself? If I were sixty years of age, I would respect the prejudices of my contemporaries and wait for nature to finish its course; but as I commence to experience misfortunes, and there is no pleasure for me, why should I support life? How far are men removed from nature! They are cowardly, base, grovelling! What a spectacle awaits me in my country! My compatriots, laden with chains, embrace the hand which oppresses them. They are no longer those brave Corsicans whom a hero animated with his virtues; enemies of tyrants, of luxury, and vile courtesans. . . . . Frenchmen, not satisfied with having deprived us of our liberty, you have corrupted our morals! . . . . If I had only one man to destroy in order to deliver my compatriots, I would plunge the avenging blade of my country and of its violated laws into the breast of the tyrant. Life is a burden to me, because I enjoy no pleasure," &c., &c.

Soon after writing the above dismal and patriotic impressions, Bonaparte obtained leave of absence and returned home, disembarking at Ajaccio in February, 1787. He ought to have rejoined his regiment in May, but he applied for an extension of leave thus:—

"*2nd April*, 1787.

"The *sieur* Napoleon Buonaparte, second lieutenant, entreats Monsignor the Marshal de Ségur to be good enough to accord him a furlough of five months and a half, dating from the 16th May next, of which he stands in need for the recovery of his health, according to inclosed certificates. Seeing his want of fortune, he begs this furlough may be granted with pay.

"BUONAPARTE."

Napoleon was not ill—merely feverish and restless, but he had family affairs to look after; he was more busy than ever with his history of Corsica; he was also at work on a romance, on a drama called the *Comte d'Essex*, and on the *Masked Prophet*, a tale after the manner of Diderot, and resembling, in prose, the *Veiled Prophet of Khorassan* of Thomas Moore. The point of this fable is to condemn the madness of those fanatical persons who allow themselves to be lured to destruction, as Napoleon afterwards lured the French to destruction in more than one disastrous campaign. Napoleon only rejoined his regiment in May, 1788. Instead of five months and a half, he remained absent a whole year.

On his return to France he learned that his regiment had been ordered to Normandy, and he applied for and obtained permission to remain in Paris to settle urgent private affairs. When this furlough had expired, he demanded permission to return home, to attend the deliberations of the States of Corsica. This extra leave was accorded, and he at once set out for his native isle, where he remained until May, 1788.

On his return to Auxonne, Napoleon settled in the Rue Vauban, and read hard. In the month of August he was put under arrest for neglect of duty, but this did not hinder him from writing thus to Uncle Fesch:—"I am unwell; the important works I have superintended these last few days are the cause. You are aware that the

general here thinks so highly of me that he charged me to construct several works which required a vast amount of calculation, and for ten days, at the head of 200 men, I have been on duty. My comrades are jealous. . . . . But what distresses me most is my bad health." A few days later: "I was on the point of sending my history to the publisher, but the unfortunate news of the disgrace of the Archbishop of Sens[1] arriving yesterday obliges me to change my plans." Bonaparte now recast his history of Corsica, and also wrote a *Dissertation sur l'Autorité royale*, relating how monarchs had usurped authority in twelve kingdoms of Europe, how most of them deserved to be dethroned, and how military government was favourable to tyranny. This "dissertation" was never published; had it been otherwise it might have got its author into serious trouble. Bonaparte was then nineteen years of age, an officer in the royal artillery, and it was while wearing the king's uniform, partaking of the royal bounty, and after having received a free education in a royal school, that he wrote this revolutionary diatribe.

On the 12th June, 1789, Bonaparte wrote the following letter to Paoli, then in England:—

"GENERAL,—I was born when the country was perishing. Thirty thousand Frenchmen *vomited* on our coasts, drowning the throne of liberty in seas of blood, such was the odious spectacle which first met my eye. The cries of the dying, the groans of the oppressed, the tears of despair surrounded my cradle from my birth.

"You left our island, and with you disappeared the hope of happiness; slavery was the price of our submission. Overwhelmed by the triple chain of the soldier, the legist, and the tax-gatherer, our compatriots beheld themselves despised—despised by those who have got the administration in their hands. . . . . Traitors to the country, base

[1] Monsignor de Marbeuf, who had been translated, and to whom the work was to be dedicated.

souls corrupted by a sordid love of gain, have circulated calumnies against the national government and against your person, in order to justify themselves." Then follow many noble and patriotic sentiments, and finally: "I hoped to be able to go to London to express the feelings you have awakened, and to talk over the misfortunes of our country, but I am too far away. Perhaps a day will arrive when I shall be able to overcome this obstacle. . . . .

"NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE,
"Officer in the Regiment of La Fère."

Only a few days before writing the above, Napoleon, who was never destined to land in England, had drawn up a petition for his mother, who desired to get Louis admitted into one of the military schools. In this petition we find such expressions as these: "Charged with the education of eight children, widow of a man who always served the king . . . . who sacrificed considerable sums to further the views of the government . . . . deprived of resources, it is at the foot of the throne and in your sensitive and virtuous heart she hopes to find them," &c. While thus craving the royal bounty, Napoleon freely expressed his hatred of the monarchy and of France.

In July, 1789, Napoleon wrote to his mother, saying:—

"I have no other resource here but work. I dress myself only once a week. I sleep very little since my illness; that is past belief. I go to bed at 10 P.M. and rise at four in the morning. I make only one meal a day, at three o'clock: this suits my health very well. . . . ."

This *régime* suited his health so little that it brought on a low fever, which greatly alarmed the regimental doctor, M. Bienvelot. Sick leave was consequently demanded, and was accorded from the 15th September, 1789, to 15th March, 1790; and again Napoleon set out for his beloved Ajaccio.

It was during this visit that he wrote his passionate and eloquent *Letter to M. Buttafuoco*, in which he poured out page after page of wrathful and indignant vituperation. Matteo Buttafuoco was a general in the French army, a representative of Corsica, and had been the bosom friend of Charles Bonaparte. He was now accused by Napoleon of being a traitor and a stipendiary of France. He was told that the chief traits of his life were traced in letters of blood; that from being the representative of a free people he had been transformed into the satrap of a tyrant; that he had communicated to Choiseul the plans and the secrets of the cabinet of Corte; that his conduct was looked upon as base and atrocious, and that the Corsicans had burned down his house (as a few months later they burned down that of the Bonapartes). The French, added Napoleon, had been beaten in Corsica, in spite of their gold, their discipline, their numerous battalions, the activity of their squadrons, and the skill of their artillery—beaten at Penta, Vescovata, Loretto, St. Nicolao, Borgo, Barbeggio, and Oletta. But in the end they had prevailed, and—"in the midst of this general disaster, in the 'bosom' of the cries and groans of this unfortunate people, you reaped the fruit of your labours. Honours, dignities, pension, were lavished on you." In such language did the lieutenant of twenty impugn the conduct of a general officer. But at this epoch insubordination was rife, and the presence of Paoli, who had just been allowed to return to Corsica, had greatly inflamed patriotic minds.

Bonaparte at this period played the part of a Jacobin, and at the same time wished to seize the citadel of Ajaccio and to drive out the French. The whole island was distracted, and there was a rumour that France was about to restore Corsica to the hated rule of Genoa. Napoleon's leave had expired on the 15th March, and on the *16th April* he wrote to his old colonel, the Chevalier de Lance, saying:—

"SIGNOR GENERAL,—My shattered health will not permit me to rejoin my regiment before a second season passed at the waters of Orezza, that is to say, before the 15th October, 1790. This obliges me to ask for four months and a half leave. I forward this petition, with certificates, to your lordship."

Leave was granted for four months from the 15th June.

At this juncture, a violent dispute having arisen between the Royalist authorities and the municipality of Ajaccio, M. de la Ferandière, the governor, threatened to burn down the town unless an officer called De la Jaille, who had been taken prisoner, were restored to liberty. Napoleon was all in favour of resistance and of attacking the citadel, which, as he maintained, had neither amunition nor provisions, and could not hold out long. The municipality, however, cowed by the determined attitude of the governor, merely protested, and it was Napoleon who drew up the protest, which commenced thus:—

"The palladium of the liberty of nations is public opinion. Princes and magistrates are humiliated by its censures and glorified by its praises; disdained sometimes by powerful men, but never with impunity. . . . . shall we, who were called the precursors of liberty, allow ourselves to be betrayed by those who live among us, by those base minds who were the first to throw themselves into the arms of the French?" &c. &c.

And it was a lieutenant of artillery on sick leave, a pupil of the Royal Military School, who, after arresting a superior officer and attempting to seize on a French fortress, wrote this!

We next find Napoleon approving of the decrees of the Assembly against the clergy, and, in connection with Abbé Fesch, composing a *Letter on the Constitutional Oath of the Priesthood*—a letter of which no trace remains. The failure

of his schemes against the Royalists, and his anti-religious sentiments, however, brought him into disrepute in Corsica, and on the occasion of a religious procession the scoffer narrowly escaped being torn in pieces. He was only saved by a penitent, who declared he would kill the first person who touched Lieutenant Bonaparte. The penitent was one of the most redoubtable and popular bandits in the island—Trenta Coste—

"Un brigand veritable et parfait Catholique"—

who was afterwards rewarded by the First Consul.

On the 15th September there were elections in Corsica, and Paoli was unanimously elected President of the Assembly and Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard. Disappointed in his literary, political, and military projects, Napoleon now contemplated returning to his regiment. The Academy of Lyons had not awarded him the prize of 1,500 francs offered by Abbé Raynal for the best essay on "What Truths and Sentiments should be inculcated into the minds of men in order to insure their happiness?" he had not been elected to the Assembly; his two attempts on the citadel of Ajaccio had failed; and he had not obtained, as he had hoped, the command of the National Guard.

His leave was up on the 15th October, 1790, but it was only on the 1st February, 1791, that he left Ajaccio, accompanied by his brother Louis. He had hardly landed at Marseilles when he wrote to Uncle Fesch: "I am in the cabin of a poor man; it pleases me to write to you from such a place after having chatted with these honest people. . . . . It is quite true that Peretti (a Corsican Royalist, and friend to Buttafuoco) threatened to stab Mirabeau. This does not honour the nation. The Patriotic Society (of which Napoleon was a member) would do well to offer Mirabeau a complete Corsican costume, that is to say, a cap, vest, breeches, drawers,

cartridge-belt, dagger, pistol, and gun. This would have a good effect!"

On reporting himself at Auxonne, Napoleon declared that he had twice attempted to pass the straits and had twice been driven back by stress of weather, and produced certificates to this effect. Not only were his excuses accepted, but the Chevalier de Lance, by ante-dating his return, procured him three months' pay, which was a matter of importance to the needy lieutenant, who occupied a chamber which was nearly bare, and which in the way of furniture had only a miserable bed without curtains, a table covered with books and papers, and two chairs. Brother Louis was obliged to sleep on the floor in an adjoining closet.

Twenty years later, when King Louis fled from Holland, Napoleon exclaimed to Caulaincourt: "Abdicate without warning me! Run away to Westphalia as if flying from a tyrant! My brother injure instead of aiding me! That Louis I educated on my pay of a lieutenant. God knows at the expense of what privations I found means to send money to pay my brother's schooling! Do you know how I managed? By never entering a *café* or going into society; by eating dry bread, and brushing my own clothes so that they might last the longer. I lived like a bear, in a little room, with books for my only friends, and when, thanks to abstinence, I had saved up a few crowns, I rushed off to the bookseller's shop and visited his coveted shelves. . . . . These were the joys and debaucheries of my youth."

On his return to Auxonne Napoleon devoted his whole time to study. Louis acted as his secretary. He was very sanguine with regard to the success of his History of Corsica, not yet abandoned. He passed much time in the study of theological questions, which always possessed a peculiar attraction for him, especially the disputes between the Roman and Gallican Churches. He said afterwards that he might have taken out his degree as a doctor of divinity

at this period. He also wrote his *Dialogue sur l'Amour*, to prove that love was baneful to society and to individual happiness, and that it would be a great blessing were Providence to deliver us from it. He composed, too, his *Reflections on the State of Nature*, in which he propounded various theories concerning the existence of man before the formation of any regular social ties. There is nothing very remarkable in these youthful essays, which show little beyond the mental activity of the writer, whose brain, as he afterwards said, never felt weary. He could work for any number of hours without experiencing the slightest fatigue.

A great revolution now occurred and the old *régime* expired. On the 21st June, 1791, the king fled from Paris, with the intention of throwing himself into the arms of his troops on the eastern frontier. This flight necessarily exercised a paramount influence on the army. More than half the officers declared in favour of Louis XVI. and deserted their colours; the remainder swore fidelity to the nation. The rank and file to a man adhered to the Republic.

In the midst of the general excitement Bonaparte distinguished himself by the violence of his recriminations against the Court and the officers who joined the army of Condé. In a letter to his friend Commissary Naudin he said :—

"This country is full of zeal and fire. In an assembly of twenty-two societies, three departments petitioned in favour of the king being brought to trial. On the occasion of the banquet of the 14th,[1] I proposed a toast to the patriots of Auxonne. This regiment can count on the men, the sergeants, and half the officers. . . . . P.S. The southern blood runs through my veins with the rapidity of the Rhone; you must therefore pardon me if you experience some difficulty in reading my scrawl."

[1] Anniversary of the fall of the Bastille.

In this same month of June Napoleon was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant, and was transferred to the fourth regiment of artillery, then in garrison at Valence. He had been attached to the regiment of La Fère for sixty-nine months, but thirty-five of these had been passed on leave. Napoleon, longing to display his talents in the capital, now wrote to Uncle Fesch: "Send me 300 francs; that sum will enable me to go to Paris. There, at least, one can cut a figure and surmount obstacles. Everything tells me I shall succeed. Will you prevent me from doing so for the want of 100 crowns?" And to his great-uncle, Lucien, he wrote, claiming six crowns which his mother owed him, and of which he stood sorely in need.

At this moment the Republican officers and the army took the oath to the nation. The tricoloured flag was adopted; horse, foot, and artillery were placed on a war establishment, and M. Duportail, the war minister, counted upon being able to place in the field 372,000 men.

Learning that it was the intention of the Assembly to raise four battalions of Corsican volunteers, Napoleon demanded permission to superintend this operation. Leave having been refused by his colonel, as he had been only two months with his regiment, he applied to the commander of the district, with better success. He was granted a furlough of three months, and was to be back at Valence, at the latest, by the 31st December, 1791. A general order had been issued by the Assembly that all officers and men were to rejoin their corps before the 10th January, 1792, on pain of being considered deserters.

On the 6th September, 1791, Napoleon, accompanied by Louis, was once more back at Ajaccio. He found Corsica divided into Paolists, Republicans, and Royalists; he himself was an ardent Paolist, and wished to exterminate his political enemies. Volney, who was in the island at this time, wrote a report on the civil condition of Corsica, which he said had cost France 5,000,000 francs and had yielded nothing. The taxes had not been

collected for three years. Salaries never reached their destination. No less than 130 murders had been committed in two years. The island was in the hands of a few nobles, who were always fighting among themselves and making friends again. The agricultural condition was wretched, and men ploughed their fields armed to the teeth. Elections always gave rise to bloodshed. The Assembly was almost entirely composed of ecclesiastics. The population was exceedingly fanatical.

It was at this moment that the decrees of the Assembly on the civil constitution of the clergy were promulgated. The exasperation of the people was intense. At Bastia the inhabitants took up arms and wished to massacre the new bishop, who had taken the oath to the nation.

In November Napoleon wrote to Sucy, the commissary of war at Valence, saying that he was going to travel through the island with M. de Volney, which author "wishes to settle here with me, and to pass his life quietly in the bosom of a free people, of a fruitful soil, and the perpetual spring-time of our country." When Napoleon wrote thus he was playing a most active part in the internal affairs of the island—so active that he quite forgot that his leave expired on the 30th December, 1791! He was intent on obtaining military rank, and, thanks to ruse and violence, he was elected *in April*, 1792, lieutenant-colonel of the second battalion of Corsican volunteers. As a lieutenant of artillery Napoleon could not legally hold this rank, but he claimed it *as no longer forming part of the regular army!* This did not prevent him from writing to the paymaster of his regiment, on the 10th April, for money. The reply was, that his name had been struck off the roll of the regiment since the 1st January, 1792!

Napoleon, who seldon renounced any scheme on which he had once set his mind, determined to make another attempt to get possession of the citadel of Ajaccio. He had now a battalion under his orders. It was arranged that Brother Joseph and Uncle Fesch should stir up

strife by demanding the execution of the decrees of the Assembly relative to the clergy, and during the troubles which would inevitably ensue Napoleon was to carry out his plans. During the religious ceremonies of Easter a quarrel was fomented, and with great military tact Napoleon seized on a couple of convents which commanded the town. A few shots were exchanged and a few persons killed. The Ajaccians appealed to Colonel Maillard, who commanded the French garrison, and that officer consented to arbitrate between the volunteers and the municipality. In the end, to the mortification of Napoleon, who wanted to carry matters to extremes, the difficulty was arranged, and Paoli blamed the conduct of the young lieutenant-colonel, who was ordered to Corte with five companies of his battalion. Aware that this *escapade* might be attended by serious consequences, Napoleon at once wrote a long justification of his conduct to the Directory of Corsica, to the war minister, and to the Legislative Assembly. Fortunately for him Colonel Maillard's report on this affair reached the War Office at a moment when the minister was overwhelmed with work. War had just been declared with the Emperor of Austria. Who could have then supposed that the young officer labouring under the accusations of indulging in civil strife, with the intention of taking a French fortress, and of desertion, was destined to bring the war declared on the 20th April, 1792, to such a brilliant conclusion at Campo Formio?

It was only on the 8th July that the war minister found time to reply to Colonel Maillard, the French commandant at Ajaccio. He strongly condemned the conduct of "M. Bonaparte," and could have sent him before a court martial; but this class of misdemeanour, by a recent law, he said, had been reserved for the ordinary tribunals. The matter therefore had been referred to the minister of justice.

Napoleon, afraid of remaining in Corsica and braving the vengeance of the clerical party, determined to leave

his native isle once more. He could not return to Valence, where he would have been arrested as a deserter, and he therefore made up his mind to go boldly to Paris. Paoli, only too glad to get rid of him, gave him a certificate to the effect that his sojourn in Corsica had been obligatory. Quartermaster-General Rossi, and other friends, furnished him with similar documents. He reached the capital on the 21st May, and fortune favoured him once more. The War Office authorities had no time to scrutinise his case carefully; they accepted his excuse that having been elected lieutenant-colonel of volunteers, he had not been able to rejoin his regiment at the expiration of his leave. It was not remarked that Napoleon's leave had expired previous to his election. As for the minister of justice, he never took any notice of the matter, and both insubordination and desertion remained unpunished.

Awaiting ministerial decision, Napoleon wrote to Joseph, saying:—

"The men at the head of the Revolution are a poor lot. It must be acknowledged, when one views matters closely, the people do not deserve all the trouble taken about them. You are acquainted with the history of Ajaccio; that of Paris is the same. Perhaps here men are meaner, worse, and greater calumniators. . . . . Every one pursues his own interest, and searches to gain his own ends by dint of all sorts of crimes; people intrigue as basely as ever. *All this destroys ambition. One pities those who have the misfortune to play a part in public affairs.* . . . . To live tranquilly and enjoy the affections of one's family is what one should do when one has 5,000 francs a year and is between twenty-five and forty years of age; that is to say, when the imagination has calmed down and no longer torments one. I embrace you, and recommend you to be moderate in all things—in all things, mind, if you desire to live happily.

"BUONAPARTE."

Everything was in a state of dire confusion in Paris at this period. Six war ministers had succeeded each other in rapid succession between the beginning of May and the beginning of October; and before the end of October Napoleon's explanations were accepted and he was re-instated in the army as captain, his promotion being ante-dated a year, with pay. Not satisfied with this piece of good luck he demanded to be transferred to the marine artillery, and then claimed the rank of lieutenant-colonel, on the ground that he had commanded a battalion of volunteers in Corsica. This demand, which was deemed presumptuous, still lies unanswered in the archives of the War Office, marked S. R. (*sans réponse*).

The Revolution having broken up the Royal Schools, male and female, we now find Napoleon writing the following letter to the administrators of Versailles:—

"GENTLEMEN,—Buonaparte, brother and guardian of *demoiselle* Marie Anne Buonaparte" (who afterwards called herself Eliza), "has the honour to remind you of the law of the 7th August suppressing the school of St. Louis. He demands the execution of that law, &c.

"BUONAPARTE."

This demand was accorded, and *demoiselle* Bonaparte received 352 francs to enable her to return home, with her linen, &c.

Although Napoleon's regiment was about to cross the frontier, he applied for and obtained permission to accompany his sister to Corsica, where the youthful pair arrived on the 17th September, 1792. Napoleon at once resumed the command of his battalion of volunteers on his own authority, although drawing pay as a captain of artillery. This was equivalent to desertion. Paoli, who commanded the district, reproached him with the violence and insubordination he now exhibited, but refrained from taking any other notice of his conduct. At this epoch

an attack on the island of Sardinia was planned, and Napoleon's battalion was told off to take part in the expedition. Napoleon had fondly hoped to obtain the command of a column destined to create a diversion, but he was doomed to disappointment, Cesari Colonna having been selected for this duty. The expedition ended in disaster. Before starting, the French sailors and the Corsicans came to blows. The main body on landing in Sardinia was seized with a panic; the troops fired on each other, fled without seeing the enemy, and insisted on re-embarking. The column to which Napoleon was attached hardly cut a better figure; he himself narrowly escaped being forgotten ashore with his men, and finally had to make his escape, after spiking his guns and mortars and throwing them into the sea. It is only fair to the young artillery officer to say that he was in no way answerable for the failure of this expedition, and that he, at least, meant fighting, and displayed the qualities of a soldier.

On his return to Corsica Napoleon abandoned his battalion without leave and repaired to Ajaccio, where he learned that Louis XVI. had been sentenced to death, that war had been declared with England, that the Convention had sent an extraordinary commissioner to the island, and that the four battalions of Corsican volunteers were disbanded. What course should he take? He was an ardent patriot and hated France. At the same time, being on bad terms with Paoli, he hardly liked joining the party determined to resist the orders of the Convention. His regiment had been in the field for nearly six months, but he had no intention of rejoining.

Thanks to a series of blunders and to despatches crossing each other, the Convention alienated Corsica, and on the 2nd April, 1793, ordered its commissioners to arrest Paoli and send him to its bar. This decree threw the whole island into a transport of fury. Bonaparte hesitated no longer. He drew up a passionate address to the

Convention in favour of Paoli. After due reflection the Convention cancelled its decree of the 2nd April, but it was too late. At this critical moment Napoleon changed sides, and attempted, for the third time, by means of a stratagem, to gain possession of the citadel of Ajaccio. He was foiled once more, and obliged, with his family, to seek safety in flight—and what a flight it was! One exile became Emperor of France and King of Italy; another reigned first at Naples, then at Madrid; Lucien became Prince of Canino; Louis sat on the throne of Holland; Marie Anne became Grand Duchess of Tuscany; Pauline a princess; and Abbé Fesch a Cardinal. Caroline, the future Queen of Naples, and Jerome, the future King of Westphalia, being children, were left behind concealed in the house of their maternal grandmother. The exasperated patriots fired the property of the Bonapartes and branded them as traitors. Napoleon was now a traitor in Corsica, and a deserter in France.

After many perils by land and deep this wonderful family disembarked in France. Napoleon at once proceeded to Nice and rejoined his regiment. Thanks to a certificate from Salicetti, one of the commissioners of the Convention, who explained his absence, he was allowed to resume duty. The Convention could not afford to be very particular, seeing the numbers of officers who had deserted and joined the princes over the border. In Napoleon's corps only fourteen officers out of eighty had consented to serve the Convention, whose hands were stained with the blood of the king.

After being attached to the coast artillery Napoleon took part in an unsuccessful attack on Avignon, which was held by the rebels. He became thoroughly dejected and ill. His prospects were deplorable, and his family were living on the scanty allowance granted by the Convention to Corsican refugees. Others were acquiring fame on the field of battle. The names of Hoche and Marceau were on every lip, and his old tutor Pichegru was general-in-

chief of the army of the north. But the name of Bonaparte was known only to a very limited circle, and he was employed in getting guns into position, throwing up breast works, and counting piles of cannon-balls.

It was at this period that Napoleon wrote his *Souper de Beaucaire*, which revealed a wonderful amount of erudition and acute knowledge of the human mind, and contained many striking ideas concerning military matters. The three government commissioners, Salicetti, Gasparin, and Robespierre the younger, to whom Napoleon showed his pamphlet, were so forcibly impressed with its merits that they ordered its publication at the expense of the Treasury. Augustin Bon Joseph Robespierre, who seems to have immediately comprehended the genius of the young artillery officer, then twenty-five years of age, at once took him under his wing. Napoleon would have fain joined the army of the Rhine, but there was work brewing close at hand. Toulon, imitating the example of Lyons and some other cities, had declared against the Republic, and had opened its port to Admiral Hood, to the general consternation of new France. Fortune now suddenly smiled on the Bonapartes, who were taken up by the government commissioners. Madame Bonaparte received pecuniary aid, which enabled her to settle with her children at Marseilles. Joseph, thanks to false certificates, was made a war commissary of the first class. Lucien *Brutus* was appointed store-keeper at St. Maximin, and the Abbé Fesch store-keeper to the army of the Alps, where, according to his nephew, he feathered his nest to the detriment of the troops. As for Napoleon, he obtained the command of the artillery of the right wing of the army which, under General Carteaux, had been sent to lay siege to Toulon. His superior, Donmartin, having been wounded at the commencement of the operations, and Perrier, the second captain, being absent, the command soon devolved on Napoleon. Salicetti and Gasparin wrote to Carnot, saying: "Carteaux is incapable. We

have no engineers. *Bonna Parte* (sic) is the only officer of artillery who knows anything of his duty, and he has too much work;" and "To compensate him for his zeal he has been made major of the second regiment of artillery." Carteaux was superseded by Doppet, who, having declared he knew nothing of siege operations, was replaced by a fine old soldier called Dugommier. A great deal has since been said of the preponderating part played by Napoleon at the siege of Toulon. How much of this is fiction? how much fact? Looking at official documents, one finds that he was mentioned only once in general orders in company with his countrymen Arena and Cervoni; but he was brought into daily contact with Robespierre the younger, Ricord, Barras, and Freron, whose influence was great; and Salicetti befriended him—Robespierre whom he afterwards denied, Barras who gave him a wife and the command of the army of Italy, Freron who was engaged to be married to his sister, the lovely Paulette, and Salicetti who had him arrested after Thermidor as a Terrorist. If citizen Bonaparte received the grade of brigadier-general for his services before Toulon the same rank was conferred on Cervoni. It was Cervoni who was sent to Paris to announce the fall of Toulon. But we are anticipating.

It is at this epoch that the official correspondence, published under the Second Empire, commences. The first reports of Napoleon are stamped with that surprising energy and decision peculiar to him from his infancy. On the 25th October, 1793, he wrote a report to the Committee of Public Safety, in which he explained the position of affairs, and expressed the "extreme pain he felt at the little attention paid to his branch of the service." "Three parts of mankind," he added, "think of necessary matters only when they feel the want of them; but then it is too late. There is no competent person at the head of the arsenal of Marseilles, and a great deal of experience is required to fill that post. It is a well known fact in the artillery that the formation of siege trains is a most difficult

operation. The artillery was not organised when I joined this army, but, thanks to the decisions at which you have arrived [flatterer !], it is now getting into working order. I have had to struggle against ignorance, and the base passions which it engenders. You ought to accord to the artillery of this army that consideration and independence which military and time-honoured custom have conceded to it, and without which it can be of no great service." And he then pleaded in favour of a general of artillery being sent to command the artillery—no doubt hoping that the choice might fall on himself.

It is difficult to explain how Napoleon in this tone of command came to communicate directly with the Committee of Public Safety and the War Minister over the heads of his immediate superiors. He at once displayed a masterly activity in the organisation of the artillery, drawing guns, horses, oxen, &c., from the neighbouring departments. He wrote to Minister Dupin at the beginning of November saying that when the representatives of the people "detained" him with the army before Toulon everything was in the most deplorable condition, "the general down to the lowest aide-de-camp meddling with the artillery;" but he soon changed all that. "Three days after my arrival the army had an artillery and the batteries of the *Mountain* and the *Sans-Culottes* were established, which sent the hulks to the bottom, and resisted 20,000 round shot. The enemy at once understood the inutility of their naval guns, and determined to risk everything by disembarking their troops. They ought to have been annihilated, but fatality, or our incompetence, allowed them to succeed. A few days later they had twenty-four guns in position, a covered way, palisades, and had received reinforcements from Spain and from Naples. I comprehended that the attempt on Toulon had failed, and that a regular siege was necessary. I spared nothing to push forward the attack on the Fort of Eguillette, and to organise a strong artillery train.

I sent an intelligent artillery officer, obtained from the army of Italy, to Lyons, Briançon, and Grenoble to draw all that could be useful to us from those different places. I requisitioned the army of Italy for the guns not required for the defence of Antibes and Monaco. I have also requisitioned the department of the Var, and have drawn 100 horses from Marseilles.

"I have procured eight bronze guns from Martigues and have replaced them by iron guns. I have requisitioned Marseilles, Aix, and the Bouches-du-Rhone for all the materials mentioned in inclosure D. I have established at Ollioules [just outside Toulon] an arsenal, where eighty blacksmiths, carpenters, &c., work without ceasing. I have established a park where gabions, hurdles, fascines, &c., are being made. I have requisitioned all the workmen at Marseilles engaged in the manufacture of baskets and demijohns. I have requisitioned horses from all the departments, from all the districts, from all the commissaries of war, from Nice to Montpellier and Valence. I have caused all the wood I could find at La Seyne and Ciotat to be taken in order to make platforms for the guns and mortars. I am having 5,000 sand-bags *per diem* made at Marseilles. I have established an artificers' shop where tarred fascines and incendiary projectiles are being manufactured. I have taken measures for establishing a foundry at Ardennes, which is in our power, and I hope in a week's time to have grape and round shot from this foundry, and mortars in a fortnight. I have a workshop where ten armourers are repairing muskets.

"You will give me some credit, Citizen Minister, for these different operations when you learn that I have to direct the park, the military operations, and the arsenal all alone; that I have not even a sub-officer of artisans; that I have only fifty men to work the guns in position, and that many of these are recruits. What we most require is powder, and I hope you will exert yourself to send me a supply without delay . . . BUONAPARTE."

One can imagine red tape standing aghast at the amount of responsibility thus assumed, and the restless activity of the young commandant :—

TO CITIZEN DUPIN, *War Minister.*

"OLLIOULES, *30th November*, 1793.

"At 5 A.M. there was a panic at the heights of Arenes about 1,000 toises from Toulon, 6,000 of the enemy under the command of the English general, O'Hara, having attacked the position, driven in the outposts, and reached the battery. Six pieces of twenty-eight were spiked. At this moment we arrived in force. General Dugommier fought with true Republican courage. We recaptured the battery and took the English general (who had been wounded in the arm) prisoner. We pursued the enemy at the point of the bayonet, killed some four or five hundred, and made a large number of prisoners, among whom a Spanish colonel, an English major, and several subalterns. The guns of the Convention were unspiked in sufficient time to increase the confusion of their retreat. . . . . Nothing could equal the courage displayed by our soldiers. This is a happy augury for the plan which has been drawn up.

"BUONAPARTE."

This may be said to have been Napoleon's first real contact with the English, whom he was destined to meet again at St. Jean d'Acre and Waterloo. We learn nothing here of a slight bayonet wound which he received, nor of a skin disease which he contracted before Toulon, and which often tormented him afterwards.

On the fall of Toulon, the civil commissioners recommended Bonaparte for a brigade, and he was called upon to furnish the usual information. His answers to the printed questions were—

Name ?—Napoleon Buonaparte.
Age ?—Twenty-five.

Residence ?—Brienne, Paris, Valence, Auxonne, Corsica.

Corps ?—1st regiment of Artillery; command of 2nd battalion of Corsican National Guard.

Garrisons, &c. ?—Auxonne; 2nd, Valence; 3rd, Ajaccio; 4th, Bonifacio; 5th, Nice; 6th, Siege of Toulon.

Detail of Services ?—Capture of the Isle of Magdeleine, Siege of Toulon.

Noble or not noble ?—Not noble..

Profession before joining ?—Joined at age of fourteen years.

Profession of father before 14th July, 1789 ?—Died 1785.

This *état des services* teems with errors and omissions which might be set down to carelessness, but for the fact that all the public documents furnished by Napoleon and his brothers—marriage certificates, &c.—contain the grossest misstatements. It is extraordinary to find Napoleon declaring himself "not noble," seeing that he and his sister had only been admitted into the Royal schools of Brienne and St. Louis on their father showing one hundred and forty years of nobility.

On the 16th February, 1794, Bonaparte received his commission of brigadier-general. He had been five years and a half second lieutenant, one year a lieutenant, one year and four months a captain, and two months a major. Out of ninety-nine months in the service, he had been fifty-eight months away from his corps, either on furlough or absent without leave. In fact, after an effective service of less than four years he found himself a general officer.

Ordered next to inspect the coast defences, Bonaparte set out for Marseilles, from which city he addressed a report to the War Minister, which, but for his usual good fortune, might have cut short his career.

The report ran thus:—

"The fort of St. Nicholas is not capable of defence. . . . It is however indispensable to place it in a state of defence,

at least against the attacks of evil-minded persons. I am therefore going to place guns in the fort *so that they will command the city.*"

This was quite sufficient to raise a storm of indignation in those days, especially in Marseilles. Point guns on the people! Turn a fort into a bastille! Bonaparte and the commander of the district, General Lapoye, were summoned to appear at the bar of the Committee of Public Safety, which was almost equivalent to being sent to the guillotine. The former appealed to the Conventialist Salicetti, and acting on his advice and that of Augustin Bon Joseph Robespierre, wrote an explanation of his conduct, and remained where he was, to let the storm blow over. Lapoye appeared before the Convention, proved his innocence, and said Bonaparte was away on duty; and the matter dropped. A less fortunate officer would in all probability have lost his head. Luckner, de Custine, de Biron, Houchard, Beauharnais, and Chancel had lost theirs for less serious crimes against the Republic.

On the 1st April, 1794, Bonaparte, who was at Nice, received orders to join the army of Italy, under the command of General Dumberion. He was to act as general commandant of artillery and inspector-general. The representatives of the people were Robespierre the younger, and Salicetti. Buonaroti was Revolutionary Agent.

The campaign was of short duration, and General Dumberion was back at Nice on the 8th May, after having beaten the Austrians and Sardinians in two or three unimportant engagements. Robespierre wrote several remarkable despatches on the operations. In one despatch he complained bitterly of the embezzlements practised by the army contractors, and declared that "the defenders of liberty are naked." In another despatch, which it will be well to bear in mind, he denounced to his brother, Maximilien, the perfidy of the Royalists. "Everywhere," he wrote, "terror has preceded us. The *émigrés* persuaded

the people that we assassinated and violated, that we ate children and destroyed religion. *This last calumny* produced the most baneful effect. In the valley of Ogneglia a population of 40,000 souls took to flight. Neither women, children, nor old men were to be found there. . . . *The defenders of the country* behaved in the most exemplary manner. They never touched an image in a country which, thanks to superstition, abounds in them."

During this brief campaign, Bonaparte had no chance of distinguishing himself, but he had the opportunity of studying the country—an opportunity not thrown away.

Matters prospered once more with the young general, who was charged to draw up a plan of campaign for the army of Italy. He was on terms of intimacy with the younger Robespierre, who wrote to his terrible brother that Bonaparte, general-in-chief of the artillery, was "an officer of transcendent merit . . . . *but a Corsican.*" Bonaparte sent in three plans of campaign, with "observations" and "considerations." The "Report of Bonaparte on the political and military position of the armies of Piedmont and Spain," which is very diffuse, contains several curious paragraphs. The writer said—"Attacks must not be disseminated, but concentrated. . . . It is Germany (Austria) which must be annihilated; that accomplished, Spain and Italy will fall of themselves. . . . No dispassionate person could think of taking Madrid [which King Joseph Bonaparte entered in July, 1808, and the Emperor Napoleon in December of the same year]. The defensive system should be adopted on the Spanish, and the offensive on the Piedmontese frontier. . . . The armies of the Alps and of Italy should be united so as to obey the same mind. . . . Germany must be smitten, but never Spain nor Italy. . . . We should never plunge into Italy as long as Germany offers a redoubtable front."

This report, which is in the handwriting of Junot, is classed in the archives of the War Office as emanating from Robespierre, probably in consequence of the notes

which "the incorruptible" wrote in the margin. It is curious to remark that Robespierre approved of all the propositions of Napoleon, with the exception of the last. And Bonaparte himself proved in 1796 that there was no great danger in "plunging into Italy" before the power of Austria had been utterly broken.

In October, 1793, a French frigate, called *La Modeste*, was lying in the port of Genoa, crew at breakfast, &c., when she was surprised and captured by the English. Robespierre at once threatened vengeance, and an ultimatum was addressed to the Serene Republic, which was held responsible for the outrage, and which hardly knew which way to turn, for the French might storm Genoa from the land side, and the English ruin it from the sea.

In July, 1794, General Bonaparte was despatched to Genoa on a double mission. He was to settle matters with the Doge (who gave satisfaction), and was to examine Savona, Genoa, and the surrounding country, in a military point of view. The general terminated his mission with success, and carefully treasured up in his capacious mind the topographical knowledge he acquired. Nothing escaped his eagle glance.

On the 28th July, 1794, he was back at Nice, full of glee, more confident than ever in his star, and persuaded that he would be selected to carry out the operations in Italy which he had recommended. But on the same day that Bonaparte returned to Nice, his two most powerful patrons, the Robespierres, perished, and the Reign of Terror was brought to a close. The news fell on him like a thunderbolt. Bonaparte was at the camp of Sieg when he heard of the catastrophe on the 5th August. All Robespierre's friends were menaced. Some fled the country, others turned round on the tyrant, and among the latter Salicetti, Albitte, and Laporte, government agents, who denounced Bonaparte and ordered his arrest.

On the 10th August, 1794, an officer and ten men presented themselves at the lodgings of General Bonaparte

and escorted him to Nice. On the 12th he was committed to Fort Carré, and his papers were placed under seal. Fortune again favoured Napoleon. Had he been taken to Paris he would certainly have been executed. At Antibes he was safe for the moment, and his friends had time to intercede in his favour.

On the 12th he wrote to the representatives of the people, saying:—

"You have caused me to be arrested. I have been dishonoured without trial; or rather I have been tried without being heard. In a revolution there are two classes, those who are 'suspected,' and the patriots. . . . To declare a patriot 'suspected,' is to pronounce a verdict and to deprive him of all he considers most precious—confidence and esteem. In which category am I classed? Since the commencement of the revolution, have I not been seen fighting against domestic enemies, or, as a soldier, fighting against foreigners?

"I have sacrificed living in my depa[illegible]nt (*id est* Corsica); I have abandoned my property; I have lost all for the Republic.

"Since then I have served with distinction before Toulon, and have deserved some of the laurels which were gained at Sagorio, Oneille, and Tanaro, by the army of Italy."

And he wildly asked why he had been arrested a week after the fall of the tyrant, and protested that the only thing which made him support the burden of life was the idea that it might be useful to his country.

On the same day Napoleon wrote a letter to Junot, saying:—

"I recognise your friendship, dear Junot, in the proposal you make. . . . Men may be unjust towards me, but it is sufficient to be innocent; my conscience is the tribunal

before which I arraign my conduct. That conscience is calm when I interrogate it; do nothing, you would only compromise me, &c.

"BUONAPARTE."

"*Under arrest, Fort Carré, Antibes.*"

Junot, Marmont, and some other hot-headed young officers of the army of Italy, had proposed to rescue Napoleon and to march on Paris. The general preferred to trust to less violent measures. He also wrote to Tilly, the French ambassador at Genoa, saying:—

"You have no doubt heard of the conspiracy of Robespierre, St. Just, Couthon, &c. &c. . . . Our maritime operations have been somewhat disarranged. The artillery was well to the front, and the Sardinian tyrant was about to receive a heavy blow, which I hope is only delayed. . . . I was slightly affected by the fate of the younger Robespierre, whom I liked and believed honest; but had he been my father I would have stabbed him myself had he aspired to tyranny."

It is supposed that this letter was not really intended for Citizen Tilly, but for the eyes of the government commissioners. It is not to be found in the "Correspondence," which is not astonishing. The copy that exists in the archives of the War Office bears this marginal note: "To be submitted again to the Emperor (Napoleon III.) in consequence of the last phrase."

Salicetti, Albitte, and Laporte having found nothing of a compromising character in the papers of Bonaparte reported in favour of his liberation, and he was consequently released on the 24th August, after having been in prison for thirteen days. He was not, however, at once reinstated in the army.

On hearing that an expedition to Corsica was contemplated Napoleon applied for employment, and, thanks to

Salicetti, his request was granted. A month after his release from prison he was general-in-chief of the artillery of the Mediterranean expeditionary corps. He wrote in a letter dated—

"HEAD QUARTERS, CAIRO (ITALY),
"*23rd September*, 1794.

"It remains for us to deliver Corsica from the tyranny of the English. The season is favourable; not a moment should be lost. . . . With 10,000 men and twelve ships of war the expedition would be a simple promenade. Drive the English from a position which renders them masters of the Mediterranean; punish the scamps who have betrayed the Republic, deliver a number of good patriots and restore them to their homes: these are the matters which should occupy the attention of the government.

"BUONAPARTE."

Corsica was at that moment in the hands of England, who had set up Sir Gilbert Elliot as Viceroy, and promulgated a constitution. Nelson, then captain of the *Agamemnon* had bombarded and reduced Bastia, and the "impregnable Calvi" had been forced to capitulate. It was generally supposed that the island was lost for France, and many Frenchmen were not sorry for it, for the Corsicans were most unpopular in the south, as witness a report which Jean Bon St. André sent to the Committee of Public Safety, saying—"Nothing stands in the way of the despots of this nation; I can assure you it is hard for Frenchmen to submit to the domination of Corsicans. . . . The Republic has lost two frigates, but need only regret the *Melpomène;* it will gain by having fewer traitors, rebels, intriguers and robbers, among its citizens. . . The ingratitude of this perfidious nation is at its height. The people understand only anarchy, and the leaders despotism. They will find in the English, rulers who will make them repent their treason. It is desirable

that the departments in the south of France should be cleansed of this villainous race."[1]

Jean Bon St. André, immortalised in the pages of the *Anti-Jacobin*, afterwards served "the little Corsican;" and the Corsicans, "whom the Romans would not have for slaves, furnished France with a master." For the moment the future master was displaying his usual activity in organising the expedition, which got under way on the

[1] In a letter, dated Tunis, 8th November, 1793, Nelson gives a short description of an engagement between his ship, the *Agamemnon*, and the *Melpomène*, *Minerve*, *Fortunée*, forty-four guns each, the *Touchet* of twenty-four, and a brig. A fight of four hours resulted in the *Melpomène* being disabled, and the other vessels hauling off and leaving her to her fate.

In May, 1794, Nelson, writing to his wife, said—"Bastia is a beautiful place. . . . . This island is to belong to England, to be governed by its own laws as Ireland, and a Viceroy placed here, with free ports. Italy and Spain are jealous of our obtaining possession; it will command the Mediterranean.'

TO MRS. NELSON.

"CAMP, BASTIA, *20th May*, 1794.

"I always was of opinion, have ever acted up to it, and never had any reason to repent it, that one Englishman was equal to three Frenchmen: had this been an English town I am sure it would not have been taken by them."

In his journal of 23rd May he wrote:—"At daylight the most glorious sight that an Englishman can experience, and which I believe none but an Englishman could bring about, was exhibited—4,500 men laying down their arms to less than 1,000 British soldiers."

TO MRS. NELSON.

"CAMP, CALVI, *June 27th*, 1794.

"That we shall take Calvi in due time I have no manner of doubt. You know probably that George III. is King of Corsica, chosen by the unanimous consent of the people, the best of all titles. The first resolution of the Parliament of Corsica was to declare that they were Englishmen; they might have been mistaken for Irishmen by their bull."

And in fact, Calvi, in spite of its reputation of being impregnable, was obliged to open its gates.

3rd March, 1895, fell in with an English squadron, and was driven back to port with the loss of two ships—the *Ça-ira*, which belied her name, and the *Censeur*.[1]

After this failure, the expeditionary force having been broken up, Napoleon once more found himself unemployed. Matters again assumed a sombre hue. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that there were too many Corsicans in the service, and that their patriotism was more doubtful than their determination to make money. A list of general officers having been made out, Bonaparte, according to seniority, stood 139th. Schèrer, who had succeeded Dumberion in the command of the army of Italy, in his inspection report wrote :—

"Buonaparte (brevet rank),
"Twenty-seven years of age,
"Six years service,
"Born at Ajaccio in Corsica,
"Commanded a battalion before Toulon, and the siege artillery.
"This officer is a general of artillery, of which branch of the service he possesses a thorough knowledge, but he has too much ambition and is too much given to intrigue for promotion."

Sucy, the Commissary of War at Valence, an old school fellow of Napoleon, reported—"He will stop short of nothing but the throne or the scaffold."

Having disposed of his horses and carriage, Bonaparte, accompanied by Louis, by Marmont and Junot, set out for Paris by order of the War Minister. He felt like an outcast, and he was ready to sell his sword to the highest

[1] In this action the English had fourteen ships of 1,090 guns, and only 7,650 men ; whilst the French had fifteen ships, mounting 1,174 guns, and 16,900 men. The issue of the expedition was regarded as so certain that the mayor and municipal council embarked on board the *Sans-Culotte*. The only ships which showed fight were the two which were captured.

bidder. In a paroxysm of despair he wrote to brother Joseph after his arrival in the capital:—"I feel like a person on the eve of battle, and that it is nonsense to take any thought for to-morrow when death may overtake me at any moment. Everything tempts me to brave destiny, and if this continues, my friend, I shall finish by not getting out of the way of the carriages as they pass. This sometimes astonishes my reason, but such is the feeling produced by the moral spectacle of *this country*, and the doctrine of chances"—meaning that Frenchmen were contemptible, and chance for the moment unpropitious.

Napoleon on reaching Paris put up at a shabby house called *L'Hotel de la Liberté*, situated in a street which now bears the name of Aboukir, in honour of one of his victories in Egypt—a victory which he said had effaced the disgrace of the battle of the Nile. He found everything in confusion. With the fall of Robespierre unity of action had disappeared, and instead of being governed by one, the country was ruled by sixteen independent committees. Napoleon was soon able to convince himself that there was no chance of his Jacobin friends returning to power. In March, 1795, Carnot, who, as the organiser of victory, had been spared the fate of his colleagues, was replaced, and in May fifteen members of the Revolutionary Tribunal were executed; others were transported to Cayenne, or thrown into the fortress of Ham. Bonaparte, though known as the creature of the Robespierres, remained unmolested.

At this period, ordered to join the army of the west and to take the command of a brigade of infantry, Napoleon ought to have immediately started for Rennes and have reported himself to Hoche, who was engaged in pacifying La Vendée. This order highly incensed him for several reasons. He considered it a degradation to be removed from the artillery; he had no desire to serve against the *Chouans*, and was annoyed at being taken away from the army of Italy in which he was known. He received

permission to remain in Paris until the 15th May, but when his leave expired he determined not to join his new corps. Thanks to a doctor named Marquis, he obtained a sick certificate, which he sent to the War Office with a demand for a month's extra leave, which was accorded. On the 23rd June he wrote to brother Joseph: "I am employed as a general of brigade in the army of the west, but not in the artillery. I am ill, and this obliges me to take a furlough of *two or three months;* when I recover my health I shall see what is to be done."

Several other letters followed in rapid succession.

To JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *24th June*, 1795.

"I intend to use all haste with the commissions for your wife. Désirée demands my portrait; you will give it to her should she still wish for it; this not being the case, keep it for yourself. No matter what happens, you know well you cannot have a better friend than myself, or one more dear to you, and who more sincerely desires your happiness. Life is like an empty dream which is soon dissipated. If you leave France and think your absence will be long, send me your portrait. We have lived so many years together, so closely united, that our hearts are mingled, and you know better than any one how entirely mine belongs to you. I feel while tracing these lines an amount of emotion I have seldom experienced. We shall soon meet; I can no longer continue my letter.

"BUONAPARTE

Joseph was then intent upon settling at Genoa, and devoting himself to the oil trade, little foreseeing the brilliant destinies and the two crowns in store for him.

To JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *6th July*, 1795.

"I have received no news of you since you left. In order to reach Genoa one must cross the Lethe, for

Désirée no longer writes to me since she has arrived in that city.

"The English have disembarked 12,000 men, most of them *émigrés*, in Brittany. That does not give much uneasiness here. We are so sure of the superiority of our infantry that we laugh at the threats of the English.

"The armies of Italy and the Pyrenees appear to have been attacked with great spirit.

"Every day a few Articles of the Constitution are decreed. Everything is quiet. There is still a scarcity of bread. The weather is cold and damp for the season, and renders the harvest backward. A louis here is worth 750 francs.

"BUONAPARTE."

TO JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *12th July*, 1795.

"The English will be obliged to re-embark in a few days. Pichegru is preparing to pass the Rhine. La Vendée is tranquil, and the Chouans are only seen north of the Loire. Peace with Spain is imminent.

"The Dutch appear warm friends of their Revolution. It is probable that the Stadtholder will not return. He has no party.

"The North is disturbed, and Poland conceives hopes.

"*Italy is growing rich on the spoils and misfortunes of France.*

"Luxury, pleasure and the arts flourish once more here to an astonishing degree. Yesterday *Phèdre* was given at the Opera for the benefit of a retired actress; there was an immense crowd at the doors from 2 P.M., although prices had been trebled. Carriages and fashionables have reappeared, and forget, or rather only remember as a dream, that they ever ceased to shine. Libraries are open, and lectures on history, chemistry, astronomy, &c., succeed each other.

Everything is accumulated in this country to amuse and render life agreeable. One is torn from one's reflections, and how is it possible to be gloomy in this busy whirlwind? Women are seen everywhere—at the theatres, in the promenades, and the libraries. In the study of the *savant* you meet very pretty persons. Here alone of all places in the world they deserve to hold the helm; therefore the men are mad about them, think only of them, live only by and for them. A woman requires to be but six months in Paris to know what is due to her and the extent of her empire.

"BUONAPARTE."

TO JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *18th July*, 1795.

"Still no letter from you, and it is more than a month since you left. Nor have I heard from Désirée since she reached Genoa. . . . . I suppose you have taken the opportunity of being at Genoa to get our plate.

"Louis is at Châlons, finishing to make himself a man; he is studying mathematics and fortification.

"I await your letters before deciding on the purchase of a property. It is impossible to have anything suitable for less than 800,000 or 900,000 francs" [probably in *assignats*].

"Junot is here living like the d——, and spending as much of his father's money as possible. Marmont, who accompanied me from Marseilles, is at the siege of Mayence. . . . . I await your letters with impatience. Salutations to your wife. I should much like to embrace her in Paris, where one is better than at Genoa. It is here that an upright and prudent man, who confines himself to his friends, lives with all the liberty imaginable, if he wishes, and is perfectly free.

"BUONAPARTE."

To JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

PARIS, 25*th July*, 1795.

"I am a General employed in the army of the West; my malady detains me here. I await further details from you. I believe you avoid speaking to me about Désirée on purpose, &c.

"BUONAPARTE."

To JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

"30*th July*, 1795.

"You shall obtain the passport you require. . . . . You ought to have received a letter from Frèron . . . . Lucien has got himself arrested; a courrier starts to-morrow with orders from the Committee of Public Safety to set him at liberty. I will do all you want with time and patience.

"The peace with Spain renders an offensive war in Piedmont indispensable. The plan I have proposed is being discussed and will infallibly be adopted. If I go to Nice we shall see each other, and Désirée also. I await your answer about purchasing you a property. I am going to write to Madame Isoard to give Lucien some money, and I will procure a place for him in Paris before starting. . . . . The harvest is splendid.

"This great nation gives itself up to pleasure, dancing, and theatres, and women (who are the prettiest in the world) have become the principal occupation. Ease, luxury, and *bon ton* have recovered their reign; the Terror is remembered only as a dream.

"BUONAPARTE."

At this moment there was a large amount of national property in the market—property which had been taken from the Church and the nobles, and which patriots were allowed to purchase on easy terms.

TO COMMISSARY SUCY.

"PARIS, *17th August*, 1795.

"I congratulate you on joining the army. . . . . Fortune, favour, and the esteem of men vary and oscillate perpetually. . . . . I have been appointed to serve in the army of La Vendée as General of the Line: *I have not accepted.* A great many officers would command a brigade better than I could, but few could command the artillery so well. I retire satisfied that the injustice done to the service will be sufficiently felt by those who know how to appreciate matters.

". . . . Health, constancy, and never be discouraged. If you find men wicked and ungrateful, remember the great, although buffoon maxim, of Scapin—'Let us be thankful to them for all the crimes they do not commit.'

"BUONAPARTE."

TO JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *20th August*, 1795.

"I am at this moment attached to the Topographical Department of the Committee of Public Safety for the direction of armies, in place of Carnot. If I make the demand I shall obtain permission to go to Turkey as General of Artillery sent by the Government to organise the artillery of the Grand Signor, with good pay and a flattering title. I will get you made consul. . . . . Everything is quiet here, but storms are perhaps brewing. I shall take five or six officers with me. . . . . The Committee of Public Safety having charged me with the direction of the armies, and with the plans of campaign (which is highly flattering) will not, I fear, allow me to go to Turkey. We shall see.

"BUONAPARTE."

TO JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *1st September*, 1795.

". . . . There is a little excitement in consequence of the renewal of the Convention. The Royalists are stirring; we shall see how this will end. . . . . Schérer has gone to the army of Italy; Kellermann to that of the Alps; Hoche has been transferred to La Vendée; Moncey to the coast of Brest."

And four days later:—

"The Committee consider that it will be impossible for me to leave France as long as the war lasts. I am going to be re-established in the artillery, and shall probably remain at the Committee. . . . . Should I stay here it is possible I may be seized with the madness of marrying. I should like to receive a few words from you on this subject, and it might be well to speak to the brother of Désirée. Let me know the result, and that will terminate the affair.

"The celebrated Bishop of Autun (Talleyrand) and General Montesquiou have received permission to return to France, and have been struck off the list of *émigrés*.

"BUONAPARTE."

TO JOSEPH BUONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *6th September*, 1795.

". . . . No matter what happens, you need feel no alarm concerning me, as I have for friends *the best men of all parties*. Mariette is extremely zealous in my behalf: you are aware of his opinions. I am on intimate terms with Doulcet. You know my other friends of an opposite opinion.

"I am going to write to your wife. I am well satisfied with Louis; he answers the hopes I conceived of him. He is

a good fellow after my fashion—*warmth, wit, talent, honesty, goodness, all combined.* You know, my friend, that I only live for the pleasure I can give my family. If my hopes are seconded by the good luck which never abandons me in my undertakings, I shall be able to fulfil all your desires. . . . . I feel much being deprived of Louis, who was of great assistance to me—no one more active, more skilful, and more insinuating. Since Louis is no longer here, I can attend only to the most important affairs. . . . . To-morrow I shall have three horses, and this will enable me to drive about in a cabriolet and attend to business.

"Adieu, my friend. Amuse yourself; everything is going well; be gay. Think of my affair (Désirée), for I am mad to have a home. It must be concluded or broken off. I await your reply with impatience. You can remain at Genoa as long as you wish. The motive is simple—to recover the little property which we still possess in Corsica.

"BUONAPARTE."

The active correspondence kept up with Joseph, and the letter to Commissary Sucy, reveal much that happened at this curious and eventful epoch in the life of Brigadier Bonaparte, but not all. They show us that he had fits of dejection, which never lasted long; that his thoughts were constantly turned towards the East; that he was hard pressed for money, and that he was anxious to marry. Joseph had espoused the daughter of a wealthy soap-boiler of Marseilles, Julia Clary, who had brought him a dowry of 20,000*l.*, and Napoleon wished to marry her sister, Désirée. Désirée Clary, however, was not destined to become Empress of France, but the wife of General Bernadotte, and Queen of Sweden. In 1795 the Bonapartes did not bear a high reputation in the south, and the soap-boiler declared that one Bonaparte in his family was quite sufficient.

Napoleon's sick leave expired on the 14th July, but as

he had no intention of joining the army of the West he procured another medical certificate, and asked for an extension. "My doctor allows me to hope," he wrote, "that in twenty days, that is to say, on the 4th August, I shall be able to rejoin my army corps." He wished to gain the 4th August, because on that date the Committees would be renewed, and "that wretch Aubry," as he called him, would no longer be war minister, and it was to Aubry, a captain in the same corps as himself, that he attributed his removal from the artillery.

The ill-health of the young General did not prevent him from being busy with his pen. In July he wrote a *Recueil sur l'Histoire depuis le 9 Thermidor, An II.* (date of the fall of Robespierre) *jusqu'au commencement de l'An IV.*, and also *Une Étude sur la Politique, les Causes des Troubles, et des Discords;* both of which autographs are in private collections. In addition to this he drew up a memorandum on the army of Italy, showing the advantages of adopting offensive operations; and Lanfrey rightly remarks that it is impossible to read this document without a feeling of intense admiration. It was referred to Kellermann, who commanded the army of the Alps, and to Schérer, who commanded the army of Italy. The former considered it the work of a madman; the second remarked that the officer who recommended such operations should be sent to carry them out. A year later this madman did carry them out, to the great astonishment of the world in general and of Kellermann and Schérer in particular.

However, for the moment the look-out was gloomy, although all around seemed gay and bent on making up for lost time. On the 18th Thermidor (5th August) Brigadier Bonaparte addressed a memorial to the Representatives of the People and the Committee of Public Safety, in which he set forth his services at considerable length and asked to be re-instated in the artillery. This document contained several inaccuracies. The petitioner said he had joined the artillery in 1782, whereas he only

obtained his commission at the end of 1784. He claimed to have served seventeen years instead of twelve, &c., &c. The petition having been referred to the competent athorities, Napoleon was once more in despair and meditated suicide. On the 16th August he received a peremptory order to join his corps, and was told that in addition to sending in the sick certificate of Citizen Marquis, he should, according to regulation, have presented himself before the Medical Board. "If," terminated the order, "your state of health prevents you from undergoing the fatigue of active service, inform me of the fact and I will ask the Committee to replace you." On the reception of this document the General immediately rushed off to Barras, Fréron, and other friends, representing himself as the victim of his attachment to the Republican party, and speaking much about the army of Italy, of the East, and of Constantinople. That he did not plead in vain is proved by the fact of his having been appointed to the topographical department on the 20th August, a post which, if we are to believe a letter written to brother Joseph, gave his active brain sufficient occupation. "I hope," he wrote to the future King of Naples, "that you will obtain a consulate in the kingdom of Naples. I am overwhelmed with business from 1 to 5 P.M. at the Committee, and then from 11 P.M. till 3 A.M."

The great ambition of Napoleon at this moment was to get to the East. Lucien said he prophesied that British preponderance in India would daily increase, and declared that he would take service in that country unless promoted at home. "I heard him several times say," wrote Lucien in his *Memoirs*, "that the English made more of a good artillery officer than the French did, and that distinguished officers of that arm were rare in India." He added: "If I take that decision, I hope you will soon hear of me, and that I shall return in a few years a rich nabob, bringing home handsome dowries for my three sisters. . . . Mamma was quite angry with Napoleon for speaking so often

about going to India, considering him quite capable of putting this project into execution in a moment of vexation against the Government."

At this moment the Sublime Porte and the French Republic were on excellent terms, and in July, 1795, the Sultan, for the second time, asked for French artillery officers, &c. Napoleon, made aware of this demand, immediately drew up a memorandum on the amelioration of the Turkish artillery, and a note on the best means of augmenting the power of Turkey against the encroachments of European monarchies, a summary of which we give:—

NOTE WRITTEN BY BUONAPARTE.

"*30th August*, 1795.

"At a moment when the Empress of Russia has strengthened the bonds which unite her to Austria, it is in the interest of France to do all in her power to render the military capabilities of Turkey more formidable. That Power has numerous and brave bodies of militia, but very ignorant with regard to the art of war. The formation of the artillery, which exercises so powerful an influence on modern tactics and the gaining of battles, and almost exclusively in the taking and defence of strong places, is still in its infancy in Turkey. The Porte, which feels this, has several times demanded artillery and engineer officers. We have some we can dispose of at the present moment; but they are neither sufficiently numerous nor sufficiently capable to produce a result of any consequence.

"General Buonaparte, who has acquired some reputation in commanding the artillery of our army under various circumstances, and especially at the siege of Toulon, offers to go to Turkey on a mission from the Government: he will take with him five or six officers,

each with a special knowledge of the sciences relative to war.

"Should he be able, in this new career, to render the Turkish armies more formidable, he believes he will be doing his country a signal service.

"BUONAPARTE."

This note was backed up by two members of the Committee, who spoke very highly of Napoleon's previous services. The Government determined to send out a military commission to Turkey. Kellermann and Schérer were ordered to carry out the plans furnished by Bonaparte, and the young General told Bourrienne to look out for a property for him in the valley of the Yonne. The road to fortune appeared once more open, but there was to be another slip between cup and lip.

On the 5th September Napoleon sent in a request for horses, setting forth that he had been obliged to sell the animals he had at Nice for a trifle. The demand was returned by the Re-mount Department with this note: "The certificate does not state that Citizen Bonaparte really sold his horses," &c. This matter created a considerable noise, more especially as it coincided with the return of the petition, which the General had addressed to the Representatives of the People and the Committee, on his exclusion from the artillery. The various errors committed by General Bonaparte were pointed out, and a confidential report made by the artillery and engineer department was most unfavourable to the petitioner.

On the 15th September, 1795, the Foreign Office submitted to the Committee of Public Safety the following project:—

"General Buonaparte shall go to Constantinople with two aides-de-camp, to serve in the army of the Grand Turk, to contribute by his talents and acquired knowledge to the reorganisation of the artillery of the powerful

Turkish empire, and to execute whatever shall be ordered by the ministers of the Porte," &c., &c.

On the same day the Committee of Public Safety issued this decree:—"General Buonaparte, formerly requisitioned to serve under the orders of the Committee, is struck off the active list in consequence of his refusal to repair to the post assigned to him"—refusal to join the army of the West. This decree was signed by Cambacérès, the future arch-chancellor of the empire, by Berlier, Merlin, and Boissy.

The blow was severe, and no doubt Napoleon poured out his feelings on the subject in his letters to his brother; but, strange to say, at this point the publication of his correspondence with Joseph is suddenly broken off for a while.

Bonaparte, however, was not destined to remain long under a cloud. He had several powerful friends, and among them Paul Barras, who had seen him at work at Toulon and who had not lost sight of him. The Royalist reaction was raising its head in the most formidable manner, and the adherents of the princes were full of confidence. The Convention perceived that strong measures could alone save it.

On the 11th Vendémiaire (2nd October) Napoleon received this laconic note: "The Citizen Bonaparte is invited to come, without fail, to-morrow morning, at ten o'clock, to the house of the Citizen Director Barras, at Chaillot." What happened then is tolerably well known. Bonaparte was charged with the defence of the Convention, and on the 13th Vendémiaire smote the Royalists hip and thigh, and saved the Republic. The Convention hastened to confirm his appointment as second in command of the Army of the Interior, of which Barras was the nominal Commander-in-chief, and two days afterwards the Artillery Committee reported in favour of his mission to Constantinople. But it was too late. Napoleon often

returned to the idea of invading the East; when emperor he seriously contemplated marching on India and seating himself on the throne of Delhi, where he proposed to remain for four years. For the moment, however, he was satisfied with the brilliant change affairs had taken. He thus announced his success to Joseph:—

"PARIS, 2 A.M., *6th October*, 1795.

"At last all is over. My first idea is to think of you, and to send you news concerning myself.

"The Royalists, formed into sections, became daily more insolent. The Convention ordered that the Lepelletier section should be disarmed, and it resisted the troops. Menou, who commanded, is said to have played the traitor, and was at once dismissed. The Convention appointed Barras to command the army, and the Committees appointed me second in command. We posted the troops; the enemy marched to attack us at the Tuileries; we killed a great number of them, and lost on our side thirty men killed and sixty wounded. We have disarmed the sections, and all is quiet. As usual, I was not wounded.

"The General of Brigade,

"BUONAPARTE.

"P.S. Happiness is for me: my courtship to Désirée and to Julie."

Barras soon resigned his military post, and Napoleon wrote to Joseph:—

"PARIS, *1st November*, 1795.

"A week ago I was appointed General-in-chief of the Army of the Interior. The Council of Five Hundred and the Ancients are assembled, and the former has drawn out a list of the Executive Directory. It appears that the five members are to be Sieyès, Rewbel, Barras, Le Tourneur, and La Revellière-Lepaux. My health is good, although I lead a very busy life.

"BUONAPARTE."

There is no more mention of Désirée, whose dowry was no longer required. Napoleon was re-instated in the artillery, and on the 23rd October was made a General of Division. He had evidently money at his disposal. He wrote to Joseph: "I have lodging, table, and a carriage to offer you. . . . . I have sent 50,000 francs, money, *assignats, chiffons*, to the family, therefore have no uneasiness. . . . You shall soon be made a consul. If Genoa does not please you, come to Paris." The rest of the family—Lucien, Louis, Jerome, and Uncle Fesch, and a number of friends, were speedily provided for.

How strange the vicissitudes in the life of this great soldier, who was:—

Sixty-six months, second lieutenant.
Twelve months, first lieutenant.
Thirteen months, captain.
Two months, major.
Twenty-two months, general of brigade.

When appointed general of brigade he had been present with his corps for forty-one months.

He was cashiered in 1792, in 1794, and in 1795.

He was only once promoted regularly—when he was made first lieutenant. His other grades were all obtained by favour from Robespierre, Barras, and other friends in power.

The year 1795, which had opened so gloomily for Napoleon, and had more than once almost witnessed the ruin of all his hopes and ambition, closed on far more cheerful prospects. The high-road to fortune and glory was now open to him.

CHAPTER II.

THE YEAR 1796.

EVEN those historians who most condemn the tyranny of Napoleon admit the extraordinary military and administrative capacity which he exhibited in 1796. Never were so many battles gained and so many kingdoms overrun in the short space of twelve months. In 1795 the name of Bonaparte was unknown beyond a very limited circle; before the close of 1796 he filled the trump of fame and had set down the mighty from their seats. He had humbled the Emperor of Germany, had forced the Kings of Sardinia and of Naples and the Pope to sue for peace; he had broken up the ancient government of Venice, deposed the Duke of Modena, created two Republics in Italy, and established his authority in Genoa and Tuscany. He had beaten with inferior forces, in the midst of hostile populations, Beaulieu, Wurmser, Provera, Quasdanowich, Alvinzi, Davidowich, and the Archduke Charles. In 1795 he was wandering about Paris, sometimes contemplating suicide, and at other times allowing his imagination to be flushed with visions of Eastern conquest; before the end of 1796 he was the greatest power on the Continent. In 1795 we found him complaining of "that wretch Aubry," and of war ministers in general. In 1796, thanks to the enthusiasm which his victories excited in France, he could afford to treat with

disrespect the positive orders of the Directory, and to settle the affairs of Italy after his own fashion. He had three times been deprived of his rank in the army, thanks to acts of insubordination, previous to being appointed Commander-in-chief of the army of Italy. In the course of 1796 he several times disobeyed the orders of the Government by concluding suspensions of arms and treaties, and entering into other arrangements with the enemy, without waiting for their approbation; but instead of being removed from the service, he was then in a position to impose his views on the Directory by simply asking to be relieved of his command.

In perusing his correspondence for 1796, it is necessary to bear in mind that Bonaparte considerably exaggerated the difficulties with which he had to contend, underrating the strength of his own forces and overrating that of the enemy. Before commencing our selection for this memorable year, we shall merely add that the *Correspondence of Napoleon* contains, for 1796, no less than 1,258 letters, despatches, orders of the day, and proclamations. On the 11th May Bonaparte wrote no less than nineteen letters, &c.; on the 14th April, eighteen, including a detailed account of his first victory of Montenotte; on the 26th April, eighteen; on the 4th May, eighteen, &c., and the year can hardly be said to have commenced before April. On the 9th May, Bonaparte wrote to Carnot that he loved his wife to madness, and this is sufficiently proved by the extravagant letters that he addressed to Josephine during the campaign in question, and which are not to be found in the *Correspondence*, but in a separate volume published in 1833—letters as remarkable for their passion as for their impropriety, although Madame de Rémusat says any woman would have been proud to receive them. It must certainly be remembered that they were addressed to a woman of a certain age, who had been married before, and whom Bonaparte had met in very dissolute society.

In the first page of the "Military Correspondence,"

Bonaparte (19th January, 1796) indicates the best plan to adopt in order to beat the Sardinian and Austrian armies, and to reach Turin. These objects obtained, he says (and his observations are very remarkable, seeing what happened before the close of the year) :—

"The King of Sardinia will sue for peace. The French general must say he has no power to conclude peace, and that he must send a courier to Paris; during this time his majesty will be obliged to make propositions of such a nature that it will be impossible to refuse them, as they will perfectly fulfil the aim of the Government; without this Turin will be burned.

"However, as the war in Italy will depend entirely on the season of the year, each month will require a different plan of campaign. The Government must therefore have absolute confidence in their general, and allow him great latitude, simply indicating the objective. It requires a month to receive a reply to a despatch sent from Savona, and during that time everything may change."

A fortnight after, Bonaparte descended from the summits of the Alps and pierced the enemy's line at Montenotte, the Sardinians were suing for peace, and the road to Turin was open. No necessity, however, arose for burning down that capital, for the King, Charles Emmanuel, one of whose sisters was married to the Comte de Provence who afterwards became Louis XVIII., and the other to the Comte d'Artois who became Charles X., ceded Nice and Savoy to France, and laid down his arms.

We shall henceforth speak of Napoleon as Bonaparte, as he thus signed his name until he adopted the Imperial title.

At the close of 1795 Bonaparte was appointed General-in-chief of the Army of the Interior, succeeding his friend and protector, Paul Barras. The first letter which we quote for 1796 is addressed to General Clarke, an officer of Irish descent, who played a considerable part in the

Napoleonic drama, and who was created Duc de Feltre under the Empire. In '96 he was Director of the Topographical Department, which post had recently been held by Bonaparte.

TO CITIZEN CLARKE, *General of Division.*

"PARIS, 24*th February*, 1796.

"Citizen General, I have received your note. . . . It is true that the *chouans* are organised in the department of the Eure, but the flying column destined to maintain tranquillity has restored order. I have directed General Huet to act in concert with the justice of the peace and to arrest the *émigrés* and refractory priests in the parish of Ile.

"BUONAPARTE."

About a year later Clarke was removed from the service as a Royalist, and nothing but Bonaparte's popularity in Paris saved him from sharing the same fate, on the same charge, and in conjunction with the regicide Carnot!

In the following letter, the first he signed "Bonaparte," without the "u," the young general announced his marriage. He had met Josephine in the company of Barras, at that moment the most influential of "*les cinq sires.*" Barras had been one of his best men, and according to report had given to Josephine, as a wedding gift, the command of the army of Italy for her husband. It is true that Carnot also claimed the honour of this appointment, and that all five Directors wished to get rid of a protector who alarmed them by his indefatigable activity and ill-concealed ambition.

TO CITIZEN LE TOURNEUR.

"PARIS, 11*th March*, 1796.

"I have requested the Citizen Barras to inform the Executive Directory of my marriage with the Citoyenne Tascher Beauharnais. The confidence which the Directory

has shown me under all circumstances renders it my duty to inform them of all my actions. ' It is a new bond which attaches me to the country; it is a new pledge of my firm resolution to find salvation in the Republic alone.

"Salutations and respect.

"The General-in-chief of the army of Italy,

"BONAPARTE."

Strange to say, Hoche, Bonaparte's rival, had been thrown into prison because, while in command of the army of the Rhine, he had married a young lady of Thionville. It is true that this was in the days of the terrible Committee of Public Safety, which considered the moment of commencing a campaign ill-chosen for matrimony and domestic happiness. Barras thought by this marriage with Josephine to secure the support of Bonaparte.

Immediately after his marriage Bonaparte started to take command of the army of Italy, then about 34,000 strong. His honeymoon lasted only forty-eight hours. On assuming the command he issued the following proclamation:—

"NICE, *27th March*, 1796.

"Soldiers, you were naked, ill-fed: the Government owed you much and had nothing to give you. Your patience, and the courage you have exhibited in the midst of these rocks, are admirable; but they procure you no glory; no brilliancy is reflected on you. I desire to lead you into the most fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces and great cities will be in your power; you will find there, honour, glory, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in courage and constancy?"

More than one French historian has severely blamed Bonaparte for encouraging among his Republican officers a spirit of ambition and among Republican soldiers an insatiable cupidity. "Bonaparte," says Lanfrey, "pointed

to Italy, not as a nation to be delivered, but as a prey to be seized upon, and his excitations produced a thirst for plunder of which no modern war offers another example." But Bonaparte was not alone to blame for this, and the military chest, though strictly guarded, was absolutely empty. Hitherto the Republic had fought in defence of the immortal principles of '93, but now it was about to indulge in a war of aggression and systematic robbery.

TO CITIZEN FAYPOULT.

"NICE, *27th March*, 1796.

"I have received your letter. I dined yesterday at the house of General Schérer, with your wife. I shall be charmed to be of service to her. . . . . It is said that the Genoese offer us 3,000,000 francs. My opinion is that this sum should be accepted without noise, and that we should continue to live in peace and friendship with that Republic, whose enmity would be baneful to our commerce and would disarrange our military calculations.

"BONAPARTE."

The chief interest in the above letter, addressed to an officer of the commissariat, lies in the fact that it shows Bonaparte, even before entering Italy, intent on setting aside the plans of the Directory, which were certainly faulty, and acting for himself. Bonaparte had succeeded Schérer in the command of the army of Italy, and he was destined to succeed him again on his return from Egypt. The demands upon poor Genoa were increased in the most exorbitant manner as soon as Bonaparte became master of the situation.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"NICE, *28th March*, 1796.

"I have been for several days in the midst of the army; yesterday I assumed the command. . . . . The adminis-

trative situation is regrettable, but not to be despaired of. I am obliged to threaten the contractors, who have robbed much and who enjoy credit, and I obtain a good deal by flattering them afterwards. The army will henceforth have good bread and meat; it has already received considerable sums in the way of arrears.

"The marches from the Rhone to the Var are provisioned, and five days ago my cavalry, my baggage waggons, and my artillery were in motion. Citizen Directors, your intentions shall be carried out; I shall march shortly. I have announced to the army that you are satisfied with its *good conduct and patience.* This has greatly flattered the soldiers, and especially the officers. *A battalion mutinied and would not leave Nice,* on the pretext that it had neither shoes nor money. I had all the grenadiers arrested; I made the battalion march, and when it was a league out of Nice, I despatched a counter-order and sent it to the rear. My intention is to disband this corps and to incorporate the soldiers in other battalions, the officers not having shown sufficient firmness.

"I was received by this army with all the demonstrations of joy and confidence due to one who during five months, acting under your eyes, has merited your confidence.

"I have been particularly struck with the frankness and honesty of General Schérer. He has acquired claims to my gratitude by his loyal conduct and the alacrity with which he has communicated useful information. His health appears somewhat shaken. He has a great facility for speaking *on moral and political* matters which might be of use to you.

"Our position with regard to Genoa is critical . . . . There are two courses open. To seize upon Genoa by surprise, but that is opposed to your intentions and would be contrary to the law of nations; or to live on good terms with her, and not to exact money from the people, which is the only thing they value.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte, on joining the army, was not well received at first, especially by some of the general officers senior to him in the service, and who had already distinguished themselves in the field. However, he speedily caused his authority to be respected, and Massena and Augereau acknowledged that they had found their master. Among other officers in the army of Italy were Marmont, Junot, Murat, Joubert, Lannes, Victor, and Suchet, all destined to acquire more or less celebrity in the field.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"NICE, *29th March*, 1796.

"The General-in-chief Bonaparte reviewed the 100th demi-brigade, &c. He is satisfied with the appearance of the troops, their sentiments of devotion towards the Republic, and their resolution to conquer. He has inspected the active divisions of the army, and has everywhere found soldiers accustomed to vanquish and to suffer, and as devoted to liberty as to discipline, which is the sinew of armies. They will find in him a comrade, strong in the confidence of the Government, proud of the esteem of patriots, and decided to acquire for the army of Italy destinies worthy of it.

"In execution of a decree of the Directory, General Alexander Berthier is appointed chief of the staff of the army of Italy. . . . ."

Berthier had already seen a fair amount of service in America and elsewhere. He could read a map, and although h was not capable of commanding a division he was invaluable as a staff-officer.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"ALBENGA, *6th April*, 1796.

"I have transferred my head-quarters to Albenga. The movement which I found commenced against Genoa has

drawn the enemy out of his winter quarters. . . .. Beaulieu has published a manifesto, to which I shall reply after the battle. I was much annoyed by this movement on Genoa, which obliged that Republic to assume a hostile attitude and alarmed the enemy, when I counted on catching him napping. This will cost us so many more men.

"General Colli sent an *émigré* named Moulin with a flag of truce. I had him arrested and brought before a court martial, as nothing can render the person of a parricide sacred.

". . . . The army is in a terrible state of destitution. I have still great obstacles to surmount, but they are surmountable. Distress has authorised insubordination, and without discipline victory is out of the question. I hope all this will be changed in the course of a few days.

"BONAPARTE."

The movement on Genoa which aroused Beaulieu nearly proved fatal to Bonaparte, who but for the gallant defence of a redoubt would have been cut off by General d'Argenteau.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"ALBENGA, *8th April*, 1796.

"You will find inclosed the letter written to me by General Colli, who commands the army of the King of Sardinia, and the answer I have returned. I hope it is in conformity with your intentions.

"The Treasury often sends us letters of change which are not honoured. One for 172,800 francs, drawn on Cadiz, has just been returned, which augments our difficulties.

"I found this army not only destitute of everything, but without discipline and in a chronic state of insubordination. The discontent was so great that evil-minded men took advantage of it to form a 'Company of the Dauphin,' and

to sing Chouan and anti-revolutionary songs. I have had two officers tried by court martial for crying *Vive le roi!*

"I suppose that Moulin's mission had something to do with all this. Although the Treasury has not kept faith with us we shall push forward.

"BONAPARTE."

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"CARCARE, 12*th April*, 1796.

"*Vive la République!* To-day, 23rd Germinal, the division of General Massena and that of Laharpe attacked the Austrians, 13,000 strong, commanded by General Beaulieu in person and the Generals Argenteau and Roccavina, occupying the important position of Montenotte. The Republicans completely defeated the Austrians, killing or wounding about 3,000 men. General Roccavina is among the wounded. Further details will be furnished when all the information relative to this glorious affair has been collected."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"CARCARE, 14*th April*, 1796.

"The Italian campaign has commenced. I have forwarded a report on the battle of Montenotte. After manœuvring for three days in order to conceal his intentions, Beaulieu attacked the right of our army with 10,000 men. General Cervoni resisted the enemy with the intrepidity which characterises the soldiers of liberty. I was not deceived as to the real object of the enemy. As soon as I was informed of the attack on my right, I ordered General Cervoni to wait until it was dark and then to fall back by a forced march (hiding his movement from the enemy) on my centre, which was protected by the heights of the Madona of Savona."

"On the 10th, at 4 A.M., Beaulieu in person, with 15,000 men, attacked and forced all the positions on which the

centre of the army rested. An hour after noon he attacked the redoubt of Monte Legino, which was our last line of defence. The enemy returned several times to the charge, but the redoubt, defended by 1,500 men, was rendered impregnable by the courage of those who defended it.

"BONAPARTE."

The battle was renewed the next day, and Massena coming up, the Austrians were routed. Had General Rampon and his men not held the redoubt, the campaign would have been lost, and half the French army and its general-in-chief captured. The next night was employed by Bonaparte in repairing his error, and this was very soon done. His great object was to separate the Sardinian and Austrian armies, and this he effected by beating Beaulieu at Montenotte and then Beaulieu and Colli at Mellesimo. It is true that Beaulieu captured a French detachment at Dego on the 13th, but Massena retook that position after some desperate fighting.

TO DIRECTOR CARNOT.

"CARCARE, *16th April*, 1796.

"You will find the details of the battles of Montenotte and Millesimo in the report forwarded to the Directory. I cannot conceal from you that I am seconded neither by the artillery nor the engineers, as, in spite of your orders, I have not a single one of the officers I asked for.

"I have captured Montezemoto. I have no officer of engineers capable of taking a survey of Ceva, and I shall have to go there myself, although my presence is very necessary on the right, where perhaps in an hour I shall be engaged with Beaulieu, who is furious, and wishes to make a despairing effort. Will you believe it, that I have not a single engineer officer who has studied at Mézières, nor one who has seen a siege or who has served in a fortified place? . . . ."

"BONAPARTE."

It is related that when the French troops arrived at Montezemoto and beheld the beautiful plains of Italy beneath them, they halted, and, struck with admiration, saluted their young commander with unanimous acclamations. In a very few days Bonaparte had managed to win the confidence of the army, whose cupidity he had also aroused.

TO GENERAL SERURIER.

"LESEGNO, *20th April*, 1796.

"I have learned with pain that our troops allowed themselves to be surprised yesterday at the village of St. Michel. . . . . By these various movements you will be in a position to take your revenge in a brilliant fashion. . . . . You must not be astonished, my dear general, at the little check you have received; it will only be the prelude to our victory.

"BONAPARTE."

Beaulieu, in spite of his age, was a very enterprising and active soldier; but, fortunately for Bonaparte, he was badly seconded, and the people of Turin lost courage, Having been beaten at Vico and then at Mondovi, his Sardinian majesty, much against his own inclination, sued for peace. His troops had been beaten, but he was still formidable by reason of his artillery, his cavalry, and the natural positions he might occupy. Nor was Turin in any immediate danger, for the French had no siege pieces and Beaulieu was not far off.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"LESEGNO, *22nd April*, 1796.

"The General-in-chief congratulates the army on its bravery and the successes it has gained over the enemy; but he sees with horror the fearful pillage in which perverse men, who join their corps only after the battle, and who

commit excesses which dishonour the army and the French name, have indulged.

"He consequently orders:—

"First. That the chief of the staff shall, within twenty-four hours, make a report on the morality of the adjutant-generals and other officers attached to the staff.

"Second. The generals of division will, within twenty-four hours, transmit to the General-in-chief, a note on the morality of the field officers under their orders since the opening of the campaign," &c., &c.

And generals of division were authorised to shoot officers "who by their example excite others to pillage, thus destroying discipline, spreading disorder through the army, and compromising its safety and glory."

Sometimes these acts of pillage were punished, sometimes they were excused, and at other times tolerated, if not encouraged.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"CARRU, *24th April*, 1796.

"I have forwarded a report on the battle of Mondovi, which does the greatest honour to the troops. . . . . You have no idea of the military and administrative condition of the army. When I arrived it was undermined by ill-intentioned persons, it was without bread, without discipline. I have made examples. . . . . My life here is inconceivable, I return fatigued to my quarters, and it is necessary to sit up working all night, and to go everywhere to re-establish order. The soldier without bread is driven to commit acts which make one blush to be a man. I intend to make terrible examples. *I shall restore order, or shall cease to command these brigands.* . . . . The campaign is not yet decided. The enemy is driven to despair; he is strong, and fights well. He knows I am in want of everything, and trusts to time. I place my faith in the genius

of the Republic, the bravery of the soldiers, the harmony of the chiefs, and the confidence reposed in me. I have 100,000 men against me, and can oppose only 34,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry to that force. The enemy possesses strong places and a numerous and efficient artillery.

"BONAPARTE."

In order to put an end to pillage, Bonaparte then announced his intention of laying a heavy war indemnity on the various *conquered* provinces, which were also requisitioned for the immediate benefit of the army.

The King of Sardinia having sued for peace, Joseph Bonaparte was despatched to Paris for instructions, also Citizen Junot, who was to present to the Government twenty-one Austrian and Sardinian standards, captured at Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, and Mondovi, and to persuade Josephine to join her disconsolate husband.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"CHERASCO, 26*th April*, 1796.

". . . . Everything is going on well. There is not so much pillaging. The first thirst of an army in want of everything has been quenched. There was an excuse for these unfortunate fellows, who after having sighed for three years on the summit of the Alps, reached the promised land and desired to enjoy it. *I have had three of them shot, and half-a-dozen condemned to hard labour. . . . . To-morrow a corporal and some soldiers, who stole the sacred vases from a church, are to be shot.* In three days discipline will be severely established, and astonished Italy will admire the moderation of our army as it already admires its courage. This occasions me a great deal of pain, and makes me pass very unhappy moments. Horrors, which make me shudder, have been committed. Happily the Piedmontese army, during its retreat, committed still greater ones.

"BONAPARTE."

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

"CHERASCO, *26th April*, 1796.

"SOLDIERS,—In fifteen days you have gained six victories, captured twenty-one standards, fifty-five guns, several strong places, conquered the richest portion of Piedmont; you have made 15,000 prisoners and have killed or wounded 10,000 men.

"Hitherto you had fought for sterile rocks, which bear witness to your courage, but which were useless to the country. To-day you equal by your services the armies of Holland and of the Rhine. Devoid of everything, you have supplied everything. You have gained battles without guns, passed rivers without bridges, accomplished forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy and often without bread. . . . . To-day you are amply provided for. The magazines captured from the enemy are numerous; the siege and field-pieces have arrived. . . . . I promise you the conquest of Italy, but on one condition. You must swear to respect the people you deliver, and repress the horrible pillage in which scoundrels, excited by the enemy, have indulged. Without that you will not be liberators, but a pestilence, and your victories, your courage, your success, and the blood of your brothers who have perished, will be all lost, as well as honour and glory. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

On the 28th April Bonaparte, in spite of the orders of the Directory, took upon himself to sign an armistice with the King of Sardinia, who allowed himself to be influenced by wealthy and timid citizens, who trembled for the fate of Turin.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"CHERASCO, *29th April*, 1796.

"The village of Coni has been occupied by our troops. . . . . I feel sure that you will approve of the suspension

of arms granted to the Sardinians; it is an armistice accorded to one wing of an army, giving me time to beat the other. It is a king who places himself entirely at my discretion, giving me up three of his strongest places and the richest half of his states. . . . .

"During the suspension I intend crossing the Adige with your army and entering Germany by the Tyrol. . . . . My columns are on the march: Beaulieu is flying, but I hope to overtake him. I shall lay a contribution of several millions on the Duke of Parma. He will make you propositions of peace, but be in no hurry, so that I may have time to force him to pay the expenses of the campaign, to replenish our magazines, and to repair our military train.

"If you do not accept peace with the King of Sardinia; if your intention is to dethrone him, you should amuse him for a few decades, and send me information at once, so that I may seize on Valenza and march on Turin.

"I shall send 12,000 men to Rome when I have beaten Beaulieu and obliged him to repass the Adige. . . . .

"As for Genoa, I think you should demand fifteen millions, and that the persons who burned the *Modeste* be tried as traitors to the country. If you charge me with this affair, and keep the matter secret, I will manage to accomplish all you wish.

"BONAPARTE."

The Genoese, in spite of their neutrality, had allowed the English to seize on a French frigate in 1793, not being well able to help themselves. This was one of those sores which Bonaparte liked to keep open. At the beginning of the campaign Genoa was to be mulcted to the extent of 3,000,000 francs without fuss; now the Republic was to be called upon to pay 15,000,000, not that any further crime could be imputed to it, but because Napoleon was in a position to exact better terms.

Having settled matters to his own satisfaction with

Sardinia, which was detached from the coalition and rendered perfectly helpless, Bonaparte now started in pursuit of Beaulieu, and prepared to levy black-mail on the whole of Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic.

TO CITIZEN FAYPOULT.

"ACQUI, *1st May*, 1796.

"We reached Acqui yesterday. Beaulieu flies so fast that we cannot catch him. . . . . Send me a geographical, historical, political, and topographical note on the imperial fiefs in the neighbourhood of Genoa; also a note on the Dukes of Parma, Placentia, and Modena; the forces they have in the field; their forts; in what consists the wealth of those countries; above all send me a list of the pictures, statues, cabinets, and curiosities at Milan, Parma, Placentia, Modena, and Bologna. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The acts of brigandage committed in Italy must not be laid entirely to the charge of Bonaparte. He was obeying such orders received from the Government as the following: "Leave nothing in Italy which our political situation will permit you to carry away, and which may be useful to us." It is true that he proved an active and willing agent.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"TORTONA, *6th May*, 1796.

"I have received your answer. I beg you will express to the Corps Législatif the thanks of the army for the honourable decree which it has voted; it is the most grateful recompense that the army can receive. As for myself, nothing can add to the esteem and devotion I have shown on all occasions to the constitution. I saw it established in the midst of the most revolting passions,

all tending towards the destruction of the Republic. I have been of some utility to it by my zeal during its first steps. My desire shall always be to die in its defence.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 6th May, 1796, Bonaparte announced to the Directory his intention to cross the Po, "by which measure I shall turn the three lines of defence which Beaulieu has had the precaution to occupy. . . . . To-day I march on Placentia. Pavia is turned, and should the enemy prove obstinate enough to defend that town, I shall get between him and his supplies." The general then complained that he had no pontoons, but added: "Be sure we shall do all that it is possible to do, and I am certain that I can depend on your justice. I know you are better able than any one to estimate the difficulty of obstacles which cannot be easily overcome by any one, and that you are far from listening to the soldiers of the clubs, who believe we can swim across broad rivers. I may be accused of temerity but not of slowness; and yet one must so calculate as to have the chances in one's favour." And in spite of his celerity, which bewildered his antagonists, every movement, as his letters, orders, and despatches prove, was in the first place most carefully worked out and considered. Bonaparte deceived Beaulieu by means of false intelligence, and crossed the Po without opposition, and without pontoons.

TO CARNOT.

"PLACENTIA, *9th May*, 1796.

"We have at last crossed the Po. The second campaign has commenced. Beaulieu is disconcerted; he miscalculates, and continually falls into the snares I set for him. Perhaps he wishes to give battle, for he has both audacity and energy, but not genius. The 6,000 men which we defeated yesterday and obliged to recross the Adda, weaken

him greatly. Another victory and we shall be masters of Italy. . . . . If we had a good administrator we should be as well off as it is possible to imagine. The soldiers have a sufficient quantity of good bread, meat, and wine. Discipline is being established, *but frequent executions are necessary*, as there are men so intractable that they cannot be commanded.

"*What we have taken from the enemy is incalculable.* We have hospital effects for 15,000 sick, several magazines of corn and meal, &c. *The more men you send me the easier shall I find it to nourish them.*

"I send you twenty pictures by the first masters, Correggio and Michael Angelo.

"I owe you special thanks for your attentions towards my wife. I recommend her to you; she is a sincere patriot, and I love her to madness.

"I hope, if things go well, to be able to send you 10,000,000 francs to Paris, which will not be amiss for the army of the Rhine.

"I cannot conceal the fact that since the death of Stengel I have not a fighting cavalry commander. I wish you would send me two or three adjutant-generals who have served in the cavalry, who have been under fire, and who have the firm resolution never to make *skilful retreats*.

"BONAPARTE."

During this campaign the French cavalry, which acquired such high reputation afterwards, did nothing. Murat on one occasion showed the white feather, and only retrieved his character when charging Mamelukes in Egypt.

Bonaparte had been married only two days when he was obliged to hurry off to assume the command of the army of Italy. Even his brief honeymoon, spent at Josephine's house in the Rue Chantereine, had been passed in the study of maps and the preparations for his coming campaign and speedy departure. When Josephine

knocked at his door, he opened it for an instant, gave her a kiss, and sent her away.

He had hardly left the capital before he commenced writing a series of passionate letters, only legible for Josephine and M. de Menval. For some time he was unable to persuade Josephine to join him in Italy. She was loth to quit the pleasures of Paris for the dangers of a campaign; and this had the effect of increasing the ardour of the young general, who at last insisted that his wife should join him, and directed Murat, who had been sent to the Directory with captured standards to bring her back with him. Murat, not without difficulty, accomplished this task.

Some of these letters contain expressions which it would be difficult, and perhaps as well not, to translate; others betray a deep and rather poetic affection, in which despair and jealousy are quaintly blended. We give a few specimens of this amorous correspondence, carried on amid the noise and bustle of war. It has been suggested by one French historian that Bonaparte's brilliant military conceptions were in all probability heightened by his passion for Josephine, which stimulated his genius and rendered him all the more anxious to distinguish himself.

TO JOSEPHINE, AT MILAN.

"ROVERBELLA, *6th July*, 1796.

"I have beaten the enemy. Kilmaine will send you an account of the affair. I am dead with fatigue. I beg you will start at once for Verona; I have need of you, for I feel I am very ill.

"A thousand kisses. I am in bed.

"BONAPARTE."

The indisposition was not dangerous, and Josephine remained at Milan, where she received a series of epistles which might better have been written by an inflammable subaltern than by the commander-in-chief of an army—

letters on the 11th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 21st, 22nd July containing such passages as these: "Ever since I left you I have been sad. I unceasingly recall your kisses, your tears, your amiable jealousy; and the charms of my incomparable Josephine kindle in my heart and my senses a bright and burning flame. . . . . Get well and come to me, so that at least before dying we may say—We were so many days happy."

Sometimes enabled to pass a few days together, the lovers were often sundered by the events of the war, and this gave rise to a fresh correspondence.

On the 10th August Bonaparte wrote to his Josephine, complaining of her indifference, and saying:—

"Three days and no letter, and yet I have written several. This absence is horrible; the nights are long, wearisome, and insipid: the day is monotonous. . . . . Think of me, live for me, be often with your well-beloved, and believe there is only one misfortune which frightens him, that of no longer being loved by Josephine."

And: "You are unkind and ugly—as ugly as you are frivolous. How perfidious to deceive a poor husband—a tender lover! Should one lose one's rights because one is far away? One of these nights your doors will be thrown open with noise, and, like a jealous fellow, behold me in your arms."

Then: "I was in bed all yesterday with fever. This hindered me from writing, my adorable friend; but I received your letters, and pressed them to my heart and my lips, and the pain of absence and 100 miles distance disappeared. At that moment I beheld you near me, not capricious and angry, but sweet and tender. It was but a dream; judge if it cured my fever."

On another occasion: "What important affair deprives you of time to write to me? What affection stifles the tender and constant love you vowed to me? Who is this *merveilleux*, this new lover who engrosses all your time?

. . . . Of a truth I am uneasy: write me four pages of those amiable things which fill my heart with pleasure."

Some days later: "When I sacrifice all my desires, all my thoughts, to you, I obey the ascendency which your charms, your character, your person, have assumed over my unfortunate heart."

On the 10th May the battle of Lodi was gained by Bonaparte, who thus concluded the report which he forwarded to the Directory:—

"Beaulieu is flying with the remains of his army; already all Lombardy may be considered as belonging to the Republic; he is at this moment crossing the states of Venice; *several towns have closed their gates to him.* I hope soon to send you the keys of Milan and Pavia. Although, since the commencement of the campaign, we have had some warm affairs, and it has been necessary for the army of the Republic to exhibit great audacity, nothing can be compared to the terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi.

"If we lost only a few men, that was due to promptitude of execution, and the sudden effect produced on the enemy by the redoubtable fire of the attacking column. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

However Bonaparte, even after his brilliant success at Lodi, which made him master of Lombardy, was ill at ease. What if the French armies on the Rhine were idle, and had prolonged the armistice? In that event, as he wrote to Carnot, the army of Italy was in danger of being annihilated. Nothing, however, could long damp the energy of the young general, whose marvellous activity was equal to every contingency both in war and politics.

At Lodi, Bonaparte, hoping to cut off two Austrian divisions, instead of turning the bridge over the Adda, attacked it in front. The success of this daring operation had a most demoralising effect on the enemy, and obliged

Beaulieu to fall back on the Mincio. Nor was this the only result of a victory which, as the young general said, placed Lombardy at his discretion. It fortified his own position at home. As regards the armies commanded by Moreau and by Jourdan, respecting whose operations Napoleon expressed anxiety, they were accomplishing nothing, and this supineness greatly added to the popularity of the commander-in-chief of the army of Italy.

The Directory was always urging Bonaparte to march upon Rome, but for strategical or other reasons he avoided executing these orders as long as possible.

TO CITIZEN CARNOT.

"LODI, *14th May*, 1796.

"On the reception of the letter from the Directory your intentions were executed, and the Milanais is ours. I shall march soon to carry out your views with regard to Leghorn and Rome. That will not take much time.

"I have written to the Directory on the subject of dividing the army. I swear that I had only the interest of the country in view. Besides, you will always find me straightforward. I owe to the Republic the sacrifice of all my ideas. If people search to injure me in your opinion, my answer is in my heart and my conscience.

"As it is possible that my letter to the Directory may be misunderstood, and as you have shown me friendship, I beg you will do whatever your prudence and your attachment may suggest in my favour.

"Kellermann will command the army as well as I can, for no one is more convinced than I am myself that our victories are due to the courage and bravery of the troops; but I think that to join Kellermann and myself in Italy would be to sacrifice everything. I cannot willingly serve with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe; besides which I believe that one bad general is better than two good ones. War, like government, is an affair of tact.

"I can be useful to you only as long as I am invested *with the same esteem which I enjoy in Paris.* That I should be employed here or elsewhere is indifferent to me: serve our country, merit a page in our history, give the Government proofs of my attachment and devotion—this is all my ambition. But I have greatly at heart not to lose in a week the fruit of two months of fatigue, danger, and trouble, and to find myself hampered. I have commenced with some glory, and I desire to continue to be worthy of you. Believe me, besides, that nothing will alter the esteem with which you inspire all who know you.

"BONAPARTE."

The Directors were already alarmed at the popularity of the young general whose victorious bulletins, published morning after morning in the *Moniteur*, excited the wildest enthusiasm in Paris. They had also some inkling of his ambitious projects. Under these circumstances, on the 7th May they wrote a despatch informing Napoleon of their intention to divide the army of Italy into two corps, one of which was to be commanded by Kellermann. This despatch reached Bonaparte just after the victory of Lodi, and it is easy to imagine how deeply it irritated him. Instead, however, of braving the decision of the Government, as he might probably have done with impunity, he merely asked to be recalled. When he pleaded in favour of unity of command he forgot that on a previous occasion he had objected to the armies of the Sambre and Meuse and that of the Rhine being confided to the same general, and this on political grounds. The Government replied to Bonaparte's letter only on the 28th, before which date fresh triumphs had rendered it impossible for them to accept his resignation. Their answer was equivalent to the most abject apology. In the meantime Bonaparte kept them in good humour by constantly replenishing their coffers.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"MILAN, *17th May*, 1796.

"The general-in-chief takes the opportunity of a temporary lull to recommend the generals of division to procure all that is necessary for the troops so that they may be in a position to resume operations. He is persuaded beforehand that the army desires to fly to new victories, but in the midst of the abundance obtained by our successes the Republican soldier must know how to form a proper estimate of his good luck, and must not tarnish his laurels: he should respect and protect the inhabitants of the country he has conquered. The general-in-chief has too lively an interest in the honour of the army to allow any individual to violate the rights of property."

This order of the day was followed by a letter to the Directory giving a list of the pictures, vases, and manuscripts, "which General Bonaparte had selected to be transported to Paris," from Milan, Parma, and Placentia, and this notice to the Directory:—"I have sent to Tontona at least 2,000,000 francs in jewelry and silver ingots, derived from different contributions." And—"We shall levy 20,000,000 francs upon this country, which is one of the richest in the world, but which has been entirely exhausted by five years of war." Only two days before Bonaparte wrote this despatch the inhabitants of Milan had hailed his entry into that city with universal delight. Five days later there was an open revolt at Pavia and latent revolt at Milan. Binasco was burned, the inhabitants put to the sword, and 400 hostages, selected from the richest families of Lombardy, were sent to France.

The following is a pretty illustration of the *suaviter in modo* and the *fortiter in re* policy in which Bonaparte was already an adept.

PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF LOMBARDY.

"MILAN, 19*th May*, 1796.

"The French Republic which has sworn hatred to tyrants has also sworn fraternity towards people. . . . . The despot who so long enslaved Lombardy has caused great mischief to France, but the French know that the cause of kings is not that of the people. . . . If the French are conquerers, they wish to consider the people of Lombardy as brothers. Respect for property, for persons, for religion, these are the sentiments which animate the French Government and the victorious army of Italy. The independence of Lombardy depends on the success of the French. In order to insure the march of the troops, provisions, which cannot be drawn from France, are necessary; they ought to be found in Lombardy; the right of war might seize them, friendship should offer them.

"A contribution of 20,000,000 francs is laid on the different provinces of Austrian Lombardy; the army requires this sum . . . . which is a very slight impost for so fertile a country when all the advantages which will result from a French occupation are considered. . . . .

"BONAPARTE.
"SALICETTI."

On the same day Bonaparte drew up the following remarkable document, which one is rather surprised to see figuring in the correspondence. But perhaps it was useless to attempt to hide decisions with which history had already dealt. A few French artists, but a very few, disapproved, and to-day Republican writers blush to think that Carnot should have sanctioned such brigandage.

DECISION.

"MILAN, 19*th May*, 1796.

"Art. 1. An agent shall be attached to the French army in Italy to *extract* and forward to the territory of the

French Republic the objects of art, science, &c., found in the *conquered towns*, the choice and number to be submitted to the general-in-chief.

"Art. 2. He shall also be charged to extract and transport the objects of art and science, &c., accorded by the powers of Italy in virtue of treaties or suspensions of arms with the French Republic."

Follow numerous articles concerning mode of transport; and the appointment of Jacques Pierre Tinet as agent. The enthusiasm of the towns which thought they had been liberated was of short duration.

TO HIS BROTHERS IN ARMS.

"MILAN, *20th May*, 1796.

"SOLDIERS,—You dashed like a torrent from the summit of the Apennines; you have overthrown, dispersed, and scattered all who opposed your march.

"Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has given vent to her natural sentiments of peace and friendship towards France.

"Milan is ours, and the Republican flag floats over all Lombardy.

"The Dukes of Parma and Modena owe their political existence entirely to your generosity.

"The army which menaced you with such arrogance finds nothing to protect it against your courage.

"The Po, the Tessin, the Adda, did not stop you a single day; those boasted bulwarks of Italy were found wanting. . . . . Shall posterity reproach us with having found a Capua in Lombardy? . . . . Let us be doing; we have still forced marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels to gather, insults to avenge. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

This manner of addressing the soldiers, and giving them the credit of the great exploits in Italy due to his own

genius, made Bonaparte extremely popular with the army, which was at once interested and flattered. There was a fair prospect, too, of more booty, which was much needed owing to the rapacity of the home Government.

TO THE MINISTER OF FINANCES.

"MILAN, *21st May*, 1796.

"The army of Italy is in the greatest distress. . . . . *It is every day reinforced, and its necessities increase in proportion.* When the Directory gave me the command of this army it drew up a plan of offensive warfare necessitating prompt measures and extraordinary resources. The advance of two *sous* in silver and of eight francs for the officers has not been paid, which discontents and discourages the army. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

And an urgent appeal is made for payment of sums over due. The same day came the following decree :—

"The various provinces of the Milanais will furnish for the wants of the army :—First, 2,000 draft horses ; second, cloth enough for 15,000 coats, 50,000 vests, and 50,000 breeches ; third, 100,000 shirts ; fourth, 20,000 hats ;—to be all delivered in one week."

And yet on the 22nd May, in spite of this penury, specie and valuables were sent to Paris where gold was scarce, and where men in power had to be kept in good humour. Peter was robbed to pay Paul. With assignats at such a fearful discount, gold and silver were absolutely necessary in France, and no doubt the civil commissioners who accompanied the army had strict orders with regard to the precious metals. It is, however, difficult to reconcile Bonaparte's letter of the 21st with that of the following day.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *22nd May*, 1796.

". . . . Commissioner Salicetti will forward you a list of the contributions we have imposed. You can at present count upon from 6,000,000 to 8,000,000 francs in gold or silver, ingots, or jewels which are at your disposal at Genoa at the house of one of the first bankers. You can make use of that sum as it is the surplus of the wants of the army (!) If you desire I can send a million to Bâle for the army of the Rhine. . . . . *The troops are satisfied;* they receive half their pay in money. Pillage is repressed, and discipline, with abundance, once more flourishes in this glorious army. . . . . I send you a copy of the suspension of hostilities accorded to the Duke of Modena; you will see this is 10,000,000 francs more for the Republic.

"BONAPARTE."

Pillage was certainly not repressed, frequent mention being made of it in subsequent letters. The prospect of the 10,000,000 francs atoned for the crime of according a suspension of arms which was contrary to instructions.

PROCLAMATION TO THE INHABITANTS OF LOMBARDY.

"MILAN, *25th May*, 1796.

"A misguided multitude without any real means of existence commits the greatest excesses in several parishes in contempt of the Republic and the army which has triumphed over several kings. This unaccountable delirium is worthy of pity; these unfortunate people are led astray. The general-in-chief, faithful to the principles adopted by the French nation, which does not make war on people, wishes to leave a door open to repentance; but those who do not lay down their arms and take a new oath to the

Republic, within twenty-four hours, shall be treated as rebels, and their villages burned. Let the terrible example of Binasco open their eyes. Such shall be the fate of all the towns and villages which remain in a state of revolt.

"BONAPARTE."

The exactions of the army of Italy had driven the people of Lombardy to despair, but Bonaparte had no idea of being trifled with by the slaves he came to liberate from a hateful despotism, and who failed to appreciate the benevolent intentions of the French Republic.

TO GENERAL DESPINOY, AT MILAN.

"PAVIA, 26*th May*, 1796.

"I suppose that by this you have shot the persons taken in arms. It is indispensable that you should send all the State prisoners you have arrested, under strong escort, to Tortona. *You will also arrest all those persons who have sent a portion of their family into the Tyrol although not connected with the last conspiracy.* . . . . It is necessary that some of the 200 hostages, whom I propose to take from Milan, should start for Pavia during the day.

"BONAPARTE."

After taking these and other violent measures, quite in keeping with those Jacobin practices which were no longer in vogue in Paris, Bonaparte wrote:—

TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE MILANAIS.

"BRESCIA, 28*th May*, 1796.

"The nobles, priests, and agents of Austria lead the people of these splendid countries astray. The French army, as generous as it is strong, will treat all peaceful inhabitants with fraternity; it will be as terrible as the fire from heaven towards rebels."

Several comminatory articles follow, calculated to strike terror into the hearts of persons guilty of even speaking against France in private. The Italians were to allow their chains to be broken in silence, and were to submit without a murmur to the exactions of their strange friends, or rather of their new masters.

On more than one occasion Bonaparte, in his proclamations, and evidently to excuse the excesses committed by his own troops, denounced the infamous exactions of the Austrians even in a friendly country. Now here is what Nelson wrote on this subject :—

TO ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JERVIS, K.B.

"GENOA, *9th April*, 1796.

". . . . The secretary was full of praises of the late Austrian army; not a sixpence of debt had been left behind, nor an individual injured by their stay in the Riviera; contrasting it with the conduct of the French. . . . .

"HORATIO NELSON."

Bonaparte was now able to turn his attention for a moment in another direction.

TO THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE.

"BRESCIA, *29th May*, 1796.

"It is to deliver the finest country of Europe from the iron yoke of the arrogant house of Austria that the French army has braved the most difficult obstacles. Victory, in harmony with justice, has crowned these efforts. The remains of the enemy's army have fallen back behind the Mincio. The French army, in pursuit, is about to enter the territory of the Republic of Venice, but it will not forget the *long friendship which unites the two Republics.* Its religion, government, customs, and property shall be respected. Let the people have no anxiety, the severest

discipline shall be maintained, and everything furnished to the army shall be paid for in money.

". . . . Faithful in the road of honour, as in that of victory, the French soldier is terrible only for the enemies of liberty and of his Government.

"BONAPARTE."

This violation of territory was most unjustifiable. Venice had refused to join the coalition, and had assumed an attitude of unarmed neutrality—attitude which proved fatal to her political existence, but which had been till then respected by Austria. The Venetians protested, but Bonaparte was not to be diverted from his course by the representations of a feeble and unarmed State. The treatment of Venice ought to have acted as a salutary lesson, and have taught Prussia, Naples, and Spain the dangers to which neutrality would expose them in their turn.

On the 30th May Bonaparte, having crossed the Mincio at Borghetto, and forced the Austrians to fall back into the Tyrol, wrote :—

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"*1st June*, 1796.

". . . . The Austrians are completely driven from Italy. Our advanced posts are on the mountains of Germany. I shall not cite the names of the men who distinguished themselves by their bravery [did cite Generals Murat and Leclerc destined to become his brothers-in-law],—I should have to mention all the grenadiers and carabineers of the advanced guard. They play and laugh with death ; to-day they are quite accustomed to cavalry, and smile at it. Nothing can equal their intrepidity if it is not the gaiety with which they undertake forced marches ; they sing turn about of love and country. You would think that on reaching their bivouacs they would go to sleep ; not at all ; each one tells his story or relates his plan of operations for

the morrow, and one often comes across men who see very clearly. The other day I was looking at a demi-brigade which was marching past when a *chasseur* approached my horse: 'General,' he said, 'you must do this and that.' 'You scamp,' I replied, 'will you hold your tongue?' He disappeared directly; I have in vain caused search to be made for him; it was just what I had ordered should be done.

"BONAPARTE."

In Paris the victories of Bonaparte were celebrated by speeches in the Champ de Mars, by cantatas by Lebrun-Pindare, by dances, banquets, torch-light processions, and other manifestations which greatly troubled the repose of the Directory.

The Austrian cavalry were a great thorn at this period in the side of Bonaparte. He had nothing to oppose to them. Marmont, writing to his father after Lodi, said, "It would be difficult to depict the little courage shown by our horse soldiers." The story about the *chasseur* is probably a fable.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"VERONA, *3rd June*, 1796.

"I have just reached this city, which I propose to quit to-morrow. It is very large and very fine. I intend leaving a strong garrison here in order to remain master of the three bridges over the Adige.

"I did not conceal from the inhabitants that, if the king of France had not evacuated their city before I crossed the Po, I should have set fire to a place bold enough to believe itself the capital of the French kingdom.

"I have just been to visit the amphitheatre; those remains of the Romans are worthy of them. I could not help feeling humiliated at the shabbiness of our Champ de Mars. Here 100,000 spectators could sit down and hear easily all that an orator said.

"The *émigrés* are flying from Italy; more than 1,500 left before our arrival. They rush to Germany, whither they convey their remorse and their poverty.

"BONAPARTE."

It is true that Verona had accorded hospitality to the Comte de Provence, afterwards Louis XVIII., but Venice had first of all obtained the authorisation of the Committee of Public Safety, and had received the formal assurance that France would not regard this matter as a violation of neutrality. Then the Comte de Provence had left the Venetian States two months before Bonaparte threatened to burn down Verona!

Having himself violated the neutrality of Venice in spite of the *long friendship* which had existed between the two Republics, Bonaparte expressed great indignation that the Austrians should have imitated him—an indignation simulated for the occasion.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *7th June*, 1796.

"When M. Beaulieu knew that we were going to cross the Mincio, he seized on the fortress of Peschiera which belongs to the Venetians, *and entered it without resistance*. . . As soon as I learned that the Austrians were in the place, I knew that it must be invested at once so as to prevent it from being provisioned. A few days' delay would have obliged me to undertake a three months' siege.

"The combat of Borghetto, and the passage of the Mincio, made us masters of this place two days later. The 'Proveditor' came in great haste to justify himself; I received him very badly, and told him that I should march upon Venice and complain to the senate of his manifest treason. While we were talking Massena had orders to enter Verona, at no matter what price. The alarm at

Venice was extreme; the archduke of Milan, who was there, at once fled to Germany.

"The senate of Venice has just sent me two sages to find out how matters stand. I renewed my complaints and spoke of the reception given to *Monsieur* (Louis XVIII.). I said I had counted upon finding in Venice a faithful ally, and that it was with great regret, owing to what had happened at Peschiera, that I was obliged to think otherwise; that I considered, however, the storm might be averted. In the meantime the Venetians furnish everything the army requires *with the best possible grace.*

"If your intention is to wring 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 francs from Venice, I have arranged this kind of a rupture in a way which will facilitate matters, and you can demand an indemnity for the battle of Borghetto which I was obliged to fight. If you have other intentions, it will be well to keep this quarrel open, and I will take the first favourable opportunity for carrying out your wishes, for we must not dispute with every one at the same time.

"*The truth of the Peschiera affair is that Beaulieu basely deceived the Venetians; he demanded a passage for fifty men and then seized on the town.* I am placing Peschiera in a state of defence, and before a fortnight it will require heavy guns and a regular siege to take it.

"BONAPARTE."

The language of Bonaparte towards the Venetians was excessively arrogant and severe: he threatened to march upon Venice in order to punish them for their treason, he exacted supplies for his army, and he occupied Verona and Legnago, the two keys of the Adige. The Austrians not being in a position to resume hostilities, the French were masters of the country, and proceeded to treat it as they had treated the Milanais. Venice was only at the beginning of her troubles. There was something astounding in the idea of making the Venetians pay for a battle by which

Peschiera was wrested by one violating power from another on neutral territory.

On the same day Bonaparte sent to the Directory a copy of an armistice concluded with Naples pointing out its various political and military advantages thus—

"It will place us in a position to dictate any terms we like to Rome; already the Papal Court is engaged in drawing up a Bull against those who, under the pretext of religion, preach civil war in France.

"From the conversation which I had this morning with M. d'Azara, minister of Spain, envoy of the Pope, it appears to me that he had orders to offer us contributions. I shall soon be at Bologna. Would you like me then to accept from the Pope, in exchange for an armistice, 25,000,000 francs in money, 5,000,000 francs in merchandise, 300 pictures and statues, and manuscripts in proportion; and that I should set at liberty all the patriots arrested for revolutionary acts? . . . Be persuaded that once you tell me positively what your orders are they will have to be very difficult if I cannot execute them.

"BONAPARTE."

In concluding an armistice with Naples, Bonaparte again acted in direct opposition to the orders of the Government, and exhibited great independence. He spoke very freely to Prince Belmonte Pignatelli, and asked him if he thought "he was fighting for those scamps of lawyers," as he called the Directory. It is true that the armistice was most advantageous, as it deprived the coalition of the Neapolitan cavalry, which Napoleon admitted to be very formidable; and it also dispensed the French army from a march to Naples which would, at the moment, have been extremely hazardous. Although Bonaparte more than once chastened the Church well, he loved her after a fashion; not only because he admired her discipline and liked to dispute with her, but because he never could shake off a certain amount of superstition. If he now spoke of marching on Rome he

avoided carrying out the intentions of the Directory as long as possible, and never fully carried them out. The Directory wished to ignore the Pope altogether, while Bonaparte treated with him as with a spiritual and temporal sovereign.[1]

TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE TYROL.

"TORTONA, *14th June*, 1796.

"I am about to enter your territory, brave Tyrolians, in order to force the Court of Vienna to conclude a peace necessary for Europe and for her own subjects; it is your own cause that I am defending. . . The French army love and respect all people, more especially the simple and virtuous inhabitants of the mountains. Your religion, your customs, shall be respected. . . But should you ignore your own interests, and take up arms, we shall be terrible as the fire from heaven; we shall burn the houses and lay waste the territory of the villages which take part in a war that does not concern them. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

It is curious to find a liberator obliged to resort to such threats as these; but the immortal principles of the French Revolution were ill-understood by simple mountaineers, whose homesteads were ruthlessly plundered by an invading army, whose chief occupation appeared to be to levy contributions, and to indulge in rapine. Priests and nobles

[1] Nelson, too, about this time had some idea of paying a visit to the Eternal City if he could only aid in driving the French out of the country, as proved by the following letter :—

TO MRS. NELSON.

"LEGHORN ROADS, *23rd August*, 1796.

". . . I do not think he (the Pope) will oppose the thunder of the Vatican against my thunder; and you will, I dare say, hear that I am at Rome in my barge. If I succeed, I am determined to row up the Tiber and into Rome.

"HORATIO NELSON."

were generally accused of being at the bottom of every hostile movement against the armies of the Republic, but the fact is that nothing but a system of terror, and terrible reprisals, could preserve even the indolent races of Italy in nominal subjection. Had Bonaparte experienced a serious reverse, the French troops would have been massacred to a man, and of this Bonaparte was well aware.

A few days afterwards the French came into contact with the Papal army.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"BOLOGNA, 21*st June*, 1796.

"General Augereau's division passed the Po yesterday and arrived at Bologna on the 19th; he found 400 soldiers of the Pope there and made them prisoners. . . We have captured the Cardinal Legate, all the officers of the staff, and taken four flags; also the Cardinal Legate of Ferrara, together with the commandant of that fort, who is a knight of Malta."

After alluding to the pictures *furnished* by Parma and Modena, the report continues—

"Monge, Berthollet, and Thouin are at Pavia, where they are busy enriching our *Jardin des Plantes* and cabinet of natural history. *I imagine they will not forget a complete collection of serpents which appeared to me worthy of making the voyage.* I think they will be here the day after to-morrow; they will find an abundant harvest.

"An intercepted letter from Vienna announces that General Wurmser is coming to command the army of Italy. . . . *Italy is to-day entirely French.* With a middling army we have to face all emergencies; to hold the German armies in check, to besiege forts, to protect our rear, *to overawe* Genoa, Venice, Florence, Rome and Naples; *we must be in force everywhere.* Military, political, and

financial unity is therefore necessary. *Here, one must burn and shoot in order to establish terror,* and there one *must pretend not to see because the time has not arrived for action.*

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte sadly wanted to get rid of the Government commissioners, who somewhat resembled our political officers in India. They no longer accompanied the army as in the days of the Terror, furnished with a portable guillotine, but they hampered his operations and offended his dignity.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"BOLOGNA, 21*st June*, 1796.

"I spoke in my preceding letter of our military position; I wish now to talk over our political situation with the Pope and the Senate of Bologna.

"The Cardinal Legate whom we made prisoner here has been sent to Rome on parole. I told him that if the Pope makes proposals convincing us of his resolution to repair the insult done to the French Republic by the assassination of Basseville, and pays us a contribution to enable us to meet the enormous expense occasioned by the war, he will perhaps find a refuge in the French Republic. . . .

"The Republic of Bologna used to enjoy great privileges, which successive Popes have infringed. In order to make the Court of Rome tremble and feel that its magic has no effect on us, I have authorised the senate of Bologna to regard as null and void all the decrees violating its liberty. This has given great pleasure here and is severely felt at Rome. During the time that the armistice lasts we shall have no need to keep troops here; for, seeing the manner in which I have embroiled the Bolognese with the Court of Rome, they will always dread its vengeance. . . . The heat of the weather is excessive. . . . This armistice is concluded rather with the dog days than with the Papal army; my

opinion is that you should be in no hurry to conclude peace, so that in September, if affairs go well in Germany and North Italy, we may seize on Rome.

"BONAPARTE."

Basseville had been assassinated during a popular rising in 1793, and from that date no French diplomatic agent had appeared at Rome. Now, however, Count Miot de Melito was sent there to negotiate, having first received the positive assurance of S. d'Agara and the Pope that he might present himself without danger at the Papal Court.

On the 23rd June was concluded the "Armistice between the French Republic and the Pope." His Holiness was to pay 21,000,000 fr. in money and goods, "independent of the contributions which have been, or which may be, levied on the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and *Faenza*."

"Art. 6. The citadel of Ancona is to be handed over to the French army in six days.

"Art. 7. The city of Ancona is to remain under the civil government of the Pope.

"Art. 8. The Pope will hand over to the French Republic 100 pictures, busts, vases, or statues selected by commissioners sent to Rome; among these objects will be comprised the bronze bust of Junius Brutus, and the marble one of Marcus Brutus, both placed in the Capitol, and 500 manuscripts chosen by the aforesaid commissioners.

"BONAPARTE," &c. &c.

It is to be doubted whether Bonaparte, seeing the high estimation in which he held Cæsar, had any real admiration for his murderer, but for the moment Marcus Brutus was a popular character whose memory was dear to Lucien Bonaparte and other Jacobins. Aware that the Directory would be dissatisfied with this armistice, Bonaparte soothed them with the assurance that it would produce 34,000,000 fr., and declared that but for the interference of the civil commissioners he would have obtained much better terms.

The Directors on their side wished to see the Papacy entirely destroyed, but they no longer enjoyed any real power in Italy.

Three days later Bonaparte wrote again complaining of the baneful influence of the civil commissioners. It is difficult to read without a feeling of indignation the passages which concern the pillage of manuscripts.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"PISTOJA, *26th June*, 1796.

"You will find inclosed the conditions of the armistice concluded with the Pope. M. d'Azara, who is the person with whom we have really negotiated, had the impudence to offer us 5,000,000 fr. in money and 3,000,000 fr. in goods, whereas I demanded 40,000,000 fr., of which 10,000,000 fr. in goods. Seeing he could obtain no diminution, he went to the commissioners, and succeeded in worming out our secret, to wit, our inability to go to Rome. It then became impossible to get more than 20,000,000 fr. by making a night march on Ravenna. I had inserted a clause that the treasures of Notre Dame de Lorette should be given up to us, and I thought that this had been agreed to, but M. d'Azara so twisted about that it became necessary to accept 1,000,000 fr. instead. This fashion of negotiating by three is most prejudicial to the interests of the Republic. . . . This is all very disagreeable for me; the Republic has lost 10,000,000 fr., and I have lost a portion of the result of my movement on Bologna. . . . There was little difficulty about the other conditions with the exception of the manuscripts; there, we were obliged to reduce our demands from 2,000 or 3,000 to 500. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

In all, Rome and the legations were called upon to pay in money and goods, 34,700,000 fr. An amusing controversy arose in consequence of Bonaparte having levied

a contribution on the Legation of Faenza (which did not exist) instead of Ravenna. But the general was not a man to allow his plans to be thwarted by special pleading. On the 2nd July he wrote again to the Directory, saying that "eighty waggons left yesterday laden with hemp and silk. . . . I am collecting all the jewels and silver plate at Tortona. . . . The savants have reaped an abundant harvest at Pavia. We are much embarrassed as to what to select at Rome. The statues can only be transported by sea, and it would be dangerous to trust them on board ship [owing to the English]. . . . Send orders," &c.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"ROVERBELLA, *6th July*, 1796.

"For some months past, Citizen Directors, the Corsican *patriots* have been in a state of insurrection against the English. I have sent them some fowling-pieces and barrels of powder, with twenty Corsican refugees belonging to the cantons which have shown the most energy. To-day we are masters of Leghorn, and it will be easy to drive the English from Corsica without sending a single soldier." Merely more refugees, guns, powder, and Commissioner Salicetti, "also some pamphlets written in a proper style [and very different to the celebrated '*Letter to Buttafuoco*']. It will further be necessary for you to authorise me to promise a general pardon to the islanders.

"BONAPARTE."

In virtue of a capitulation concluded with Admiral Hood, Corsica had been annexed to the British Crown, and was governed by Sir Gilbert Elliot as viceroy. As for the last King of Corsica, poor Theodora, whose romantic career was traced by Boswell in his history of the island, he died in London, like Paoli; but unlike Paoli, who lies entombed in Westminster Abbey, he sleeps in St. Anne's, Soho, after having been released from the King's Bench. His funeral

expenses were paid by an oilman, and Horace Walpole wrote his epitaph.

Nelson, who was at first enthusiastic about Corsica and the advantages which would accrue from its possession, soon altered his mind, as the following letter will show, when he became better acquainted with the inhabitants.

TO WILLIAM LOCKER.

"CAPTAIN AT SEA. *November 5th*, 1796.

" . . . We have now done with Corsica ; I have seen the first and the last of that kingdom. Its situation certainly was most desirable for us, but the generality of its inhabitants are so greedy of wealth, and so jealous of each other, that it would require the patience of Job and the riches of Crœsus to satisfy them. They say themselves they are only to be ruled by the Ruling Power, shooting all its enemies, and bribing all its friends. They already regret our departure from them, for no more silver harvest will come to their lot. I remember when we quitted Toulon we endeavoured to reconile ourselves to Corsica, now we are content with Elba—such things are ; however, we have a fine port, and no expenses for the government of the island. The conduct of the Pope is extraordinary ; although he is at war with the French, yet he has not opened his ports to us ; he is fearful of a turn in the present happy prospects. In short, Italy has been lost by the fear of its princes ; had they expended half the money to preserve their territories which they have paid the French for entering them, their countries would have been happy, instead of being filled with present misery and diabolical notions of Government."

"VERONA, *12th July*, 1796.

" . . . . For several days past we have been in observation along the Adige. Woe to him who miscalculates !

" We are now engaged in besieging Mantua. I propose making a bold stroke. The boats, Austrian uniforms, and

batteries will be ready by the 28th. Ulterior operations will entirely depend on the success of this sudden attack, which, like all of a similar nature, will depend upon luck—a dog or a goose. . . . . You will find inclosed the copy of a letter written to the Venetian Senate and the reply. However, I am master of all the strong places of the Republic along the Adige. Perhaps you may deem it advisable to commence a little quarrel with the Venetian ambassador in Paris, so that after the fall of Mantua, and when I have driven the Austrians from Brenta, I may find it easier to put forward the demand for a few millions which you intend to make. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Neither slumbering dog nor cackling goose had aught to say to the fate of Mantua in July, 1796. That fortress was saved for the moment by Wurmser, who swept down on the Adige with 60,000 men. In the centre of the French line Joubert and Massena were driven out of Corona and Rivoli. On the left Sauret was obliged to evacuate Salo, and Quasdanowich occupied Brescia, while on the right an Austrian corps made its way to Verona.

How desperate was the condition of French affairs at this juncture may be gathered from the following letter.

TO GENERAL AUGEREAU (*besieging Mantua*).

". . . . 30*th July*, 1796.

"You must fall back upon Roverbella, abandon your line, destroy the bridge of Porto Legnago, burn the carriages of your siege-guns, and carry off everything possible. . . . . Every moment is precious. I confide to your ability and ordinary prudence the execution of these measures. This is the unfortunate position of the army—the enemy has broken our line at three places; he is master of the important points of Corona and Rivoli; Massena and Joubert have been obliged to yield to force. Sauret has abandoned Salo and fallen back on Desenzano; the enemy

has seized upon Brescia and the bridge of San Marco. You will see that our communications with Milan and Verona are cut. Await fresh orders at Roverbella, whither I shall go.

"BONAPARTE."

These orders must have been promptly obeyed, for when Wurmser reached Mantua the blockading force had entirely vanished, to the great disappointment of the Austrian general.

With wonderful rapidity Bonaparte concentrated his forces. He first fell upon Quasdanowich at Lonato and drove him from Salo and Brescia, and then attacked and defeated the two other Austrian corps before they had completed their junction.

TO CITIZEN SALICETTI.

"BRESCIA, *2nd August*, 1796.

"Fortune appears adverse for the moment. So many events have happened within the last few days that it is impossible for me to send you a detailed report. Thanks, however, to the victory of Lonato and to the vigorous measures I have adopted, matters will soon be set right. I have raised the siege of Mantua and am here with nearly all my forces. . . . . Louis (Bonaparte) will furnish you with full information. . . . . See that Milan, Tortona, Alessandria, and Pavia are well supplied. I am very much fatigued, and have ridden five horses to death. I cannot write to the Directory.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte did, however, write to the Directory the same day, saying: "We have experienced a reverse, Citizen Directors, but already victory has returned to our standards. If the enemy had the good luck to surprise us at Salo and to take Corona, we have beaten him at Lonato and have

recaptured Salo. The Austrian army is very strong; we have 30,000 men under arms and 12,000 in hospital. . . . . It is under these difficult circumstances that I have reason to admire the courage and the devotion of the troops."

The French recovered the line of the Adige and drove Wurmser and the remaining half of his army into the Italian Tyrol. The Austrians in this brief campaign had 20,000 men killed or wounded, and lost 15,000 prisoners and 70 guns.

On the 6th August Bonaparte furnished the Directory with a full report of his more recent operations, and his triumphs at Lonato and Castiglione after the Salo-Corona affair. In this very long despatch he thus relates one of the most curious episodes of this splendid campaign.

"During the whole of the 17th Thermidor (or 4th August) Wurmser was engaged in getting together the remnants of his army, bringing up his reserve, and drawing all his disposable forces from Mantua, in order to set them in battle array in the plain between the village of Golferino, on which he rested his right, and the Chiese, which already protected his left. The fate of Italy was about to be decided. He concentrated some 25,000 men and a large force of cavalry, feeling that he might still change the fate of the campaign.

"On my side I issued orders for the concentration of all the columns of the army. I went myself to Lonato to see what troops I could draw thence; but what was my surprise on entering that place to receive an Austrian *parlementaire*, who summoned the commandant of Lonato to surrender, because, he said, he was surrounded on all sides! In fact, the cavalry vedettes informed me that some Austrian columns touched our grand guards, and that already the road from Brescia to Lonato was intercepted at the bridge of San Marco. I quickly perceived that this could only be the remnant of one of the enemy's divisions

which had been cut off, and which, having wandered about in the hope of being able to rejoin the main body, was endeavouring to find a way of escape. The circumstance was sufficiently embarrassing, for I had only about 1,200 men at Lonato. I sent for the *parlementaire*, and after having his eyes unbandaged, told him that if his commanding officer had the presumption to capture the general-in-chief of the army of Italy he would do well to advance; that he ought to have known I was at Lonato as my whole army was there, and that all his general and field officers should be held personally responsible for the insult. I declared that if in eight minutes his division had not laid down its arms, I would not spare a man. The *parlementaire* appeared much astonished to find me there, and an instant afterwards the whole column laid down its arms. It was 4,000 strong, with two guns and 50 cavalry."

The Austrian general, somewhat bewildered, and, in fact, engaged in endeavouring to effect his escape, was totally deceived by the presence of Bonaparte, whose ready wit saved him from falling into the clutches of the enemy. After giving a few details concerning the battle of Castiglione, Bonaparte continued:

"In five days, therefore, another campaign has been finished. Wurmser has lost, during these five days, 70 field-pieces, all his infantry caissons, from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, 6,000 men killed or wounded, and almost all the troops drawn from the Rhine. Independently of this, a great portion of his force has been dispersed, and we are picking up men in pursuit. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Attacked again on the 7th August, the enemy was obliged to raise the siege of Peschiera and to abandon the line of the Mincio.

"The Austrian army which for weeks," wrote Bonaparte,

"threatened the invasion of Italy, has vanished like a dream."

In his narrative of the above affair Bonaparte made no allusion to Josephine, whom he had summoned to Brescia by means of the most tender entreaties, and who narrowly escaped capture. In her terror she wept. "Wurmser," said her husband, embracing her, "shall pay dearly for those tears." In the end Josephine, more dead than alive, managed to reach Lucca in a state of terrible anxiety, as she had left Bonaparte surrounded by foes, and had herself been exposed to the fire of the enemy.

TO CITIZEN CARNOT.

"VERONA, *9th August*, 1796.

"One of my brothers, who is war commissary at Marseilles, has gone to Paris without permission. This young man combines some talent with a good deal of obstinacy; he has *all his life* had the mania of meddling with politics [had assumed the name of Brutus under the Terror]. At a moment when it appears that a great many persons desire to injure me, and when every intrigue is employed to attach credit to rumours as stupid as they are malevolent, I beg you to render me an essential service and to order him to join some army.

"I recommend you *the one* (*id est*, Louis) who was my aide-de-camp, and whom I sent to you on the eve of the battle of Lonato. This gallant young man deserves all the attention you can bestow on him.

"The heat is excessive here, and my health has suffered. If there be in France a single pure-minded and honest man capable of suspecting my political intentions, I shall at once renounce the happiness of serving my country. Three or four months of obscurity will calm envy, re-establish my health, and place me in a position to fill any post to which the confidence of the Government may call me. It was only by leaving Paris at the proper time that

I have been able to serve the Republic. *By leaving the army of Italy at the right moment* I shall be able to devote the rest of my life to *the defence of the Republic.* The great art of Government is not to let men grow old. In entering a public career I adopted for principle, 'Everything for the country!'

"BONAPARTE."

After losing the battles of Roverdo and Bassano, Wurmser managed, much to the disappointment of Bonaparte, to cross the Adige and to throw himself into Mantua, defeating the detachments which endeavoured to stop him. Bonaparte afterwards gave his venerable opponent great credit for this feat of arms. Under the walls of Mantua Wurmser once more delivered battle (St. George's), but he was repulsed and obliged to shut himself up in the fortress, the siege of which he had forced the French to raise a few days previously by the impetuosity of his attack on their lines.

On the 16th September, 1796, Bonaparte despatched Marmont to Paris with twenty-two captured standards, and a detailed account of the combats of Cerea, Castellaro, Porto Legnago, Due Castelli, and the battle of St. George's, in which the French took a whole regiment of cuirassiers, a division of hulans, and twenty-five guns, in addition to infantry.

And yet, with all his victories, Italy was so little French, that Bonaparte's mind was filled with apprehensions for the future. The Papal Court had rejected the additional stipulations which the Directory had attempted to impose. It positively refused to cancel all the briefs fulminated against the French Republic and the civil constitution of the clergy, and to abolish the Inquisition. The waggons containing the 21,000,000 francs, and which had started for France, were ordered to return, and Cardinal Mattei took possession of Ferrara. Naples, too, was restive, the Venetians more discontented than ever, and affairs with Genoa,

Modena, and Tuscany in the most unsatisfactory condition. However, Wurmser was shut up in Mantua, and it was not probable that Austria would give any further trouble for some weeks to come.

Tuscany had been alienated by the most cruel injustice. That state was at peace with France, there was no pretext for attacking it, and it enjoyed the mildest of governments. But Tuscany was feeble, at Leghorn lay forty English merchant vessels, and the Directors had been assured that heaps of gold were to be found there. The temptation was too strong, and Napoleon determined to pounce by stealth on this rich prey. The Grand Duke was living in fancied security when he heard that a French division had crossed the Apennines and was marching on Pistoja. Bonaparte, who accompanied this force, declared that it was on the way to Rome to intimidate the Pope, and on the earnest representations of Manfredini, the Grand Duke's minister, he consented that it should pass through Sienna instead of through Florence. In conformity with this promise, the division marched under the orders of Murat, but it had not gone far before it changed its direction and hurried to Leghorn. The English had fortunately taken alarm, and when Murat and the two Government commissioners, Salicetti and Gareau, thought to sieze on their booty, great was their mortification at beholding the forty vessels standing out to sea. Bonaparte in a very respectful letter explained this flagrant violation of territory by his desire to "maintain neutrality." He assured the Tuscans that their flag, their garrison, and their property would be respected, but his instructions to General Vaubois were in direct contradiction to these assurances. On the 11th Bonaparte wrote to Faypoult that it was his firm intention "to maintain the harmony existing between himself and the Grand Duke," and on the 12th he wrote to Miot de Melito, the French minister at Florence, to warn him of the Grand Duke's departure for Vienna, so that he might have him seized *en route*. It was naturally supposed that

the Grand Duke would fly to the court of his brother, who was organising another army.

Bonaparte had now time to turn his attention once more to Rome during the siege of Mantua.

TO CARDINAL MATTEI.

"MILAN, *26th September*, 1796.

"Your character, sir, which all who know you praise, induces me to permit you to return to Ferrara and to throw the veil of oblivion over your conduct of last month. I flatter myself that you have too much intelligence and too great a knowledge of the New Testament for that conduct to have been anything but a temporary forgetfulness; a priest who mixes himself up in political affairs does not deserve the respect due to his profession.

"Return to your diocese and practise that virtue which it is unanimously agreed you possess; but never interfere with politics. Be persuaded, besides, that the clergy, and all persons connected with public worship, will be specially respected by the French Republic.

"I am, sir, with esteem and consideration, &c.,

"BONAPARTE."

The Cardinal had been made prisoner and thrown into a convent for having re-occupied Ferrara in the name of the Pope, but now he was to go to Rome with pacific assurances, in company with a French agent, whose instructions were to gain time.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *1st October*, 1796.

"After the battle of St. George's we endeavoured to entice Wurmser to fight another battle, so as to weaken his garrison *extra muros*. . . I have now 18,900 men acting as an army of observation, and 9,000 laying siege to Mantua. I leave you to think, if I do not receive reinforcements, how I shall be able to resist the Emperor this winter, who will

have 50,000 men in the field in six weeks. . . Reflect that you require in Italy, to be able to sustain a winter campaign, 35,000 infantry for the army of observation, and 18,000 infantry for siege operations. These two forces united make 53,000 men, and at present we have only 27,000; cavalry, gunners, sappers, drivers, etc., were also needed, and ——

"If the preservation of Italy be dear to you, Citizen Directors, send me all this aid. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Things were again looking black, and an attempt to cajole the King of Sardinia into an offensive alliance had failed—his Majesty had demanded too much; nothing less than Lombardy, which the Directory now wished to offer to Austria in exchange for Belgium, on the conclusion of peace. Overtures made to Venice had also broken down and everything was going wrong on the Rhine.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *2nd October*, 1796.

"The Republic of Venice is alarmed, and is plotting with the King of Naples and the Pope. Of all the people of Italy the Venetians hate us the most; they are all armed, and in some of the cantons the inhabitants are brave. . . . . The King of Naples has raised a force of 60,000 men, and if he is to be attacked and dethroned that will require 18,000 infantry, and 3,000 cavalry. . . . . Rome is strong owing to her fanaticism, and if she declares against us she will greatly augment the force of the King of Naples, and will oblige me to protect my rear with 3,000 men. . . . . I think that 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry will be able to keep Rome in respect. . . . . Should we be beaten on the Rhine [where Moreau and Jourdan were being severely handled by the Archduke Charles] it will be necessary to conclude peace with Rome and Naples. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY.

"MILAN, *2nd October*, 1796.

"Majesty, Europe desires peace. This disastrous war has lasted too long. I have the honour to notify to your Majesty that if you do not send plenipotentiaries to Paris to offer negotiations for peace, the Directory has ordered me to fill up the port of Trieste, and to ruin all your Majesty's establishments in the Adriatic. Up to the present I have refrained from executing this plan in the hope of not increasing the number of innocent victims of this war. I hope that your Majesty will be alive to the misfortunes which menace your subjects, and will restore that repose necessary for the tranquillity of the world, &c., &c.

"BONAPARTE."

When Bonaparte wrote the above hectoring demand, which received no answer, he was hard pressed and in a state of great anxiety, as is proved by the following letter to the Directory—

"MILAN, *8th October*, 1796.

"We shall not be able to take Mantua before February; you will perceive that our position in Italy is uncertain, and our political system very bad. . . . . We were negotiating with the Pope when the armistice was broken, and 10,000,000 francs, pictures, and merchandise were about to be handed over to us. Rome is arming, and arousing the fanaticism of the people. . . . . I consider peace with Naples most essential, and an alliance with Genoa and with the court of Turin necessary. Make peace with Parma; take Lombardy, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and Ferrara under your protection, and above all send troops. . . . . Our situation is very precarious; you should adopt a system capable of insuring us friends *among princes as well as among peoples*. Diminish our enemies. The influence of Rome is incalculable; it was a great mistake to quarrel with that

Power. Had I been consulted I should have delayed negotiations as I did with Genoa and Venice. Whenever your general in Italy is not the centre of everything you will run great risks. This language will not be imputed to ambition; I have only too many honours, and my health is so impaired, that I think I shall be forced to demand a successor. I can no longer get on horseback; my courage alone remains, and that is not sufficient in a position like this.

"BONAPARTE."

The indisposition complained of was not serious, nothing more was heard of it, and the general continued to display his usual restless activity. Before Bonaparte received any reply to the above letter he deposed the Duke of Modena, and turned his State into a Republic, in direct contradiction to the positive instructions of his Government. Other States soon shared the same fate.

On the 12th October, 1796, Bonaparte sent to the Directory a terrible complaint against the army contractors. He wrote:—

"Since I arrived at Milan I have waged war with the swindlers. I have had several tried and punished; others I denounce. In making this declaration of war a thousand voices will be raised against me, and will endeavour to pervert opinions. If two months ago I wished to be Duke of Milan, to-day I desire to be King of Italy! [only assumed the iron crown at Milan in May, 1805] but as long as my strength remains, and I enjoy your confidence, I shall show the swindlers no more pity than the Austrians.

"The company Flachat is a nest of robbers [Flachat was afterwards tried and acquitted] without money, and without morality."

After giving a long list of "horrors which made him blush to be a Frenchman" Napoleon added:—

"You no doubt supposed that your administrators would rob, but that they would perform their duty and exhibit some sense of shame; they plunder in a manner so ridiculous and impudent, that if I had a month's time I would have every one of them shot. I never cease having them arrested and tried by court-martial, but they buy the judges; it is a regular fair here, where everything is sold. . . . . Thévenin is a robber; he indulges in insolent luxury; he made me a present of several fine horses, of which I was in need, and would not accept anything for them [a generous thief]. Have him arrested, and keep him six months in prison; he is able to pay a war tax of 500,000 francs (£20,000) in money. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

And much more did Bonaparte write in a similar strain. What most troubled him was to see the people emigrating *en masse*, and whole districts depopulated. If this continued where were his supplies to come from?

TO GENERAL WURMSER.

"MODENA, 16*th October*, 1796.

"The siege of Mantua, sir, is more disastrous for humanity than two campaigns. Brave men ought to affront danger, but not the pestilence of a marsh. Your cavalry, so precious, is without forage; your garrison, so numerous, is ill-fed; thousands of sick men require change of air, medicines, and wholesome nourishment. . . . . Restore to the Emperor your person, your cavalry, your infantry; give us Mantua; we shall both of us be gainers, and more especially humanity.

"However, as you may believe, I have special reasons beyond the interests of humanity . . . . there will be no inconvenience in allowing you to make yourself acquainted with the position of my army, &c., &c.

"BONAPARTE."

The next day, in a letter to the Directory announcing the meeting of the Congress of Bologna, Modena, Reggio, and Ferrara, &c., Bonaparte added :—

"I await with some impatience the reinforcements you have announced. I have summoned Wurmser to surrender. . . . . As soon as I know if the English have passed the Straits, and learn your intentions concerning Naples, I shall assume a suitable tone with Rome ; I hope to make those *fellows* restore the money which they sent and then took back."

Probably finding resistance useless the Directory now consented to allow Bonaparte to act as he deemed fit with the Pope.

TO CARDINAL MATTEI.

"FERRARA, 21*st October*, 1796.

"The Court of Rome has refused to accept the conditions of peace offered by the Directory ; it has broken the armistice by suspending the execution of my conditions ; it is arming ; it desires war ; it shall have it. But before accomplishing the ruin and death of the madmen who would oppose the Republican phalanxes, I owe it to the nation, to humanity, and to myself to make a last effort to induce the Pope to return to sentiments more moderate and more in conformity with his true interests, his sacred character, and common sense. You are aware, Cardinal, of the strength of the army I command : in order to destroy the temporal power of the Pope, the will alone is wanting. Go to Rome, see the Pope, enlighten him with regard to his true interests. . . . . The French government permits me once more to reopen negotiations, and everything may be arranged. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Three days afterwards Bonaparte wrote to citizen Cacault from Verona to continue negotiations with Rome, adding :—

"I only wait for a favourable moment to fall upon Rome and to avenge the national honour. The chief object is to gain time. . . . . The great art at present is to indulge in a little mutual recrimination in order to deceive that *old fox*. It would be well to obtain a commencement of the execution of the armistice. . . . Victory is returning to our standards."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"VERONA, *25th October*, 1796.

". . . . There appears to be some intention of according an amnesty in Corsica. I think it would be well to except —first, the four deputies who took the crown to London ; second, the six members composing the Council of State of the Viceroy, and lastly the *émigrés*. . . . . I have caused citizen Panatieri, Paoli's secretary, who came from London to intrigue, to be arrested at Leghorn.

"BONAPARTE."

The next letter reveals the fact that at a very early date Bonaparte was considered capable of committing any crime to further his own ends :—

TO CITIZEN CARNOT.

"VERONA, *25th October*, 1796.

"You have seen by the letter of my brother Lucien in what a state of exaltation he is. He compromised himself in '93 several times in spite of my reiterated advice. He wished to play the Jacobin. . . . His sojourn at Marseilles would be dangerous for himself and the public weal as intriguers would get hold of him. Corsica being free to-day, you would much oblige me by sending him there, since his hot head will not permit him to remain with the army of the Rhine."

Napoleon was sorry to trouble Carnot with his domestic affairs, but felt that he must keep a lookout on the political conduct of his relations, since people had such a bad opinion of him that, "when a man was assassinated at Lyons, it was at once given out it was by one of my emissaries or parents—a man I had never heard of!"

"We are anxiously expecting reinforcements. . . . . Things have taken a favourable turn. The peace concluded with Naples and Genoa has filled our enemies with despair. It is unfortunate in our treaty with Naples that we did not obtain the cession of the Island of Elba. *I have given orders at Leghorn for the occupation of Elba directly it is evacuated by the English. . . . . I shall obtain the island in return for our equivalent indemnity taken from the Papal States.* Porto-Ferrajo is necessary to us, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

Porto-Ferrajo, which Nelson, with the consent of the Grand Duke of Tuscany had occupied by way of compensation when the French seized on Leghorn. Porto-Ferrajo, with which Napoleon was destined to make a closer acquaintance in later years.[1]

Having received instructions from Paris, Bonaparte wrote once more to citizen Cacault to reopen negotiations with the Pope, saying:—

"You may assure him that I was always opposed to the treaty, and especially to the manner in which it was negotiated [had suggested that only a portion of it should be revealed to his Holiness at first, so as not to frighten him], that it is owing to my special and reiterated

[1] TO ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JERVIS, K.B., *Captain.*

"PORTO-FERRAJO, 10*th July*, 1796.

"SIR,—I have the pleasure to inform you that the troops under the command of Major Duncan took possession of the forts and town of Port-Ferrajo this day, at ten o'clock. . . ."

demands that the Directory has empowered me to open up new negotiations. My ambition is rather to be the saviour than the destroyer of the Holy See. You know we have always held the same ideas on this subject, and in consequence of the unlimited powers given to me by the Directory if they will only act with wisdom at Rome, we may assure peace to this lovely portion of the world and tranquillise the timorous consciences of many people."

We have several letters about this date complaining of the state to which the army was reduced. "The army is without shoes, without money, without uniforms; the hospitals are devoid of everything, and our wounded are in the most horrible state of destitution. All this owing to want of money, at a moment when we have *acquired* 4,000,000 francs at Leghorn, when the merchandise at Tortona and Milan offers a real resource. Modena, too, should pay us 1,800,000 francs, and Ferrara considerable contributions." And the next day, writing to the Directory:—"We are in such a state of penury that, unless some remedy be adopted, you will have to send money to feed the army." On the 30th November, 1796, appeared a decree at Milan calling on Lombardy to pay up 20,000,000 francs; ordering the sale of the property belonging to the House of Austria, abbey lands, church plate, &c. "Seeing the state of destitution to which the army has been reduced." Napoleon attributed this condition of affairs to the mal-administration of those Government commissioners who were such thorns in his side, and the probability is that he made the picture more gloomy than it really was. The country, however, was evidently becoming exhausted. M. Lanfrey admits that never had such plundering been seen since the Romans despoiled Corinth. The *Corinthium æs* was represented by silver madonas, sacred vessels, and church bells.

At the beginning of November, Alvinzi was at Pavia with 40,000 men and Davidowich was coming through the Tyrol with 18,000. Bonaparte marched against Alvinzi

and inflicted a check upon him at Carmignano, but bad news arrived from the Tyrol where Vaubois had been beaten and Bonaparte had to fall back on Verona. On the 11th he once more attacked Alvinzi at Caldiero, but without being able to carry the position. The situation of the army appeared desperate, but the incomparable firmness and decision of its general were equal to the occasion and saved it.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"VERONA, 13*th November*, 1796.

"I must give you an account of the operations of the army since the 2nd; if it be not satisfactory the army must not be blamed; its exhaustion and its inferiority in the way of men inspire me with alarm. Perhaps we are on the point of losing Italy. None of the expected reinforcements have arrived." After many gloomy predictions comes the account of the corps of General Vaubois being seized with panic and losing 1,300 prisoners and guns, and the check experienced at Caldiero; all this and the death of so many brave men "renders me circumspect; I no longer dare to expose myself as my death would discourage the troops and be a misfortune for those who are the object of all my care. In a few days we shall make a last effort. . . ."

And that *last* effort was at Arcola.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"VERONA, 19*th November*, 1796.

"I am so overcome with fatigue that it is impossible for me to narrate the movements that preceded the battle of Arcola, which has just decided the fate of Italy." The fighting was long and sanguinary, and it was a desperate affair crossing the bridge; Generals Verdier, Bon, Verne, and Lannes were all put *hors de combat* in the attempt. "Augereau, seizing a standard, shouted to the troops, 'Cowards, do you fear death?'—and he remained at the

extremity of the bridge for several minutes without producing any effect. . . . . I went there myself and asked the soldiers if they were the conquerors of Lodi; my presence had such an effect on them that I determined to make another effort to cross."

After many fluctuations the enemy was beaten, but "I cannot conceal that I did not find in my phalanxes the soldiers of Lodi, Millesimo, and Castiglione; fatigue, and the absence of the gallant fellows who have fallen, have deprived them of that impetuosity which would have given me a right to expect the capture of Alvinzi and the greater portion of his army. . . . . The field and staff officers displayed an activity and a bravery without example; twelve or fifteen were killed; not one but had his uniform riddled with bullets. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

There is a celebrated painting of Bonaparte, standard in hand, crossing the bridge of Arcola at the head of his grenadiers, but the legend appears to have been taken from the picture instead of the picture from the fact. One finds, on the other hand no mention in "the Correspondence" of Napoleon having tumbled into a morass during the action and being rescued from his perilous position by his brother Louis as was the case.

The fighting at Arcola lasted three days and it was hoped that the result would lead to peace. The Directory sent General Clarke to negotiate; he was to conclude an armistice, but Bonaparte strongly protested, pointing out that much better terms might be procured after the fall of Mantua, which was *in extremis*. "Send me 30,000 men," he wrote, "and I will march upon Trieste, carry the war into the states of the Emperor, revolutionise Hungary, and go to Vienna. You will then have a right to expect millions, and a good peace."

Under these circumstances hostilities were resumed. Lord Malmesbury, too, who had been sent to Paris to

negotiate on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*, returned to London, for the British Government would not consent to restore the Cape to Holland, nor would France renounce her views upon Belgium.

Venice, having protested against the conduct of the liberating army, received the following reply :—

TO THE PROVÉDITEUR-GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE.

"MILAN, *8th December*, 1796.

"In the note which you have sent me, sir, I do not recognise the conduct of the French troops on Venetian territory, but that of the troops of the Emperor who, wherever they have passed, have committed horrors which make one shudder." Napoleon then criticised the style of the document forwarded to him, comparing it to the effort of an indifferent schoolboy, and added, "Good God! the ills inseparable from a *state of war*, and the shock of passions and interests are already so great and so afflicting for humanity, that it is not worth while augmenting them a hundredfold by adorning them with fairy tales which are either malicious, or extremely ridiculous. I give the lie in the most formal manner to any one daring to say that in the Venetian States a single woman has been violated by the French troops. . . . . BONAPARTE."

At other moments the atrocities committed by his own soldiers made him blush to be a man! It must be remembered that Venice was not at war, but at peace with France.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"VERONA, 21*st December*, 1796.

"The citizen Hercules is promoted to the rank of captain. I grant a gratification of seventy-two francs to each of the twenty-five guides who accompanied him at the battle of Arcola. BONAPARTE."

Citizen Hercules had been sent round to the rear of the Austrian army at Arcola at the head of twenty-five troopers armed with trumpets, and had there blown a blast such as had never been heard since the fall of Jericho, to the utter bewilderment of the enemy. This stratagem, worthy of my Lord Peterborough, had a great influence on the fortunes of the day.

It is more than probable that in the following despatch Bonaparte, in accordance with custom, misrepresented numbers on both sides:—

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, 28*th December*, 1796.

"The army of General Alvinzi is on the Brenta and in the Tyrol, and that of the Republic along the Adige. . . . . Mantua is invested with the greatest care. . . . . You will see by the Emperor's letter that Wurmser must be *in extremis*. . . . . The army returns which you have sent are full of errors. . . . . The army of Italy, properly so called, consisted primitively of 38,500 infantry. It has been reinforced by 10,000 men. We should therefore have 51,100 infantry had the army experienced no losses; but 4,000 men have been killed on the field of battle, there are 1,000 wounded, unfit for further service, 2,000 men have died in hospital; total, 7,000. In all, your army has been reinforced by only 12,500 men, and that in a campaign during which so many battles have been fought, and where the same troops have destroyed the Sardinian army and that of Beaulieu, 73,000 strong; the army of Beaulieu, reinforced by 20,000 men from the Rhine, commanded by Wurmser; the army of Wurmser, reinforced by 18,000 men drawn from Poland, 6,000 from the Rhine, and 12,000 recruits commanded by Alvinzi. And we are on the eve of an affair with the *débris* of all these armies, reinforced by 4,000 volunteers from Vienna, 3,000 men from the Rhine, 3,000 recruits who have already arrived, and 1,500 expected in January.

"It required good luck, and good play, to beat Alvinzi. How hope to beat, with the same troops, Alvinzi reinforced by 30,000 men, while we have as yet received only 3,000?" Dwelling then on the merits of the troops—"I say with true satisfaction that no army more desires the preservation of the sacred Constitution, sole refuge of the liberty of the French people. Here, we hate and are ready to fight against the new revolutionists, no matter what their aim. No more revolution; this is the hope of the soldier. He does not demand peace, which he mentally desires, because he knows that is the only way not to obtain it, and that those who do not desire it ask for it loudly so as not to get it. The soldier prepares himself for new battles, and if he sometimes ponders over the feeling which animates several towns in France, his chief regret is to see deserters received and protected and the laws without force. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

At the close of 1796 Bonaparte therefore found himself in a critical position, in spite of a series of brilliant feats of arms, which elicited the astonishment and admiration of friend and foe. In the course of a few months he had accomplished marvels, but his victories still required to be consolidated. He had beaten all the generals sent against him, had broken up a formidable coalition, had enriched his country with plunder, and had made and unmade governments. Bonaparte himself desired to go on with the war, while France and the Directory were in favour of peace. General Clarke had been directed to conclude an armistice and to discuss conditions with Austria. Bonaparte protested against an armistice on military grounds, and he very soon managed to gain Clarke over to his views and to enlist him on his side. The agent of the Directory, in fact, soon became the agent of Bonaparte.

It will be well to remember the conditions which Clarke was empowered to make to the Emperor. First condition

or combination: "France to keep Belgium; to restore to Austria her possessions in Italy, and to allow her to seize upon certain German archbishoprics and a portion of the Palatinate." Second combination: "France to keep Belgium and the Milanais, and to cede to Austria the Papal States, with the title of King of Rome for the Grand Duke of Tuscany"! (the brother of the Emperor of Austria). In a third combination, Bavaria was to be offered to Austria.

CHAPTER III.

THE YEAR 1797.

AT the beginning of this eventful year Bonaparte prevented the junction of Alvinzi and Provera and gained the battle of Rivoli. Provera was then forced to lay down his arms, and that gallant veteran, Wurmser, was obliged to open the gates of Mantua. The Pope, terrified by the crushing reverses of the Austrians, consented to sign the treaty of Tolentino, by which he lost Avignon and the other Papal territories in France, together with Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna; he engaged to pay 30,000,000 francs to the French Republic, and to hand over a stipulated number of pictures, statues, and manuscripts. The Archduke Charles in vain attempted to turn the tide of victory; he was driven back under the walls of Vienna, and forced to sign the preliminaries of Leoben, which ended in the treaty of Campo Formio. Hoche and Moreau passed the Rhine, and Kray was in a most critical position, when the news of the armistice put a stop to further operations, to the great disappointment of the French generals. England offered to negotiate for peace, and a conference was opened at Lille, which, in consequence of the exorbitant demands of France, led to no result. In September there was a *coup d'état* operated by General Augereau, who saved the Directors from the Royalists who had conspired to upset the Republic and

restore the Monarchy. General Pichegru and fifty-two deputies were transported, and Carnot only escaped the same fate, owing to the eminent services he had rendered to his country. Bonaparte was intimately mixed up in this affair.

One of the most striking and curious events of the year was the iniquitous destruction of the old Venetian Republic, which was almost contemporary with the commencement of the Christian era. Venice, although a Republic, was handed over by the French Republic to the Austrian Empire. At the close of the year we find Bonaparte engaged in preparing to invade England, or rather seemingly making preparations to effect a landing on our shores. His ambitious and restless character had so alarmed the Directors that they desired at any price to employ his military talents at a secure distance from the seat of government.

We see that both France and Austria gained by this war. If Austria ceded Belgium to France, recognised her right to the Ionian Islands and the left bank of the Rhine, and acknowledged the Cisalpine Republic, France, on her side, handed over to the House of Hapsburg Venice, Istria, Friuli, and Dalmatia.

As regards the negotiations at Lille, where one of the principal points disputed was the right of the King of England to style himself King of France, it was not expected that much good would arise. The negotiations were hardly serious, nor was their rupture much regretted.

At the close of the year the army of England was formed, and the Congress of Rastadt opened, the result of which was to deprive England of her great ally on the Continent, to wit, Austria.

On the 1st January, Bonaparte wrote a letter to M. Battaglia commencing thus:—"The French troops have occupied Bergamo in order to anticipate the enemy, who intended to seize upon that essential point. I frankly acknowledge that I was glad of this opportunity to drive

out the *émigrés* who had sought refuge in the city, and to punish the libelists who, since the commencement of the campaign, have not ceased to recommend the assassination of the soldiers of the French Republic. The Bergamesques have assassinated more Frenchmen than all the rest of Italy put together." If this were the case surely Bonaparte had no need to plead as an excuse for his violation of Venetian neutrality the necessity of anticipating the Austrians. The fact is that Bergamo was an important military position, and the Venetians were to be goaded into acts of despair so as to furnish Bonaparte with an excuse for seizing on the country. It was useless for M. Battaglia to protest or complain.

A letter of the 5th January shows us that Bonaparte upon that date confided the command of Lombardy to General Kilmaine, an Irish officer of considerable merit, born in Dublin. It is certain that Lombardy had little reason to congratulate itself on the appointment of this Milesian commandant, whose rapacity was only surpassed by that of Massena. As for the conduct of the French troops, that still left much to be desired.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"MILAN, *8th January*, 1797.

"You will have citizens Bockty, Chevilly, and Descrivains, who are employed in the administration of the army, brought before a court-martial for having robbed and compromised the safety of the army. It is this infamous conduct which has compromised our operations and caused the loss of a great number of our comrades. . . . I consequently demand that these three men be condemned to death in order to alarm their accomplices, who are only too numerous in the army of Italy.

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *6th January*, 1797.

"The more I examine, during leisure hours, the *incurable* defects in the administration of the army of Italy, the more I am convinced of the necessity of applying a prompt and *infallible* remedy. The accounts of the army are in the greatest disorder; to the well-earned reputation of the controller for swindling is joined the incapacity of his subordinates. Everything is sold. The army consumes five times more than is necessary, because the storekeepers make out false orders and share the profits with the contractors. The principal actresses of Italy are all living with *employés* of the French army; luxury, depravation, and embezzlement are at their height. The laws are insufficient. There is only one remedy—the constitution of a court with power to shoot any army administrator. Marshal Berwick had the *intendant* of his army hung because provisions failed; and in the midst of abundance, and when paying five times more than is necessary, we are often in want. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

It is curious to contrast the penury to which the army was often reduced with the amount of money furnished to the home Government, and with the official and non-official plunder. The army contractors were not the only guilty parties. The rapacity of most of the commanding officers was notorious. Some of them were always followed by waggons which contained their ill-gotten gold, which they were afraid to send home or to allow out of their sight.

TO GENERAL RUSCA.

"MILAN, *7th January*, 1797.

"Some unfortunate people have allowed themselves to be seduced by perfidious agents, who excite them to revolt and draw down upon them the horrors of war. You will

march to Castelnovo and shoot the chief of the rebels, and send twenty hostages to Milan; you will destroy the house of the confessor of the Duke of Modena, who is the author of this rebellion, and on the ruins you will cause a pyramid to be erected with this inscription: *Punishment of an infuriated priest who misused his position as a minister to preach revolt and assassination.* You will assemble the magistrates, the heads of the various convents, and the *curés*, and tell them from me that as long as they are animated by the true principles of religion, like Cardinal Mattei and the bishops of Modena and Pavia, I shall respect them and their property; but if they become instruments of civil war, I shall have their convents destroyed, and I shall cause the *curés* of revolted villages to be personally punished. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Considering the fearful exactions to which the Italians were subjected, and the manner in which their religious sentiments were offended, it is not astonishing that they should now and then have broken into revolt, and have shown a decided preference for the yoke of their old masters. Cardinal Mattei was now a docile instrument in the hands of the French general, but rather through fear than through love.

TO GENERAL CLARKE.

"VERONA, 12*th January*, 1797.

"I had hardly left Roverbella, when I learnt that the enemy had presented himself at Verona. Massena made his plans, which were very skilful; we have captured 600 prisoners and three guns. General Brune received seven bullets in his uniform without being wounded, which was good luck.

"BONAPARTE."

Alvinzi, acting on the orders of the Aulic council, had suddenly attacked the French at several points. On the

same day, in addition to the attack on Verona, other attacks were directed against Corona and Legnago, while Provera threatened the lower Adige. The Aulic council hoped to be able to deceive Bonaparte as to the point where the real attack was to be made, to force his lines, and to oblige him to raise the siege of Mantua. The Austrian plan was at first successful, but Bonaparte was too prudent a general to act before learning with certainty the intentions of the enemy. During the whole of the 12th and 13th January he remained to the rear of Verona, at an equal distance from Rivoli and Legnago, ready to march on either point, and waiting for the reports of his lieutenants. At 10 P.M. Joubert, who had been driven out of Corona, sent Bonaparte a despatch which removed all uncertainty and induced him, without a moment's delay, to hurry with all his available resources to Rivoli, where he arrived at 2 A.M. on the 14th. The next day, the celebrated battle of Rivoli was fought, which ended in the almost total destruction of Alvinzi's army, and brought about the capitulation of Mantua.

On the 17th January, 1797, Bonaparte wrote to the Directory from Roverbella:—

"Operations of such importance, and military actions so numerous have happened here since the 12th, that it is impossible for me to send you a detailed report before to-morrow.

"On the 12th January the enemy attacked General Massena's division before Verona, was completely beaten, and lost 600 prisoners and three guns.

"On the 13th the enemy moved a strong column by way of Montagna and Caprino, and obliged General Joubert's division to evacuate Corona and to concentrate at Rivoli. I foresaw this movement, marched there during the night, and this gave rise to the battle of Rivoli, which we gained on the 14th and 15th after an obstinate resistance, during which we captured 13,000 prisoners and a

great number of standards and guns. General Alvinzi, almost alone, escaped with great difficulty. . . The enemy fell back on Mantua. At a cannon shot from the place he attacked St. George's, a suburb which we had carefully entrenched, and which he could not carry. I arrived during the night with reinforcements, and this brought on the battle of La Favourite, the fruit of which was 7,000 prisoners, with guns, standards, all the baggage of the army, a regiment of huzzars, and a considerable convoy of corn and cattle which the enemy wished to throw into Mantua. Wurmser attacked our left wing, but he was received as usual and forced to retire. In three or four days the fifth army of the Emperor has been entirely destroyed.

"We have made 23,000 prisoners; among them a lieutenant-general, two generals, 6,000 men killed or wounded, 60 guns, and 24 standards. All the battalions of the Vienna volunteers have been captured; their standards were embroidered by the hands of the Empress. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

During these affairs, four regiments of Massena's division, after fighting all day at Verona and deciding the battle of Rivoli, marched sixteen leagues during the night in order to cover Mantua; a feat reminding one of our light brigade in the Peninsula which, about to bivouac after a march of twenty miles, pushed forward on hearing that Wellington was engaged at Talavera, and got over sixty-two English miles in twenty-six hours, leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in spite of bad roads, a burning sun, and a scarcity of water. Reminds one also of Prince Henry's march when he vanished from Daun, halting only thrice for three hours at a time, during fifty-six hours—a march much admired by Prince Henry's brother, Frederick the Great.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"VERONA, 20*th January*, 1797.

"You will find inclosed, Citizen Directors, some intercepted letters which are exceedingly curious, showing the obstinacy and bad faith of the Court of Rome, and the refusal on the part of the cabinet of Vienna to accept the alliance of the Pope, which no doubt arises from its desire to conclude peace. I have caused these letters to be printed in the Bologna gazettes, so as to convince all Italy of the idiotic doting of these old cardinals. To-morrow I shall pass the Po, near Ferrara, and march on Rome. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CARDINAL MATTEI.

"VERONA, 22*nd January*, 1797.

"The foreigners who influence the Court of Rome wish to ruin that beautiful country; the words of peace which I charged you to convey to the Holy Father have been stifled by those men for whom the glory of Rome is nothing, but who are sold to the courts which employ them. We are drawing to the close of this ridiculous comedy. You are a witness of the price I attached to peace, and of my desire to spare you the horrors of war. The letters which I sent you, the originals of which are in my hands, will convince you of the perfidy, the blindness, and the temerity of those persons who at present influence the Court of Rome. No matter what may happen, I beg you, Cardinal, *to assure his Holiness that he can remain in Rome without the least uneasiness. The first minister of religion will find, in this title, protection for himself and the Church.* Assure also all the inhabitants of Rome that they will find friends in the French army who will congratulate themselves only on victory insomuch as it will ameliorate the lot of the people, *and free Italy from foreign domination.* I shall take particular care not to suffer any change to be made in the religion of our fathers, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 22nd Bonaparte wrote a letter to citizen Cacault, the French minister at Rome, telling him to leave that city six hours after the receipt of his despatch. Bonaparte had made up his mind to enforce the conditions of the armistice signed in 1796, at all events as far as pecuniary matters were concerned; but he had already determined not to destroy the Papacy entirely. Letters from France had warned him of a reaction in favour of the Catholic Church, and as the Directory allowed him full liberty in this question he proceeded to act as gently as circumstances permitted.

To GENERAL KELLERMANN.

"VERONA, *26th January*, 1797.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have not seen your commissioner, but I presume that he will be at Milan. I have given orders for the 100,000 francs you require to be handed to him. I regret that the roguery of Flachat & Co. prevents me from sending you all the money necessary, but we are ourselves in very straitened circumstances; I think, however, that we shall soon settle matters with the Pope, and this will place some funds at our disposal.

"BONAPARTE."

The army contractors above-mentioned were accused of having embezzled to the extent of several million francs.

To CITIZEN CARNOT.

"VERONA, *26th January*, 1797.

"I received your letter, my dear Director, on the battle-field of Rivoli. Formerly I saw with pity all the rumours spread concerning me, each one making me speak according to his passion. I believe you know me too well to suppose that any one can influence me. I have always felt thankful for the marks of interest you have given me, for which I shall ever be grateful. There are men for whom hate is a necessity, and who being unable to overthrow the Republic, console themselves by sowing discord

wherever it is possible. As for myself, nothing they can say affects me: the esteem of a small number of persons like yourself, that of my comrades and of the soldier, sometimes also the opinion of posterity, and, above all my conscience and the prosperity of my country, are the sole objects which interest me. . . . . I have ordered citizen Cacault to leave Rome; you can have no idea of the bad treatment which this *prétraille* [term of contempt for the priesthood] made him undergo. . . . I told Manfredini the last time I saw him, that if the Emperor desired a proof that Thugut was sold to France when he was ambassador at Constantinople, I could easily procure it. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The language of Bonaparte, the amount of independence he assumed, and the court he held in Italy sorely troubled the home government. Hence a profusion of professions on the part of the General-in-Chief and frequent but insincere demands to be relieved. Nothing more appears in the correspondence on the subject of Thugut's venality. The Pope having refused to execute the articles of the armistice, Bonaparte issued the following:—

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

"BOLOGNA, *1st February*, 1797.

"The French army is about to enter the territory of the Pope; it will be faithful to the maxims it professes, and will respect the religion of the people. The French soldier carries a bayonet in one hand, sure guarantee of victory, and with the other he offers peace, protection, and safety."

Then come threats in case of resistance, and—

"Art. I.—Every town or village which at the approach of the French army shall sound the alarm bell, shall at once be burned and the municipality shot.

"Art. II.—The Commune in which a Frenchman is assassinated will be subjected to martial law; a flying column will be sent there, hostages taken and an extraordinary contribution levied.

"Art. III.—All priests, monks, &c., shall be protected and maintained in their present position if they conduct themselves according to the principles of the New Testament; but if they be the first to transgress them they will be treated in military fashion, and more severely than other citizens.

"BONAPARTE."

On the same day Bonaparte informed the Directory that Wurmser had at last offered to capitulate, also that General Victor had marched on Imola, the first town in the Pontifical States—"Can we not," added Napoleon, "if we go to Rome, unite Modena, Ferrara, and the Romagna, and form them into a powerful Republic? *Might we not give Rome to Spain* on the condition that she guarantees the independence of the new Republic? We might then restore the Milanais and Mantua to the Emperor, and even give him Parma if necessary. The Emperor would lose nothing, Spain would gain a great deal, and we should gain still more, for we should have a natural ally in Italy. . . ."

The notion of giving Rome to Spain was only a fugitive idea, supposing it to have been really entertained. The principle, however, of mixing up the court of Madrid in Italian affairs was not abandoned, as was proved when Napoleon established the son-in-law of the King of Spain on the throne of Tuscany.

In a letter of the 3rd of February, addressed to the Directory, Bonaparte said:—

"I applied myself to show French generosity towards Wurmser, a general seventy years of age, towards whom fortune, during this campaign, has been so cruel, but who

never ceased to exhibit a constancy and a courage which history will chronicle. Enveloped on all sides at the battle of Bassano, losing at a single blow both a portion of his army and of the Tyrol, he dared to conceive the hope of being able to seek refuge in Mantua, from which he was four or five days distant, of passing the Adige, of defeating our outposts at Cerea, and of crossing the Molinella. Shut up in Mantua he headed three sorties. . . ."

Bonaparte then gave an account of the defeat of the Roman army by Lannes. The troops of his Holiness encamped with great care on the river Senio made no stand—"although during the fight several priests crucifix in hand preached to these wretched troops." The French captured 14 guns, 11 flags, and 1,000 prisoners.

Faenza offered some resistance. The chiefs, however, and notably the bishop, were the first to fly. The town having been taken, Bonaparte instead of pillaging it, sent fifty Roman officers who had been made prisoners to remonstrate with the citizens on the folly of their conduct. "This morning," added Bonaparte, "I sent for the monks and priests and reminded them of the principles of the evangelists. . . ."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"FORLI, *3rd February*, 1797.

"You will find inclosed the memorandum sent to me by citizen Faipoult; you will shudder with indignation when you see with what impudence the Republic is robbed. I have given orders for the arrest of Legros, Controller of the Treasury, and Lequêsne of the commissariat. I have also recommended Faipoult to have citizens Payan and Pergallo arrested at Genoa. You will never permit the robbers of the army of Italy to find refuge in Paris. While I was away from Milan fighting, citizen Flachat left, taking with him 5,000,000 francs; he has placed us in the greatest embarrassment. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

On the same day Bonaparte ordered Berthier to have an inventory made "of all the effects taken from the Pope." Official and organised plunder was evidently regarded in the same light as those "big wars which make ambition virtue."

The French troops had been specially recommended to respect Papal territory, but a despatch addressed to General Victor shows that this order was disregarded. On the 5th February the general was reminded that he was at the head of an army corps and not of a horde of pillagers.

Rimini having been occupied and looted, a sharp note was addressed to the Regent of the Republic of St. Marino, in whose territory Monsignor Ceretti, Bishop of Rimini, had taken refuge. Bonaparte expressed his desire to live on good terms with the Regent, but he must at once arrest Monsignor Ceretti, who, after preaching discord and assassination, had fled *carrying all his treasures with him.* If not immediately given up 2,000 men were to be sent in search of the fugitive.

TO THE MINISTER OF WAR.

"PESARO, *8th February*, 1797.

"The General-in-Chief directs me to send you the flags captured at Mantua by General Augereau. These new trophies close the campaign. While the general is engaged in bringing Rome to its senses, he is also making arrangements for the next campaign.

"BY ORDER."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"ANCONA, *10th February*, 1797.

"We have conquered the Romagna, the Duchy of Urbino, and the marches of Ancona in a very short time. At Ancona we captured 1,200 Papal soldiers. *They were*

posted very skilfully on the heights in front of the city; General Victor surrounded them and took them all prisoners without firing a shot. The Emperor of Austria had just sent to the Pope 3,000 excellent muskets and 120 heavy guns which we found in the fortress. . . . No government was ever so despised, even by the people who obey it, as this one. To the first feeling of terror inspired by the entry of our troops succeeded the joy of being delivered from the most ridiculous of governments.

"I send you some despatches taken from a courier coming from St. Petersburg and addressed to the Grand Master of the Order of Malta. I think some use might be made of them by sending them to our ambassador at Constantinople. . . .

"We are masters of Notre Dame de Lorette. There was gold and silver in the treasury to the value of 7,000,000 francs, and corn, which we took. Before the arrival of Colli there was 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 francs.

"BONAPARTE."

It was probably by the despatches mentioned above that Bonaparte became aware that the Emperor Paul was negotiating with the Grand Master Homspesch for the sale of Malta, a piece of information of which he took advantage the following year by outbidding Paul.

Colli, thus tacitly accused of having plundered the Santa Casa to the extent of one or two million francs, after having fought for his country with distinction, took service first under the Emperor of Austria then under the Pope, and finally under Napoleon. As for the image of Notre Dame de Lorette, after having been transported by angels from Nazareth to Italy, to escape from the infidel, it was transported by French soldiers to Paris, and remained in the National Library until the signing of the Concordat, when it was restored to Pius VII. to console him for the loss of the Legations.

TO CARDINAL MATTEI.

"ANCONA, *13th February*, 1797.

"In the letter which you have given yourself the trouble to write to me, I recognise that simplicity for which you are distinguished."

After enumerating the only conditions upon which he would cease hostilities, Bonaparte added:—

"These clauses fulfilled, his Holiness may hope to save his states by reposing more confidence in the generosity of the Republic. . . . I know that his Holiness has been deceived, and I am willing to prove to Europe once more the moderation of the French Republic by granting him five days, so that he may send a negotiator to Foligno whither I shall repair, and where I hope to be able to contribute personally to an arrangement, and to give the Holy See a marked proof of my esteem. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

There was not a word in this letter of the proposal to hand over Rome to Spain, and the "most ridiculous of governments" now enjoyed the esteem of the young general.

In a despatch to the Directory of the 15th February, Bonaparte related how he had come to the aid of the French priests who, driven from France, had taken refuge in the Papal States, and who cried at the sight of a Frenchman. If his measures were not at variance with general principles, he added, that he thought he might be able to make use of these ecclesiastics. He went on to say:—

"Ancona is an excellent port from whence one can sail to Macedonia in twenty-four hours, and to Constantinople in ten days. My project is to collect there all the Jews possible. I am having the forts placed in a state of defence. We must manage to keep Ancona at the general peace so that it may remain French for ever; this will give

us great influence over the Porte, and will render us masters of the Adriatic, as Marseilles, Corsica, and St. Pierre, render us masters of the Mediterranean.

"Loretto contained about 3,000,000 *livres tournois*. They left us about a million francs out of seven million. I send you the Madonna with all the relics.[1] . . . The Madonna is in wood.

"This is what I intend doing. I mean to make peace with the Pope in exchange for the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, the Duchy of Urbino and the Marches of Ancona; and he must pay us the 3,000,000 livres (the value of the treasury of Loretto). 2nd. 15,000,000 francs, money remaining due on the armistice; he must give us all his cavalry and artillery horses; he must dismiss Colli and all his Austrians, &c. If these conditions be not accepted I shall march on Rome.

"I prefer an arrangement to going to Rome, 1st, because that will avoid a dispute with the King of Naples which may become serious; 2nd, because if the Pope and all the princes were to fly from Rome I should never be able to obtain what I have demanded; 3rd, because, deprived of her finest provinces, Rome cannot long exist; 4th, because the court of Rome ceding to us all its rights over the provinces above-named will not be able, at the general peace, to regard this as a temporary arrangement. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The Pope had been deserted by all the Catholic powers, beginning with Spain which had cast her lot in with revolutionary France. If Bonaparte now desired, on the eve of resuming hostilities with Austria, to avoid any difficulty with the King of Naples, it was not a religious but a territorial difficulty which was feared. Both Naples and Austria coveted the Papal States.

[1] Among the relics was a cannon ball, which had nearly killed Julius II.; offered by that Pope. At a later date a king of Sweden left in the Santa Casa his coat, vest, and flesh-coloured breeches.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"TOLENTINO, 19*th February*, 1797.

"The Committee of Savants has reaped a good harvest at Ravenna, Rimini, Pesaro, Ancona, Loretto, and Perugia which will be at once forwarded to Paris. Joined to what is to be sent from Rome we now possess everything that is beautiful in Italy, with the exception of a small number of objects at Turin and Naples.

"BONAPARTE."

On the same date Bonaparte transmitted to the Directory the treaty of peace concluded with the Pope. In his letter he said :—

"My opinion is that Rome deprived of Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, and the 30,000,000 francs which we take from her will not be able to exist; this old machine will go to pieces of itself.

"It is possible that I may have erred in the decision I have taken, but no one will accuse me of having sacrificed the interest of my country to my own glory.

"The King of Sardinia asks to make an offensive treaty with us, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

To the Sovereign Pontiff Napoleon wrote, also on the 19th :—

"The French Republic will in future be one of the sincerest friends of Rome. All Europe is aware of the pacific intentions and the conciliatory virtues of your Holiness. I send you my aide-de-camp to express to your Holiness the esteem and veneration which I entertain for your person, and I beg you will believe in my desire to give you, on all occasions, the proofs of respect and veneration with which I have the honour to be, &c., &c."

The day before Bonaparte had written to Joubert in a rather different strain, saying :—"The army is within three marches of Rome. I am engaged in negotiating with this *prétraille*, and once more St. Peter will save the capitol. . . ."

On the 23rd February, the Pope ratified the treaty of Tolentino, and thus avoided two great dangers—that of seeing Rome stormed by the French, or sacked by the revolutionary party.

It was only some months later, and when Austria was negotiating at Leoben, that the treaty with the King of Sardinia was signed. His majesty signed this treaty because he had reason to be dissatisfied with Austria, and because, like the Pope, he dreaded the ultra-Liberals.

In the beginning of March Bonaparte sent Generals Casalta, Gentili, and Cervoni, to Corsica to aid in expelling the English.

PROCLAMATION TO THE SOLDIERS OF ITALY.

"BASSANO, 10*th March*, 1797.

"The capture of Mantua has just terminated a campaign which entitles you to the eternal gratitude of your country. You have triumphed in fourteen pitched battles, and in seventy combats; you have taken more than 10,000 prisoners, 500 field-pieces, 2,000 siege guns, and four pontoons.

"The contributions levied on the countries you have conquered have fed, kept, and paid the army during the whole campaign; you have, in addition, sent 30,000,000 francs to relieve the public treasury at home.

"You have enriched the museum of Paris with more than 200 objects; masterpieces of old and new Italy, and which it required thirty centuries to produce. . . .

The remainder of this proclamation was filled with invectives against the Emperor of Austria, who had degraded himself into being "the paid servant of the merchants of

London," and against those perfidious islanders, who, "strangers to the ills of war, smile with pleasure at the woes of the Continent."

Having settled matters with the Pope, Bonaparte, having issued this address, determined to resume hostilities with Austria. For the moment he had nothing to dread from Sardinia or Naples. He had received a strong reinforcement commanded by Bernadotte from the army of the Rhine, and Mantua had capitulated. Bonaparte has been blamed by some writers for having opened this campaign before he could count upon the assistance of the armies of Moreau and of Hoche, which were unable to pass the Rhine for want of money. Moreau went to Paris, and went there in vain, to solicit a few thousand pounds for the purchase of pontoons. It is supposed that Bonaparte was induced to commence operations alone, in the hope of being able to compel Austria to sue for peace before Moreau and Hoche could take the field. At the same time from the letters which Bonaparte addressed to the Directory, blaming the dilatory conduct of the army of the Rhine and that of the Sambre et Meuse, it is conjectured that he wished to excuse a possible failure by showing that he had been left to carry on the war against Austria single-handed. There can be no doubt that more than once during the brief and brilliant campaign of '97, Bonaparte entertained serious fears with regard to the result of his temerity, and hence his eagerness to open negotiations with the enemy, and to agree to terms which Austria could never have expected had not the signature of the preliminaries of peace checked the victorious advance of Hoche and Moreau.

On the 17th March Bonaparte sent to the Directory an account of his victory over Prince Charles at Tagliamento. The Archduke had only just time to escape. The Austrians left six guns, one general, several field officers, and 400 men in the hands of the French. Again Bonaparte pressed on the Directory the necessity of Moreau crossing the Rhine, as the Emperor was concentrating his best troops

in Italy. A few days afterwards he crossed the Isonzo and boldly entered Austrian territory.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PROVINCE OF GORITZ.

"GORITZ, 21*st March*, 1797.

"An unjust terror has preceded the French army; we have not come to conquer you, or to change your customs or your religion. The French Republic is the friend of all nations. Perdition to those kings who are mad enough to do it battle.

"Priests, nobles, citizens, people, banish your uneasiness; we are good and humane, &c. &c."

And before the inhabitants of Goritz had time to look round, they found themselves in the enjoyment of a constitution and a central government. Judging by the severe orders of the day, which Bonaparte felt it his duty to issue against officers and men who indulged in pillage, it is clear that the terror of the inhabitants of the newly invaded province was justified, and that they required assurances with regard to the humanity of the invader.

TO CITIZEN BOUDET.

"HEAD-QUARTERS, GORITZ, 21*st March*, 1797.

"Write to citizen Boudet to approve of his putting on the colours of the 57th demi-brigade, 'The terrible 57th demi-brigade which nothing can stop.'

"By order of the General-in-Chief."

On the 25th March Bonaparte again reported proceedings to the Directory, and was able to announce further successes. The Austrians had been driven into the Noric Alps, and a battle had been fought at Jarvis, above the clouds, upon heights which overlooked Germany and Dalmatia. In several places the snow was three feet deep, and the cavalry had to charge over ice. "It is indispensable that the armies of the Rhine should enter Germany."

Bonaparte added: "Up to the present Prince Charles has manœuvred worse than Beaulieu and Wurmser; he has committed faults at every step, and extremely big ones. They have cost him dear, and would have cost him more dearly still if his reputation had not imposed upon me to a certain extent, and hindered me from taking advantage of certain blunders which I perceived, but which I attributed to plans which never existed in reality."

Several years afterwards the Archduke Charles, under the walls of Vienna, allowed himself to be imposed upon and completely paralysed by the reputation of Bonaparte. But for the timidity of the Archduke in the presence of Bonaparte, the French Emperor would never have crossed the Danube, or recovered from the check he experienced at Essling.

It is, however, only fair to observe that while Bonaparte was his own master, the Archduke was constantly hampered by the orders of the Aulic council. In this campaign, too, his forces were numerically weaker than those of his opponent.

TO CITIZEN CARNOT.

"GORITZ, 25*th March*, 1797.

"... Has the Rhine been passed? It is clear that in a few days my movement will be unmasked, and that the enemy, perceiving his danger, will abandon the Rhine, in order to attack me. If Moreau does not then push forward by forced marches, I shall be beaten, and obliged to fall back into Italy. You will see by the intercepted letters I forward that the enemy hopes to open the campaign on the Rhine at once; but he calculates, as usual, without taking into consideration what we may do. If Prince Charles commands the armies of the Rhine and Italy, it will be necessary for us to have unity of command in Germany. . . . If I had 20,000 men more, I think I could reach Vienna in a fortnight. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE BURGOMASTER OF LIENZ.

"VILLACH, *28th March*, 1797.

"The General-in-Chief Bonaparte sees with pain the terror which has preceded the French army. Let the inhabitants be tranquil, and without fear. The General-in-Chief will protect your religion, your persons, your properties, and your customs."

On the 31st March Bonaparte wrote a long letter to the Archduke Charles, calling upon him to prove himself the benefactor of the human race, and to bring the war to a close. "As for myself," added Bonaparte, "if the overtures which I have the honour to make, can save the life of a single man, I shall be more proud of the civic crown I shall have deserved than of the sad glory which attaches to military successes," &c. &c. Bonaparte, when he wrote this strange letter, must have been well aware that the Archduke had no power to conclude peace, and he received a reply to this effect. This appeal to humanity was owing to the difficulties by which he found himself surrounded.

On the 1st April Bonaparte had pushed on to Klagenfurt. He was still without news of Moreau, and impatiently waiting to hear of the passage of the Rhine. He announced to the Directory his intention of signing the preliminaries of peace in the event of the Archduke returning a favourable answer. In a proclamation to the inhabitants of Carinthia, he said that the cabinet of Vienna would not allow the Emperor to make peace; that the ministers, corrupted by English gold, betrayed their prince and their country, and were at the beck of those perfidious islanders who were hated by the whole of Europe. After the usual assurances concerning religion, property, &c., the proclamation added: "Innocent victims, have you not already sufficiently suffered through the folly of others? *All the taxes which you used to pay to the Emperor will serve to indemnify you for the damage inseparable from the march of*

an army, and to pay for the provisions with which you have provided us." And as in the province of Goritz, so in Carinthia, a central government was established and got into working order.

On the same day Bonaparte announced that he had sent 40,000*l.* to the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, 40,000*l.* to the Army of the Rhine, 20,000*l.* to the Army of the Alps, and that he was about to send 40,000*l.* to Toulon for the Marine.

On the 4th April Bonaparte announced the conclusion of an offensive and defensive treaty between the French Republic and the King of Sardinia, the two most remarkable articles being that his Majesty was to cede the island of Sardinia to France, and to be compensated for this cession on the conclusion of the general peace; and that for the present he was to be permitted to maintain neutrality towards England while taking an active part in the war against Austria.

The Directory refused to ratify this treaty.

On the 7th April Bonaparte consented to an armistice with the Austrians, and announced this fact to the Directory, adding explanations of his conduct. He said that the Austrian delegates had assured him that the Emperor rather than lose everything in Italy, would leave Vienna and would run the risk of continuing the war.

"Our armies," he added, "have not yet passed the Rhine, and we are within twenty leagues of Vienna; the army of Italy is, therefore, exposed alone to the efforts of one of the first powers of Europe.

"The Venetians are arousing their peasants, bringing their priests into the field, and setting in motion with fury the whole mechanism of their antiquated government. Venice has at present 20,000 armed men in my rear."

Thus neatly did Bonaparte prepare the plan he had conceived for handing over the Venetian Republic to the tender mercies of Austria.

"In the Papal States, too," continued Bonaparte, "con-

siderable numbers of peasants are descending from the mountains and threatening to invade the Romagna.

"The different nationalities in Italy, reunited by a spirit of liberty, and excited in various ways by the most glowing passions require to be restrained and supervised."

And in fact, so long as the struggle with Austria was doubtful, the whole of Italy was openly hostile to the liberating army.

On the 9th April Bonaparte wrote a comminatory letter to the Doge of Venice, threatening war unless he at once disbanded his armed peasants.

"Do you think," he asked, "that because I am in the heart of Germany, I am powerless to cause the first nation in the universe to be respected? Do you think that the legions of Italy will tolerate the massacres you have encouraged? The blood of my brothers in arms shall be avenged. . . . If, contrary to the manifest desire of the French Government, you oblige me to make war, you must not suppose that, in imitation of the troops you have armed, the French soldiers will ravage the properties of the innocent and unfortunate people of the mainland. I shall protect them, and one day they will bless even the crimes which obliged a French army to deliver them from a tyrannical government. BONAPARTE."

Junot was the bearer of this missive to the Doge, and he was to insist upon receiving a reply within twenty-four hours. In a despatch of the same date, General Kilmaine was instructed how to act. He was to secure hostages at Padua, Verona, Treviso, Bassano, Brescia, and Bergamo, and he was to fall unexpectedly on some village where the rebels were not in force, and to burn it. All the Venetian nobles and all the persons attached to the senate were to be arrested, &c. &c. Verona, which was in a position to resist, resisted, and before the French could subdue that city they lost 300 men. But "the first nation in the universe" was not to be braved with impunity.

TO THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF LOMBARDY.

"GRATZ, 12*th April*, 1797.

"You ask for assurances for your future independence; but those assurances, are they not to be found in the victories which the army of Italy gains every day? . . . Each of our victories is a line in your constitutional charter! . . . Facts assume the place of declarations. . . . You cannot doubt the interest and the desire of the French Government to render you free and independent."

At this very moment Bonaparte was advising the Directory to restore Lombardy to Austria in exchange for her possessions on the left bank of the Rhine. Mantua was to be exchanged for Mayence, &c.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"LEOBEN, 16*th April*, 1797.

"I send you by General Leclerc some interesting despatches concerning the situation of the army and the negotiations which have been commenced. In passing through Germany General Leclerc will be able to observe the various movements of the enemy, and to afford information to Generals Moreau and Hoche on reaching the Rhine. I beg you will send him back at once. All the officers whom I despatch to Paris remain there too long; they spend their money, and over-indulge in pleasure. I send you, by a captain of huzzars, who has seen eighty years service, several colours captured from the enemy.

"BONAPARTE."

The venerable huzzar was one François Jantzon, who had joined the army in 1738, who had fought in Flanders and Bohemia from 1741 to 1748, then through the campaigns of the Seven Years' War, and afterwards through those of the Revolution. On the 16th April, 1797, Jantzon was eighty-five years of age, and reckoned sixty years of active service and twenty campaigns. The campaigns

counting double made the eighty years referred to in Bonaparte's letter.

In another voluminous despatch to the Directory, in which he reviewed the various measures open to adoption in the event of his negotiations with Austria being broken off, Bonaparte again complained of Moreau. He said:—

"The best troops and the best generals are opposed to me. When a general is anxious to take the field nothing can stop him. Ever since history has commenced to chronicle military operations, a river has never been considered a serious obstacle. If Moreau wishes to cross the Rhine he will cross it, and if he had already passed it, without raising so many objections, we should now be in a position to dictate peace in an imperious manner, and without running any risk; but the person who is afraid of losing his glory is sure to lose it. I crossed the Julian and the Noric Alps when the snow was three feet deep. . . . Every one believed the feat impossible. If I had only considered my private interests, I should have halted after crossing the Isonzo; I flung myself into Germany, in order to disengage the armies of the Rhine, and to prevent the enemy from assuming the offensive; I am at the gates of Vienna, and this insolent and arrogant court has sent its plenipotentiaries to my head-quarters. The armies of the Rhine can have no blood in their veins. If they leave me here alone, I shall fall back into Italy, and Europe will judge the difference between the conduct of the two armies: they will afterwards have to support the entire weight of the forces of the Emperor; they will be overwhelmed, and it will be their fault."

Bonaparte, in fact, was at Leoben, and his advanced guard could see the spires of Vienna from the top of the Sæmmering. Under these circumstances, the Emperor of Germany and the Marquis de Gallo and General Merfeldt repaired to his head-quarters at Leoben with full powers

At first Bonaparte objected to the Marquis because he was Neapolitan minister at Vienna, but he added, in a report to the Directory: "I did not consider it right to persist in this opposition, because it would have been productive of delay, and because the Marquis appeared to enjoy the full confidence of the Emperor of Austria; also, because the Austrians and Hungarians are greatly irritated at seeing foreigners play the chief part in so important an affair, and because, should we break off negotiations, this will be an excellent means of exciting discontent against the Government of Vienna."

Bonaparte found the negotiators great sticklers in matter of etiquette. The Marquis de Gallo insisted on the pavilion in the centre of a garden, where the deliberations took place, being declared neutral. Bonaparte consented to this fiction, although, as he remarked, "this neutral point is surrounded on all sides by the French army, and is in the midst of our bivouacs."

On the 17th April the General-in-Chief issued the following order, which was to be applied to Bernadotte's division:—

"All the women who have not been authorised by the Council of Administration must leave the division within twenty-four hours; in default of which they will be smeared with soot and exposed for two hours in the market-place. The General-in-Chief is informed that the disorders which are committed are owing to these abominable women, who excite the soldiers to pillage."

Now the soldiers belonging to the army of the Rhine, who were drawn from the north of France, prided themselves on their steady behaviour and their discipline. They were of quite a different temperament to the soldiers of the army of Italy. A good deal of jealousy existed between the forces under Hoche and Moreau and those under Bonaparte. The probability is that the above order

of the day was undeserved, and was issued with the view of reducing, in appearance, the moral qualities of Bernadotte's division to a level with those of the remainder of the army. It is certain that the disorders complained of existed before Bernadotte's division reinforced the troops under General Bonaparte. An Italian writer has left it on record that Bernadotte's soldiers conducted themselves with so much steadiness and moderation that the different towns disputed which should have them for garrison.

On the 18th the preliminaries of peace were signed, and the news of this important event was at once despatched, not only to the Directory, but to Generals Hoche and Moreau, whose operations were thus suddenly interrupted to their great mortification.

On the 19th April Bonaparte, in a further despatch to the Directory, made such remarks as these respecting the negotiations with Austria: "As for the renunciation of our rights over Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna in exchange for the Venetian States, those provinces will always remain in our power. . . . : The Government of Venice is the most absurd and tyrannical of governments, and it is beyond doubt that it wished to take advantage of our being in the heart of Germany to fall upon us. . . . . By ceding Venice to Austria the Emperor will be bound to France, and, at least for a time, will be obliged to be friendly towards us." After some further remarks with regard to the astute character of his policy, which he very highly appreciated himself, Bonaparte entered into an explanation of his military movements. He said: "If at the commencement of the campaign I had persisted in marching on Turin, I should never have crossed the Po; if I had persisted in marching on Rome, I should have lost Milan; if I had persisted in marching on Vienna, I should perhaps have lost the Republic. The real plan for destroying the Emperor was the one I adopted, but I required 6,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry in addition to the force under my command. The plan, too, would have succeeded

had the Rhine been passed at the same time that I crossed the Tagliamento, as I thought would be the case, *since two couriers in rapid succession ordered me to open the campaign.*"

Referring once more to the negotiations, Bonaparte said that if peace were concluded "it will be a monument of glory for the French Republic, and an infallible sign that it can, in two campaigns, subdue the Continent, provided it has strongly organised armies. . . . . *I have not levied a single contribution in Germany, and there has not been a single complaint against us.* . . . . In a few days I will send you the ratification of the Emperor. I shall canton my army in the Venetian provinces, where its wants shall be supplied until I receive your orders. As for myself, I ask for repose. I have justified the confidence you reposed in me. I have always considered myself as nothing in the operations I have directed, and I pushed on to Vienna after having acquired more glory than is necessary to be happy, leaving behind me the superb plains of Italy, just as I marched forward at the beginning of the last campaign in search of bread for the army which the Republic could not feed.

"Calumny will endeavour in vain to attribute perfidious intentions to me; my civil career shall resemble my military career, by its simplicity. However, you must feel that I ought to leave Italy, and I beg that, when returning the ratification of the preliminaries of peace, you will give me permission to return to France.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was well aware that his presence was not desired in Paris, and that he could even treat with Austria with impunity, although that duty really belonged to General Clarke, the political officer of the Directory. As for not having levied any contributions in Germany, that was a strange and also a false statement. It was strange that Bonaparte should boast of sparing a country with which he was at war, and of levying his contributions and

drawing his resources from territories which had done their best to observe a strict neutrality. It was false, because he levied 3,000,000 francs on Goritz, a similar sum on Trieste, and because he seized stores and appropriated the taxes in those places. If no complaints were made against the conduct of the army, why the order of the day aimed at Bernadotte's division? Why the order that all pillagers were to be shot? Why did Bonaparte write on the 21st March that "the General-in-Chief receives complaints from all sides," adding that he would render generals responsible for the conduct of their men? It was true, however, that, anxious not to drive Austria to despair, Bonaparte had avoided treating Germany as he had treated Venice, Genoa, Lombardy, Modena, &c. He showed himself as lenient to the strong as he showed himself merciless towards the weak. It was not altogether *Væ victis* with him.

TO GENERAL DELMAS.

"LEOBEN, 20*th April*, 1797.

The General-in-Chief is informed that you have beaten several soldiers with a cane. As this mode of punishment is contrary to our principles and the system of discipline established in the army of Italy, you are directed to conform to one and the other."

On the 22nd April Bonaparte, in a despatch to the Directory, said that Austria, which refused compensation in Germany, was very anxious to conclude a definitive peace. He afterwards remarked that "the house of Austria has immense resources. It has waged war with the money of England; *its subjects are not oppressed, and are attached to the Government.* In offering favourable conditions to Austria we become independent of the King of Prussia, and able to hold the balance between the two powers. The Emperor will lose Belgium, Milan, and Modena, but he will obtain Venice; he will have less regret at being obliged to conclude peace, and there will

remain behind no national hatred. . . . . If you desire to continue the war, you must send me 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, so that I may be independent of the Rhine. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

In another despatch, dated the 30th, Bonaparte, evidently feeling that it was necessary to excuse himself in the eyes of the Directory, wrote that his plan for levying contributions in the faubourgs of Vienna had totally failed, owing to the inaction of the army of the Rhine. He added: "If Moreau had been willing to march, we should have made the most astonishing campaign, and have entirely changed the situation of Europe. Instead of that, he went to Paris and would do nothing; and when I saw by your letters that your only hope was in making Hoche move alone, I thought the campaign was lost, and I believed we should have been beaten one after the other.

"As for me, I flung myself without hesitation into the heart of Germany; I made more than 24,000 prisoners; I forced the Emperor to evacuate Vienna; and I concluded peace at my head-quarters. The conditions of this peace are no doubt advantageous to France and to the Emperor; that is the beauty of it. It delivers us from the influence of Prussia."

This jealousy of Moreau broke out upon every occasion, and yet Moreau had sent Bernadotte and his best troops to reinforce Bonaparte. Carnot was so enchanted with this disinterestedness that he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief of the army of the Rhine, "Oh, my dear Fabius, how great you were on that occasion!"

On the 20th April a French captain called Laugier, in spite of regulations, insisted upon mooring his vessel alongside the powder magazine near the Lido. Having refused to listen to the remonstrances of the commandant of the fort that officer opened fire, and Laugier and a few men were killed. This was a most unfortunate affair for Venice,

and it was speedily turned to account by Bonaparte, who sent a very exaggerated report of the episode to the Directory on the 30th. He wrote: "If you wish French blood to be respected in Europe a terrible example must be made of Venice. We must have blood; and the noble Venetian admiral who presided at this assassination must be publicly punished. M. Quirini may carry on intrigues in Paris, but the infamous treason of the Venetians is too notorious." As for the Venetian Government, it was called upon to dismiss the British ambassador; to deliver up all the British merchandise; to pay 20,000,000 francs, and to arrest the assassins; and although the French ambassador had not left Venice, Bonaparte ordered all the Venetian ships in Leghorn and Ancona to be seized, and Bernadotte was directed to embark 300 grenadiers on board five frigates, and to capture a vessel of war belonging to the Republic, which was lying at Trieste.

Bonaparte had not to complain of the city of Venice and of Verona only, but of Padua, Castiglione, and Mantua. By a decree dated May 6th, we see how Verona was chastised for endeavouring to shake off the yoke of the liberators of Italy. It was to pay 170,000 sequins, all the objects in the pawn-office pledged for more than fifty francs were to be confiscated; fifty of the chief culprits were to be garotted and sent to Toulon for transportation to Cayenne; all their property was to be seized. By Art. 8, all the plate in the churches and other public establishments was to be appropriated; and by Art. 11, all the pictures, collections of plants and shells belonging to the city or to private individuals, were to be confiscated for the benefit of the French Republic.

A deputation of the Venetian senate had gone to Gratz to apologise for what had passed and to endeavour to save the existence of the Republic. But before this deputation arrived, and before Bonaparte had heard of the Laugier affair, he had given Venice to Austria. He now declared war against the Republic, and in every place occupied by

the French troops the Lion of St. Mark was torn down and replaced by a tree of liberty.

In a letter from Milan, addressed to the Bishop of Como, Bonaparte said: "Throw water and not oil on human passions; remove prejudices, and fight with ardour against false priests, who degrade religion by making it the instrument of the ambition of kings. The doctrine of the Evangelists is that of equality, and hence it is most favourable to that Republican form of government under which your country is about to exist."

It is curious to find two Popes afterwards expressing themselves in very similar language. In December, 1798, during the French occupation of Italy, Cardinal Chiaramonte, Bishop of Imola, who the year following became Pius VII., wrote a pastoral letter in which he said: "The democratic form of government adopted by you, my dear brethren, is not repugnant to the Gospel; it necessitates, on the contrary, all the sublime virtues which are only to be learned in the school of Jesus Christ, which, if devoutly practised, will conduce to your happiness and to the glory of your Republic."

Just half a century later Leo XII. said to M. de Chateaubriand, who had been sent to Rome to try and settle a dispute between Charles X. and the French bishops: "Jesus Christ never pronounced in favour of any peculiar form of government. . . . . The Catholic religion has prospered in the centre of republics as well as in the bosom of the monarchy," &c.

Embezzlement continued to reign everywhere. On the 6th May Bonaparte complained to the Directory that the gendarmes in Corsica had revolted in consequence of not having been paid; the funds sent for that purpose had been misappropriated. "And yet," added Bonaparte, "since Corsica has been restored to France we have sent there 700,000 francs and large quantities of corn."

On the 9th May Bonaparte ordered the arrest of Commissary Bouquet, who was found guilty of having robbed

the pawn-offices of Padua and of Vicenza, and who was sentenced to five years in chains. On the same date Bonaparte, writing to Berthier, said: "I see with indignation the thefts which are committed by several French agents, who place seals on the Venetian pawn-offices so as to be able to rob them at their leisure."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, 14*th May*, 1797.

"I am organising the Cisalpine Republic. . . . . To-morrow I shall conclude a treaty with the Venetian deputies. I hope this affair will end well. . . . . The marine will gain four or five line-of-battle ships, three or four frigates, and from three to four millions of cordage, wood, &c. . . . . The million for Toulon will be despatched to-morrow; another million, half in gold and half in silver, will be sent to Paris the day after to-morrow, and may be usefully employed at Brest. The two millions for which the Minister of Finance drew upon Citizen André will be paid in merchandise or in land; this, joined to a million for the army of the Sambre and Meuse, 500,000 francs for the army of the Alps, and 500,000 francs which Corsica costs us, will form a sum of 7,000,000, which the army of Italy has furnished since the commencement of the campaign. We have sent to Toulon from Trieste 25,000 quintals of corn and 100,000 francs of hemp and steel. The Pope has given us eight millions in diamonds, which, according to valuation at Modena, are worth not more than 4,500,000 francs.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 16th May the treaty of peace was concluded with Venice, which renounced its ancient form of government. By Art. 3, the French Republic, in accordance with request, and in order to guarantee the tranquillity of Venice and the happiness of its inhabitants, accorded a division of French troops to maintain order and to protect

persons and property. Venice was to pay 15,000,000 francs, twenty pictures, and 500 manuscripts, ships, stores, &c. A provisional government was named. This treaty was concluded simply to enable Bonaparte to obtain possession of Venice without fighting. He had no idea of respecting it himself.

TO GENERAL BERNADOTTE.

"MILAN, 18*th May*, 1797.

". . . . . In a few days negotiations for a definitive peace will be opened, and it will be impossible for you to go to Paris before that date. I have no intention of quitting the army. . . . . After the signature of peace it is proposed that an expedition shall be undertaken against England or Portugal. You shall have the choice of one or the other.

"I salute you,

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte now established himself in the splendid chateau of Montebello, close to Milan, with his wife, his mother, his brothers Joseph and Louis, his sister Pauline, and his uncle Fesch. Count Miot de Melito has left an account of the brilliant court held by the young general. A severe etiquette was observed; his aides-de-camp were no longer received at his table; he was most particular in the choice of his guests; he dined as it were in public, after the manner of the French kings; his saloons were constantly filled by the great nobles and by all the distinguished men in Italy, who came to solicit the favour of a glance or of a moment's conversation. Bonaparte was no longer the general of a triumphant Republic, but a conqueror on his own account, imposing his laws on the vanquished. Among other persons were the two Austrian plenipotentiaries, Count Merfelt and the Marquis de Gallo. The marquis was also Neapolitan ambassador at Vienna; he was afterwards ambassador at Paris, and then minister of foreign affairs, first to Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples,

and then to Murat. A number of officers from other armies and distinguished French civilians flocked to Montebello.

To Miot de Melito Bonaparte spoke very plainly. He said: "What I have accomplished up to the present is nothing. I am only at the commencement of my career. Do you think that I have triumphed in Italy for the honour and glory of the lawyers of the Directory, for Carnot, and for Barras? Do you think that it is in order to found a Republic? What an idea! A Republic of 30,000,000 souls, with our customs and our vices! Where would be the possibility? It is a chimera with which the French are enamoured, but which will pass like many others. They require glory, and their vanity must be satisfied; but they have no conception of liberty. Look at the army! The victories we have gained have restored to the French soldier his veritable character. I am everything for him. Let the Directory endeavour to deprive me of my command, and it will see who is master. The nation requires a chief who has acquired glory, and not theories and phrases. Give them playthings and they will allow themselves to be led anywhere," &c. &c.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MONTEBELLO, *20th May*, 1797.

"General Baraguey d'Hilliers has taken possession of Venice. That unhappy city was a prey to anarchy and civil war. The French were acclaimed by the people. *The confidence which those persons who have seen the army of Italy have in its discipline and the good spirit which animates officers and men, is one of the most pleasant fruits of good conduct; it forms a better title to the gratitude of humanity than the victories it has gained.* The ambassadors of England and of Russia, and M. d'Antrigues, have fled from the city.

"I beg you will send me instructions concerning Rome. The health of the Pope is very bad, and he may die at any

moment. . . . . All the merchandise in Venice belonging to the English, Russians, and Portuguese has been confiscated.

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN HALLER.

"MONTEBELLO, 20*th May*, 1797.

"You will find inclosed an order given to General Baraguey d'Hilliers. My intention is that if you can procure 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 francs you shall carry out the confiscation. . . . . The order must be executed gently, and as little cause of discontent as possible must be given to the Venetians.

"As for the Duke of Modena, if you can get 6,000,000 francs out of him, you must make sure of the money, so as to be able to seize it on the demand of the inhabitants of Modena, who have claims to make on this subject. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN HALLER.

"MONTEBELLO, 21*st May*, 1797.

"I have approved of the sale of the Abbey St. Nicholas, on condition of the price being paid in four months. You must obtain 500,000 francs down for the property of St. Martin, and must arrange to pay the other million to Citizen André. . . . . Should the confiscation of the English merchandise create too much dissatisfaction, and not promise more than 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 francs, it need not be effected. I beg that the Venetians may be treated in general with generosity, and not made to hate us like the inhabitants of Ancona.

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE COMMITTEE OF ARTS.

"MONTEBELLO, 21*st May*, 1797.

"Berthollet and Appiani are at Verona and Venice, where they are collecting various art treasures. I am

glad to see that some of the objects to be furnished by Rome have already started. I am expecting every moment a little frigate to transport them to Toulon.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 26th May Bonaparte again asked for instructions concerning Rome, adding:—

"Under present circumstances I think it will be well to ask the King of Spain to send 5,000 men to Parma, so that in the event of anything happening I may mix the Spaniards with our troops, and this will have a singular effect on the King of Naples. . . . . Spain having by her marine a decided preponderance over Naples, it is indispensable to entangle them a little in the affairs of Italy. The Emperor and the King of Naples have evidently an eye on the inheritance of the Pope. I think it would be preferable to give Spain 5,000 men more to act against Portugal, and to have 5,000 Spaniards in Parma."

Bonaparte went on to say that he had despatched General Gentili to seize upon Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia; that the isle of Malta was most important to France; that the Grand Master was dying, and that his successor would probably be a German. He thought that with 500,000 francs it would be possible to arrange for a Spaniard being elected. There were no English, he said, in the Mediterranean, and a combined French and Spanish fleet might pass by Lavalette and take possession of it. "If we don't adopt these means," he added, "Malta will fall into the power of the King of Naples. This little isle has no value but for us."

On the same day Bonaparte gave General Gentili his instructions. "You will act as the auxiliary of the Republic of Venice. You will do all in your power to captivate the inhabitants. At Corfu, and at sea, you will seize on all the Venetian vessels of war which are

'wavering.' If the inhabitants are in favour of independence, flatter their taste, and do not fail in your various proclamations to speak of Greece, of Athens, of Sparta." Bonaparte then informed the general that the Citizen Arnault, a distinguished man of letters, would follow the expedition. He was to draw the pay and rations of a brigadier; he was to study the islands and report on all he saw, and also to help the general in the manufacture of his manifestoes.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTIONS RAISED IN THE COUNTRIES CONQUERED IN ITALY.

In this list, which was made out by Bonaparte himself and which is in his handwriting, we find that the Church plate brought in 1,500,000 francs; the plate of Rome and Verona, 760,000 francs; golden ingots, 600,000 francs; and in all 23,000,000 francs.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MONTEBELLO, *27th May*, 1797.

"You will find inclosed the ratification of the Emperor to the preliminary treaty. The plenipotentiary of the Emperor regretted that the treaty had not been drawn up on parchment and that the seals were not larger. I agree with the first remark, and think that parchment ought to be employed for documents meant to be preserved. . . . . We held the first conference to-day respecting the definitive peace, when we agreed to present the following plan:—

"1st. The Rhine boundary for France.

"2nd. Salzburg and Passau for the Emperor.

"3rd. The Duchy of Cleves or an equivalent in Germany to Prussia.

"4th. The maintenance of the German Confederation.

"5th. The reciprocal guarantee of said articles.

"For Italy:—

"1st. Venice for the Emperor.

"2nd. Mantua, Brescia to the Adige, for the new Republic.

"As the Emperor desires an indemnity for the Duke of Modena, he might be offered the island of Zante. . . . .

"To destroy the German Confederation would be to lose the whole advantage of Belgium and of the Rhine boundary; it would be to place from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 inhabitants in the hands of two powers which we equally distrust. If the Germanic Confederation did not exist it would be necessary to create it for our convenience.

"Do you approve of our system for Italy?

"Venice, which has been falling into decay since the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the birth of Trieste and Ancona, will with difficulty survive the blows we have inflicted upon it. The people are incapable, cowardly, and in no way fit for liberty; without land and without water it appears only natural that Venice should be left to those to whom we give the continent.

"We shall take her vessels, despoil the arsenal, carry off the guns, destroy the bank, and keep Corfu and Ancona. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

On the previous day Bonaparte had assured the municipality of Venice that—"Under all circumstances I will do what I can to consolidate your liberty, and to place unhappy Italy, free and independent of foreigners, on the stage of the world. . . . *Venice is the only population worthy of liberty.*"

At Corfu Gentili behaved with an amount of duplicity worthy of his chief. He presented himself as the agent of the new government, and once admitted into the fortress, he seized upon it, upon the fleet, and a large quantity of stores of all kinds. An island more valuable than the whole of Italy was worth this bit of perfidy.

TO GENERAL JOUBERT.

"MONTEBELLO, *28th May*, 1797.

"I am informed that forty-five parishes of the Vicentin have refused to give up their church plate. I beg you will take measures to make them furnish it like the others. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MONTEBELLO, *6th June*, 1797.

"I have just given orders for two millions in gold or silver to be sent to Paris for the fortification of Brest. . . . Since the commencement of the new campaign (against Austria), the Army of Italy has supplied

1st.	To the Army of the Rhine	1,000,000	francs.
2nd.	To the Army of the Sambre et Meuse...	1,000,000	„
3rd.	To the Army of the Alps	500,000	„
4th.	To Toulon...	1,000,000	„
5th.	To Paris	1,000,000	„
6th.	About to be sent to Paris	2,000,000	„
7th.	To Toulon...	1,000,000	„
	TOTAL	7,500,000	„

Bonaparte was never weary of enumerating his services and of whetting the appetite of his employers, who were able to maintain themselves in power only by means of bribery and corruption of the most shameless description, and in this there was a strong contrast between the men of the Directory and their friends, and the incorruptible Robespierre.

TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

"MONTEBELLO, *6th June*, 1797.

"I am led to suppose that the celebrated manuscript of Josephus, from the Ambrosian Library, which was sent to

Paris from Milan has not arrived. As it is the only manuscript written on papyrus, it is very important that it should not be lost. I beg you will inform me if it has been sent to the National Library.

"BONAPARTE."

This precious manuscript was duly received in Paris, but in 1815 it was restored to Italy, and it is again to be seen in the Ambrosian Library.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"MONTEBELLO, *7th June*, 1797.

"I at first thought of sending General Kilmaine to Marseilles, but he has expressed the desire to take part in the expedition to England, should it take place. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL BERNADOTTE.

"MONTEBELLO, *7th June*, 1797.

"I beg you will let me know to what sum the church plate of the town of Udine and of the whole of Friuli, amounts.

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN HALLER.

"MONTEBELLO, *12th June*, 1797.

"I thought I had informed you that I had granted to the city of Verona the church plate wherewith to pay its contribution (?)

"If the letters of change sent to you by the municipality of Verona have not been paid, inform your agent of this fact. I authorise you to sell the Abbey of San-Zeno. . . . Take the plate in the churches of Venice, but let this be done through the medium of the provisional government, and let it go to pay a portion of the 3,000,000 francs which are due to us.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 13th June Commodore Perrée received instructions to seize upon everything in Venice, on the pretext that "conformity of principles" existed between the two governments "Send to Toulon," wrote Bonaparte, "all the marine stores required in that port. By a secret article the Venetians are bound to supply us with stores to the value of 3,000,000 francs, but my intention is to seize upon all the Venetian vessels and all the stores possible."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MONTEBELLO, *24th June*, 1797.

"The Pope had an attack of apoplexy on the eve of Corpus Christi, and was bled several times. He is eighty-three years of age. I beg you will send me positive instructions as to what to do in the event of his death. Am I to allow a new Pope to be elected? If there be a revolution in Rome, and the King of Italy marches on the city, am I to oppose him? . . . The Austrians have invaded Istria and Dalmatia.

"BONAPARTE."

Of what use instructions since Bonaparte always anticipated or disregarded them? But what could a feeble Directory do with this ever victorious and popular commander, beyond allowing his conduct to be called in question?

At the end of June, a representative, called Dumolard, brought a motion before the Assembly, which was aimed at General Bonaparte. In a very able speech he protested against the treatment of Venice, and threw doubt on the crimes attributed to that country, in order to justify the violation of the right of nations; he complained that the Assembly, unlike the British Parliament, was not kept aware of what was passing, and that peace and war and treaties were concluded without its knowledge. He also questioned the right of the French Republic to interfere with the form of government in other countries. Dumolard

was no adversary of General Bonaparte, but a straightforward Republican, who seems to have had some presentiment of the military tyranny in store for his country, and to have desired to uphold the authority of parliament and international law.

Bonaparte wrote in the most indignant terms to the Directory on the subject of this motion, which, published by order of the Assembly, was clearly aimed at him. "I had the right to expect," he wrote, "if not civic triumphs, at least to be allowed to live tranquilly under the protection of the Republic, after having concluded peace on five occasions, and having felled the coalition. To-day I find myself denounced and persecuted, although my reputation belongs to my country." After a torrent of complaints and accusations, the General, as a proof that 400 Frenchmen had been assassinated by the Venetians, sent the Assembly a dagger. He concluded by tendering his resignation.

After writing this letter, Bonaparte proceeded to draw up a series of vigorous notes, in which he did ample justice to his great services—notes which must have had a startling effect on the Directory. In the first he said—"Ignorant and garrulous lawyers have asked why we occupied Venice. . . . But I warn you, and I speak in the name of 80,000 men, that the time when cowardly lawyers and wretched babblers guillotined soldiers, is past; and, if you oblige them, the troops of Italy will march on the Clichy barrier, and woe to you!" In another note, explaining his military operations, which had been criticised, he wrote—"It was said that Bonaparte entered Germany by the Tyrol, by Carinthia, and by Carniola. But in thus dividing his forces, he had no fear of finding himself too weak, seeing the positions occupied by the enemy. . . . As soon as the enemy had been beaten and had fled, Bonaparte, knowing that he might rally his forces behind the mountains, fell upon his divisions, beat them in detail, concentrated his army on one point, and was prepared to operate in any

direction. On the other hand, the army of Prince Charles was spread out between Salzburg and Vienna, and was weakened by detachments sent into the Tyrol and Carniola. . . . Prince Charles has constantly fallen into all the snares set for him by General Bonaparte. . . . The art of war consists in always being, with an inferior force, stronger than the enemy on the point of attack; but this art is not to be learned in books, nor by practice; it is a matter of tact which constitutes military genius."

With regard to the crimes imputed to the Venetians, it should be borne in mind that in 1796 Napoleon wrote to the Directory, saying—"I am obliged to exaggerate the assassinations, &c. &c., so as to oblige the Venetians to furnish me with all I require, in order to appease me. This is how these people must be treated." It is not astonishing that *one* deputy should have protested against the iniquitous treatment of a sister Republic, which had refused to join the coalition against France.

TO THE MINISTER OF WAR.

"MILAN, *30th June*, 1797.

"The General-in-chief begs me to inform you that he has appointed citizen Eugene de Beauharnais, sub-lieutenant of hussars and aide-de-camp. The General hopes that the Directory will confirm the appointment. This young citizen is the son of General de Beauharnais, whose loss will long be regretted by the country. "BONAPARTE."

General de Beauharnais, who was a gallant and upright soldier, had perished, like several other distinguished officers, on the scaffold, and Bonaparte had married his widow and adopted his children.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"MONTEBELLO, *6th July*, 1797.

"Be good enough to order General Dufresse to restore immediately all that his wife took at Mestre, to their

different owners, and among other things the carriages belonging to the house where the citizen Erizzo lodged her.

"BONAPARTE."

The following proclamation was issued on the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille. It was a warning to the Royalist factions in France which were threatening the existence of the government and the constitution.

TO THE ARMY.

"MILAN, *14th July*, 1797.

"Soldiers—To-day is the anniversary of the 14th July. You see before you the names of your comrades who have fallen on the field of honour for the liberty of the country; they have furnished you with a brilliant example. You owe yourselves entirely to the Republic, to the welfare of 30,000,000 Frenchmen, and to the glory of that name which has received new lustre by your victories.

"Soldiers, I know that you are deeply afflicted at the misfortunes which threaten the country; but the country is in no real danger. The same men who triumphed over Europe coalesced, exist. Mountains separate us from France; if necessary, you will cross them with the rapidity of the eagle, to support the constitution and to protect the Republican government.

"Soldiers, the government watches over the sanctuary of the laws. The Royalists, as soon as they show themselves, will cease to exist. Do not be alarmed; let us swear by the manes of the heroes who fell beside us in the struggle for liberty; let us swear on our new standards—Implacable war to the enemies of the Republic and of the constitution!

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, 15*th July*, 1797.

"Inclosed you will find the copy of a letter I have received from General Clarke. You will perceive that the negotiations are being drawn out. It is beyond doubt that the Emperor is waiting to see what turn affairs will take in France.

"The army receives a great many newspapers from Paris, and more especially the worst; but they produce the very contrary effect to that intended. The indignation of the army is at its height. The soldiers ask if for the price of their fatigues and of six years war, they are to be assassinated. . . . As for myself, I am accustomed to a total abdication of my interests; however, I cannot be insensible to the insults and calumnies spread every day by eighty journals, and which are not denied by a single one; nor can I be insensible to the perfidy and the heap of atrocities contained in the (Dumolard) order of the day.

"I see that the Clichy Club wishes to march over my dead body in order to destroy the Republic. . . . You will find accompanying this, the poinard of the assassins of Verona.

"But, under all circumstances, the recollection of the constant proofs you have given me of your unlimited confidence, shall never be absent from my mind.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte frequently called upon the government to take active measures against the reactionary journals, to break their presses, and to tolerate only a few official newspapers.

One could hardly suppose from the following letter that Bonaparte had no soul for music himself.

TO THE INSPECTORS OF THE CONSERVATORY.

"MILAN, 26*th July*, 1797.

"I have received your letter. The music for which you ask is being copied in the various towns of Italy. I shall

take the greatest care to enrich the conservatory. . . . Of all the fine arts, music is that which exercises the most influence on the passions—that which the legislator should most encourage. A piece of moral music composed by a master never fails to touch the feelings, and has more influence than a good philosophic work which convinces the reason without exercising any effect on our habits.

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *27th July*, 1797.

"General Augereau has asked for permission to go to Paris, whither he is called by private affairs. I take the opportunity of forwarding the originals of the addresses to the army. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Augereau was going to Paris for something more important than urgent private affairs; he was going to act as the sword of Bonaparte in the *coup d'etât* of the 18th Fructidor. The Royalists were raising their heads. They had managed to secure the Presidence of the Five Hundred for Pichegru, and of the Elders for Barbé-Marbois, and had procured a seat in the Directory for Barthélemy. Under these circumstances, Barras and two of his colleagues determined to apply for armed assistance to prevent a Bourbon restoration. The question was whether they should appeal to Moreau, to Hoche, or to Bonaparte. As Moreau and the Army of the Rhine had exhibited but little enthusiasm on the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille, which had been noisily celebrated by the other two armies; and as Bonaparte was rather dreaded, Hoche was first applied to, and he consented to save the Republic. However, difficulties arose, and the young General, disgusted with what he had seen in Paris, returned to his head-quarters. It was the turn of Bonaparte to step in. He had already sent Lavalette to Paris, with money-bags, and instructions, and

a bargain was soon struck between Barras and himself. Hoche had been able to offer the government nothing beyond his wife's marriage portion. Bonaparte sent Barras 3,000,000 francs, and afterwards despatched Augereau to Paris to employ force. There was a law against any body of troops approaching the capital, but Augereau crossed the rubicon, surrounded and dissolved the Chambers. Barthélemy, who was a Royalist, Carnot, who was opposed to violent measures, Pichegru, and fifty-two other deputies, were sentenced to transportation.

Bonaparte, at this moment, is strongly suspected of having lent a not unwilling ear to Royalist overtures. He had no sooner attained power than he recalled Carnot and made him war minister. Barthélemy, the other exiled director, made his escape from Cayenne, but was created a senator in 1800. Carnot was removed from office for opposing Bonaparte's nomination as consul for life. It was Barthélemy who offered him this dignity on the part of the Senate. Under the Empire Barthélemy became a count and under the Restoration a marquis.

Bonaparte now urged upon the Directory the necessity of dissolving the Royalist clubs and prohibiting the Royalist journals in Paris. He had heard that negotiations with England had been opened at Lille, and, in the event of their success, he gave it as his opinion that Austria should be chastised for her bad faith.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *28th July*, 1797.

"I forward the addresses of Joubert's and of Massena's divisions. The army is devoted to the Republic and to the constitution. . . . The soldiers have been greatly distressed by the gossip *of that Dumolard*, which was printed by order of the Assembly, and sent in great profusion to the army. They are indignant to find doubt thrown upon the massacres of which they were victims. . . . As for

myself, I am engaged in endeavouring to restrain that patriotic ardour which is the distinctive character of all the soldiers of the army of Italy. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Writing from Milan on the 26th to General Clarke, who was endeavouring to come to terms with the Austrian plenipotentiaries, Bonaparte said that Talleyrand had replaced Delacroix at the Foreign Office, and that the journals spoke of a split in the Directory between Carnot and Barthélemy on one side, and Barras, Rewbell and Revellière-Lépeaux on the other.

On the 3rd August Bonaparte forwarded a note to the Pope on the subject of an arrangement between Church and State. After remarking that it was a propitious moment to put into execution a work in which sound policy and true religion would play an important part, he added—

"The French government has just permitted the Catholic Apostolic and Roman churches to be opened, and has granted tolerance and protection to that religion.

"Either the priests will take advantage of this first act of the French government in the spirit of the evangelists, by lending their aid to the cause of public tranquillity, and by preaching those maxims of charity which form the true basis of religion . . . . or else they will act in a contrary manner, and be once more persecuted and expelled."

His Holiness was then called upon for a bull, directing the French clergy to preach obedience to the government and the constitution. And "after this operation," Bonaparte said it would be useful to consider what measures should be adopted to reconcile the constitutional and the non-constitutional priests, between whom of course the greatest enmity existed. Those members of the clergy who had remained true to the Pope, and had never married or received

salary from the Republic, naturally looked upon the constitutional clergy as renegades. Bonaparte felt the necessity of effecting a reconciliation between those ecclesiastics who had suffered for their faith, and those who had cast off their allegiance to Rome in her hour of need, and in the day of danger.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *28th July*, 1797.

"I forward you a letter from General Clarke. There is nothing new concerning the negotiations, and it is impossible to trifle with us in a more shameless manner. . . . Should the war recommence, and you send me reinforcements, &c., I will promise you to be in Vienna by harvest time, to form a junction there with the army of the Rhine, and to make the Hungarian peasants drink Tokay.

"Our troops have arrived at Corfu, and were well received. In Albania the people still remember Greece, Sparta, and Athens. I have already entered into correspondence with the chiefs of the country, and perhaps Greece will rise from her ashes. . . .

"The gallant General Desaix has arrived to see the army of Italy. *What he says concerning the army of the Rhine is not at all reassuring.* . . .

"BONAPARTE."

In a letter to General Clarke of the 29th July, Bonaparte mentioned that it had been found impossible to make Hoche minister of war, as he had not the requisite age, and that he was to go to Ireland. He informed Joubert of the same fact a few days later, adding—"There is a great deal of agitation in Paris; the *messieurs* are divided among themselves. The army of the Sambre and Meuse has pronounced with the greatest vigour in favour of the government. General Desaix, who has been here for

some days assures me that *the army of the Rhine shares the opinions of the army of Italy.*"

On the 1st August Bonaparte gave an account to the Directory of the occupation of Corfu. The French had been greeted with shouts of joy, and the papa of the island had presented General Gentili with a book which he found to be the *Odyssey* of Homer. After saying that the tree of liberty had been planted in Zante, Cephalonia, and other islands, Bonaparte added—"The island of Corcyra was, according to Homer, the country of the Princess Nausica. Citizen Arnault, who enjoys a well-deserved reputation in literature, writes to me that he is about to sail, in order to plant the tricolour on the ruins of the palace of Ulysses. . . ."

If Bonaparte could plunder Italy of her statues, he was capable of rewarding so renowned a sculptor as Canova, who ought perhaps to have refused the offer.

TO CANOVA, *Sculptor at Rome.*

"MILAN, *6th August*, 1797.

"I have learned through one of your friends that you have been deprived of the pension you enjoyed at Venice. The French Republic takes a particular interest in the great talent which distinguishes you. As a celebrated artist you have a right to the special protection of the army of Italy. I have given orders for your pension to be paid at once. I beg you will let me know that this order has been executed, and believe in the pleasure I experience in being agreeable to you.

"BONAPARTE."

TO H.R.H. THE GRAND DUKE OF TUSCANY.

"MILAN, *7th August*, 1797.

"Attempts have been made to disturb your Royal Highness, and to invent motives for dispute between you and the French Republic.

"I consider it my duty to inform your Royal Highness

that the Directory having every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of your Royal Highness during the whole of the Italian war, will seize every opportunity to testify to your Royal Highness the manner in which it regards these friendly proceedings; in my own name, having witnessed the reception and the care which your Royal Highness has always lavished on my brothers in arms, I shall always feel flattered at being able to be agreeable to you. To this feeling of gratitude must be joined a feeling of esteem. I have seen the states of your Royal Highness, and I said to myself that all the princes of Europe ought to learn in Tuscany how to preserve their thrones, by founding them on moderation and the happiness of their people.

"BONAPARTE."

All this did not save the Grand Duke, who was treated with the same cruelty and perfidy as other Italian princes. A few years later, and we shall find Bonaparte's sister Eliza sitting on the Grand Ducal throne, and governing her husband and her other subjects in a manner which earned for her the nickname of Semiramis.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *9th August*, 1797.

"I announced the despatch of twenty-one standards after the battle of Rivoli, and I sent you only fifteen or sixteen. I now forward the others, which were left behind by mistake at Peschiera, by General Bernadotte.

"This General, who gained reputation on the left bank of the Rhine, is now one of the officers the most essential to the glory of the Army of Italy. . . . I beg you will send him back as soon as possible. [After praising the gallantry and Republican ardour of Bernadotte's troops, which had been drawn from the army of the Rhine]—

"You see in General Bernadotte one of the staunchest friends of the Republic.

"BONAPARTE."

In a letter to the Directory of the 16th August, Bonaparte once more asked for reinforcements lest hostilities should be renewed, in spite of all his persuasions and threats and his direct appeal to the Emperor. In this letter he wrote—"The isles of Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante have a greater interest for us than the whole of Italy. I think that if we are obliged to choose, it would be better to restore Italy to the Emperor, and to keep the *four* islands, which are a source of wealth and prosperity for our commerce. The Turkish Empire is crumbling to pieces; the possession of the islands would enable us to support it as far as possible, or to take our share.

"The time is not far distant when we shall find out that in order really to destroy England we must seize upon Egypt. The vast Ottoman Empire which is wasting away daily renders it obligatory upon us to take measures in good time for the protection of our commerce in the Levant. . . ."

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"MILAN, *22nd August*, 1797.

'I have the honour of forwarding you a copy of the reply made by the Pope. If the Directory desires he will issue a pastoral letter directing the bishops to preach obedience to the laws of the Republic. A good deal of agitation reigns at Rome, and a number of persons have been arrested. Two porters said to the Pope a few days ago, 'We no longer want your blessings, but not to pay taxes.'

"Should the negotiations not take a favourable turn, I think it will be essential to ratify the treaty with the King of Sardinia, which will give us 10,000 men. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

On the 3rd September Bonaparte wrote a very sharp letter to the Minister of Finance, complaining of the false

statements made by the Treasury with regard to the Army of Italy, and the swindling practised in that department. "The Treasury," he said, "declares that we have 30,000,000 francs in the chest; that is a falsehood. It is all we can do to pay the troops. The pay of the army is estimated at 1,400,000 francs, whereas it amounts to 3,000,000 francs. The Treasury says that the Army of Italy only sent 100,000 francs to the Army of the Rhine; another falsehood. It sent a million last year and another million three months ago." Bonaparte then complained that the million he had sent for Toulon, and the million he had sent for Brest, had been kept in Paris. In addition to providing for all its own wants, the Army of Italy, wrote Bonaparte, had procured for the Republic about £2,000,000.

On the 6th September Bonaparte wrote a long and amusing despatch to Talleyrand on the still pending negotiations. After giving a sketch of the Austrian negotiators —Gallo, Merveldt, and Degelmann—concerning whose individual and collective capacity he spoke in terms bordering on contempt, he said—"They speak very little and have no talent for dialectics. We always end by making them admit that all they say and all they do is at variance with common sense; but they always have Thugut and their instructions in their mouth. In private they whisper, after looking round to see that no one is listening, that Thugut is a scamp who ought to be hung; but Thugut is the real sovereign of Vienna."

In reply to some exorbitant demands, Bonaparte said that he lost his temper; that he accused the Emperor of Germany *of wishing to make himself King of Rome* (he was afterwards grandfather of the king of Rome), and that he had informed the negotiators that a fortnight after the opening of the campaign he would be so close to Vienna that the people, instead of breaking Thugut's windows as they had already done, would hang him.

TO THE ARCHBISHOP OF GENOA.

"PASSARIANO, 10*th September*, 1797.

"I have just received your pastoral letter of the 5th. I thought I was listening to one of the twelve apostles. It was thus that St. Paul spoke. How respectable is religion when it has ministers like you! True apostle of the Evangelists, you oblige your enemies to esteem and to admire you; you convert even the incredulous.

"How comes it that the Church which has a chief like you, should contain miserable subalterns who have neither charity nor peace?" And Napoleon went on to say that priests like these, with haggard eye, who preached revolt, murder and blood, who were paid with the gold of the rich, *who betrayed the people like Judas*, should be driven from the Church, which should call down upon them the anathemas and maledictions of Heaven. "The sovereignty of the people, liberty, this," said the General-in-Chief, "is the political code of the Gospel.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was quite as indignant with Naples as with Austria on the subject of her pretensions, and spoke and wrote as harshly of Acton as he did of Thugut. Naples wanted the Ionian islands and half the Papal states, especially Ancona, for which equivalents she would consent to cede the island of Elba.

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"PASSARIANO, 13*th September*, 1797.

". . . . I think that henceforward the maxim of the Republic should be never to abandon Corfu, Zante, &c. We ought, on the contrary, to establish ourselves there firmly; we shall find immense resources there for our commerce, and they will be of great use to us in future European movements.

"Why should we not seize upon the island of Malta? Admiral Brueys might anchor there and seize upon it.

"Four hundred knights and a regiment of 500 men alone constitute the defenders of La Valette. The inhabitants, about 100,000 in number, are very favourable to us, and very much disgusted with their knights, who are dying of hunger. I confiscated all their property in Italy on purpose. With the isle of St. Peter, ceded to us by the King of Sardinia, Malta, Corfu, &c., we shall be masters of the whole Mediterranean.

"If upon making peace with England we are obliged to cede the Cape of Good Hope, it will be necessary to seize upon Egypt. That country has never belonged to an European nation. The Venetians alone, some centuries ago, had a certain preponderance there. We could sail from here with 25,000 men, escorted by eight or ten ships of the line or Venetian frigates, and seize the country. Egypt does not belong to the Grand Signor.

"I wish, Citizen Minister, that you would procure some information in Paris as to the effect which our expedition to Egypt would have on the Porte.

"With armies like ours, for which all religions are equally good, Mahometan, Copt, Arab, idolatry, &c. [this to the ex-Bishop of Autun!], all this is quite indifferent to us; we respect one like the other.

"BONAPARTE."

We shall find that one of the first things which Bonaparte did when he got to Malta was to despoil the Church.

A letter to the Directory dated the 13th September says that the Government Commissioners appointed to select works of art in Italy have terminated their labours. According to Bonaparte—

"These men, distinguished by their talents, have served the Republic with a zeal, activity, modesty, and disinterestedness without example; solely occupied with the

object of their mission they have acquired the esteem of the whole army; they have given to Italy, in the delicate mission they were charged to fulfil, the example of virtue which always accompanies real talent. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

A note at the end of the third volume of Napoleon's *Correspondence* gives a list of 860 statues, pictures, &c. taken from Rome. The objects marked A belonged to the gallery of Cardinal Albany; those marked C B were taken from Cardinal Braschi; those marked P came from the Vatican; those marked I belonged to English (Inglesi) living in Rome, &c.

It was at this date that the negotiations of Lille, which had been opened by Pitt, were broken off. Lord Malmesbury was as unsuccessful as he had been the previous year. England agreed to restore the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch, but refused to restore Ceylon. She also insisted on keeping Trinidad, which she had taken from Spain. At the same time she consented to pay half a million sterling for the ships which had been burned at Toulon. It is interesting to remark, seeing what happened at the treaty of Amiens, when Bonaparte was First Consul, that the Directory refused to sacrifice their allies.

England, left without an ally, was in a terrible predicament. The fleets had mutinied. The bank had suspended cash payments. A French threat of invasion, however, aroused the whole energy of the nation and restored union.

On the 16th September (30th Fructidor) Bonaparte appears to have received from Paris the news of the success of the *coup d'état* of the 4th September or 18th Fructidor. He at once issued an address "To the sailors of the squadron of Rear Admiral Brueys," in which he said:—

"Comrades, the *émigrés* had taken possession of the National tribunal . . . . the soldiers rallied round the tree of liberty and the partisans of tyranny are in chains.

"Comrades, as soon as we have pacified the Continent, we shall join you in conquering the liberty of the seas. . . . Without you we shall be able to carry the glory of the French name only into a little corner of the Continent; with you we shall cross the seas and the national glory will behold the most distant regions.

"BONAPARTE."

It was on the 22nd September only that Bonaparte addressed a similar proclamation to the army and adhered to the new order of things.

On the 19th of September Bonaparte wrote to the Directory once more for reinforcements. He said that the Austrians could oppose him with 10,000 cavalry and 90,000 infantry, while 18,000 cavalry had been raised in Hungary. To meet this force he had only 4,000 cavalry and 45,000 infantry, 2,000 Poles, and 1,000 Italians. After pointing out what should be done he added:—

"In spite of these measures the enemy will be stronger than I am. If I can forestall him and assume the offensive the first, I shall beat him and be under the walls of Vienna in a fortnight. If, however, he assumes the offensive before me everything will become dubious."

On the 25th September Bonaparte complained to the Directory that an officer had arrived from Paris with a circular written by Augereau to all the generals of division in the Army of Italy.

"It is clear," he wrote, "that the Government is acting towards me as it did towards Pichegru after the 13th Vendémiaire. I beg you will replace me and accept my resignation. No power on earth will induce me to remain in the service after this horrible mark of ingratitude on the part of the Government, which I was far from expecting. My health, which is greatly shattered, demands repose and tranquillity. I experience the necessity of mingling with my fellow citizens. Too long has a great power remained in my hands. I have always exercised it

for the benefit of my country; so much the worse for those persons who do not believe in virtue and who suspect mine. My conscience and the opinion of posterity will be my recompense.

"BONAPARTE."

The new Government had shown itself suspicious of Bonaparte in more ways than one, and thought it could curtail his power. Orders were sent to him which were equivalent to saying that he was no longer to exercise unlimited authority in Italy. Bonaparte retorted by tendering his resignation, an act which brought the Directory to its knees. The Government replied to the General in the most abject terms. It said:—

"How can you accuse us of ingratitude and injustice when we have never ceased to repose entire confidence in you?" It was hinted that the Royalists, after having poisoned Hoche, wished to deprive the Republic of the genius of Bonaparte by disgusting him with the Directory. "You speak of repose, of your health, of resignation," added the Directors, "but the repose of the Republic which you protect forbids you to think of your own. Should France lose the fruit of your victories and be forced to conclude a disgraceful peace, we shall not only be ill, we shall perish," &c., &c. And the Directory positively refused to accept Bonaparte's resignation.

It was clear, after the reception of this letter, that Bonaparte had everything in the hollow of his hand, and that he could treat the Government as it deserved. Pichegru was an exile, Moreau in disgrace, Hoche was dead. Bonaparte was without a military rival.

The Directory had wished to recommence the war with Austria for two reasons: it objected to the terms offered by Bonaparte, and it dreaded the presence of the young general in Paris. On his side, Bonaparte, knowing that he could gain more popularity in France by concluding peace than by winning half a dozen more victories, determined

to go on with the negotiations. The Directory wished to avoid the shame of abandoning Venice to Austria. Venice weighed very lightly in the balance with Bonaparte where his own interests were concerned. He was never tired of inveighing against its despotic Government and promising it freedom, but he had no compunction about handing it over to an absolute monarchy.

On the 26th September Bonaparte urged upon the Directory the absolute necessity of sending him reinforcements and of ratifying the treaty he had concluded with the King of Sardinia. He could not understand the reluctance of the Directory to come to terms with the House of Savoy.

"Have you any scruples," he wrote, "about forming an alliance with a king? We have the King of Spain for ally and perhaps the King of Prussia. Do you wish to revolutionise Piedmont and to incorporate it with the Republic? The best way to accomplish this without a shock and without violating treaties would be to incorporate the 10,000 Piedmontese troops with ours, and to associate them with our victories. Six months afterwards the King of Sardinia would find himself dethroned. When a giant embraces a pigmy and folding him in his arms stifles him, he cannot be accused of having committed a crime. It becomes simply a matter of difference of organisation!"

General Clarke, who had been acting as the confidential agent of the Government, was recalled after the 18th Fructidor. In more than one letter Bonaparte mentioned the abilities he had displayed in his civil capacity. He wrote to Talleyrand on the 26th September saying:—

"I do not care to inquire if this officer was originally appointed to act as a spy upon me. If such were the case I pardon him. I have seen him groan over the unfortunate reaction which threatened to engulf liberty and France." And Bonaparte concluded by asking Talleyrand to give the general another appointment. Clarke

proved himself, before and afterwards, of a very pliant disposition; he betrayed Carnot and the Royalists in 1797 just as, at a later date, he betrayed Napoleon for Louis XVIII., in connection with Talleyrand.

On the 28th September Bonaparte described to Talleyrand an interview with the Austrian negotiators.

"After dinner," he wrote, "when the Germans speak freely, I had a conversation of four or five hours with M. de Cobenzl, who allowed me to perceive a desire on the part of the Emperor to adhere to our political system so as to oppose the ambitious projects of Prussia." An indiscretion which Bonaparte turned to account with consummate ability.

TO CITIZEN JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"PASSARIANO, *29th September*, 1797.

"Inform the Court of Rome immediately, that unless General Provera be at once expelled, the French Republic will look upon this refusal on the part of his Holiness as the commencement of hostilities. . . . Mention in your conversation with the Secretary of State that the *French Republic was generous at Tolentino, but it will not be so again.* . . . For myself, who know the Italians, I attach great importance that the Roman troops should not be commanded by an Austrian general. . . You must insist upon General Provera leaving Rome within twenty-four hours. . . . Say publicly that he has been my prisoner twice during this campaign, and that before long he will be my prisoner for the third time. . . . If the Pope dies you should do all in your power to prevent the election of another Pope, and to get up a revolution. . . . The King of Naples will not move, but if he does on the revolution being accomplished you will inform his majesty as soon as he crosses the frontier that the Roman people are under the protection of the French Republic. You will afterwards have an interview with the Neapolitan general, and

say that the French Republic sees no inconvenience in opening negotiations with the Court of Naples on the subject of its demands. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte might very well have left Provera to the Pope if there was truth in what he wrote of that General at St. Helena.

"General Provera," he wrote, "who capitulated at La Favourite, had previously been taken prisoner at Cosseria, where he had shown little talent. This was the real reason which induced me to praise him in order to obtain him credit, and it succeeded. Provera was re-employed and was captured a second time. The praise of an enemy should therefore be regarded with suspicion unless given after the cessation of hostilities."

On the 1st October Bonaparte wrote that matters were going on badly, but that the position of the French army in Italy was superb. Should hostilities recommence Venice would furnish 25,000,000 francs. He added:—

"All the arrangements which I make at this moment constitute the last service I can render to my country. My health is entirely shattered, and good health is indispensable in war.

"The Government has, no doubt, taken into consideration the demand which I made a week ago for the nomination of a commission of publicists to organise a free Italy; of plenipotentiaries to carry on the negotiations, and a General enjoying its confidence to command the army. I do not know any one capable of replacing me in these three functions. . . . As for myself, I am seriously affected at finding myself obliged to stop short at the very moment when perhaps there is nothing but fruit to gather; but necessity masters my inclination, my will, and my reason. I can hardly get on horseback; I require two years repose. . . ."

This feeling of despondency, if it ever existed, was not of long duration, nor did it prevent Bonaparte from displaying his wonted activity in the way of despatch writing and laying plans for the future.

TO CITIZEN HALLER.

"PASSARIANO, *6th October*, 1797.

"The negotiations are almost broken off: the Austrians demand too much.

"Send me money with all diligence; dip into all the coffers for we must have some immediately; in twelve days we shall be campaigning. Look to the Brescians, I must have a million from them. Tell them, as well as the Cisalpines, that unless they furnish money I shall leave them in the lurch and make peace without them. . . .

"BONAPARTE.

"P.S.—Money, money, money!"

TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

"PASSARIANO, *7th October*, 1797.

"You will find inclosed, Citizen Minister, the confidential scheme handed to me by the Count de Cobenzl. I acquainted him with all the indignation you would feel on reading it. . . . In two or three days everything will be settled one way or the other. I acknowledge that I shall do all I can to conclude peace, as the season is far advanced, and there is no hope of accomplishing anything important.

"You little know these people here. They do not deserve 40,000 Frenchmen being killed for them. I see by your letters that you always start from a false hypothesis; you imagine that liberty can make an enervated, superstitious, *pantaloon*, and cowardly nation accomplish great things. You desire me to do miracles, and I do not know how. I have not a single Italian in my army with the exception, I think, of 1,500 scamps, picked up in the

streets of various towns, who pillage and are good for nothing. You must not allow yourself to be imposed upon by a few Italian adventurers in Paris."

Napoleon had a different opinion of the Piedmontese; he added:—

"If the negotiations do not take a favourable turn. France will ever repent her decision with regard to the King of Sardinia. This prince, with one battalion of infantry and one squadron of cavalry, is stronger than the whole Cisalpine.

"Since I have been in Italy I have received no aid from the love of the people for liberty and equality. My only true auxiliaries have been the good discipline of the army, and the great respect we have shown for religion, which has been carried to the extent of cajoling its ministers: justice, and, above all, the prompt punishment of evil-doers. This is history; the remainder, which is all very fine in proclamations, printed discourses, &c., is so much romance. . . It is only with prudence, wisdom, and great dexterity that obstacles are surmounted and important ends attained. There is but one step from triumph to a fall. I have seen in the greatest circumstances that a little thing has always decided important events. . . . The character of our nation is to be too elated in prosperity. If we take as the basis for all operations true policy, which is nothing else than the calculation of combinations and chances, we shall long remain the *grande nation*, the arbiter of Europe. I say more; we shall hold the balance of power in Europe, and, if destiny decrees this, I see no impossibility in attaining, in the course of a few years, those splendid results, of which the heated and enthusiastic imagination catches a glimpse, but which the extremely cool, persevering and positive man can alone grasp. . . . I write to you as I think, which is the greatest mark of esteem I can give you.

"BONAPARTE."

The above was addressed to Talleyrand, who had conceived the highest opinion of the talents of the young soldier, and who foresaw the brilliant destiny which awaited him far more clearly than any one else.

Hoche had hardly returned to his head quarters when he died under the most suspicious circumstances. He is generally supposed to have been poisoned, but this affair is still shrouded in mystery.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"PASSARIANO, *17th October*, 1797.

"Art. 1. On the 10th Brumaire the army will celebrate a funeral ceremony in honour of General Hoche.

"Art. 2. The name of General Hoche will be inscribed on the pyramids of the divisions," &c., &c.

Hymns composed by Chenier and Lebrun were to be sung in honour of Hoche and of the 18th Fructidor.

On the same day Bonaparte's mind was relieved by the signing of the treaty of Campo Formio. In a letter to Talleyrand, he said :—

"I have no doubt the critics will depreciate the treaty I have just signed. All those, however, who know Europe and have the tact of affairs will be convinced that it was impossible to arrive at a better treaty without recommencing hostilities and conquering two or three more provinces from Austria. Was that possible? Yes. Was that probable? No."

Bonaparte then recapitulated all the difficulties with which he would have been obliged to contend.

"No. 6. We have war with England; that enemy is sufficiently redoubtable. . . ."

"No. 10. The Austrians are dull and avaricious; no people are less intriguing and less dangerous for our domestic affairs than the Austrians. The English, on the contrary, are generous, intriguing, and active. Our

Government must therefore destroy the Anglican monarchy, or expect to be itself destroyed by the corruption of these intriguing and enterprising 'insulars.' The present moment offers us a capital opportunity. Let us concentrate all our activity on the marine and destroy England. That done, Europe is at our feet."

The occupation of Mayence and the destruction of *Carthage* were to compensate France for her generosity towards the Emperor.

Bonaparte was not at all certain that the Directory would ratify the treaty of Campo Formio concluded in direct opposition to the formal instructions of the Government, and for this reason he sent it to Paris by Berthier and the savant Monge, in order that they might urge its acceptance. Before the Directory could come to a decision the news of peace having been concluded spread through Paris like wild-fire, and created such enthusiasm that the ratification of the treaty became an act of necessity.

Bonaparte, who had formed a correct idea of public opinion, now turned his attention in a different direction.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *5th November*, 1797.

". . I think you might leave 25,000 men in Italy, take 36,000 to England, and order the rest to Nice, Chambéry, and Corsica. . . . For the expedition to England we shall require: 1st, good naval officers; 2nd, a great number of troops well commanded, so as to menace several points at once, &c.; 3rd, an intelligent and determined admiral—I think Truguet the best; 4th, 30,000,000f. ready money. General Hoche had some very good maps of England, which should be obtained from his heirs. You could not select a more distinguished officer than General Desaix. Although I truly need repose, I shall never refuse, as far as possible, to sacrifice myself for my country.

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, *12th November*, 1797.

"You will find inclosed the distribution of the Army of Italy as the Army of England. . I have given all the necessary orders for moving our column on the ocean. I shall send Citizen Andréossy to Paris to-morrow, in order to cast guns of the same calibre as the English field-pieces, so that, once in the country, we may be able to use their cannon balls. . . I have sent Citizen Poussielgue to Malta under pretext of inspecting the Levant, but really to put a last touch to our designs upon that island. . .

"BONAPARTE."

It is well known that Bonaparte, at all events at this date, had no idea of invading England, and the above letter shows that even before leaving Italy his mind was bent upon striking a blow at our eastern possessions. The probability is that Citizen Poussielgue entered into negotiations with Homespech for the sale of Malta, over the price of which island the Czar was haggling.

TO THE ARMY.

"MILAN, *14th November*, 1797.

"Soldiers, I start to-morrow for the Congress of Rastadt.

"On finding myself separated from the army, I shall only be consoled by the hope of soon seeing myself once more among you, struggling against new dangers.

"No matter what post the Government assigns to the Army of Italy, it will always be worthy to sustain the liberty and glory of the French name.

"Soldiers, in talking among yourselves of the princes you have conquered, of the nations who owe you their liberty, and of the battles you have fought, say—In two campaigns we would have done more.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte had lived in regal state at the chateau of Montebello, but it was not without a feeling of surprise that the diplomats assembled at Rastadt witnessed the Republican General enter that town in a carriage drawn by eight horses. He did not tarry long at Rastadt, being unwilling to take an active part in the negotiations. He wrote several letters to Joseph, who was French minister at Rome at this period, complaining of the attitude of the Papal Government, which he considered as anything but satisfactory.

General Clarke, whom the following letter concerns, had formerly served in the dragoons. In 1790, however, he resigned his commission, and was attached to the French embassy in London. We have seen him acting as a spy upon Bonaparte, and being won over by the General. Now he was in disgrace and accused of being the creature of Carnot, which regicide minister was suspected of royalist designs, and was openly accused by Barras of having betrayed the Republic.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MILAN, 15*th November*, 1797.

"General Clarke, who is going to Paris, has been employed in Italy for several months. In all the letters addressed to him, and which have been intercepted, I have found nothing out of conformity with the principles of the Republic. General Clarke is a hard and conscientious worker. If his *liasons* with Carnot have rendered him 'suspect' in diplomacy, he might be useful in military matters, and for the expedition to England. If he has need of indulgence, I beg you will accord him some. . .

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte afterwards employed Clarke as his war minister, and made him Duc de Feltre.

TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

"RASTADT, 30*th November*, 1797.

"To-day we proceeded to exchange the ratifications of the treaty of Campo Formio. . All the members of the Congress have arrived and have paid me a visit. The King of Sweden has sent the Baron de Fersen as his ambassador. . He came to see me surrounded by all the fatuities of a courtier of the *Œil-de-bœuf* (Versailles). After the usual compliments . . . I addressed him in these terms. . . How explain the conduct of the Court of Sweden, which takes every opportunity of sending to Paris and elsewhere ministers and ambassadors essentially disagreeable to every French citizen? The King of Sweden would no doubt object to receive a minister who had endeavoured to excite the people of Stockholm to revolt. No, sir; the French Republic will not tolerate men who are too well known by their *liasons* with the ancient court of France to come and brave the ministers of the first people on earth. . . . During this discourse the Baron changed colour several times, but acted like a courtier. He replied that his Majesty would consider what I had said, and then he left. *I naturally re-conducted him to the door with the usual ceremonies.* . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Baron de Fersen is well known to us for his devotion to the unfortunate Marie Antoinette, and the effort he made to save the royal family on the occasion of the flight to Varennes.

After having exchanged the ratifications of the treaty of Campo Formio, and signed the military convention by which Mayence and Manheim were handed over to France, Bonaparte left Radstadt for Paris, where he met with an enthusiastic reception. On the 5th December he was received in solemn audience by the Directors and eulogised

in the most fulsome manner. Barras, after enumerating his exploits and comparing him to Socrates, to Cæsar, and to Pompey, said—"Go and chain up that gigantic freebooter who oppresses the seas. Go and chastise in London outrages left too long unpunished. Numerous votaries of liberty await you." The fact is that Barras and his colleagues were far from desiring the presence of the young General in Paris, as they dreaded his popularity. On his side, Bonaparte was soon anxious to escape from the capital, where nothing was to be done for the moment. Even at St. Helena he dwelt with satisfaction on, and chuckled over, the line of conduct he pursued at this period. He avoided, as much as possible, appearing in public, living quietly with Josephine in the rue Chantereine, now called the rue de la Victoire, and taking her into the country on Sundays. Convinced that the Directors, and especially Barras, wished to poison him, he carefully avoided arousing suspicion. On the 28th December he was elected a member of the Institute, and at the fêtes given in his honour he appeared in the costume of that learned body, and affected to prefer the palm leaves of the savant to the uniform of the General-in-Chief.

Thus closed 1797. On a flag presented to the General by the Directory a list of his deeds during that year was emblazoned—150,000 prisoners—170 colours—550 siege guns—600 field pieces—5 pontoons—9 ships of 64 guns—12 frigates—12 corvettes—18 galleys captured—Armistice with the King of Sardinia—Convention with Genoa—Armistice with the Duke of Modena, the King of Naples, the Pope—Treaty of Campo Formio. Then followed a list of the peoples who had been freed, and of the chief works of art sent by the General to Paris.

On the ocean the French were not so fortunate; at least their allies sustained two severe defeats. Admiral Duncan inflicted a more serious blow on the Dutch fleet than it had suffered at the hands of Admiral Brisbane in the preceding year; and the Spanish fleet was more ill-treated by Lord

St. Vincent than it had been by Rodney in 1780. With only 15 sail of the line the English Admiral beat 27 Spanish ships, the smallest of which carried 74 guns. This will explain a certain aversion on the part of the "gallant dons" to put to sea in the following years, in spite of the remonstrances and entreaties of Bonaparte.

CHAPTER IV.

THE YEAR 1798.

THE chief events of 1798 may be thus summed up. By the treaty of Campo Formio and the break down of the negotiations of Lille, England was isolated. The Congress of Radstadt was sitting. In February Berthier entered Rome, and secured the person of the Pope in consequence of General Duphot, who was attached to the staff of Joseph Bonaparte, having been killed in a riot. Declining to venture across the Channel, Bonaparte in March was appointed commander and chief of the Army of the East, and on the 19th May he sailed for Egypt. The conscription was established in France. In the absence of Bonaparte and his army, England managed to form a second coalition into which all the powers, with the exception of Spain and Prussia, entered. Austria desired to revenge her defeats; Germany to recover her Rhenish provinces; Russia, offended at the treatment of the kings of Naples and of Sardinia, accepted British subsidies and agreed to furnish troops to serve with the English in North Germany, and 60,000 men to act with the Austrians. The Emperor Paul at the same time offered an asylum to Louis XVIII., and received the title of Grand Master of the Knights of St. John. Suwarrow, after having been long in disgrace, was recalled. The invasion of Rome and of Switzerland had excited wide-spread indignation. In August Nelson gained

the battle of the Nile. In September the Sublime Porte declared war against France, and its action was quickly followed by the Barbary powers. The new Republics, ruthlessly plundered by French agents, were ready to revolt at any moment against their liberators, whose exactions they continued to support with impatience.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER, AT MILAN.

"PARIS, *6th January*, 1798.

"I thank you for the observations you have sent me concerning the French establishments in the Ionian sea. You waste no time, and devote the hours which peace prevents you from passing on the field of battle, in instructing yourself.

"I should much like to have you with me in England, but it seems the government consider your presence necessary in Italy. That post is so essential, that I should do wrong to resist, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

This allusion to the Ionian Islands, which Bonaparte considered "of more importance to France than the whole of Italy," shows that his thoughts were still directed towards the East.

General Duphot, having been massacred at Rome, close by the side of Joseph Bonaparte, who had a narrow escape, General Brune was despatched to Naples to threaten war in the event of the King occupying the Papal States. At the same time, Bonaparte despatched detailed directions to Berthier, ordering him to march secretly on Rome. "When you are at two days' march from that city," he wrote, "you will threaten the Pope and all the members of the government, guilty of this greatest of crimes, so as to inspire them with terror, and make them take to flight. . . . If it be proved that the army of the King of Naples is on the march to Rome, and that the General of the Emperor of Germany

in Italy positively states it to be the intention of the cabinet of Vienna to support the operation of the King of Naples, you will declare that no prince has yet put forward the pretension of keeping the French Republic in tutelage, and of hindering it from punishing offences committed against its ambassadors; and that at the first movement made by the Austrian General, the French army will seize on Tuscany. This should be said, and not written. When you reach Rome you will organise the Roman Republic, and arrest the principal assassins of the 8th Nivose, especially Cardinal Albani and his family; you will seize their papers and confiscate their property."

A portion of the troops destined for England were to be employed in this expedition, and citizen Faipoult was to place at the disposal of the army the 8,000,000 francs worth of diamonds which the Pope had given in payment of contributions! The venerable Cardinal Albani was very harshly treated, and was relieved of a splendid collection of paintings and marbles.

Berthier knew his business well, for he wrote to Bonaparte saying—"In sending me to Rome you have nominated me treasurer of the Army of England, and I shall endeavour to fill your coffers." As a fact, the Papal States and Switzerland were to furnish funds for the expedition to Egypt—Rome and Geneva!

Berthier had no difficulty in carrying out his instructions. Having seized upon Pius VI., he sent that Pontiff's walking-stick as a trophy to the Directory.

The same day at midnight Bonaparte wrote a second letter to Berthier, saying—"The Directory forwards you precise instructions as to all you are to do. The honour of taking Rome is reserved for you. . . . You are appointed chief of the staff of the Army of England. Of course you will first of all pacify Italy, and avenge the national honour which has been so deeply insulted."

After renouncing the hand of Désirée Clary for himself, Bonaparte had recommended General Duphot in his stead.

This match had been arranged, and the marriage was on the point of being celebrated when the gallant young officer was assassinated.

TO THE MINISTER OF WAR.

"PARIS, *7th February*, 1798.

"I start to-morrow, Citizen Minister, in order to visit the coasts of the ocean. I shall be back in twelve days. General Desaix is going to Brest, and General Kléber to Havre. . . . I beg you will place 30,000 francs at the disposal of General Desaix, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of England, for the extraordinary expenses of that army.

"BONAPARTE."

The appointment of Desaix was only temporary. As for Bonaparte, he was delighted to get away from Paris, where he was afraid of his popularity being compromised. During his stay in the capital he had avoided appearing in public as much as possible, and had lived the life of a simple citizen, with his wife. He knew that the more he showed himself the faster his popularity would vanish in so frivolous a capital as Paris. He knew that the slightest mistake would interrupt his career and perhaps cause his ruin. "The Parisians," he remarked, "retain no impression."

On the 23rd February Bonaparte addressed a long report to the Directory on "the difficulties of an invasion of England." Before undertaking so bold an operation, it would be necessary, he said, to obtain command of the sea. It might be possible to escape the vigilance of the British squadrons blockading Brest and Texel, or during the long winter nights to slip across the Channel in boats. The whole tone of this report however, was, opposed to an invasion of our shores, and in favour of attacking our communications with India. The expedition to Egypt

was soon decided upon, but it was kept secret till the last moment, and in the meantime preparations for the invasion of England were ostensibly carried on.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, 10*th March*, 1798.

"You ought to have received my letters relative to the embarkation of troops at Genoa. . . . Brune has beaten the Swiss, and has captured thirty colours. Inclosed you will find commissions for Generals Surrurier and Cervoni, who are appointed to the Army of England.

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

"PARIS, 26*th March*, 1798.

"I forward you a letter from the Directory, and beg you will order the citizens (list inclosed) to hold themselves in readiness to start for Bordeaux. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

This list included two astronomers, four geometricians, one aeronaut, three naturalists, one chemist, one mineralogist, one antiquary, six civil engineers, and an interpreter. These were the *savants* destined to accompany the young General to the East.

On the 27th March Bonaparte, as a person conversant with Italian affairs, wrote very warmly to the Directory, protesting against the arrest of the citizens Paradisi and Moscati in the Cisalpine Republic. "France and liberty," he said, "had no more sincere friends. Citizen Paradisi, who was a celebrated professor at Reggio, is the only Italian, who, sword in hand, rendered any service to the French army. . . .

"Citizen Moscati is known as one of the most renowned doctors in Europe, being very learned in the moral and political sciences. He devoted himself entirely to the army, and it is to his advice that we owe the lives of 20,000 men, who

would otherwise have perished in hospital. The debasement of the Cisalpine Government at its birth, and the loss of its best citizens, would be a real misfortune to France, and a triumph for the Emperor and his partisans.

"BONAPARTE."

The work of disintegration had already commenced.

TO M. J. B. SAY, *Man of Letters.*

"PARIS, *28th March*, 1798.

"I thank you, Citizen, in the name of General Bonaparte, for your kindness in undertaking the purchase of works destined to form his portable library," &c.

The list consisted of thirteen volumes of arts and sciences; thirty-nine volumes of geography and voyages, including those of Cook; 125 historical works, ancient and modern; forty volumes of poetry, including Napoleon's old favourite, *Ossian*, and ten volumes of light verses; twenty volumes of masterpieces of the French Theatre. In the way of novels, four volumes of Voltaire, Héloïse, Werther; four volumes of Marmontel; of English novels, forty volumes; Le Sage, ten; Prevost, ten. Then works on political and moral sciences—the Old Testament, the New Testament, the Koran, the Vedas, Mythology, and Montesquieu (*Esprit des Lois*).

Of these works, on the voyage to Egypt, the most carefully studied was the Koran.

TO CITIZEN MONGE, AT ROME.

"PARIS, *2nd April*, 1798.

"I have received, my dear Monge, your letter of the 30th Ventose. Desaix ought to have arrived; I beg you will hand him the inclosed. I count upon you and upon him to embark at Civita Vecchia. . . . I rely upon the Arab printing establishment of the Propaganda, and on you, should I have to ascend the Tiber with a squadron in order to lay hold of you. BONAPARTE."

Considering the sort of proclamations which the General afterwards issued in Egypt, it is curious to find they were printed at Rome, in an establishment intended for the propagation of the Christian religion. Monge had been sent to Rome to organise the new Republic.

TO THE MINISTER OF WAR.

"PARIS, *5th April*, 1798.

"General Bonaparte is informed that there exists in the War Office copies of Major Rennel's map of Bengal, and special maps of the course of the Ganges, published by the English. He begs you will place them at his disposal, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

For Bonaparte contemplated not only capturing Malta and Egypt, but taking Vienna and Constantinople *à revers*, and re-establishing the Greek Empire, or invading India, and seating himself on the throne of the Great Mogul.

The following decree by the Directory, but drawn up by Bonaparte, was published on the 12th April, when the expedition was almost ready to sail:—

"Art. 1. An army shall be formed called that of the East.

"Art. 2. This army shall be composed of troops drawn from, &c., &c.

"Art. 3. The Citizen Bonaparte, at present General-in-chief of the army of England, is named General-in-chief of the army of the East. He will be replaced in the command of the first of these armies, &c., &c.

"The present decree is not to be printed."

Then followed other decrees, pointing out the necessity of driving the English from Egypt. The Beys had formed intimate relations with them, and had practised cruelties of the most horrid description on French subjects, who were daily pillaged and assassinated. The English, aided by infamous treason, had become masters of the Cape of

Good Hope, to the great detriment of French commerce with India, rendering it absolutely necessary that a new route should be opened to Republican enterprise, so as to wage war with the satellites of Great Britain, and dry up the sources of their corrupting wealth.

"Art. 1. The General-in-chief of the army of the East will seize on Egypt.

"Art. 2. He will drive the English from all their possessions in the East, and above all destroy their entrepots in the Red Sea.

"Art. 3. He *will have the isthmus of Suez cut through*, and will take all the necessary measures to insure the free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea for the French Republic," &c., &c.

Next came a violent indictment against the Knights of Malta, and

"Art. 1. The General-in-chief of the army of the East is to seize on the isle of Malta," &c., &c.

These and other decrees were all dictated by Bonaparte. Brune had succeeded Berthier in Italy, and had been succeeded in Switzerland by Lannes. To the latter General Bonaparte wrote on the 13th April:—

"I await with impatience the 3,000,000 francs from Berne. I suppose you sent me news of them by my courier who passed through Lyons yesterday."

Art. 3. shows how Bonaparte understood that liberty of the seas which he so strongly advocated whenever he referred to England and her naval supremacy.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE DIRECTORY.

"PARIS, *14th April*, 1798.

"I should like, first, a letter from the Directory authorising the Citizen Monge to embark with General Desaix as a savant attached to the expedition. Second, to take

with me the Citizen Piveron, *who was for some time employed as agent to Tippoo Sahib.* He might be sent to India in order to re-open relations with that country.

"BONAPARTE."

The agents of Tippoo Sahib had been warmly received at Versailles at the beginning of the reign of Louis XVI.

TO VICE-ADMIRAL BRUEYS.

"PARIS, 17*th April*, 1798.

"I have received your different letters, Citizen General. . . . The Government has entire confidence in you. . . . On the first decade of Floreal I shall be on board your ship. Have a good bed prepared for me, as if for a man who would be sick during the whole voyage. I shall have eight or ten aides-de-camp with me. Berthier will have two or three adjutant-generals, &c. Lay in a good stock of provisions. . . . As you are the only person to whom I have announced my arrival at Toulon, it will be useless for you to speak about it. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The following curious instructions were sent to the future Viceroy of Italy, who, though quite a lad, was to accompany the expedition to Egypt as one of his stepfather's aides-de-camp; his youthful appearance there earning him the nickname of Cupid.

TO CITIZEN EUGENE BEAUHARNAIS.

"PARIS, 22*nd April*, 1798.

"You will be good enough to start to-morrow at 4 A.M., with Citizen Fister, the chambermaid of my wife, and the Citizen Hebert, who will sit on the box with the coachman. You will go to Lyons, passing through Auxonne and Châlons. You will find out at both places whether my grooms, servants, baggage, &c., have reached those towns,

and when they will arrive at Lyons. On reaching Lyons you will alight at an inn, which used to be called the Palais Royal, if it still exists, &c., &c.

"BONAPARTE."

Josephine accompanied Bonaparte as far as Toulon, and when the expedition sailed went to take the waters at Aix, in the hopes they would enable her to bear her second husband a child.

At this moment the fate of the expedition was held in suspense, and it appeared probable that Bonaparte's services would once more be required with the army of Italy. Bernadotte had been appointed French ambassador at Vienna, and had given such offence by hoisting the Republican flag that the people had broken his windows. The Directory wished to recommence the war with Austria, but to this Bonaparte offered a strenuous opposition. Words ran so high between the Government and the general that the latter offered his resignation. Rewbel handed him a pen, which Bonaparte had hardly taken when it was snatched from him by Merlin. After this violent scene matters were more calmly discussed, and the young general, as on previous occasions, carried his point.

TO GENERAL BRUNE.

"PARIS, *23rd April*, 1798.

"I have given orders to General Baraguay d'Hilliers to disembark his troops if they have been embarked, and to return if he has marched. . . . If affairs go wrong I think the chief efforts of the Austrians will be made in your direction, in which case I feel you will stand in need of more troops, and above all of a great deal of money.

"BONAPARTE."

Under these circumstances Bonaparte made a direct appeal to the Count Cobentzel to maintain the good relations established at Campo Formio. In a letter to the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, he said he would never be able to settle anything with Messrs. Lehrbach and *Metternich*, who knew nothing of the intentions of their cabinet, and enjoyed little credit.

When Bonaparte himself commanded in Italy he found means to send money home; now money would be required from France. The supposition is that Italy had been drained of her resources.

ORDER.

"PARIS, 28*th April*, 1798.

"Bonaparte, member of the National Institute, General-in-chief of the army of England (?), orders General Reynier," &c., &c.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte had been elected to the Institute in the place of his old friend Carnot, and delighted to veil his military aspirations under the palm-leaves of that learned society, whose costume he donned on public occasions.

TO GENERAL CAFFARELLI.

"PARIS, 2*nd May*, 1798.

"All the obstacles in the way of the expedition have been removed. I start to-morrow evening, and shall be at Toulon by the 9th, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"AUXERRE, 4*th May*, 1798.

". . . . I beg you will write to me by the courier who will hand you this, and send me all the newspapers since the day I started. I have ordered my couriers to alight at your house; you will see that they rejoin me at Toulon without delay, especially Moustache and Lesimple.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was exceedingly suspicious of the intentions of the Government, and was convinced that Barras—who "was capable of anything"—was bent on mischief.

In the following "Proclamation" we see nothing of the celebrated ten arpents of land (twenty perches each) which every soldier of the army of the East was promised on his return to France: possibly because these arpents were never given.

PROCLAMATION.

"TOULON, *10th May*, 1798.

"Soldiers, you are one of the wings of the army of England. You have fought on mountain and plain, and besieged forts; it remained for you to wage a maritime war.

"The Roman legions, which you have sometimes imitated but not yet equalled, fought against Carthage both by sea and on the plains of Zama. Victory never abandoned them because they were constantly brave, patient in the support of fatigue, well disciplined, and united.

"Soldiers, Europe has its eyes upon you.

"You have great destinies to fulfil, battles to fight, dangers to overcome. You will do more than you have yet accomplished for the prosperity of your country, for the happiness of mankind, and for your own glory.

"Sailors, infantry, cavalry, artillery, be united, and remember that on the day of battle you will stand in need of each other, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

After being detained at Toulon for a week by contrary winds and rumours of an English fleet of thirty sail cruising off the coast, the expedition at length got under way, Bonaparte still signing himself "Member of the Institute and General-in-chief of the army of England." On the 23rd May he wrote to the Directory to say he had been

five days at sea, and was "between the islands of Corsica and Elba"—his cradle and his prison.

TO CITIZEN JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"ON BOARD 'L'ORIENT,' 23*rd May*, 1798.

"We have had good and bad weather. We are now well at sea, sailing for Elba. This evening we shall pass Bastia. I have not been sea-sick. Let me know all the news. . . .

"BONAPARTE.

"P.S. My wife will remain a few days at Toulon, and will then go to take the waters" (waters supposed to be a cure for sterility).

Little difficulty was experienced in getting possession of Malta, where the French were fortunate enough, as General Caffarelli remarked, to find some one to admit them. The Grand Master having capitulated on the condition of property and religion being respected, Bonaparte wrote this unctuous letter to the bishop, thanking him for his reception of the French:—

TO THE BISHOP OF MALTA.

"ON BOARD THE 'ORIENT,' 12*th June*, 1798.

" . . . I know of nothing more respectable and worthy of the veneration of men than a priest who, imbued with the true spirit of the Gospel, is persuaded that he is in duty bound to obey the temporal power, and to maintain peace, tranquillity, and union in his diocese, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"ON BOARD THE 'ORIENT.' 12*th June*, 1798.

"The army is informed that the enemy has surrendered the standard of liberty floats over the forts of Malta. The

General-in-chief insists on the most exact discipline. He desires that persons and property be respected, and that the people of Malta be treated with friendship."

The Knights of Malta were to be expelled; but we find in the correspondence a list of members of the order who were excepted—fourteen knights, *who, six months previously, had furnished Napoleon with useful information, or who had offered patriotic subscriptions towards the invasion of England.* These traitors to their order were allowed to join the French army.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"MALTA, 13*th June*, 1798.

"You will direct citizens Monge and Berthollet to visit the Mint and the treasury of the church of St. John, and other places where there may be precious objects.

"BONAPARTE."

And naturally all the treasures which those two citizens could discover were considered lawful plunder.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"MALTA, 17*th June*, 1798.

"You will find inclosed the original treaty concluded by the Order of Malta with Russia. It had been ratified only five days before. . . . The Emperor of Russia should thank us, since an occupation of Malta will save his treasury 400,000 roubles. Had his majesty intended keeping Malta he ought to have concealed his designs. However, we now possess, in the Mediterranean, the strongest place in Europe, and it will cost a good deal to dislodge us.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 18th June Bonaparte wrote fourteen despatches, orders, &c., some of them several pages in length, and gave a last touch to the organisation of the island. Naval, military, and civil schools, municipal councils, and the

national guard were created. Slavery was abolished, also liveries and titles of nobility; and the arms of the Order were to be everywhere replaced by those of the Republic. With the exception of the bishop, all priests, monks, and nuns, not natives, were to leave the island; no one was to take vows before being thirty years of age; no order was to have more than one convent; Latin priests were not to say mass in Greek churches; the Jews desiring to establish a synagogue were to be protected; no bishop or churchman was to receive money for administering the sacraments, *nor to acknowledge the supremacy of any foreign prince.* The whole judicial and administrative system was arranged; the post-office, paving and lighting, public fountains, pawn-office, hospitals, stamp duty, tobacco, salt, house-rent, public instruction—nothing escaped the vigilance of this restless mind. The General created a central school to replace the university, and other chairs. It was to be composed of—

1st. A professor of arithmetic and stereometry, salary 1,800 francs.

2nd. A professor of algebra and stereotomy, salary 2,000 francs.

3rd. A professor of geometry and astronomy, salary 2,400 francs.

4th. A professor of mechanics and physics, salary 3,000 francs.

5th. A professor of navigation, salary 2,400 francs.

6th. A professor of chemistry, salary 1,200 francs.

7th. A professor of Eastern languages, salary 1,200 francs.

8th. A librarian, who will lecture on geography, salary 1,000 francs.

To this central school shall be attached—

1st. A library and cabinet of antiquities.

2nd. A museum of natural history.

3rd. A botanical garden.

4th. An observatory.

Having remained a month at Malta, and escaped Nelson by a miracle—Nelson, who could not believe a French army would be landed in Egypt in the middle of summer[1] —Bonaparte continued his voyage.

Before landing at Alexandria he issued the following proclamation :—

"Soldiers! You are about to undertake a conquest the effects of which will be incalculable on civilisation *and the commercial world.*

"You will deal England the surest and most sensible blow while waiting to kill her outright.

"We shall make some fatiguing marches; we shall fight several battles; we shall succeed in all our enterprises; the fates are for us.

"The Mameluke Beys, who exclusively favour English commerce, who have ill-treated our merchants, and who tyrannise over the inhabitants of the Nile, a few days after our arrival will have ceased to exist.

"The people amongst whom we are going to live are Mohammedans; the first article of their faith is 'There is no God but God, and Mahomet is his prophet.'

"Do not contradict them. Deal with them as we dealt with the Jews *and with the Italians.* Respect their muftis and their imauns, as you respected rabbins and bishops.

"Show for the ceremonies prescribed by the Koran, and for the mosques, the same toleration you have always

[1] Writing a month afterwards to his wife Nelson said :—

"SYRACUSE, *July 20th*, 1798.

"I have not been able to find the French fleet, to my great mortification, or the event I can scarcely doubt. We have been off Malta, to Alexandria in Egypt, Syria, into Asia, and are returned here without success; however, no person will say that it has been for want of activity. I yet live in hopes of meeting these fellows; but it would have been my delight to have tried Buonaparte on a wind, for he commands the fleet as well as the army. Glory is my object, and that alone. God Almighty bless you.

"HORATIO NELSON."

shown for convents, for synagogues, for the religion of Moses and that of Jesus Christ.

"The Roman legions protected all religions.[1] You will find customs here different from those of Europe: you must habituate yourselves to them.

"The people here treat their wives differently from us; but in all countries the man who commits rape is a monster.

"Pillage only enriches a few men. It dishonours us; it destroys our resources; it renders the people hostile when it is necessary to make them friendly.

"The first town we shall enter was built by Alexander. We shall find at each step *souvenirs* worthy of exciting the emulation of Frenchmen.

"BONAPARTE."

Pillage and rape were to be punished by death, and the most Draconian laws were to be enforced. In a letter to the Pasha of Egypt Bonaparte explained his presence. He had come to deliver him from the Beys. "You have no doubt been informed," he added, "that I have no intention of doing anything opposed to the Koran or the Sultan. You are aware that the French nation is the sole ally which the Sultan has in Europe. Come therefore to me, and curse the impious race of the Beys."

In a proclamation dated "14th Messidor, Year VI. (2nd July, 1798), 18th of the month of Muharrem, year of the Hegira 1213," Bonaparte, after dwelling on the baneful effects of Mameluke rule, added:—

"Did we not destroy the Pope, who said it was necessary to wage war against the Moslems? Have we not destroyed the Knights of Malta, because those madmen believed that God desired war with the Moslems? Have we not for centuries been the friends of the Grand Signor (may God accomplish his desires!) and the enemy of his enemies?"

[1] Before the days of Christ, or of Mohammed.

Then followed comminatory articles like those of Italy, and any village offering resistance and favouring the Mamelukes was to be burned to the ground. The slaves who refused to be liberated from the Mameluke yoke were to be exterminated without pity.

TO THE PASHA OF EGYPT.

"GYZEH, *2nd July*, 1798.

"I am very sorry for the violence done to you by Ibrahim. If you are your own master, return to Cairo, where you will enjoy the consideration due to the representative of our friend the Sultan. . . . *By the grace of God, on which all depends*, the Mamelukes have been destroyed. Be assured, and assure the Porte, that the same arms *we* have rendered victorious shall be always at the disposal of the Sultan. May Heaven fulfil his desires against his enemies.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte experienced no trouble in landing and in capturing Alexandria, which was taken by surprise, and hardly defended.

DECISION.

"ALEXANDRIA, *4th July*, 1798.

"Art. 1. The names of all the men killed at the capture of Alexandria shall be engraved on the column of Pompey.

"Art. 2. They shall be buried at the foot of the column, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

In the criticism of our operations in Egypt in 1801, which Napoleon wrote at St. Helena, he blamed General Abercrombie for having wasted four days and a half after landing before he attacked Alexandria. He himself immediately attacked that city with a handful of men, without waiting for his guns, for, as he wrote, it is one of the great principles in war to act with celerity, which is even

preferable to artillery. He boasted that eighteen hours after his fleet had been signalled he stormed Alexandria. It must be remembered, however, that he disembarked with the utmost precipitation, fearing lest he should be caught *in flagrante delicto* by Nelson; also that he ordered Colonel Crétin to place Alexandria in a state of defence, consequently the Alexandria which Abercrombie had to attack was not the Alexandria surprised by Bonaparte, and captured with hardly any loss.

In engraving the names of the soldiers who fell at Alexandria he sought, as usual, to strike the imagination of the army. He was well aware of the excellent effect of this system on the Gallic mind. In the course of this campaign he said that the Directory could not last, as it did nothing for the imagination of the people. He did not sin in the same way himself.

On the 24th July Bonaparte addressed a long report to the Directory, giving an account of his operations, his triumphs, and especially of the battle of the Pyramids, where forty centuries looked down on the French army. In the body of this report we find a strong recommendation that the Directors should keep Egypt, which "has a rich soil, a healthy climate, and is close at hand." But there were drawbacks.

On the 25th July Bonaparte wrote a letter full of despair to Joseph. He said—"You will see by the public papers the results of the battles and the conquest of Egypt, which was sufficiently disputed to add another leaf to the military glory of this army. Egypt is the richest country in corn, hemp, &c., which exists in the world. . . . There is no money, not even enough to pay the troops. I may return to France in two months. I recommend you the care of my interests. *I have a great deal of domestic affliction, for the veil has been entirely raised.* You alone upon earth remain to me; your friendship is very dear. . . . It is a sad position when one has all one's affections centred in one heart. You understand this.

"Arrange so that on my arrival I may have a country place either near Paris or in Burgundy; I hope to be able to spend the winter there in solitude, for I am tired of human nature. . . . Glory is insipid at twenty-nine years of age; I have exhausted everything, and it only remains for me to become truly egotistical. I intend keeping my house. I shall never part with it, to no matter whom. I have just enough to live upon! Adieu, my only friend; I have never been unjust towards you. . . . Embrace your wife and Jerome."

Bonaparte had just entered the Egyptian capital in triumph when he wrote this gloomy letter. Desdemona was unfaithful, but Othello soon consoled himself, as we shall see.

TO GENERAL KLÉBER.

"CAIRO, *27th July*, 1798.

"We have at Cairo, Citizen General, a very fine mint. We require all the ingots which we left at Alexandria, in exchange for the coin given to us by the merchants. I beg you will therefore assemble the merchants to whom the said ingots were given, and ask to have them back. I will give them in exchange corn and rice, of which we have enormous quantities. . . . We have driven 2,000 of the best mounted Mamelukes into the Nile. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

How Bonaparte acquired his corn and rice is not stated, nor has history left on record what the merchants of Alexandria thought of the operation of the French General. Unfortunately a French gunner was assassinated in Alexandria, and this laid the city open—as Rome, Venice, and other cities in Italy had been laid open—to numerous vexations. No less than fifty hostages were taken on board the fleet, nor was this all.

ORDER.

"CAIRO, *30th July*, 1798.

"Bonaparte, General-in-Chief.

"It being just that the commerce of Alexandria should contribute, like that of Cairo, towards the keep of the army, &c.

"Art. 1. A contribution of 300,000 francs shall be levied on the principal merchants. . . . This sum must be paid in twenty-four hours after the publication of the present.

"Art. 2. All persons who were employed under the late administration must pay a share of the contribution.

"BONAPARTE."

ORDER.

"CAIRO, *30th July*, 1798.

"Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, having proofs of the treason of Seid Mohamed el-Koraïm, whom he had overwhelmed with benefits, orders—

"Art. 1. Seid Mohamed el-Koraïm shall pay a contribution of 300,000 francs.

"Art. II. In default of acquitting this debt, five days after the publication of the present order he shall have his head cut off.

"BONAPARTE."

And poor Koraïm, either unable or unwilling to pay this price, had his head cut off, and carried through the streets on a pike, as a warning to all traitors not in a position, or unwilling, to purchase immunity. Bonaparte had been informed that Koraïm had concealed his money in a cistern, where it may possibly still lie, for his servants, though tortured, either would not, or could not, reveal the hiding place.

Damietta, Rosetta, and other towns were also to contribute towards the expenses of the French army, each in due proportion.

TO GENERAL MENON.

"CAIRO, 31*st July*, 1798.

"Your presence, Citizen General, is again necessary at Rosetta for some days, for the organisation of that province.

"The Turks can only be kept in order by means of the greatest severity; every day I have five or six heads cut off in the streets of Cairo. *We have been obliged to spare the inhabitants up to the present, in order to obliterate the terrible reputation which preceded us.* To-day, on the contrary, we must assume the tone necessary to make ourselves obeyed; and for them to obey is to fear. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

On hearing of the disaster of the Nile Bonaparte, in order not to discourage his army, affected to treat the destruction of the French fleet lightly, saying that the English would force him to accomplish greater things than he had proposed.

TO REAR-ADMIRAL GANTHAUME.

"CAIRO, 15*th August*, 1798.

"The situation in which you find yourself, Citizen *General*, is horrible. If you did not perish, fate must destine you to revenge our navy and our friends; receive my congratulations (in anticipation). *This is the only agreeable sentiment* I have experienced since the day before yesterday, when I received at thirty leagues from Cairo your report, forwarded to me by General Kléber.

"I salute and embrace you.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was much disappointed with the obstinacy of other towns which rejected his overtures, and on the slightest complaint they were to be burned down, &c.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

CAIRO, *1st August*, 1798.

". . . . General Dumuy will disarm the town of Daivan-hour, and will cut off the heads of the five chief inhabitants, one amongst the worst men of law, and four others, who have most influence with the population, should be selected. After this he will send twenty-five hostages to Cairo, &c., &c.

"BONAPARTE."

Frequent orders of this description were despatched by Bonaparte to his various lieutenants.

In a long despatch to the Directory, giving an account of the situation, the General-in-Chief criticised the conduct of Admiral Brueys, adding—"If in this fatal event he committed errors, he expiated them by a glorious death.

"The fates wished in this, as in many other circumstances, to prove that if they have accorded us the preponderance on the Continent, they have given the empire of the seas to our rivals. But, no matter how great this reverse, it cannot be attributed to the inconstancy of fortune; she has not abandoned us yet; far from that; she has favoured us in this operation more than ever. When I arrived before Alexandria, and learned that the English had passed that place a few days before *with a superior force*, in spite of the tempest which reigned, and at the risk of being shipwrecked, I landed. I remember that when all was ready for disembarking, a vessel of war was signalled in the distance; it was the *Justice*[1] coming from Malta. I cried, Fortune, will you abandon me? What, only five days! I marched all night, and attacked Alexandria at break of day with 3,000 men worn out with fatigue, without guns, and almost without cartridges."

In a letter to Marmont, dated the 18th August, Bonaparte showed considerable anxiety to know what the

[1] A French frigate coming from Malta.

English were about. "You will forward me the most minute details," he wrote, "and let me know the situation of the English, and the manner in which our squadrons behaved during the combat. In speaking either to the generals, to the sailors, or to the soldiers, take care to say and to do all in your power to encourage them. More especially, have a conference with Rear-Admiral Ganthaume, and let me know what he thinks of the conduct of our fleet, what he thinks of the conduct of Villeneuve, and what he supposes that the English intend doing. Assure him of my esteem, &c., &c."

Two days afterwards, writing to Kléber, he said—"The Turks will think twice before undertaking any important operation against us; besides, they would soon repent of it. . . . I do not fear 100,000 Turks. If the English relieve this squadron by another, and continue to infest the Mediterranean, they will perhaps oblige us to do greater things than we proposed to perform"—would force the French to take India.[1]

On the 22nd August Bonaparte created an institute at Cairo, which he organised with his usual love of detail. In the list of persons proposed to form "the Institute of Egypt," the Correspondence gives, "Mathematical Section, Bonaparte, Monge, &c." In the section of political economy, one remarks the name of Tallien.

[1] The Mediterranean certainly was infested at this time with British cruisers, which let very few French vessels through. About this date Nelson thus wrote to Earl Spencer :—

"MOUTH OF THE NILE, 9*th August*, 1798.

"I send you a pacquet of intercepted letters, some of them of great importance: in particular, one from Bonaparte to his brother. He writes such a scrawl, no one not used to it can read it: but luckily we have got a man who has wrote in his office to decipher it. Buonaparte has differed with his Generals here, and he did want—and, if I understand his meaning, does want—and will strive to be the Washington of France. . . .

"HORATIO NELSON."

ORDER.

"CAIRO, 26*th August*, 1798.

"Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, orders—

"Art. 1. The first Vendemieure epoch of the establishment of the Republic shall be celebrated at the different points occupied by the army, by a civic *fête*.

Art. 2. The garrison of Alexandria shall celebrate the *fête* round the column of Pompey. . . . The tricoloured flag shall be planted on top of the column. The needle of Cleopatra shall be illuminated.

"Art. 6. The troops in Upper Egypt shall celebrate the *fête* amid the ruins of Thebes."

Conversation of Bonaparte in the Grand Pyramid with several imauns and muftis :—

Bonaparte.—God is great, and His works are marvellous. Behold, a great work accomplished by the hand of man. What was the object of him who built this pyramid ?

Soliman.—It was a powerful king of Egypt, whose name was Cheops. He wished to prevent sacrilegious persons from disturbing the repose of his ashes.

Bonaparte.—The great Cyrus had himself buried in the open air, so that his body might return to the elements. Do you not think he did better ?

Soliman (*inclining*).—Glory to God, to whom all glory is due.

Bonaparte.—Honour to Allah ! Who was the calif who opened this pyramid and disturbed the ashes of the dead ?

Mohamed.—They think it was the Commander of the Faithful, Mahmoud, who reigned several centuries ago at Bagdad. Others say it was the renowned Aroun al Raschid in quest of treasure ; but he only found mummies. . . .

Bonaparte.—Bread stolen by the wicked fills the mouth with gravel.

Mohamed (*inclining*).—That is the observation of wisdom.

Bonaparte.—Glory to Allah! There is no other God but God; Mohammed is His prophet, and I am one of his friends.

Soliman.—Salutations and peace to the man sent by God; salutations also to you, invincible general, favourite of Mohammed!

Bonaparte.—Mufti, I thank you. The Koran delights my mind. . . . I love the prophet, and intend to visit and honour his tomb in the sacred city.[1] But my mission is first to exterminate the Mamelukes.

Ibrahim.—May the angels of victory sweep the dust from your path and cover you with their wings. The Mameluke has deserved death.

Bonaparte.—He has been smitten and delivered over to the angels of darkness, Moukir and Quakir. God, on whom all depends, has ordered his domination to be destroyed.

Soliman.—He extended the hand of rapine over the land, the harvests, and the horses of Egypt.

Bonaparte.—And over the most lovely slaves, very holy mufti. Allah has withered up his hand. If Egypt be his farm, let him have the lease God gave him; but God is just and merciful for His people.

Ibrahim.—O most valiant amongst the sons of Jesus, Allah has caused you to be followed by the exterminating angel, in order to deliver the land of Egypt.

Bonaparte.—This land was in the hands of twenty-four oppressors (Beys), rebels towards the great Sultan our ally (whom God surround with glory), and 10,000 slaves from the Caucasus and Georgia; Azrael, the angel of death, has blown upon them, and they have disappeared.

Mohamed.—Noble successor of Alexander, honour to your invincible arms, and to the unexpected thunderbolts which issue from the midst of your mounted warriors.

[1] Bonaparte went neither to Mecca nor to Rome.

Bonaparte.—Do you believe this thunder to be the work of the children of men? Allah has caused it to be placed in my hand by the genius of war.

Ibrahim.—We recognise by His works Allah, who sent you. Would you conquer without the permission of Allah? The Delta and all the neighbouring countries resound with your miracles.

Bonaparte.—A celestial car will ascend by my orders to the clouds; and the lightning will descend to the earth by a wire as soon as I command it.[1]

Soliman.—And the great serpent which issued from the column of Pompey on the day of your triumphal entry into Alexandria and was withered up—was this not a prodigy operated by your hand?

Bonaparte.—Lights of the century, you are destined to see still greater marvels; for the days of regeneration have arrived.

Ibrahim.—The divine unity regards you with an eye of predilection, adorer of Jesus, and renders you the supporter of the children of the prophet.

Bonaparte.—Mohammed, has he not said, "Every man who adores God and does good, no matter what his religion, shall be saved"?

Soliman, Mohamed, and Ibrahim (*all bowing together*).—He has said it.

Bonaparte.—And if I have tempered, by orders from on high, the pride of the Vicar of Jesus, by diminishing his terrestrial possessions, in order to heap up for him celestial treasures, tell me, was it not rendering glory to God whose mercy is infinite?

Mohamed (*embarrassed*).—The Mufti of Rome was rich and powerful; but we are poor.

Bonaparte.—I know that; do not be alarmed. You have been weighed in the balance of Balthazar, and have

[1] Franklin and Montgolfier were both to be pressed into the service. It is true that the latter had already succeeded against the Austrians at Fleurus.

been found light. This pyramid, then, did not contain any treasure?

Soliman.—None, O lord, we swear it by the holy city of Mecca.

Bonaparte.—Evil, three times evil to those who search for perishable riches, and who covet gold and silver, which resemble dross.

Soliman.—You have spared the Vicar of Christ, and have treated him with clemency and kindness.

Bonaparte.—He is an old man whom I honour, but he has done wrong in condemning all Mussulmans to eternal fire; and Allah forbids intolerance.

Ibrahim.—Glory to God and to his prophet, who has sent you among us to stimulate the faith of the weak, and to open the doors of the seventh heaven to the faithful.

Bonaparte.—You have spoken rightly, most zealous muftis; be faithful to Allah, the sovereign master of the seven marvellous heavens; to Mohammed, his vizier, who passed through all the heavens in a night. Be the friends of the Franks and Allah; Mohammed and the Franks will recompense you.

Ibrahim.—May the prophet himself place you on his left hand on the day of resurrection, after the third sound of the trumpet.

Bonaparte.—Let him who has ears to hear listen; the hour of resurrection has arrived for all people who groan under oppression. Muftis, imauns, mollahs, dervishes, calenders, tell this to the people of Egypt. Encourage them to join us in finishing to annihilate the Beys and the Mamelukes; favour trade with the Franks in your various provinces and in their efforts to reach the ancient country of Bramah; offer them depots in your ports, and drive out the islanders of Albion, accursed among the sons of Jesus; such is the will of Mohammed. The treasures of industry and the friendship of the Franks will be your reward until you ascend to the seventh heaven and sit beside black-eyed houris, always young and always

maidens, and repose under the shadow of Lama, whose branches will offer to all true Mussulmans everything they desire.

Soliman (*inclining*).—You have spoken like the most learned of mollahs. We repose faith in your words; we will serve your cause, and may God hear us.

Bonaparte.—God is great, and His works are marvellous. Salutations and peace be to you, most holy muftis.[1]

"*12th August*, 1798."

TO GENERAL MARMONT.

"CAIRO, *28th August*, 1798.

"I have received your letter of the 7th Fructidor. I flatter myself that you will be able to send us the greater portion of our artillery. . . . You may remember our batteries of Toulon, and how little dangerous the English are by land.[2] Artillery, with red-hot cannon balls, served with *sang froid*, is terrible against vessels.

"Our affairs here are improving every day. Go and see the Sheik El Messiri on my behalf; tell him among other things of the manner in which we celebrated the *fête* of the prophet; that three or four times by decade I hold conferences with the chiefs of the law and the principal cherifs of Cairo, and that no one more than myself is persuaded of the purity and sanctity of the Mohammedan religion.

"BONAPARTE."

[1] Speaking to Madame de Remusat, at Boulogne, Bonaparte thus excused the idea he had conceived of adopting the Mohammedan faith :—

"After all, circumstances might have induced me to turn Mussulman. It would have been a sign-post; but I should have reached the Euphrates first. A change of religion, inexcusable for the sake of private interests, becomes comprehensible where immense political results are involved. Henri IV. was right in saying, '*Paris is well worth a mass.*' Do you think the Empire of the East, and perhaps the subjection of the whole of Asia, were not worth a turban and loose trousers? The state of feeling in the army was such that it would have undoubtedly lent itself to this joke."

[2] Marmont had reason to doubt this afterwards in Spain.

On the same day, writing to General Menou, Bonaparte said—"I cannot approve too highly of the dinner you gave to the sheiks of the country. We celebrated the *fête* of the prophet here with an amount of pomp and fervour which almost merited me the title of saint."

When at the camp of Boulogne, Bonaparte confided to Madame de Remusat that he had some idea at this period of writing a Koran of his own, of assuming the turban, and of riding into the desert on an *elephant;* but the Moslems in Egypt were never deceived by the professions of a prophet who extended his protection to such dogs as Copts and Jews.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"CAIRO, *8th September*, 1798.

"A Portuguese squadron composed of four vessels of war and two frigates arrived before Alexandria on the 29th August, and joined the squadron of cruisers left behind by the English. . . . Render us justice, Citizen Director, for this impertinence on the part of the Queen of Portugal. In order to get to Lisbon, there is no ocean to be crossed. . . . . If we could close the port of Lisbon to the English, they would have to come from London to Alexandria without casting anchor. Besides, this would not fail to occupy their attention. We might procure at Lisbon the means for reorganising our fleet.

"I am awaiting news from Constantinople [whither he thought Talleyrand had been sent]. *I could not possibly return to Paris in October, as I promised,* but the delay will only last a few months. All is going on well here; the country is subdued, and is becoming accustomed to us. The rest must be the work of time. All the institutions which can accelerate the march of events are in active operation. . . . Since my departure I have not received a single letter from you or from any minister or person who interests me. . . . Never did colony offer greater advantages. I have no doubt that by means of Egypt you will

be in a position to make any terms you wish with England. Mistress of Egypt, France would be in the long run mistress of India. The Cabinet of London is well aware of this. In a fortnight I will send you my brother (Louis) who will give you all the information you may desire.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte never forgot nor forgave the insult of the Queen of Portugal. Several years afterwards, when first consul, he wrote to Talleyrand, saying—"If the King of Spain objects to occupy one of the provinces of Portugal, Lucien (then ambassador at Madrid) may release him from this task on condition of the King of Portugal handing us over the *three* vessels which blockaded me at Alexandria."

As for the country becoming accustomed to the French, that was a gross falsehood in the sense Bonaparte applied the term "accustomed." The resistance on the part of the inhabitants was never interrupted; oppressors and oppressed fought against the common enemy. The Correspondence contains page after page of letters and orders for the burning of villages, for summary executions, for the securing of hostages, for making severe examples. Of a truth the French army soon more than justified the terrible reputation by which it had been preceded. And this was the manner in which a neutral country was treated, in order to punish England, and to threaten our communications with India!

Ever anxious to remove blame from his own shoulders, we find Bonaparte returning to the subject of the battle of the Nile, and calumniating a gallant officer, if not intentionally, at all events in the most reckless manner.

TO GENERAL KLEBER.

"CAIRO, 10*th September*, 1798.

". . . . As for the conduct of Rear-Admiral du Chayla, it would have been glorious for him to have fallen on his quarter-deck like Petit Thouars. But what deprives him

of all chance of recovering my esteem, is his cowardly conduct with the English since he became their prisoner. There are men who have no blood in their veins. He will have to listen every evening to the English getting drunk upon punch, and drinking to the shame of the French navy! He will be disembarked at Naples as a trophy for the lazzaroni. It would have been better for him to have remained a prisoner on board an English ship, and to have asked no favour. O'Hara, who was a vulgar man, when he was taken prisoner at Toulon, and asked what he wished, replied, 'To be left alone, and to owe nothing to pity.' Kindness and good treatment only honour the conqueror; they dishonour the conquered, who ought to show reserve and pride.

"BONAPARTE."

What a pity it was that the Emperor Napoleon did not remember these fine sentiments when he was at St. Helena annoying the world with his petulance! As a matter-of-fact, Rear-Admiral du Chayla fought in the most gallant way, and insisted on continuing to fight his ship after being dangerously wounded, and when only three guns remained in a condition to reply to the fire of the enemy. He was complimented by the Minister of Marine.

In one of the letters intercepted by the British cruisers we find Tallien, who was in Egypt, writing to his wife, the fair Carrabus, in a different strain to Bonaparte, and saying among other things:—

"When you receive this letter it will be already known without doubt in France that our squadron has been defeated by the English. We are all here in the greatest consternation. I am unable to give you any details, because we do not as yet know them in a positive manner; what is unfortunately only too certain is, that the superb vessel *L'Orient* was blown up during the battle. Being placed on an eminence overlooking the sea, we were eye-witnesses of this awful spectacle. The battle lasted over twenty-four

hours; the English must have suffered very much. We are ignorant as to the number of vessels we have lost. I venture to hope that the alarming rumours which are afloat may not be confirmed. Admiral Brueys was killed, as well as Ducheyla, and a number of other heroes (not Duchayla).

"One cannot at the first moment form an opinion as to the causes of this disaster, afflicting to every good Frenchman; on the contrary, it is necessary that one should use every endeavour to repel calumny, which neither respects misfortune nor the ashes of the dead. . . . We leave to-morrow for Cairo; we shall be the first to announce this afflicting news to Buonaparte, who, I hope, will take a just view of his position, and support with courage this first reverse of fortune. I confess I am uneasy as to the effect that this news will produce in France."

THE REPUBLICAN NEW YEAR.

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

"CAIRO, *1st Vendémiaire, Year VII.*
(*22nd September*, 1798.)

"Soldiers, we celebrate the first day of the year VII. of the Republic.

"Five years ago the independence of the French people was menaced; but you took Toulon; this presaged the ruin of our enemies.

"A year afterwards you beat the Austrians at Dego. The next year you were on the summits of the Alps. . . . Who would have thought you would now be on the banks of the Nile?

"From the Englishman, celebrated in arts and commerce, down to the hideous and ferocious Bedouin, you attract the attention of the world, &c.

"Soldiers, your destiny is superb, because you are worthy of the great things you have done, and of the opinion formed of you, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"CAIRO, *24th September*, 1798.

". . . . Numerous flying columns march through the villages of the provinces of Damietta and of Mansourah, in order to inflict severe punishment on the chiefs of the revolt, and to visit those unfortunate persons who have been led astray by the writings and false promises of Ibrahim Bey, with exemplary vengeance.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 9th of the Republican month we find Bonaparte issuing this order of the day—

"Jean-Baptiste Lenati, Benedite, and François Sala, accused and convicted of having cut bunches of dates in a Turkish garden, have been condemned, in accordance with the law of the 21st Brumaire, to be marched up and down the camp, in the midst of a detachment, twice a day, carrying ostensibly the bunches of dates, having their tunics turned inside out, and wearing on their breast a placard with the word '*Maraudeur*' written on it."

This example of severity in the matter of a few dates does not appear to have had much effect.

We have seen how poor Koraïm had his head cut off because he refused to pay the price at which Bonaparte valued it.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"CAIRO, *6th October*, 1798.

"You will order General Manscourt to send the merchants of the Mamelukes who have arrived at Alexandria, to Cairo. An inquiry will be held to find out if these merchants have received any advances.

"You will also order the General to seize the property of Hassan-Allah, in order that we may *repay ourselves the*

40,000 *medins he owes to Koraïm.* As for the brother of Koraïm, his property should not be confiscated, as he is not yet accused of anything.

"BONAPARTE."

Very little progress was made in gaining the affection of the Egyptians, in spite of all the cajolery to which Bonaparte had recourse. Like the people in Italy, they preferred their old masters to their new one. This want of sympathy for the soldiers who were to free them from the tyranny of the Beys was exhibited by the Egyptians on every opportunity; and no Frenchman could stray from his column without being massacred.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"CAIRO, *7th October*, 1798.

". . . I send you my brother (Louis) with the standards taken from the Turks and Mamelukes. . . . The customs of this country are not ours; it will require a long time for this people to become used to them. However, every day they know us better.

"The Porte has nominated Djezzar pasha of Acre and General-in-chief of all Syria. He has replied to none of the overtures I have made him. Our consuls[1] have been everywhere arrested, and the Ottoman Empire resounds with the noise of war. . . . This country swarms with ferocious Arabs. All the tribes united muster 12,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry. . . . The soil is the most beautiful in the world, and the position as interesting as it is decisive, with regard to India."

After dwelling at length on the political situation, asking for news about Spain, Russia, Germany, Turkey, and the expedition to Ireland, and demanding reinforcements, Bonaparte added:

[1] Consuls at Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco, all thrown into irons.

"We want for nothing here; we are fortifying all the most essential points, and we are full of health, strength, and gaiety."

However, money was scarce, for we find Napoleon writing two days later to Citizen Poussielgue—

"It is indispensable to get money as quickly as possible so as to pay the troops for the 3rd decade of Vendémiaire:

"1st. Pay into the chest the remainder of the money for the cotton.

"2nd. Sell the coffee *derived* from the merchants who did business with the Beys.

"3rd. Sell for ready money the incense, muslin, and elephants' teeth found in a house, of which the inventory was recently taken.

"Lastly, hasten the payment of the contributions still due. BONAPARTE."

On the 17th October Bonaparte rendered an account to the Directory of his various operations, and gave a graphic description of the intrepidity of the enemy's cavalry, which galloped close up to the French squares, and died after having flung "their hatchets, pistols, and guns at the heads of our men. . . Here (at Sediman), as at the battle of the Pyramids, the soldiers reaped a considerable booty, hardly a Mameluke upon which they found less than 500 louis." And, in fact, French soldiers who had turned their bayonets into fishing-hooks were to be seen on the banks of the Nile, angling for defunct Mamelukes, who had been driven into that river and had perished. The rich booty offered by the enemy reconciled the French soldiers to Egypt, and quelled insubordination, which was on the point of assuming dangerous proportions.

TO GENERAL MARMONT.

"CAIRO, *17th October*, 1798.

"That intriguer, Abdallah, the steward of Mourad Bey, passed through El Choarah three days ago, going in the

direction of Alexandria. I wish you could catch him. I would give 1,000 crowns for him—not that he is worth that, but in order to make an example. It is the same man who went on board the vessel of the English Admiral. The Arabs might be spoken to; they would do a great deal for 1,000 sequins."

"BONAPARTE."

Mourad Bey was a most implacable and ubiquitous enemy, and even his steward's head would have been acceptable.

On the 27th October Bonaparte furnished the Directory with an account of the revolt at Cairo, during which his aide-de-camp Sulkowski and General Dupuy perished. To General Reynier he wrote on the same date, saying tranquillity had been perfectly re-established at Cairo. "Every night we cut off thirty heads, and a great many chiefs (*sic*). . . Punish the different Arab tribes which have revolted against you. *Try and obtain some horses and hostages.* The best way to punish the revolted villages is to capture the Sheik-el-Beled, and to cut off his head, for everything depends on him." Bonaparte also informed General Lanusse, the same day, that the *diligence* of Damietta had been attacked, and had its throat cut (*sic*) in the province of Guelyoub, adding—"Try and get hold of the chiefs and cut their heads off." On the 27th, too, General Berthier was ordered to arrest the Sheik-el-Beled of El Ekhsas—"and, in case he has run away, four of the principal inhabitants of the village which fired on our boats."

Cairo was punished in the most merciless manner. On the 21st October Bonaparte wrote to General Bon to put to the sword every armed person he met; and the next day to Berthier—"Be so good as to order the commandant to cut the throats of all the prisoners who were taken with arms in their hands. They must be taken to-night to the banks of the Nile, between Boulak and Old Cairo, and their headless trunks thrown into the river." A large

number of peasants in the neighbourhood of Cairo, who had taken part in the revolt, were decapitated; and one morning a long string of donkeys laden with sacks and escorted by soldiers halted in the middle of the Ezbekieh. When a crowd had assembled the sacks were opened, and the multitude saw with horror and affright the heads of the massacred peasants roll to the ground.

These orders are not to be found in the correspondence.

In the midst of numerous despatches directing the severest measures of repression, it is a relief to find an order which, had it been observed, would have reflected some credit on the Commander-in-Chief. It appears like an oasis in the desert.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"CAIRO, *4th November*, 1798.

"The barbarous custom of inflicting the bastinado on men supposed to be in the possession of important secrets ought to be abolished. It has long been recognised that this manner of examining men, by putting them to torture, produces no good effect. The unfortunate wretches say everything that comes into their heads, &c. Consequently the General-in-chief forbids the employment of this method, which is contrary both to humanity and to reason.

"BONAPARTE."

Citizen Guibert, a young officer of guides, having been told off for a mission to the English Admiral, received the following instructions:—

"You will hand the Admiral, in a careless way, the different Egyptian papers and copies of the *Décade*. You will try to obtain some European papers. You will give him to understand that I frequently receive news from Constantinople by way of land, and that there is no truth in the rumour of a Russian squadron blockading Corfu. You will tell him, as if by inadvertence, which will be set

down to your youth, that I send to France every day, that several of my aides-de-camp have been despatched, and, among others, my brother who left twenty-five days ago. If he asks where they start from, you will say you do not know, but that my brother started from Alexandria. . . . You will tell him that if he has any difficulty in procuring water, you know it to be my intention to furnish it; you will relate that before Mantua, knowing that Wurmser had a great number of sick, I sent him a large quantity of medical stores, a piece of generosity which much astonished the old Marshal [and of which he never heard]; also that I sent him every day a dozen oxen, &c., &c.!

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was exceedingly anxious for news. His communications with Europe were almost completely cut off, and he knew little or nothing of what was passing at home, for his land communications had been utterly destroyed since the Barbary powers had turned against him. His brother Louis, however, was fortunate enough to escape the British cruisers and to reach France.

TO AMED PASHA, GOVERNOR OF LEIDEH.

"CAIRO, 19*th November*, 1798.

"I do not wish to declare war if you be not mine enemy; but it is time that you explain yourself. If you continue to harbour Ibrahim Bey on the frontiers of Egypt, I shall regard that as a mark of hostility, and I shall go to Acre. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The fact is that Bonaparte had long determined to carry his arms into Syria, but he was always glad of a pretext which would look well in a proclamation, and justify an attempt should it turn out unsuccessful. Writing to the Directory on the 21st November, Bonaparte said:—

"The Porte has dismissed the Pasha of Egypt, and has nominated the ex-Pasha of Damascus in his place. The Porte appears to have written to me several times, *but all the letters have been intercepted by the English.* . . . We have no news from Europe since the arrival of Lesimple, that is to say since the 18th Messidor—nearly five months ago—and we are becoming anxious. . . ."

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"CAIRO, *2nd December*, 1798.

"Order Citizen Deriot to march with twenty-five troopers, at 2 A.M., to fort Sulkowski, to pick up thirty men of the 22nd in garrison there, and with this force to enter the village of El Matarzeh, where it is indispensable he should arrive an hour before daybreak, in order to kill some Arabs. . . . He will return along the Nile, and will study the locality so as to be able to form another ambush the day after to-morrow.

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN POUSSIELGUE.

"CAIRO, *7th December*, 1798.

"Considering the loss we have experienced in the sale of her diamonds, the wife of Mourad Bey must be made to pay 8,000 talari within five days.

"BONAPARTE."

And this was the way in which Bonaparte revenged himself on the gallant and indomitable Mameluke leader fighting for faith and country.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"CAIRO, *8th December*, 1798.

"Will you make known to the doctor and the surgeon-in-chief that I am dissatisfied at the facility with which they

give certificates to return to Europe, to individuals whom cowardice, inconstancy, and the absence of love of duty, induce to leave the army before the end of the campaign. . . .

"BONAPARTE.

This desire to escape from Egypt was manifested even in the headquarters staff, and but for the want of means of transport it is quite possible that the general camp, pioneers and all, would have insisted upon returning to France.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"CAIRO, *8th December*, 1798.

". . . When a village revolts, in order to punish it, the General in command of the district must seize on all the children between the ages of twelve and sixteen; a list of these children must be sent to the General-in-chief, who will give orders respecting their ulterior destination. When a village deserves to be burned, care should be taken to carry off all the children.

"BONAPARTE."

It is curious to find the Imperial Commission of 1860 publishing an order which should stamp its author with infamy. But then there were so many infamies committed throughout this campaign that it would have been useless to eliminate one or two.

Bonaparte busied himself a good deal with what was passing at Constantinople at this moment. He despatched Citizen Beauchamp thither on a mission, to demand the release of French prisoners in Syria, to reassure the Sultan with regard to the expedition to Egypt, to declare that the French would aid Turkey against the two Emperors who were bent on dismembering his empire, and, above all, to see how things were going on at home,

and to learn the intentions of the Porte. Bonaparte wrote the most friendly letter to the Grand Vizier, and also addressed himself to "Citizen Talleyrand, ambassador at Constantinople," who was, however, at that period, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Citizen Beauchamp was thrown into the Seven Towers, and two Turkish armies, one in Syria and another at Rhodes, prepared to assert the sovereign rights of the Porte in Egypt.

TO CITIZEN FOURÈS, *Lieutenant of Chasseurs.*

"CAIRO, *18th December*, 1798.

"Citizen Fourès is ordered to start by the first diligence from Rosetta for Alexandria, where he will embark on board a brig. . . . He will be the bearer of the accompanying despatches, which he will open only at sea, and in which he will find his instructions. I hand him 3,000 francs to cover the expenses of his mission.

"BONAPARTE."

There is a little romance attached to the above letter. Junot having told Bonaparte of several infidelities committed by Josephine, the General-in-chief determined to console himself by establishing a harem; but not finding the native women to his taste, he took for mistress an exceedingly pretty and lively young woman—Madame Fourès. As her husband was in the way he was ordered to France with despatches, but he fell into the hands of the English, who, suspecting the real state of the case, set the unfortunate sub-lieutenant ashore at Alexandria. Citizen Fourès could obtain no redress at headquarters beyond a divorce, which was pronounced by court martial. The favour of Madame Fourès did not last beyond the campaign. On his return to Paris Bonaparte pardoned Josephine's frailties, and having taken Pauline Fourès from one husband gave her to another, although the first spouse wished to have her back.

ORDER.

"CAIRO, 19*th December*, 1798.

"Bonaparte, General-in-chief, wishing to favour the convent of Mount Sinai—

"1st. In order to transmit to future races the traditions of our conquest;

"2nd. Through respect for Moses and the Jewish nation, whose cosmology retraces the earliest ages;

"3rd. Because the convent of Mount Sinai is inhabited by well-educated and polished men, living in the midst of the barbarity of the desert;

"Orders, &c., &c."

And the good monks were afforded protection against the Bedouins, and granted several religious and commercial privileges, while Bonaparte signed his name in the register alongside of that of Mohammed.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF CAIRO.

"CAIRO, 21*st December*, 1798.

"Perverse men led some of you astray; they have perished. God has ordered me to be clement and merciful to the people; I have been clement and merciful towards you.

"I was angry with you for revolting. During two months I deprived you of your divan; but to-day I restore it. Your good conduct has effaced the stain of your revolt.

"Cherifs, ulemas, preachers in the mosques, make known to the people that those who deliberately declare themselves my enemies shall find no refuge in this world nor the next. . . . Make known to the people that since the world was created it was written that after having destroyed the enemies of Islamism and overthrown the cross, I should come from the far west to fulfil the duty imposed upon me. Show the people that in the holy book

of the Koran, in more than twenty passages, what is happening was foreseen, and what is to happen is explained.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was about to invade Syria with five divisions, leaving Desaix in Upper Egypt, Marmont at Alexandria, and Dugua at Cairo. It was hoped that with its divan restored the inhabitants of Cairo would remain quiet in the absence of the General-in-chief. Hence this sudden affability.

CHAPTER V.

THE YEAR 1799.

THIS year was filled with stirring events. The French had 40,000 men in Egypt under Bonaparte. Scherer commanded 50,000 in Italy; Jourdan 40,000 on the Danube; Massena 30,000 in Switzerland; Bernadotte 30,000 on the Rhine; Macdonald 20,000 in Naples, and Brune 10,000 in Holland. The coalition had over 300,000 men under arms. In March Jourdan was defeated by the Archduke Charles, and Germany was lost. In April Scherer was beaten by Kray, and after losing the lines of the Adige, the Mincio, and the Adda was superseded by Moreau, who in his turn was defeated at Cassano. In June Macdonald, who had hurried away from Naples, lost the stubborn-fought battle of Trebia, where 12,000 men fell on each side. In August Joubert, who had succeeded Moreau and Macdonald, was beaten on the desperate field of Novi by Suwarrow, and was himself slain. The loss was 7,000 men on each side. Grouchy, after receiving fourteen wounds, still waved the French flag over his head while lying on the ground. The Chouans were abroad in Brittany and La Vendée. It was only in Holland and in Switzerland that the French arms were successful. A British force 12,000 strong under Sir Ralph Abercromby landed in Holland, took the fort of Helder, repulsed a combined Dutch and French attack, and captured the whole Dutch

fleet in the Texel. However, disasters followed. No sooner had the Russian contingent under General Hermann arrived than the French gained the battle of Bergen. The English who formed the left and centre carried all before them under Dundas and Pulteney, and made 1,000 prisoners, but the Russian wing having been completely routed, the Duke of York was obliged to retreat, and to evacuate Holland. In Switzerland Massena inflicted on Korsakow a crushing defeat which prevented Suwarrow from crossing the Alps, and carrying out his darling scheme of marching on Paris. Soured by disappointment the veteran returned to St. Petersburg and died of a broken heart. These French successes had an immense influence on passing events. They drove the Czar, who traced the reverses of his troops to English and Austrian treachery, into the arms of France.

In February Bonaparte marched into Syria. In March Corfu was taken by a combined Russian and Turkish force. In May the siege of St. Jean d'Acre had to be raised. In June Bonaparte returned to Egypt. In July he defeated the Turks at Aboukir, in August he sailed for France, and in October he landed at Frejus, and set out for Paris. In November he turned out the chambers, and in December he became first consul.

It will be remarked from the first letter we quote for 1799 that General Bonaparte was anxious to open negotiations, and to obtain some positive information as to what was passing in Europe.

TO GENERAL MARMONT.

"CAIRO, *7th January*, 1799.

". . . I authorise you to send a *parlementaire* to the English; you will tell them that having learned they have the plague on board, you desire to render them all the assistance dictated by humanity. *Send an extremely upright man who is not a great talker, and who has good ears.* . . . a man having the rank of captain, who will take with him

Egyptian gazettes, and who must try and obtain European ones in exchange. Direct the officer to go on board alone so that there may be no gossip on his return. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"CAIRO, *8th January*, 1799.

"Any medical man who leaves his ambulance in presence of the enemy, without orders, or who refuses his aid to persons suffering from contagious maladies, shall be arrested. . . . BONAPARTE."

And it was directed that Surgeon Boyer, who had refused to attend to plague-stricken patients, should be dressed as a woman and paraded through the streets of Alexandria with a placard on his back with these words—"Unworthy to be a French citizen; he fears death." After which Citizen Boyer was to be put in prison and sent back to France by the first ship.

A balloon was sent up on the anniversary of the battle of Rivoli, but it does not appear to have greatly impressed the Moslem mind.

TO GENERAL VERDIER.

"MANSOURAH, *18th January*, 1799.

". . . . The Sheik of the village of Myt-Ma'sarah is very culpable; *you will threaten him with the bastinado* unless he tells you where other Mamelukes and other guns are hidden. . . . After which you will cut off his head and expose it with an inscription to the effect that he suffered for having hidden guns. BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"CAIRO, *25th January*, 1799.

"You will set out on the 10th Pluviôse for Alexandria, and embark on board the frigate *La Courageuse*. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Lengthy instructions followed, but Berthier at the last moment made up his mind to remain with the army which was about to undertake active operations. The fact of his contemplated return to France was due to his violent love for a Madame Visconti whom he had carried off from her husband in Italy. This singular and extravagant passion lasted till death, although under the Empire Bonaparte forced his chief of the staff to marry a German princess. The three lived together and got on very happily until poor Berthier either fell from, or was pushed out of, a window, and died, after having deserted his old master and taken service under Louis XVIII.

TO THE IMAUN OF MUSCAT.

"CAIRO, *25th January*, 1799.

"I write you this letter to inform you of the arrival of the French army in Egypt. As you have always been friendly you must be convinced of our desire to protect all the merchant vessels you may send to Suez. I also beg you will forward the inclosed letter to Tippoo Sahib by the first opportunity.

"BONAPARTE."

TO TIPPOO SAHIB.

"CAIRO, *25th January*, 1799.

"You have already been informed of my arrival on the shores of the Red Sea, with a numerous and invincible army, animated with the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England.

"I hasten to inform you of my desire to receive news with regard to the political position in which you find yourself placed. I even desire you will send to Suez some competent person who enjoys your confidence, and with whom I can confer.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte had great hopes of obtaining the alliance of Tippoo, who had on more than one occasion made overtures to France. In 1788 Louis XVI. received an

embassy from Tippoo which was *fêted* at Versailles, but owing to the state of the French exchequer could obtain neither men nor money. This failure so irritated the Nabob of Mysore that he had two of his ambassadors executed on their return. In 1791 Tippoo once more applied to the French king for assistance, offering to pay all expenses if his majesty would only send him 6,000 men. But Louis XVI. at that moment had lost all authority, and was bewailing the error he had committed in favouring the independence of the United States merely to thwart England. In 1797 poor Tippoo, sadly shorn of his glory, saw another chance of revenge. A Jacobin club had been established at Seringapatam composed of Frenchmen who had been driven from Pondicherry. They swore hatred to all royalties and tyrants with the exception of *Citizen Tippoo, the Victorious.* An embassy was once more sent to France, but led to a very trifling result. As to the overtures made by Napoleon, nothing came of them, for his letter fell into the hands of a British cruiser. In April 1799 Seringapatam was stormed, and Tippoo Sahib's eventful career brought to a close.

In a letter which Nelson wrote to George Baldwin, Esq., Consul at Alexandria, he said—"I am persuaded of the intention of the French to attempt driving us from Egypt in concert with Tippoo Sahib," and he added that even at the risk of a war we should get possession of his sea coast.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"CAIRO, *26th January*, 1799.

"You will place under arrest the officers and sub-officers of the detachment charged to bring in the flock of sheep captured from the Arabs by General Murat, which detachment not only did not prevent pillage, but was the first to pillage. You will send the names of the officers and men to the paymaster, so that the value of the sheep stolen may be stopped.

"BONAPARTE."

And on the same day Bonaparte wrote to Berthier that 200 soldiers who had lost their sight were to be sent to Rosetta. An English brig having gone ashore, and sixteen of the crew having been saved, he had great hopes of obtaining news from Europe.

ORDER.

"CAIRO, *1st February*, 1799.

"The house occupied by General Lannes together with twenty feddans of land is conceded to him for ever."

General Murat and General Dommartin received similar gifts. The conquest of the country was regarded as permanent.

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"CAIRO, *5th February*, 1799.

"Several generals and officers having informed me that their state of health will not permit them to serve any longer in this country, I have given them leave to return to France. . . . The arrival of a vessel at Alexandria with letters for me from Genoa and Ancona has just been announced. This is the first news from Europe for eight months. . . . I hope to learn what is passing on the Continent so as to be able to shape my conduct in consequence.

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"CAIRO, *10th February*, 1799.

"The ship which arrived at Alexandria merely brought me a letter from the consul at Ancona saying that all was quiet in Europe and in France."

Bonaparte made no mention of the letters from Genoa which were probably written by Joseph and Lucien, whose efforts to keep the General acquainted with what was going on were incessant.

The report continued :—

"I am having a corvette built at Suez, and I have a flotilla of four despatch boats cruising in the Red Sea. . . . Ibrahim Pasha and other pashas threaten to invade Egpyt. I start in an hour to meet them. We shall have to pass nine days in a desert without grass or water. I have collected a sufficient number of camels and hope we shall want for nothing. . . . In the operation I am undertaking I have three objects in view. 1st. To insure the conquest of Egypt by constructing a strong fort beyond the desert, &c. 2nd. To force the Porte to give explanations. 3rd. To deprive the English cruisers of the supplies they draw from Syria.

"I am accompanied in this expedition by the Mollah, who, after the mufti of Constantinople, is the most revered man in the Mussulman Empire. . . . The Ramazan, which commenced yesterday, was celebrated by me with great pomp. I performed the same functions that the Pasha used to perform. General Desaix is 160 leagues from Cairo making excavations among the ruins of Thebes. . . . By the first courier I will send you the levels of the Suez Canal, the vestiges of which are perfectly preserved. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

A long letter which Bonaparte wrote to Desaix on the same date shows that the ship which reached Alexandria must have brought him an ample stock of news. He informed Desaix that the Congress of Rastadt was still sitting ; that recruiting was brisk ; that Jourdan commanded the army of the Rhine and Joubert that of Italy ; that when it was known in London that he had landed in Egypt, all England went mad ; that the English had declared war against the Italian Republics, and were blockading Malta ; that General Humbert had managed to double Scotland and to land in Ireland, &c.

On the 6th February Bonaparte set out for Syria, having little idea of the obstacles he was destined to encounter, and which proved stronger than his own imperious will.

TO THE SOLDIERS OF KLEBER'S DIVISION.

"THE WELLS OF ZÂOUY, *24th February*, 1799.

"It is not by mutinying that you will remedy matters: it would be better for you to bury your heads in the sand and to die with honour, than to indulge in disorder and to violate discipline."

Kleber had lost his way in the desert for three days, and a number of soldiers in despair had flung away their muskets and become insubordinate.

On the 27th February Bonaparte wrote to Desaix, saying:—

"We have crossed seventy leagues of desert which is exceedingly fatiguing; we had brackish water and often none at all. We ate dogs, donkeys, and camels. There has been a horrible wind blowing for the last three days, and it is pouring with rain. The sky is overcast, and the climate resembles that of Paris. . . ."

This letter was from Gaza.

On the 5th March Bonaparte, evidently in bad humour, was at Jaffa. There he gave General Berthier orders:—

"Put Adjutant-General Grenier under arrest for not having sent camels with the head-quarters convoy, and afterwards having sent them without orders.

"Put Major Faure of the artillery under arrest for having sent a man for tools without an escort.

"Put the canteen man of the *Guides* and the three bandsmen under arrest for having allowed their horses to be stolen by the Arabs."

Aide-de-camp Beaumont, a surgeon, and other officers and men were to be punished in a similar manner for neglect of duty, and although the bastinado had been condemned on principles of reason and humanity—

"The officer in command of the convoy is authorised to administer the bastinado to the camel-drivers who fail to keep their appointed rank, and to the carters who do not picquet their horses at the places indicated."

Bonaparte was most prolific in his appeals to the various civil and religious authorities in Syria, assuring them of his friendly intentions. He thus addressed :—

THE SHEIKS, ULEMAS, AND COMMANDANT OF JERUSALEM.

"JAFFA, *9th March*, 1799.

"God is clement and merciful!

"I make known to you that I have driven the Mamelukes and the troops of Djezzar Pasha from the provinces of Gaza, &c.; that it is not my intention to wage war against the people; that I am the friend of the Mussulman; that the inhabitants of Jerusalem can choose between peace and war; if they choose the first let them send delegates to the camp of Jaffa to promise never to do anything against me. If they are mad enough to prefer war I shall march against them. They ought to know that I am terrible as the fire of heaven for my enemies, but clement and merciful towards the people, and those who desire to be my friends.

"BONAPARTE."

On the same day he remonstrated with Djezzar Pasha and said :—

"In a few day I shall march upon St. Jean d'Acre. But why should I shorten the life of an old man whom I do not know? What are the few leagues more, compared with the country I have conquered? And since God has given

me the victory I wish to follow his example and to be clement and merciful, *not only towards the people but towards the great.* . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"JAFFA, *13th March*, 1799.

"On the 5th Fructidor I sent an officer to Djezzar the Pasha of Acre: he received him badly and sent no reply. On the 29th Brumaire I wrote to him again, and he cut off the bearer's head. The Frenchmen arrested at Acre have been cruelly treated."

Bonaparte then entered into a detailed account of his various operations—the capture of El Arysch, the battle of Gaza, "where we charged the enemy by the heights which look on Hebron, and where Samson carried off the gates;" and the siege of Jaffa, which place was taken by storm.

"At five o'clock," he wrote, "we were masters of the town, which during twenty-four hours was handed over to pillage and all the horrors of war, which never appeared to me so hideous; 4,000 of the troops of Djezzar were slaughtered, and among them 800 gunners and a portion of the inhabitants." And, "The Republican army is master of Palestine.

"BONAPARTE."

To Marmont Bonaparte wrote concerning this hideous massacre:—

"The capture of Jaffa was very brilliant, 4,000 of Djezzar's best troops and the best gunners of Constantinople were slaughtered"—not to talk of 2,500 prisoners massacred in cold blood three days after the capitulation.[1] This

[1] Bonaparte afterwards attempted to justify this barbarous act on the grounds that he could not feed these prisoners, and that, had he

tragedy enacted, Napoleon marched upon St. Jean d'Acre, laying siege to that place on the 18th March.

TO M. SIDNEY SMITH.

"ACRE, 23*rd March*, 1799.

"The General-in-Chief Bonaparte commanding the armies of the French Republic begs me to inform you that in virtue of the cartel of exchange between the two nations, he sends you the English prisoners captured at Hayfa, &c., &c. He hopes you will send to his camp the French prisoners, especially those taken on board the last vessels, on condition that they shall not serve against the troops of

allowed them to go, they would have fought against him again. Lanfrey dismisses both these pleas, saying that Napoleon, who seldom lost fifty men in his battles in Egypt, had little to fear from these captives, and that, as he took large quantities of provisions at El Arysch, Gaza, and Jaffa, there would have been no difficulty in feeding them. Several officers refused to have anything to do with the execution.

General Bon commanded the firing party, and his orders (the original exists) were to shoot the prisoners—"taking precautions so that none of them can escape."

At the same date (23rd March) we find Nelson writing :—

TO THE HON. WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

"CULLODEN, PALERMO, 23*rd March*, 1799.

"MY DEAR SIR,—The ambassador of Buonaparte has been intercepted by my friend Troubridge on his way to Constantinople, and amongst other articles of his instructions is a very important one—viz., an offer to enter on terms for quitting Egypt with his army. This offer is what I have long expected the glorious battle of the Nile would produce ; but it was my determination from that moment never, if I could help it, to permit a single Frenchman to quit Egypt.

"Sir Sidney Smith, who has the present command of the squadron off Alexandria, thinks differently from me, and will grant passports for the return of that part of the French army which God Almighty permits to remain. I have therefore thought it highly proper to send Sir Sidney Smith the order, of which I transmit a copy, for I consider it nothing short of madness to permit that band of thieves to return to Europe. . . .

"NELSON."

his Britannic Majesty. The General-in-Chief begs me to thank you for having sent him back one of his couriers," &c., &c.

The courier was the unfortunate Fourès! There was therefore a touch of irony in his expression of gratitude. The relations between Bonaparte and Sir Sidney Smith became much less cordial afterwards.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"ACRE, *8th April*, 1799.

". . . . Soldiers go out on the roads and carry off the provisions which the peasants are bringing to market; several complaints have been made against the men of Kléber's division. For several weeks past there has been no bread in the market because that which the peasants were bringing in was taken from them by force, or at an arbitrary price; several peasants were beaten and not paid. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

In a long letter to Marmont, Bonaparte, on the 14th April, gave an account of how matters were progressing at St. Jean d'Acre.

"There are a large number of English and *émigrés* in the place," he wrote, "and you may imagine how anxious we are to enter it. I should bet for 1st Floreal (20th April). . . . General Caffarelli, my aides-de-camp Duroc, and Eugene de Beauharnais, General Valentin, Sanson, Say, and Souhait are among the wounded."

The gallant Caffarelli who had already lost a leg, had his arm amputated, and died.

Highly indignant with that "grain of sand," as he contemptuously called Acre for presuming to stand in the way of his destiny and to destroy his illusions, he wrote to Berthier—

"The admiral of the English squadron cruising before Acre having been barbarous enough to embark some French prisoners on board a ship from Constantinople, tainted with the plague, on the pretext of sending them to Toulon but really to make away with them; besides, this man, being a kind of lunatic, you will inform the commanders along the coast that it is my intention not to hold any communication with him. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

What Sir Sidney Smith really did was to aid in the defence of Acre; to publish proclamations in Turkish to the effect that Bonaparte had been sent to Egypt because the Directory feared him and his army; to call the General a renegade, and to offer to meet him in single combat.

On the 10th May, Bonaparte sent an account of his various battles to the Directory, pointing out the rapidity with which the army had passed the desert.

"Murat," he said, "had gained possession of Safed, whose inhabitants showed him the spot where Judith had killed Holofernes." 'The Combat of Nazareth' ended in the defeat of the enemy, who had crossed the Jordan coming from Damascus. 'The Combat of Canaan' seems to have been drawn. At the 'Combat of Mount Tabor' the cavalry of the enemy behaved with great gallantry, but was finally dispersed. At St. Jean d'Acre matters were not going as well as could be wished.

Bonaparte wrote—

"The season is too far advanced; the end I had in view has been accomplished (?) My presence is required in Egypt. I have placed a battery of twenty-four guns *so as to destroy the palace of Djezzar, and the principal monuments in the town.* . . . . Having reduced Acre to a heap of stones, I shall recross the desert, so as to be ready to receive any Turkish or European army which

may attempt to land. . . . . Since crossing the desert I have lost 500 men killed and 1,000 wounded. The enemy has lost 15,000.

"BONAPARTE."

This despatch would hardly lead one to believe that Bonaparte retreated from before Acre only after fourteen unsuccessful attempts had been made to carry the place by storm, after his troops had suffered severely, and after several of his lieutenants had remonstrated with him. Nothing could equal his fury at being foiled by land as well as by sea.

After giving orders that the troops should sharpen their bayonets on all three edges, and informing General Dugna that Generals Bon, Lannes, and Duroc had been wounded, and that Ventura his interpreter was dead, Bonaparte issued one of his usual bombastic proclamations, reminding the army of the great things it had accomplished. To explain his retreat he said :—

"A few days more, and you would have captured the Pasha in the very middle of his palace ; but at this season the capture of Acre would not be worth the loss of some days ; besides, the gallant fellows who would have perished are required for more essential operations.

"Soldiers, we have a career of dangers and fatigues before us. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Everything was now prepared for a retrograde movement. We see by the various orders how the sick and wounded were to be removed; how General Dommartin was to throw some of his guns into the sea at dead of night, and how five spans of an aqueduct and the pillars of a mosque were to be blown up. Junot was ordered to burn all the mills on the river Jordan and to sell or destroy all the corn. Having caused Mount Carmel to be occupied,

orders to commence the march back to Egypt were issued for the 20th May, and everything was to be done at Cairo to give the return an air of triumph. A great show was to be made with captured standards and prisoners. The siege of St. Jean d'Acre cost the French 4,000 men.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"JAFFA, 26*th May*, 1799.

"Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, seeing the consequences of the embezzlements of the magazines under present circumstances, and the necessity of making a severe example of a crowd of depredators, orders," &c.

The accused were to be tried by drum-head court-martial, and summarily shot if found guilty.

On the 27th May Bonaparte gave an account of his glorious achievements to the Directory, and related that when he was on the point of carrying Acre, spies, deserters, and prisoners informed him that the plague was raging in the place. Under these circumstances its capture was renounced. On the 3rd Prairial, the army, he mentioned, encamped among the ruins of Cæsarea, in the midst of the remains of marble and granite columns, which proved the truth of what Josephus had written concerning that city.

On the 15th June, Bonaparte, in a letter to Desaix announced his arrival at Cairo. "I salute and love you," he concluded; adding, as P.S. : "Wear a flannel waistcoat; that is the only way to avoid getting sore eyes."

An officer who took part in this retreat has left a striking picture of the horrors with which it was accompanied. The fearful thirst, excessive heat, and want of water demoralised the army, destroying all generous sentiments. "I saw officers who had suffered amputation," he wrote, "thrown out of their stretchers though they had paid the men to carry them. Sick and wounded were abandoned. All the villages, hamlets, and towns on the line of march were burned. Those who presided over these disasters,

seemed, by spreading desolation round them, bent on revenging their reverses. . . . . The beautiful sky was obscured by the smoke of our continual conflagrations." And in one of the intercepted letters published in England may be found such paragraphs as these:—"If the army had known what awaited it, not one of us would have embarked;* death would have been a thousand times preferable to the misery we endure. We are surrounded by enemies on all sides. In the space of a week 600 men have died of thirst. Discontent is general; never was despotism carried to such a pitch. Soldiers have been seen to kill themselves in presence of the General-in-Chief, exclaiming, 'This is your work.'"

Bonaparte, violently irritated with Sir Sidney Smith, whom he now called a captain of fire-ships, in an order of the day of the 18th June, said:—

"During the absence of the army in Syria, the commander of the British squadron so far forgot himself, and what he owed to honourable soldiers, as to propose to General Dugna to take advantage of a moment, when a portion of the army was beyond the desert, to return to France. . . . . The General-in-Chief will make known to the army all the officers, who by their conduct, forget they are the citizens of the first nation in the world, which, after having subdued the Continent, has, by founding its power on the Nile, sapped the gigantic strength of England in India; a nation, for which he has only one fear, that of arriving too quickly at the maximum of glory and prosperity, after which, in the natural order of events, everything declines."

From this period all the despatches of Bonaparte show that Egypt continued in a most unsettled condition. One despatch gives an account of fighting at Thebes and eleven other places, and although villages which revolted were burned to the ground and their inhabitants put to the

sword, this did not prevent other villages from revolting and false prophets from preaching resistance. On the 28th June Bonaparte asked for reinforcements.

"The army," he said, "has lost 5,344 men since it landed, but the Syrian campaign has had a great result; *we are masters of the whole desert*, and have disconcerted the plans of our enemies for this season." And then, "If you could send us 15,000 men we might go anywhere, even to Constantinople. We require 2,000 men for our cavalry, with carbines, saddles, &c.; 6,000 foot soldiers; 600 hussars; 500 gunners; engineers, masons, carpenters, sappers; 20,000 muskets; 40,000 bayonets; 3,000 sabres; 6,000 brace of pistols; 10,000 pioneering tools. *If you cannot send this succour you must make peace.* . . . . We are very anxious for news from France. . . . . *It will be the happiest day in our existence when we hear of the establishment of the first Republic in Germany.*

"BONAPARTE."

The above despatch shows what Bonaparte, driven back into Egypt, thought of the prospects of the expedition two months before he left the country.

The Cherif of Mecca having applied for passports for the *Fath-el-Bahri* and three other vessels, bound for India, Bonaparte directed Berthier to make them out in the following form:—

"The French Republic makes war against the pashas and the ministers of the Grand Turk, who, are influenced by Russia, the eternal enemy of Islam, but the French Republic is the most sincere friend of the descendant of the califs, of the chief of the Mussulman religion, the greatest and the most perfect of princes, the Cherif of Mecca.

"In consequence the General-in-Chief orders," &c., &c.

TO THE DIVAN OF CAIRO.

"*21st July*, 1799.

"There is no other God but God, and Mohammed is His prophet!

"To the Divan of Cairo, chosen among the wisest, the most educated, and the most enlightened persons. May the grace of the Prophet be on you!

"I write you this to inform you that . . . . eighty vessels presented themselves before Alexandria, but being warmly received they have anchored at Aboukir and are disembarking troops. My intention is, when they are all disembarked, to attack them, to kill all who refuse to surrender, and to grant others life in order to bring them here as prisoners, which will be a fine sight for Cairo.

"Those who brought this fleet here hoped to join the Arabs and the Mamelukes in pillaging and devastating Egypt. There are on board this fleet, Russians who hold in horror those who believe in the unity of God, because, *according to their lies, they believe there are three gods.* But they will soon perceive that the number of gods does not constitute force, and that there is only one, the Father of Victory, clement and merciful, always fighting for the good and confounding the machinations of the wicked, who, in His wisdom, decided that I should come to Egypt to change the state of affairs, and to substitute for a regime of devastation, a regime of order and justice. In thus acting, He gives a proof of His omnipotence, for what those who believed in the Trinity were never able to accomplish, we have done—we who believe that a single God governs nature and the world.

"BONAPARTE."

In the next letter, Bonaparte said that General Abdallah Menou, who had embraced Islamism, and taken to himself a Turkish wife (from whom he afterwards obtained a divorce), was going to Rosetta.

On the 25th of July, Bonaparte gained the Battle of Aboukir, utterly defeating the Turkish army which had been landed, without cavalry, in the hope of capturing him and his host; seized with panic, thousands of Turks were driven into the sea and drowned.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"ALEXANDRIA, *1st August*, 1799.

"The name of Aboukir was bitter to every Frenchmen: the 7th Thermidor (25th July) has rendered it glorious. The victory which the army has gained will accelerate its return to Europe. We conquered Mayence and the Rhine boundary by invading a portion of Austria. We have now re-conquered our establishments in India and those of our allies. By a single operation we have placed in the hands of the Government the means of obliging England, in spite of her maritime triumphs, to sign a peace glorious for the arms of the Republic.

"BONAPARTE."

However the Aboukir of Bonaparte in no way wiped out the effect of the Aboukir of Nelson.

TO GENERAL DESAIX.

"CAIRO, *11th August*, 1799.

"I have not been well satisfied, Citizen General, with your operations during the movements which have just taken place. No matter what events arise, nothing should hinder a soldier from obeying orders; talent in war consists in overcoming the obstacles in the way of an operation, and not in causing it to fail. I mention this for your future guidance.

"BONAPARTE."

On the same day, in an exceedingly long letter, Bonaparte informed Desaix that he had received some English papers, that several battles had been fought, that Jourdan had been beaten at Feldkirch, and had re-passed the Rhine;

that Schèrer who had assumed the command of the army of Italy, had been beaten at Rivoli, and driven back across the Mincio and the Oglio; that the Russians had not yet arrived, that Prince Charles commanded against Jourdan, and Kray against Schèrer; that Jarvis and Nelson were in the Mediterranean with fifty vessels; that Toulon and Carthagena were blockaded; that Corfu had been taken by famine, but that Malta had been revictualled for two years. And in the next letter Marmont was directed to take measures for the defence of Boghaz as "M. Smith is capable of any act of madness."

It was M. Smith who had sent Bonaparte the English papers referred to in the hope that the ill news they contained would still further discourage the army under his command.

ORDER.

"CAIRO, 16*th August*, 1799.

"The commanders of the provinces will make known in an Arabic circular, to be sent to all the villages, the pomp with which the *fête* of the Prophet has been celebrated at Cairo. No celebration within the memory of man was so brilliant. All the troops in Cairo, lighted by a great number of torches, went to visit the Sheik El-Bekry. The General-in-Chief dined with him, as also Mustapha Pasha, and all the principal officers captured at Aboukir. The General-in-Chief was present at the reading of several Arab poems written in honour of the Prophet; after which, in the midst of the grand sheiks, he said prayers and heard the genealogy of the Prophet recited. The Pasha and the Turkish prisoners were overcome with surprise at the respect shown by the French for Islamism and the law of the most holy of Prophets. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The next day Bonaparte wrote once more to the Grand Vizier to try and bring the war to a close. He asked—

"By what fatality comes it that France and Turkey are at war when their frontiers are so distant from each other, when France is the enemy of Russia and the Emperor, and the Porte the enemy of Russia and the Emperor? . . . Is not your Excellency aware that Russia is the real enemy of Islam? The Emperor Paul I. has become Grand Master of Malta, that is to say he has sworn to wage war against the Mussulmans. Is he not chief of the Greek Church? . . . . France, on the contrary, has destroyed the Knights of Malta, and has broken the chains of the Turks who were in slavery. Thus the Sublime Porte has declared war against its true friends, and has entered into an alliance with its veritable enemies. The Sublime Porte therefore which was the friend of France as long as that power was Christian, declares war directly France by her religion approaches the Mussulman belief. Russia and England have deceived the Sublime Porte. . . . . My army is powerful, well disciplined, and supplied with everything which can render it victorious over all other armies were they as numerous as the sands of the sea." And many arguments were employed to induce the Sultan Selim to open negotiations with France, and to checkmate the perfidious designs of Russia and Austria. "Say but the word," added Bonaparte, "we will close the Black Sea to Russia, and cease to be the plaything of that hostile Power we have so many reasons to hate. It is not against the Mussulmans that the French armies wish to display their tactics and their courage; *but, on the contrary, united some day with the Mussulmans, they will drive out the common enemy.* . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

It was certainly an anomaly, which has not escaped the historian, to see the Czar, or Patriarch of the Greek church, assume the office of Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, and take the Pope, whom he anathematised in his ecclesiastical capacity, under his protection; to see the Grand

Master, whose first vow was to exterminate all Mussulmans, allied with the Turks; and Russian battalions decorated with the Catholic cross of St. John of Jerusalem, the schismatic cross of St. Andrew, and the Protestant cross of St. Anne, fighting beside the standard of the Prophet to re-establish the Pope in Rome, Catholicism in France, and Islamism in Egypt.

TO GENERAL KLÉBER.

"ALEXANDRIA, 22*nd August*, 1799.

"You will find inclosed, Citizen General, an order to take over the command in chief of the army. The fear of the English cruisers returning makes me hasten my departure. I take with me Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossy, and Marmont, the citizens Monge and Berthollet.

"You will see by the inclosed English papers that we have lost Italy, and that Mantua, Turin, and Tortona are blockaded."

In the event of not receiving reinforcements and of suffering a loss of 1,500 men by plague before the end of the year Kléber was authorised to come to terms with Turkey even on the condition of evacuating Egypt. Bonaparte added—"You know how to appreciate, as well as any one, the importance to France of such a possession as Egypt. The Turkish empire, which is menaced with ruin on all sides, is crumbling to pieces to-day, and the evacuation of Egypt by France would be a misfortune all the greater because we should live to see that fine province in other European hands."

A great deal of advice was then tendered. If the Porte replied to the overtures for peace, Kléber was to persist in assuring the Sultan that France never had any intention of taking Egypt from the Porte. As for the internal government of Egypt, Kléber was told to lull fanaticism to sleep until it could be eradicated. Further on, Bonaparte said—"I applied several times for a company of actors; I shall

take particular care to send you some. This article (*sic*) is very important for the army, and also for the purpose of effecting a change in the customs of the country.

"The important command you are about to assume will enable you to display those talents with which nature has favoured you. . . .

"Accustomed to see the recompense of the trials and labours of life in the opinion of posterity, I abandon Egypt with the greatest regret.

"The interest of the country, its glory, *obedience*, the extraordinary events which are passing there, have alone decided me to return to Europe."

TO GENERAL KLÉBER.

"ALEXANDRIA, *22nd August*, 1799.

"The General Kléber is ordered to assume the command in chief of the army of the east, *the Government having summoned me home.*

"BONAPARTE."

Thus terminated the Egyptian expedition as far as Bonaparte was concerned. It had ended in failure. At St. Helena he said that he was aware that the expedition would end in a catastrophe as soon as the English had destroyed his fleet at Aboukir, and, by way of excusing his departure, he added—"There was nothing to detain me in Egypt; it was an exhausted enterprise. Any general was good enough to sign a capitulation which time would render inevitable." The noble-minded Kléber was spared this task, which fell to the lot of Abdallah Menou.

We have seen how the expedition arose, because Bonaparte wished to leave France for a time, and because the Directory wished to get rid of a powerful protector and his army. It has been asserted by most writers that Bonaparte deserted his army in Egypt and returned to France without orders. This charge is true, to a certain extent, true as far as Bonaparte himself was concerned. The government

had sent orders for his return. Admiral Bruix had been instructed to use every effort to bring him back, and negotiations had been opened with the Porte for the evacuation of Egypt, on the condition of means being furnished to General Bonaparte and his army to return to France. A Greek, of the name of Vittallis, had been charged with the task of conveying the orders of the Directory to Bonaparte, and Vittallis was on his way to Egypt when he met Napoleon at Aix. The General had therefore anticipated orders.

What finally caused Bonaparte to accelerate his departure from Egypt was a packet of newspapers which Sir Sidney Smith had sent to him, enumerating the French reverses in Italy and on the Rhine. The British Commodore thought this intelligence would increase the discouragement which reigned in the French army, and perhaps lead to a capitulation. He little foresaw the real consequences of his act.

Before leaving Egypt and his army, Bonaparte gave Kléber a *rendezvous*, but he hurried on board ship without waiting for him, and left his successor merely the written instructions already referred to. Kléber immediately wrote a report to the Directory, in which he drew a mournful picture of the state of destitution in which the army had been left—neither arms, powder, lead, nor clothing—dysentery and ophthalmia rife. "General Bonaparte," he added, "a few months after our arrival, exhausted the extraordinary resources, and levied war contributions which the country could not support. . . However, at his departure, Bonaparte did not leave a *sou* or any equivalent object in the military chest. On the contrary, he left arrears for 12,000,000 francs, which, under present circumstances, means more than a year's revenue. For the army alone the arrears amount to over 4,000,000 francs. . . ." It would be difficult to say what effect this despatch would have created had it been received by the Directory. Captured by a British cruiser, however, it did not reach Paris until Kléber had been

assassinated, and when Bonaparte was First Consul and master of the situation.

When at St. Helena, Bonaparte wrote a series of observations on the Egyptian campaign, under General Menou, and the operations of the English. He said that the English Cabinet undertook the war with 60,000 men—34,000 Englishmen and 24,000 Turks. These forces were drawn from England, India, and other places, and the plans were most defective. . . . As a proof of this, Bonaparte pointed out that the division from India reached Kosseir six months after Abercromby had landed, that it never fired a shot; that the reserve drawn from London and Gibraltar also reached Egypt six months after General Abercromby; that the Capitan Pasha with his 6,000 men arrived at Aboukir twenty days after Abercromby; that the Grand Vizier crossed the desert only in May, instead of three months sooner. Consequently instead of having 60,000 men, Abercromby landed with 19,500 Englishmen, destitute of everything. He had no horses for his artillery or for his cavalry, although he had passed two months at Malta and two months in Asia Minor (where he might have procured any number of animals) making preparations. "These faults," said the writer, "were committed by the cabinet which conceived the plan of campaign. They furnish a new proof of the bad state of English administration, which is the most defective in Europe."

Respecting the manœuvres of General Abercromby, Bonaparte had a great deal to say. He was right in believing that once master of Alexandria, he would be able to persuade the French to accept the capitulation of El Ayrisch; he ought not to have arrived before the 15th April, when he would have been able to surprise the city, and when he landed, instead of wasting four days and a half, he should have marched at once on Alexandria. He himself had immediately attacked the city with a mere handful of men, without waiting for his guns, "for it is

a principle in war that the thunderbolt is preferable to the cannon." Admiral Keith, too, should have deceived the French by threatening Damietta.

The operations of General Hutchinson (who succeeded Abercromby) were also sharply criticised by the imperial captive. He was blamed for "running after accessories when he was within striking distance of the heart. . . . All his operations should have been directed against Alexandria, and he ought to have conquered Egypt without losing sight of the masts of his fleet." He was then blamed for moving so slowly, but Bonaparte admitted *that he thought the force under General Belliard twice as strong as it really was.*

The Emperor still more severely condemned the operations of the French commanders—those of Generals Friant, Lanusse, and Lagrange; and the conduct of Colonel Cavalier was pronounced to have been so unjustifiable that he ought to have been brought before a court-martial. "The Romans would have decimated his detachment," wrote the Emperor, adding, "It was their anxiety to return to France which led the soldiers to capitulate. . . . It would be well to pass a law forbidding all communication with the enemy; for our soldiers are so good-natured, and so ready to make friends, and our officers are so easily deceived, that foreigners perpetually make fools of them."

The conduct of General Belliard was strongly censured. He thought he had 10,000 English troops in front of him at Cairo, whereas he had only 4,000, the remainder of the enemy's force being Turks and Bedouins. "He surrendered the capital of Egypt," wrote the Emperor, "with its magazines, 400 guns, &c., without firing a shot. It is true that the interests of the generals, the officers, and civil authorities were stipulated for with great care. Of these 14,000 men, 500 enlisted in the Mamelukes, and the remainder returned to France. The army brought home its standards, arms, fifty pieces of artillery, horses, *an immense amount of baggage, and all the curiosities of the*

country. . . . When officers consider it possible to escape from a critical position by means of a convention, everything is lost. Better would it be to confide the defence and the honour of the country to old women armed with distaffs.[1] . . . The grief felt by the First Consul when he heard of this capitulation [which he knew to be inevitable] may be easily imagined. His first impulse was to have all the generals who took a part in the council of war arrested. . . . But on second reflections the First Consul changed his mind. General Belliard was a very distinguished officer; he had rendered important services during the campaign; at Arcola he had covered Bonaparte with his body, and had received a bullet destined for his chief. . . . . He had been abandoned, without orders, by General Menou (who had succeeded Kléber) whose irresolution and want of military talents had destroyed all hope and all confidence. The generals who signed the capitulation were distinguished officers. Would it have been well, seeing the brilliant situation of the Republic when peace was concluded with Russia, the Porte, and with England, to have cast a shadow over its glory, and to have afflicted the nation by opening an inquiry which would have dishonoured brave men who had deserved well of the country? Was it not preferable to close one's eyes, and to attribute all that had happened to fatality, and to the absolute incapacity of the Commander-in-Chief? For, no matter what the energy of the Government, an army of lions commanded by a deer will never be an army of lions."

Naturally all the operations of Abdallah Menou were severely censured, and he was written down as an unmitigated blunderer; but this did not prevent his employment under the empire as governor of Piedmont and Venice. As for General Belliard, he afterwards distinguished himself at Ulm and Austerlitz. He fought against us in Spain; he marched to Moscow and back;

[1] In the days of Joan of Arc the English sent the French a present of a flag, with a distaff embroidered on it.

he lost an arm at Leipsic; he served Louis XVIII. as major-general of the army, on the abdication of Bonaparte; he rejoined his old master on his return from Elba; after Waterloo he was thrown into prison for a time, but instead of sharing the fate of Ney, was soon taken into favour once more. On the fall of Charles X. he was sent by Louis Philippe on a mission to Berlin, and he died at Brussels in 1832, while engaged in the formation of the new Belgian Government.

That Bonaparte did not assemble a court-martial to try the generals who capitulated in Egypt is not astonishing, for the evidence would certainly have damaged his own reputation, and have brought to light matters which it was his interest to keep concealed.

Some years afterwards (24th November, 1803) Napoleon wrote as follows to Talleyrand:—

"Write in cipher to Citizen Lesseps that he ought to go to Cairo; that he did wrong to show the letter of the Mamelukes to the Pasha of Cairo. . . . . Let him tell Osman Bey that I received his letter and understood its contents; that I like the Mamelukes because they are brave, and especially the Mamelukes of Mourad Bey, because they took our part and joined the French army; that my intention is to favour and protect them, and that they can count upon this. Let him tell the widow of Mourad Bey that I have received her letter; that I have given special orders to the French agents in Egypt to protect her; that she has nothing to fear, and that she shall want for nothing, because Mourad Bey ended by becoming the friend of France.

"BONAPARTE."

The fact is, that after the departure of Bonaparte, who had treated Egypt as Sallust treated Numidia, Mourad Bey, this modern Jugurtha, incensed at the reception he met with in the camp of the Grand Vizier Mustapha, who

was marching against the French, first of all retired from the scene, and then came to terms with Kléber, and aided that general in his operations against the Turks. Mourad remained the faithful friend and ally of the French, until carried off by the plague towards the close of 1801, and he was so deeply regretted by his Mamelukes that they broke his sword and spear over his grave, considering no one else worthy to wield them after their beloved chieftain.

It was on the night of the 22nd August that Bonaparte left Egypt with his staff. Managing, with his usual good fortune, to escape the British cruisers, on the 1st October he landed at Ajaccio, where he remained until the 7th, making himself thoroughly acquainted with the position of affairs on the Continent before venturing to continue his journey. On the 9th he disembarked safely at Frejus, and on the 10th he was at Aix, from which place he wrote:—

TO THE DIRECTORY.

"AIX, 10*th October*, 1799.

"CITIZEN DIRECTORS,—Since I left France I have received only one of your despatches, which reached me when I was before Acre. It contained the news of our successes at Naples, which made me conjecture an approaching war on the Continent. From that moment I considered that I should no longer remain absent from France. . . . Egypt, protected from invasion, is entirely ours." Then came a different excuse, that of the successes in the kingdom of Naples, for his return. "I procured," added Bonaparte, "after several diplomatic conferences (?), the English *Gazettes* up to the 6th June, by which I learned the defeat of Jourdan in Germany and of Schèrer in Italy. I started at once with the *Muiron* and *Carrère*, although bad sailers. I did not calculate the danger. It was my duty to be where my presence was most necessary. Animated with these sentiments, I should

have thrown my cloak around me and have left in a boat had I not had frigates. I have left Egypt well organised, under the orders of General Kléber. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Such was the letter in which Bonaparte explained his sudden return to France—a return which took the Directory by surprise, but which was hailed with delight by the nation. With regard to the successes of Championnet and the establishment of the Parthenopean Republic, Lanfrey has very clearly pointed out the reason of Bonaparte's apprehensions. Their immediate consequence was that the French armies found themselves called upon to defend a line which extended from Naples to Amsterdam, and which was vigorously assailed along almost its whole length. As for the reverses experienced by Schèrer and other French generals, they had in a great measure been repaired before Bonaparte landed in France, and the Republic was safe from its foreign enemies. In Paris, however, there were nothing but plots and conspiracies; but what most of the conspirators wanted was an unscrupulous general. Applications had been made to Bernadotte and to Moreau, who afterwards boasted that he had refused the Dictatorship. Sieyes had founded great hopes on Joubert, and had given him the command of the army of Italy, so that he might acquire the necessary amount of glory. As Barras had given Josephine de Beauharnais to Bonaparte, so Sieyes gave Mlle. de Sémonville to Joubert, to attach him to his person and to the Republic. Unfortunately for Sieyes and fortunately for Bonaparte, Joubert was killed at Novi. The consequence was that Bonaparte, not long after reaching Paris, formed an alliance with Sieyes. A few days before coming to terms Sieyes had talked of having Bonaparte shot for his breach of discipline in leaving Egypt, while Bonaparte had proposed that Sieyes should be driven from the Directory in consequence of having sold himself to Prussia!

The Directors soon became aware that the popularity of Bonaparte was too strong for them. He had been received with enthusiasm at landing at Frejus. He had made a triumphal march through France, and had been greeted with delight in Paris. His absence in Egypt, the uncertainty which had long reigned with regard to his fate and the fate of his army, and the conviction that he had been exiled by the Government, all served to heighten his popularity. His little house in the Rue de la Victoire was soon crowded with men of all parties seeking to win over the young General to their cause. Jacobins, Republicans, and Royalists received encouragement alike, and as Bonaparte afterwards confided to Madame de Rémusat at the camp of Boulogne there was not a party in France which did not place faith in him. He soon ascertained that "the pear was ripe" as he expressed it, and that he was the real master of France. All his rivals were out of the way. Hoche and Joubert were dead, Pichegru was a rebel, Moreau had been estranged and was willing to remain neutral, and Bernadotte, who had been removed from the War Office, was sulking, and had married Desirée Clary. Writing to Lucien Bonaparte, the future King of Sweden, then a staunch Republican, said in reference to the 18th Brumaire—"But is it for me to reproach you for not having imitated the great models of patriotism to be found in history, when I myself could yield to the entreaties of Joseph? Why? Because Joseph is the husband of Julie, the sister of my wife Desirée. See upon what slight things the destinies of a great Empire depend."

Distrust and uncertainty everywhere reigned, and under these circumstances it was decided that the chambers should remove to St. Cloud in order that they might enjoy greater freedom. This did not prevent the chambers from being dispersed by Bonaparte at the head of his grenadiers, and thus perished the Constitution of the Year III. which had formerly excited so much enthusiasm on the

part of the General and the troops under his command. In achieving this result Bonaparte was powerfully aided by several members of his family, by Joseph, by Lucien, and by Josephine, whose frailties had been pardoned. In fact Lucien by his courage saved the situation at a moment when the General, bewildered by the uproar and reproaches of the representatives of the nation, lost his head, and was dragged out of the chamber by his grenadiers, livid and fainting. Had Lucien not come to the rescue of his brother and harangued the troops, little more would probably have been heard of Bonaparte.

The chief power now passed out of the hands of the Directory into those of three Consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger-Ducros. Before the end of the year the Constitution of the Year VIII. had created three consuls who were elected for ten years. The three Consuls elected were Bonaparte, Cambacères, and Lebrun, but all the prerogatives were centered in the first Consul. This Constitution obtained the sanction of over 3,000,000 voters. Such is the brief sketch of the situation after the return of Bonaparte from Egypt.

To CITIZEN LAPLACE.

"PARIS, *19th October*, 1799.

"I have received with gratitude, citizen, the copy of your fine work (*La Mécanique céleste*) which you have just sent me. *The first six months* I can dispose of shall be spent in reading it. If you have nothing better to do, come and dine with me to-morrow. My respects to Madame Laplace.

"BONAPARTE."

No letter from the 19th October to the 9th November.

On the 18th Brumaire (8th November), after the decree which transferred the Corps Législatif to St. Cloud, Bonaparte issued addresses to the Council of Elders, the

National Guard of Paris, and the army. In these addresses we find such phrases as the following :—

"We desire a Republic founded upon true liberty, upon civil liberty, and the national representation, and we shall obtain it. I swear this in my own name and that of my comrades. . . . During two years the Republic has been misgoverned. You hoped that my return would put an end to so many evils ; you celebrated it with a unanimity which imposes upon me the obligations I am fulfilling. . . . Liberty, victory, and peace will replace the French Republic in the rank it formerly occupied in Europe, and which it lost, thanks to incapacity or treason."

On the following day in a speech to the Council of Elders Bonaparte complained that he was already overwhelmed with calumnies, that people spoke of Cæsar, of Cromwell, and of a military government. If he had desired a military government, he asked, would he have lent his support to the national representation ? Since his return from Egypt, he said, he had been surrounded by intrigues. All the factions had tried to gain him over. "I am no intriguer," he added ; "you know me; I believe I have given pledges enough of my devotion to the country."

Speeches and proclamations were filled with the most liberal and Republican sentiments calculated to allay suspicion. Then came the following order of the day dated Paris, 20th Brumaire, Year VIII.

"General Bonaparte is highly satisfied with the conduct of the troops of the line, pensioners, and national guards, who yesterday, so fortunate for the Republic, showed themselves the real friends of the people; he expresses his particular satisfaction to those brave grenadiers who covered themselves with glory in saving the life of their general when on the point of falling beneath the blows of representatives armed with poniards.

"BONAPARTE."

At the sitting of St. Cloud, Bonaparte, accused of violating the law, had lost courage, had fainted, and had been carried out of the Chamber by his grenadiers, but the fact of any one having attempted to stab the general is very doubtful. Lucien Bonaparte, who saved the situation by jumping on his horse and haranguing the troops, spoke of representatives armed with daggers and paid by England, but this was so much metaphor. Nor did any one see the twenty assassins who attacked the general, and pierced private Thomé's uniform, and yet one reads in the *Moniteur* of the 23rd Brumaire — "Thomas Thomé, genadier of the Legislative Body, who had the sleeve of his coat torn in protecting Bonaparte from the blow of a dagger aimed at him, dined on the 20th and breakfasted on the 21st with him. The citizeness Bonaparte embraced Thomas Thomé, and placed a diamond ring, worth 2,000 crowns, on his finger."

In a note to the Minister of War, dated the 15th November, 1799, we find General Kléber officially nominated to the command in chief of the army of the East. Some reinforcements were to be despatched to Egypt, and —"You can also despatch a troupe of comedians. The Minister of the Interior will be able to furnish *them*.

"You will add 1,000 sabres, and 1,000 pair of pistols."

The same day Bonaparte wrote to Citizen Laplace, Minister of the Interior, and Astronomer—

"The Consuls of the Republic charge me, Citizen Minister, to ask you, without loss of time, to compose a troupe of comedians for Egypt. It will be well to add some ballet girls. The Minister of Marine will provide the means of transport."

In the midst of the gravest cares of state Bonaparte never neglected what appeared to many persons trivial details, but with the importance of which he was well acquainted.

TO GENERAL JOURDAN.

"PARIS, 24*th November*, 1799.

"Citizen General, I have received your letter of the 29th Brumaire. Your feelings were hurt on the 18th.

"Now that the first moments have passed I have the greatest desire to see the conqueror of Fleurus constantly on the road which leads to the organisation of true liberty and happiness.

"No matter what your position, I beg you will never doubt the friendship I bear you.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte never got on well with Jourdan, who was the only marshal who did not receive the title of prince or duke. He was never forgiven his opposition on the 18th Brumaire.

On the 24th November, General Hédouville, commander-in-chief of the army of England (!), prematurely announced the suspension of hostilities in La Vendée, and on the 30th Bonaparte wrote thus to Berthier :—

"The War Minister, by special courier, will at once send the contents of the inclosed to the general-in-chief of the army of England, ordering him to adopt active measures against the rebels and Chouans.

"BONAPARTE."

The "inclosed" contained a report of a contemplated attack on Brest by the English.

By a decree of the 28th November, 1799, we find that the Hotel des Invalides was not large enough to hold all the pensioners, and consequently "the ancient dwelling of the kings" was to receive a "*Republican destination.*" In other words, the château of Versailles was to be placed at the disposal of the war minister for the benefit of wounded soldiers. Care was to be taken, however, that no works of

art were damaged. A couple of days afterwards Bonaparte signed a decree directing that the statue of Mars, "*which came from Rome*," should be placed under the dome of the Invalides—where his own remains now slumber—together with all the flags captured from the enemy. A list of the victories of the Republic was to be engraved upon marble tables.

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY OF THE EAST.

"Soldiers! the consuls of the Republic often turn their attention to the affairs of the army of the East.

"France is aware that your conquests will accelerate the restoration of her commerce and the civilisation of the world.

"All Europe watches you.

"I am often with you in spirit.

"No matter in what situation you are placed by the chances of war, you will always be the soldiers of Rivoli and Aboukir; you will be invincible.

"Accord to Kléber the same unlimited confidence you had in me: he deserves it.

"Soldiers! think of the day when, victorious, you will return to the sacred territory. It will be a day of glory and joy for the whole nation.

"BONAPARTE."

DECREE.

"The Consuls of the Republic, &c., decree—

"1. That the *émigrés* detained at Ham were wrecked on the coast of Calais.

"2. That they do not come under any law passed against the *émigrés*.

"3. That it is contrary to the usages of nations to take advantage of a shipwreck in order to deliver to the just vengeance of the law unfortunate persons who have escaped the fury of the waves."

And the *émigrés* in question were to be conducted to the frontier.

It is much to the credit of Bonaparte that he at once abolished the infamous law of hostages, which had been passed while he was in Egypt. He himself threw open the doors of the Temple, and announced to the prisoners their liberty. At the same time the agents of the Government received orders to tolerate the presence of all *émigrés* who remained quiet. Josephine, no doubt, had a good deal to say to these measures of clemency, which it was hoped would induce the Royalists to lay down their arms, and accept the new order of things.

TO GENERAL KLÉBER.

"PARIS, 18*th December*, 1799.

"I have despatched several vessels to Egypt, Citizen General, and hope they have reached you. . . . I send you a staff officer who will inform you of all that has passed. You will see it was high time for me to return to France. The events which have occurred here should be a new source of encouragement for your troops. . . . I dare not write even in cipher, for there are men in Paris and in London who decipher everything. Be assured that I do not lose sight of you. . . . Why is it that men like you cannot be in two places at once?

"BONAPARTE."

War with Austria appearing once more imminent, Bonaparte sent instructions to Moreau, who commanded the Army of the Rhine.

"The Government," concluded this letter, "has entire confidence in the zeal of General Moreau and in his military talents, which ought, in the forthcoming operations, to efface the shame cast on the French arms during the last campaign in Italy.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 23rd December, Bonaparte informed the War Minister that he had arranged with the Minister of Finance to send a million francs to the army of Italy, and on the following day it was decreed that the 14th July (anniversary of the capture of the Bastille), and the 1st Vendémiaire (foundation of the Republic), should be observed as national holidays.

On the 29th December, Bonaparte addressed the following letter to the King of England:—

"Called by the voice of the French nation to occupy the post of first magistrate of the Republic, I deem it right, on assuming power, to inform your Majesty directly of this fact.

"Ought the war, which for the last eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the globe, to be eternal? Are there no means of extinguishing it?

"How can the two most enlightened nations in Europe, which are stronger and more powerful than their safety and independence require, sacrifice commerce, internal prosperity, and domestic happiness to ideas of vain grandeur? How can they avoid feeling that peace is the greatest necessity as well as the greatest glory?

"These feelings cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who governs a free nation for the sole purpose of rendering it happy.

"Your Majesty will perceive in this overture nothing beyond my sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, towards a general pacification, by a prompt step, entirely confidential and divested of those forms which, necessary perhaps to disguise the dependence of feeble states, only reveal in powerful states a mutual desire to deceive each other.

"France and England, by an abuse of force, can, unfortunately, for a long time to come continue the struggle; but I presume to say the fate of all civilised nations is connected with the end of a war which sets the whole world in a blaze. "BONAPARTE."

The English Government refused to depart from the ancient forms established for the transaction of diplomatic affairs. The King of England did not enter into direct correspondence with the First Consul, and the British Cabinet refused to treat with a Government which depended on the life of a single man, unless it would abandon that system of unprovoked aggression from which Holland, Italy, Switzerland, and Egypt suffered. The above letter was written for France rather than for England, and to justify war rather than to secure peace. Such was the impression of the British Parliament, which had no confidence in Bonaparte. In the Upper House Lord Grey asked: "Who concluded a treaty of peace with Sardinia and then violated it? Bonaparte. Who concluded and then broke a treaty with the Grand Duke of Tuscany? Bonaparte. Who concluded and then annulled the armistices with the petty states of Italy? Bonaparte. Who plundered the Duke of Parma in spite of his neutrality? Bonaparte. By whom was Venice dragged into the war if not by Bonaparte? Who, after having made peace with Venice and given her a constitution, delivered her over, bound hand and foot, to Austria? Bonaparte. If Genoa has been subdued and humiliated, it is to Bonaparte that Republic owes the sacrifice of her wealth and her independence. If Switzerland, by lying offers of peace and alliances, has been induced to abandon her rights and her liberties, it is by Bonaparte she has been despoiled!" Pitt spoke in the same strain in the Lower House, borrowing for the occasion the *Pacem nolo quia infida* of Cicero.

TO HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR.

"PARIS, *25th December*, 1799.

"On my return to Europe after an absence of eighteen months, I find war being waged between the French Republic and your Majesty.

"The French nation has selected me to occupy the post of first magistrate.

"Foreign to all sentiments of vain glory my first desire is to put a stop to the shedding of blood. Everything leads one to foresee that in the next campaign numerous armies skilfully commanded will triple the number of victims who have already fallen since hostilities were recommenced.

"The well-known character of your Majesty can leave no doubt as to the desire of your heart. If it be alone listened to, I foresee the possibility of reconciling the interests of the two nations.

"In the relations which I previously had with your Majesty, you showed me personally some esteem, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

On the same day Bonaparte penned the following "Proclamation to the army of Italy," which revealed a curious state of affairs:—

"Soldiers! circumstances which detain me at the head of the government prevent me from being among you.

"Your wants are great; they shall be provided for.

"The greatest qualities of the soldier are constancy and discipline; valour is only the second.

"Soldiers! several corps have quitted their positions. They have remained deaf to the voice of their officers.

"Are all the gallant fellows of Castiglione and Rivoli dead? They would sooner have perished than have deserted their standards, and they would have brought back their young comrades to honour and duty.

"Soldiers! you say that your rations are not regularly served out. What would you have done if, like the 4th, 18th, 22nd, and 32nd, you had found yourself in the middle of the desert, without bread and without water, eating horses and mules? '*Victory will give us bread,*' they said; and you—you desert your standards!

"Soldiers of Italy, a new general commands you. He was always to be found in the van in the days of your glory. Accord him your confidence, &c. . . .

BONAPARTE."

In the desert there was no help for it, but in Italy the soldiers revolted because Massena and other officers plundered the military chest, and left them to starve. Count Miot de Melito says in his memoirs: "Massena, who succeeded Berthier at Rome, behaved in such a way that the French troops, left without pay, in the midst of the immense riches which he appropriated, revolted, and refused to recognise his authority. His peculations and pilferings, his shameful avidity, tarnished the laurels with which he had covered himself."

This was not the first time that Massena—whose real name appears to have been Manasseh—was found guilty of similar malpractices, nor was it the last. In 1798, when deprived of his command for his *dilapidations*, he wrote a piteous letter to Bonaparte, saying, "What is to become of me? I appeal to your kindness. I expect everything from you; an embassy would save me from the disgrace of returning to France at once. I can no longer serve, yet I have nothing wherewith to reproach myself." Bonaparte now threatened him with a court martial unless he disgorged.

On the 25th December, too, the citizens of St. Domingo were informed of the change which had been operated in the French Government, and told that the colony would be governed by special laws. A decree was issued, and Art. VI. set forth that—

"The following words, 'Gallant blacks, remember that the French people alone recognise your liberty, your equality, your rights,' shall be inscribed in letters of gold on all the flags of the battalions of the National Guard of the colony of St. Domingo. "BONAPARTE."

Three years after this Bonaparte re-established slavery and the slave trade.

TO THE SENATE OF THE FREE AND IMPERIAL TOWN OF HAMBURG.

"PARIS, *30th December*, 1799.

"We have received your letter, which does not justify your conduct. Courage and virtue preserve states; cowardice and vice ruin them. You have violated hospitality. This did not happen among the most barbarous hordes of the desert. Our fellow-citizens will ever reproach you. The two unfortunate men you have delivered up will die illustrious; but their blood will do more harm to their persecutors than would have been done by a whole army.

"BONAPARTE."

The two unfortunates were Napper Tandy and Blackell, Irish rebels. Hamburg preferred giving them up to being bombarded. Napper Tandy did not die illustrious, but rather obscurely at Bordeaux, to which city he retired after two years' confinement in Dublin. The above incident may account for the atrocious way in which Hamburg was afterwards treated. It had not to wait long for a first instalment of vengeance.

DECREE.

"PARIS, *30th December*, 1799.

"The consuls of the Republic considering that for the last six months the body of Pius VI. has been in depot at Valence without having been accorded the honours of sepulture;

"That if this old man, respectable by his misfortunes, was for a moment the enemy of France, this was owing to his having been seduced by the advice of men who surrounded his old age;

"That it is in accordance with the dignity of the French nation, and in conformity with the sensitiveness of the national character, to accord marks of consideration to a man who has occupied one of the first places on earth.

"Art. I. The Minister of the Interior will give orders for the body of Pius VI. to be buried with the honours usual to persons of his rank.

"Art. II. There shall be raised over the place of sepulture a simple monument recording the dignity with which he was clothed.

"BONAPARTE."

The body of this ill-used pontiff was sent to Rome at the time of the Concordat as a kind off-set to the demands of the Papal Court, which claimed the restoration not only of the Italian Legations, but of Avignon and Carpentras.

CHAPTER VI.

THE YEAR 1800.

THE year 1800 saw Bonaparte master of the destinies of France. The Directory had disappeared. The sensual Barras, who had contributed to his rise, had signed his resignation on the condition of being allowed to keep possession of his ill-gotten gains. Sieyes, the most avaricious of abbés and lawgivers, allowed himself to be bribed. When the Directory was overthrown, it had 600,000 francs in its coffers. Sieyes was presented with 350,000 and the property of Crone.

> "Sieyes à Bonaparte avait promis un trône,
> Sous ses débris brillants voulant l'ensevelir:
> Bonaparte à Sieyes a fait présent de Crone
> Pour le payer et l'avilir,"

wrote the poet Lebrun.

France, at the commencement of 1800, was at war with England, Austria, Russia, the Porte, and America. British fleets blockaded the French and Spanish ports, intercepting all communication with Malta and Egypt. The Turks and the English were preparing to attack Kléber. Kray commanded an Austrian army in Germany, and Melas had over 100,000 men under his orders in Italy. The army of the Rhine, under Moreau, was composed of 110,000 men; but in Italy, Massena had but an

army 25,000 strong, and consequently Melas had little difficulty in forcing that brilliant General to seek refuge in Genoa. There was a third French army being secretly formed at Dijon.

In addition to suspecting the sincerity of Bonaparte when holding out an olive branch, the English Government had other motives for rejecting the overtures made at this moment by the First Consul. Pitt doubted the stability of the new Government in France; he considered a Royalist restoration imminent, and he was intent on capturing the French expeditionary force in Egypt, and on forcing Malta to capitulate. Austria, too, was unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, and to renounce the territories she had reconquered during the absence of Bonaparte.

Under the impulsion of Bonaparte an immense change was operated in every branch of the administration. Prefects and sub-prefects were established in all the departments, and supreme authority was thus vested in the central government. By a mixture of force, cunning, and cruelty, the Vendean insurrection was suppressed. Several of the Chouan leaders laid down their arms and accepted the new order of affairs, and the Abbé Bernier, who had been a Royalist firebrand, preaching insurrection, subsided into Bishop of Orleans, and joined the "sacred gendarmery" of the First Consul.

When tranquillity had been restored at home, Bonaparte set out to take the command of his troops in the field. The Czar, irritated against England and Austria, and seized with a sudden admiration for Bonaparte, had withdrawn from the coalition, and joined the maritime confederation destined to resist English tyranny on the ocean. On the 6th May Bonaparte left Paris, and placed himself at the head of the Army of Reserve. Moreau had commenced operations on the 25th April, and in a fortnight had five times defeated Melas, and had driven him back upon Ulm, with the loss of 30,000 men. Another effort,

and he would have reached Vienna. This was not what the First Consul intended. Before Bonaparte left Paris, orders signed by the three consuls were despatched to Moreau, directing him to detach 25,000 men, who were to join the Army of Reserve, and to confine his operations to the right bank of the Danube. These orders were handed to him by Carnot in person. Moreau, who might at once have forced Austria to sue for peace, obeyed. Bonaparte reserved for himself the honour of striking the blow which was to decide the campaign. On the 18th he crossed the Alps. He might have saved Massena by marching to the relief of Genoa. He might have beaten the various corps of Melas in detail, and have reached the beleaguered city in a week, but he had a more theatrical operation in view, and Genoa and its starving garrison were sacrificed. Bonaparte marched on Milan, and he had hardly entered that city when he learned that Massena had been obliged to capitulate.

The battle of Marengo was lost by the Austrians on the 11th June. In the midst of the fight Melas, worn out with fatigue, and sure of success, retired to Alexandria, and despatched couriers in all directions announcing the defeat of the French; but a surprise similar to that which for a moment shook the iron nerves of Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf, awaited Melas. On the 12th August, 1759, Frederick sent four successive couriers to Berlin—"Russians beaten; rejoice with me!" and then, a fifth courier, to have the archives sent to Potsdam. At Marengo a cavalry charge changed the fate of the day, after Melas thought he had obtained a victory. An armistice followed, in virtue of which the Austrians evacuated the whole of north Italy, but still occupied Tuscany and Ancona. Preliminaries of peace were signed, and Bonaparte returned to Paris. On the 14th July, Kléber, after having won the battle of Heliopolis, was assassinated. On the 26th September peace was signed between France and America. In November, hostilities with Austria were

recommenced, and on the 2nd December Moreau won the battle of Hohenlinden. On the 24th of the same month an attempt was made to blow up the First Consul.

We have seen how strained were the relations between the Directory and Bonaparte prior to the 18th Fructidor, when Angereau accomplished the *coup d'état* against the Royalists. In spite of all his professions of Republicanism and devotion to the Constitution of the Year III. the sincerity of the young General was sorely suspected, and not without cause. As soon as he became First Consul he amnestied all the persons proscribed on account of that affair, with the exception of Aubry, and he recalled Carnot and made him War Minister.

On the 4th January, 1800, Bonaparte wrote to Admiral Bruix, who had received the command of a squadron destined to succour the army of Egypt. In this letter the French Admiral was instructed to try and capture Sydney Smith and his ships, for St. Jean d'Acre was a sore subject.

La Vendée was giving great trouble, and on the 5th January Bonaparte wrote to General Hédouville, Commander-in-chief of the army of England, that he was sending him reinforcements to the extent of 17,400 men. La Vendée being sincerely Catholic, the General was to placard everywhere, and to publish in the journals an account of the funeral honours rendered to Pius VI.

"You are invested, my dear General," continued this letter, "with full power; *act as freely as if you were in the middle of Germany.* Let minor interests and personal considerations disappear in presence of the necessity of suppressing the rebellion, and of causing the government to be respected.

"It is useless to have courts martial. The consuls opine that the generals should have all rebels taken in arms summarily executed. . . . No matter what accusations are brought against you the Government will support you; but your military actions will be examined by a man who

is accustomed to severe and energetic measures. . . . The First Consul thinks that in order to give a salutary lesson it will be well to burn down two or three large parishes. Experience has taught him that this is the most humane way of proceeding. Weakness is inhumanity," &c.

Bonaparte had freely practised this system in Italy and Egypt, but experience should have taught him that the "infernal columns" of Thurreau had done less to appease La Vendée than the milder measures adopted by Hoche.

On the 13th January, 1800, Bonaparte wrote four letters to Talleyrand—the first to the effect that he had ordered the reduction of the French army in Batavia by 18,000 men, but that the pay, clothing, and rations of this force were still to be made good by the Dutch Republic. The sum of a million francs was to be paid at once to the French War Minister. The Dutch were to be told that although these 18,000 men had been withdrawn from their territory, they were really employed for Batavia on the Rhine!

In the second letter Talleyrand was asked to state what amount of money it would be possible to obtain from Holland in exchange for Flushing, and whether the French Government could draw on Holland for 40,000,000 francs.

In the third letter Talleyrand was told that it was most essential to procure 4,000,000 francs, which Bonaparte thought might be obtained from Hamburg. "The senate of that town," added Bonaparte, "thinks there is an agreement between us and Prussia to violate its independence. Make the most of this, and say that no matter how coveteous Prussia may be, and no matter what her offers, a reconciliation with the French Government is quite possible. . . . . Six, or even four, millions, would help us to win a campaign."

In the fourth letter Talleyrand was called upon to furnish information with regard to negotiations with Portugal, and to state the pecuniary aid which might be derived from that country. Bonaparte thought it would be possible to

obtain 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 francs for the army of Italy, which would increase his chances of reconquering that country by thirty per cent. The crime of Portugal was not closing her ports to England.

As regards the first letter, the troops which Bonaparte had maintained in Holland were not for the protection of the Dutch but to attack England, and they were withdrawn to reinforce the army in La Vendée! As regards Flushing, that place had certainly been captured by the French several years before, but when peace was restored there had been no question of ceding it to France. Now, on his sole military authority, Bonaparte forced the Batavian Republic to pay ransom.

General Hédouville not having shown himself sufficiently unscrupulous in La Vendée, was superseded by General Brune, who assumed the title of General-in-Chief of the army of the West. In the first instructions addressed to General Brune, he was informed that he had 60,000 men under his orders; that he was to show himself very tolerant towards the priests, but that he was to burn some large villages and farms in the Morbihan. The troops were to want for nothing, and were to be supported by the guilty departments. "It is only by rendering war terrible," added Bonaparte, "that the inhabitants will be induced to shake off their apathy and unite against the brigands. . . . You will inform the chiefs, Châtillon, d'Autichamp, Bourmont, d'Andigné, and Frotté, that if they accept the propositions of the Government their persons and their properties will be respected." These chiefs were also led to believe that Bonaparte intended to play the part of a Monk, and to restore the monarchy.

A soldier of the thirty-second demi-brigade having written to Bonaparte reminding him of his services, his wounds, &c., received the following reply:—

"TO THE GALLANT LÉON,—I have received your letter, my gallant comrade. You are the bravest grenadier in the

army now that the gallant Benezette is dead. You received one of the hundred sabres which I distributed to the army. All the soldiers admitted that you were the model of the regiment. I greatly wish to see you. The War Minister will send you an order.

"I love you as my son. "BONAPARTE."

And the "gallant Léon" was made a sub-lieutenant in the Consular Guard.

TO GENERAL MASSENA.

"PARIS, *5th February*, 1800.

"I have seen with great pleasure the firm way in which you have established order in your army. We expect at each moment 1,500,000 francs drawn from Holland, which will be forwarded to you. La Vendée is three parts pacified. Brune has beaten Georges. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Massena probably disgorged. It is a significant fact that none of the officers or men who revolted against his authority were brought to trial.

TO LUCIEN BONAPARTE, *Minister of the Interior.*

"PARIS, *7th February*, 1800.

"I beg you to give the necessary orders for placing in the grand gallery of the Tuileries the statues of Demosthenes, Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Scipio, Brutus, Cicero, Cato, Cæsar, Gustavus-Adolphus, Turenne, the great Condé, Duguay-Trouin, Marlborough, Prince Eugène, Marshal Saxe, Washington, Frederick the Great, Mirabeau, Dugommier, Dampierre, Marceau, and Joubert.

"By order of the First Consul."

Few persons now remember Dugommier, who was hardly of a calibre to figure among the sages and heroes above-

named. He was a gallant old soldier, who had been Bonaparte's commanding officer at the siege of Toulon.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"PARIS, *7th February*, 1800.

"Washington is dead. This great man fought against tyranny. He consolidated the liberty of his country. His memory will always be dear to the French people, and especially to French soldiers, who, like American soldiers, fight for liberty and equality.

"Consequently the First Consul directs that for the next ten days all the standards and pennons of the Republic shall be veiled in crape."

Funeral honours were also paid to Washington when the new standards were distributed to the army, and a pompous eulogy of the American patriot and soldier was pronounced by M. de Fontannes, who drew a parallel between him and General Bonaparte. The day that the *Moniteur* published this discourse in honour of the founder of American democracy, Bonaparte took up his residence at the Tuileries.

We have seen how Nelson gave Bonaparte credit for wishing to be the Washington of France. Lanfrey, in his *History of Napoleon* (vol. ii. p. 8), says that he more than once pretended to assume a part which he had no intention of playing, and that he had neither a sufficient amount of disinterestedness nor generosity to tread boldly in the footsteps of one who is called by Byron "the first, the last, the best;—the Cincinnatus of the West."

Matters now began to look brighter in the west; the back-bone of the rebellion was evidently broken. Abbé Bernier, one of the most active and influential members of the clerical party, had made his submission, and had gone to Paris to offer his services to the Government. Some chiefs were negotiating: the rebels who still held out were

to be utterly destroyed. A reward of 1,000 louis was offered to any one who would kill or capture Frotté.

On the 13th February Bonaparte wrote:—

"Frotté has asked leave to submit; my reply is that he must surrender at discretion. Brune is vigorously pursuing Georges. Operations will be carried on actively against Bourmont and Frotté. . . . Every day we shoot five or six *chouans* here (in Paris)." And on the 14th: "Let Frotté surrender at discretion, and *he will be able to count on the generosity of the Government*, which wishes to forget the past and to rally all Frenchmen." On the 18th Bonaparte wrote: "That wretch Frotté has preferred allowing himself to be captured to laying down his arms." And: "Frotté has been captured with all his staff, and shot. Bourmont has laid down his arms, and is coming to Paris. Georges also is going to surrender. The Russians are returning home. The Porte is beginning to understand its true interests. The financial condition of the Republic is improving." And on the 23rd February: "Bourmont is at Paris, and is going to be married. He desires to reside here, or elsewhere, in tranquillity, now he has entered into the good graces of the Government."

During the whole of this affair Bonaparte acted with his accustomed duplicity. He first of all led the Royalists to believe that he intended to restore the monarchy. As for Count Louis de Frotté, the most brilliant of the *chouan* leaders, he was not captured, but surrendered to General Guidal, after having received a safe conduct from that officer, and being encouraged by the assurances that he could reckon on the generosity of the Government. His assassination was due to personal vengeance. Frotté had held Bonaparte up to ridicule for growing pale and fainting in the arms of his grenadiers on the 18th Brumaire, and Frotté's brother had taken part in the defence of St. Jean d'Acre. These two facts alone were quite sufficient to seal his doom.

On the 28th February, Bonaparte informed Admiral

Mazzeredo, the Spanish ambassador, that he had given orders for the Brest squadron to drive off the English squadron, it being shameful to permit from twenty-one to twenty-five vessels to blockade from thirty-five to forty.

The expedition to Ireland was to be renounced, and the combined fleets were to operate in the Mediterranean, and to relieve Malta.

In a letter to General Hédouville, dated 2nd March, Bonaparte says—"Try and have Charles and Chandelier arrested. They are two wretches guilty of all sorts of crimes." We shall see that an attempt was afterwards made to prove that Charles and the unfortunate Duc d'Enghien were one and the same person.

TO CITIZEN LUCIEN BONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *March 3rd*, 1800.

"Citizen Minister, I beg you will ask the citizens Lebrun and Rouget de l'Isle to write a '*Hymne aux Combats*' to a well known air like the *Marseillaise* or the *Chant du Départ*. This hymn must contain things applicable to all the circumstances of war, and propound the idea that peace follows in the train of victory. "BONAPARTE."

It is impossible to read the following letter without feelings of astonishment:—

TO GENERAL BRUNE.

"PARIS, *5th March*, 1800.

"I have received your despatch of the 11th Ventose. . . . I saw Georges this morning; he appeared to me a sturdy Breton who might be turned to some account in the interest of the country. . . . . I have also seen Chatillon, who dined with me to-day. I was very well satisfied with him. . . . . Shall we have peace? Shall we have war? However this may be, the Emperor treats us with the greatest politeness. Forms are observed by him as much as they were neglected by *our friend* Georges.

"BONAPARTE."

The gallant Frotté had not been in his grave a month; a month before Georges and his comrades were wretches of the deepest dye, and half a dozen *chouans, per diem*, were being shot in Paris. The smoke was still going up from the smouldering villages in La Vendée and Brittany. It may be remarked that Bonaparte was much struck with the military ability exhibited by the Vendean chiefs, and was anxious to turn their talents to account. The resistance they offered to his arms had at once irritated him as a despot, and excited his admiration as a soldier.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *7th March*, 1800.

"I beg you will hand this note to the Spanish ambassador" (a note of all the more interest seeing what afterwards happened to Villeneuve and Gravina at Trafalgar). "Admiral Briux has just informed the Government that he is blockaded in the port of Brest by twenty-one English vessels; that he has seventeen well-manned and well-armed French vessels, and that Admiral Gravina has fifteen Spanish vessels ready to weigh anchor; that the First Consul finds it humiliating and shameful for the two nations to be blockaded by an inferior force; that he has ordered Briux by telegraph to put to sea, and to give chase to the English fleet; that the intention of his Catholic Majesty in leaving fifteen vessels at Brest was not to render them useless to the advantage and glory of the two nations; that consequently the First Consul desires orders may be given to Admiral Gravina by telegraph to second the *sortie* of the French fleet.

"BONAPARTE."

The despatch was forwarded, but the allied squadrons remained inert or never got beyond Toulon. It was found impossible to relieve Malta, or to succour the army in Egypt.

On the 8th March there appeared a violent proclamation

directed against England, who had "betrayed the secret of her horrible policy;" who wished "to rend France, destroy her marine and her ports, efface her from Europe, or reduce her to the rank of a second-rate power." England was accused of sowing discord among all the nations of the Continent in order to prey on their commerce. But neither gold nor promises, nor intrigues, would rivet the people of Europe to her views. Young citizens were called upon to offer their services to the state in the sacred interests of humanity, and were assured that the First Consul would go and conquer peace at the head of those warriors he had so often led to victory.

It was generally sufficient to excite the country against England in order to obtain recruits. English perfidy and English tyranny excused all kinds of arbitrary measures at home and abroad. At the present moment, however, the irritation of Bonaparte arose from a feeling of personal insecurity, and the assurance that plots were being hatched against his life by French refugees in London.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *10th March*, 1800.

"You will inform citizen Otto, the French Commissioner in London, that the Government will consent to the exchange of General Don for Napper Tandy and his companions; and that if this does not suit the English Government, the French Government will exchange Generals Hermann, Don, and Mack against Generals Colli, Perignon, and Grouchy. Citizen Otto, in a separate note, will point out how unworthy it is of the English nation to threaten to render the captivity of French prisoners in England harder. Can the nation of Newton and of Locke forget itself to such a point? Prisoners are not answerable for the conduct of their Government. The French will never retaliate. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN FORFAIT.

"PARIS, *12th March*, 1800.

"How comes it, Citizen Minister, that the English prisoners receive a pound of beef, while the ration of the French soldier is only half a pound?

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was certainly not very merciful towards his prisoners if we take for example his treatment of the Pope at Savona, of the "black cardinals," and of the Queen of Etruria, and other captives who had incurred his displeasure. If he did not retaliate it is nevertheless a fact that the British Government, after the date of the above letter, complained of the treatment of English prisoners. Of the generals offered in exchange, Mack was an Austrian who had been captured by Championnet in Naples, and who was destined to be captured by Bonaparte at Ulm. Hermann, it is true, was a Russian who had fallen into the hands of the French at Bergen when acting with the Duke of York in the Low Countries. The French Generals Perignon and Grouchy, who afterwards became marshals, were made prisoners by Suwarrow at Novi, and the application for their exchange should have been addressed to St. Petersburg. Colli was Bonaparte's old antagonist in Piedmont, who had taken service in France.

TO GENERAL MOREAU, *Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine.*

"PARIS, *16th March*, 1800.

"General Dessolles will acquaint you with my views concerning the campaign which is about to open. He will inform you that no one more than myself takes an interest in your personal glory and welfare. The English have disembarked! What do they want? I am to-day a sort of lay figure, having lost liberty and happiness. Grandeur is all very well, as far as recollection and the imagination are concerned. I envy you your happy lot; you are going

to accomplish great things with your gallant men. I would willingly exchange my consular purple for the epaulette of a brigadier under your orders.

"I hope circumstances will permit me to come and give you a helping hand. At all events my confidence in you, in every respect, is unlimited.

"BONAPARTE."

What afterwards happened leads one to doubt the sincerity of this letter; but it is possible that Moreau by his vanity and his indiscretion may have brought his trials on his own head, and that Bonaparte was really anxious to secure his services in the field. It is certain, however, that Bonaparte was on the point of himself assuming the command of the army of the Rhine at this juncture, and that he was irritated with Moreau for not accepting his plans.

TO CITIZEN LUCIEN BONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *5th April*, 1800.

"The Consuls of the Republic desire you will inform the managers of the different theatres that no dramatic work ought to be accepted without your permission. The head of the department of Public Instruction should be held responsible for the performance of all pieces contrary to good morals and social order. . . . The First Consul would see with pleasure the suppression of the couplet alluding to him in the *Tableau des Sabines*."

On the 7th April, 1880, a note addressed by the order of the First Consul to the French ambassador at Vienna contained the following phrase:—"The overtures made by the French Government to the Cabinet of St. James's and the different answers of that Cabinet have been published and discussed in the British Parliament. They prove that France desires a general peace and that England does not."

In one of the discussions thus alluded to Mr. Dundas, who doubted the sincerity of these overtures, said, "The

French Republic has waged war with Spain, Naples, Sardinia, Tuscany, Genoa, Geneva, Venice, Modena, Austria, Russia, Egypt, England, and even with that creature of its own creation—the Cisalpine Republic." And other speakers in Lords and Commons spoke in a similar strain!

TO GENERAL KLÉBER.

"PARIS, *19th April*, 1800.

"When you receive this letter the gallant army of the East will have re-entered the ports of the Republic after having left in Egypt immortal traces of its glorious works. . . . As for you, Citizen General, who have so well justified the choice of the First Consul, when, on his departure from Egypt, he confided to you the command of the army, you will not doubt the satisfaction he experiences at the prospect of your return, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

It is difficult to reconcile this letter with what Bonaparte wrote on the 15th May, and with what he said at St. Helena—"If Kléber had evacuated Egypt I should have had him tried by court martial. All the documents had already been laid before the Council of State." In a long note on the Egyptian campaign, which is to be found in the tenth volume of *Napoleon's Military Correspondence*, we find the treaty of El Arish thus spoken of: "When armies believe it possible to get out of difficulties by means of a convention, all is lost. Just as well confide the honour and defence of the country to old women armed with distaffs."

We shall refer to this "note" again when we come to the final capitulation of Abdallah Menou.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *23rd April*, 1800.

"There will be no harm in sending some fowling-pieces of various models to the King of Spain.

"You can inform M. Musquiry, who spoke to me of the desire of his Catholic Majesty to obtain an increase of

territory in Italy for the Duke of Parma, that when negotiations are opened the French Government will be delighted to convince Europe of its esteem for the house of Spain ; that in this matter the private feelings I entertained for the Duke of Parma in Italy accord with the policy of the Republic. . . . Tell Alquier that I wish him to buy me eight saddle horses of Spanish breed. Ask him why, since Portugal refuses to make peace, *Spain does not seize on several provinces of that kingdom*, which might be exchanged at the general peace for Minorca.

"Mention to M. Urquijo how unfortunate it will be should Malta fall into the hands of our enemies, and ask him to send five or six vessels there laden with corn, brandy, meat, and flour. "BONAPARTE."

The Court of Spain hastened to offer the horses as a gift, and endeavoured, but in vain, to elude the demand concerning Portugal. Nowhere had the execution of Louis XVI. created greater indignation than in Spain. War between the two countries had ensued, and the general of the Franciscans offered to march upon France at the head of 10,000 monks. In 1795, however, the French having obtained possession of the Ebro provinces, Spain treated for peace at Bâle, and agreed among other things to cede to France the Spanish portion of the island of St. Domingo. In the event of war either power was to aid the other with ships and troops, and the King of Spain was to press his son-in-law, the King of Portugal, to close his ports to British vessels. And it was for concluding this treaty, which was a millstone round the neck of the weaker power, that Manuel Godoi, the lover of the queen, was created Prince of the Peace.

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TO GENERAL BERTHIER, AT DIJON.

"PARIS, *27th April*, 1800.

". . . . My plan is not to cross the St. Gothard. I do not consider this operation as possible, supposing the

ordinary rules of prudence to be observed, until Moreau has obtained a great advantage over the enemy. Besides it is possible we may be obliged to hurry to Tortone in order to disengage Massena, who, if he has been beaten, must be shut up in Genoa where he has only a month's rations. . . . The operation of crossing the St. Bernard appears much more in proportion to our present means.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was about to place himself at the head of the Army of Reserve, 60,000 strong, in order to attack Melas, who had conceived the plan of retaking Nice, and of then, in conjunction with a British force assembled at Minorca, capturing Toulon.

TO GENERAL MOREAU.

"PARIS, *5th May*, 1800.

"I was just starting for Geneva when the telegraph brought the news of your victory over the Austrians; glory, three times glory! The position of the army of Italy is critical. Massena is shut up in Genoa. The army of Melas, although weakened, is considerable. I salute you affectionately.

"BONAPARTE."

The victory here alluded to was that of Hochstedt over Kray, which was to be followed up by more brilliant triumphs.

TO GENERAL DESAIX.

"LAUSANNE, *14th May*, 1800.

"MY DEAR DESAIX,—I have just received your letter of the 15th Floreal. . . . I was very uneasy on seeing a month elapse without receiving any news from you; I feared everything from the punic faith. But at last you have arrived — good news for the Republic, but especially for me. . . . Two months ago I received the capitulation, but

made no remark about it because it bore your signature; but how came it that 16,000 or 18,000 Frenchmen were afraid of 30,000 Turks? Six thousand men would have been sufficient to have beaten them, captured their guns and camels, &c.

"On arriving in France I found the Republic lost; La Vendée at the gates of Paris; the fleet blocked up in Brest, &c. It was necessary to find money and to refit the squadron; thirty-six ships with stores and 6,000 troops were just going to sail for Egypt when the news came of the capitulation.

"But don't let us talk of this any more. Come and join me as quickly as possible. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Desaix had been allowed to leave Egypt on the signing of the treaty of El Arish, which the British Government refused to ratify.

There are several facts to be borne in mind while reading the following letter. Bonaparte would never have sailed for Egypt had Talleyrand not promised to go to Constantinople in order to secure the neutrality of the Porte. As soon as Bonaparte left France Tallyrand determined to remain in Paris. Before leaving Egypt Bonaparte earnestly appealed for reinforcements, and attempted to open negotiations with the Porte. Before sailing for France he promised to despatch reinforcements, and his frequent efforts to keep his word show that he considered them absolutely necessary.

TO THE CONSULS OF THE REPUBLIC.

"LAUSANNE, 15*th May*, 1800.

"I have just received your letter of the 22nd Floreal. I beg you will have the inclosed printed at length in the official journal, for it is well for the public to know the situation of the army of Egypt when I left it, and how

exaggerated are the reports made by the agents of England. You can add that during two years campaigning in Egypt and Syria, in spite of the great battles fought, the army was not diminished one-fifth.

"There was no plague in Egypt this year; it is therefore infamous that the country should have been abandoned. The only thing which could have justified an evacuation was the fact of the army having been greatly weakened by the plague. By letters I have received it appears that Desaix, Menou, Davoust, and several other generals of courage were opposed to the evacuation of Egypt. All that I say here is intended for you. I think it will be necessary for you to say that the Brest squadron, with stores of all kinds and 6,000 men, was about to sail when the news of the capitulation arrived. It will be well to remark that when the 18th Brumaire happened the war in the West had intercepted our communications with Brest to such an extent that Admiral Briux took more than a month to go from Paris to that port. I wish Citizen Lebrun to draw up this article himself, which should show Europe that had I remained in Egypt that country would have belonged to France.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte made several misrepresentations. The army of the Grand Vizier was not 30,000 but 80,000 strong, and English and Russian armies were approaching. The capitulation not having been ratified Bonaparte was afforded an opportunity of despatching his men and supplies from Brest, an opportunity of which he did not avail himself.

Numerous despatches were written at this moment on the subject of the passage of the Alps; sledges were ordered for the artillery, and all the details of the march were carefully sketched out and clearly explained by Bonaparte to his lieutenants.

TO THE CONSULS OF THE REPUBLIC.

"MARTIGNY, 18*th May*, 1800.

"I have received your letter of the 24th Floreal, and thank you for your expressions concerning the death of my brother's wife" (the first wife of Lucien). "She had been suffering for a long time.

"We are struggling against ice, snow, storms, and avalanches. The St. Bernard, astonished to see so many persons crossing it, throws obstacles in our way. However, the third of our field artillery has already passed. . . . I am in the midst of the Valais, at the foot of the great Alps. In three days all the army will have crossed. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

And the next day from the same place—

"The weather has become fine, which was necessary for the rapid passage of our artillery by the St. Bernard. . . . The Minister of the Interior" (Lucien) "has informed me of his desire to come and join me, wishing for distraction since the death of his wife; but in addition to the fact that in two or three days operations here will be carried on with great activity, I think it necessary under all circumstances that he should remain in Paris.

"I read in the papers that I wrote a letter to my mother in which I said I should be at Milan in a month. That is at variance with my character. Very often I do not say what I know, but I never say what will happen. I beg you will insert a jocular kind of note to this effect in the *Moniteur*. BONAPARTE."

And on the 24th May from Aosta—

"You will find inclosed the bulletin of the army, which you can publish in the official journal.

"Events are about to succeed each other with rapidity, and I hope to be back in Paris in a fortnight. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was at Milan before a month (on the 3rd June), and not back in Paris until the 3rd July!

TO CITIZEN JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"AOSTA, *24th May*, 1800.

"I beg you will give my wife 30,000 francs. The greatest obstacles have been overcome. We are masters of Ivrée and of the citadel, where we found ten guns. We fell down here like lightning; the enemy, who in no way expected us, can hardly believe his eyes. Great events are about to occur. I hope the results will redound to the honour and glory of the Republic.

"BONAPARTE."

Bernadotte replaced General Brune in command of the army of the West, for the *chouans* still required to be watched. Writing to Bernadotte on the 24th May, and giving him an account of his operations, Bonaparte added—

"A thousand amiable things to Madame Bernadotte if she is at Brest."

On the 27th May Bonaparte announced to his two colleagues that everything was going on well, and, "*before the end of Prairial I shall be back in Paris*"—did not get back till the 14th Messidor.

On the 28th May Bonaparte addressed a long report to the Government showing that he was displaying his wonted activity and genius at the opening of this campaign. He began by saying that the perspective of marching along a road several leagues in length and eighteen inches broad, hewn in perpendicular rocks, with mountains of snow threatening to fall on their heads, &c., did not frighten his soldiers. Next came a brief allusion to the combat of Aosta, then accounts of the affairs of Chatillon, the capture of Ivrée, the combat of Chinsella, the taking of Susa and la Brunetta on the 2nd Prairial, and that of Verceil on the 7th. The following passage is from

the report on the affair of Chatillon. The success of the campaign depended on the capture of Bard in the mountain passes.

"The same day the advanced guard arrived at half a league from the château of Bard. The enemy occupied the heights which commanded the village. . . . I ordered the village to be stormed. The sappers and grenadiers lowered the draw-bridge, broke in the gates, and the town was carried. Three companies of grenadiers established themselves there and the citadel was blockaded. On the 5th I ordered General Loison to close round the place and to break all the barriers in order to facilitate the passage of our artillery. The grenadiers of the 28th behaved with the greatest intrepidity. The enemy considered Bard, constructed to close the entry to Piedmont, where two mountains form the valley of Aosta, as an insurmountable obstacle. A road was hewn in the mountain of Albard. Where the slope was too steep steps were cut, and where the path became still more narrow, with a precipice on either side, walls were erected; where the rocks were separated by deep fissures bridges were thrown, and the French cavalry marched over a mountain which had been for centuries considered inaccessible for infantry. By an extraordinary effort, which again astonished the enemy, while 1,500 men were working incessantly at the Albard road, the soldiers carried on their backs two pieces of four to the defile of the Con, and after having clambered with them over fearful rocks for thirty hours, got them into position on the heights which commanded the citadel. . . ."

And it was only after the accomplishment of this difficult feat that Bard was taken and the road to Italy cleared.

To CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"NOVARA, *1st June*, 1800.

"You will find inclosed your letter to M. de Thugut, with a few alterations. As it closes the negotiations which

my letter opened with the Emperor of Austria, I have thought it right to give it the form of a peroration.

"Should the news from Egypt be confirmed it will be important to have some one in Russia. The Ottoman Empire has not long to exist, and if Paul I. turns his eyes in that direction our interests will become common. Beurnonville is right in saying that we shall never do anything with Prussia.

"BONAPARTE."

In a bulletin to the army dated Milan, 3rd June, the First Consul relates that twenty-four hours before he entered that city the inhabitants did not know the French were in Italy; also that a letter from the Prince de Hohenzollern, who commanded the army blockading Genoa, had been intercepted. By this letter it appeared that the Prince and Melas were entirely ignorant of the movements of the French, and thought the army of reserve had been sent back to Paris. It is true that Bonaparte had taken every possible means to conceal his movements.

TO CITIZEN FOUCHÉ.

"MILAN, *4th June*, 1800.

"I am assured that Georges has returned from England. It is indispensable to have him arrested, as well as the father of Frotté who is in the Orne. Spare no means to take these men dead or alive.

"BONAPARTE."

We have seen how Talleyrand received permission to send some fowling-pieces to the King of Spain. In a letter, dated the 4th June, Bonaparte wrote:—

"I do not see any inconvenience in your sending some dresses to the Queen of Spain: you may lay out a thousand louis in this affair. However, the necessary decorum must be observed, so that there may be nothing ridiculous in the matter.

"BONAPARTE."

It is not said whether Talleyrand himself selected the dresses, and with due decorum.

In the bulletin of the Army of Italy of the 4th June, Bonaparte announced that "a *Te Deum* has been chanted in the cathedral of Milan in honour of the happy delivery of Italy from heretics and infidels. . . The Austrians have the talent to make enemies of all parties; *their rapacity is unexampled;* they have carried off the very trees. *Even* the priests are discontented at seeing English heretics and infidel Mussulmans profane the territory of holy Italy.[1] *Add to this none of them have been paid for;* the Austrians have taken everything. The university of Pavia has been destroyed, and the instruction of the young men in the various colleges confided to the Jesuits." And, in fact, a fearful picture was drawn of the atrocities perpetrated by the enemy.

On the 5th June, Bonaparte pronounced a long allocution to the clergy of Milan. "I have assembled you," he said, "in order to have the pleasure of acquainting you with the sentiments which animate me towards the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion." He was persuaded that that religion could alone secure happiness and good government. He would punish, even with death, any one who should insult that religion or their sacred persons. He had disapproved of all that had been done against religion when he was a simple agent of the government. "Modern philosophers," he added, "have tried to persuade France that the Catholic religion is the implacable enemy of every democratic system and of every republican government. Hence the cruel persecution of religion and its ministers by the French Republic. . Experience has undeceived the French, and has convinced them that the Catholic religion is better adapted than any other to divers forms of government, and is particularly favourable to republican institutions. I myself am a philosopher, and I know that,

[1] A few days later Napoleon made Abdallah Menou a governor in holy Italy.

in no matter what society, no man is considered just and virtuous who does not know whence he came and whither he is going. Simple reason cannot guide you in this matter; without religion one walks continually in darkness; and the Catholic religion alone gives to man certain and infallible information concerning his origin and his latter end. It is the same with morality," &c.

Then followed a description of the restoration of the Catholic religion in France, and—

"The manner in which the defunct Pope has been treated should inspire you with confidence: Pius VI. owed his misfortunes partly to those persons in whom he reposed confidence, and partly to the cruel policy of the Directory. When I am able to negotiate with the present Pope I hope I shall be able to remove all the obstacles in the way of a complete reconciliation between France and the head of the Church." And Bonaparte concluded by saying he had ordered that at least a portion of their property should be restored to the clergy.

This manifestation, which was the prelude of the Concordat, occurred just a year after Bonaparte had boasted in Egypt that he had destroyed the Pope, overthrown the cross, and wrested Malta from the enemies of the crescent.

On the 8th June, Bonaparte, in a letter to Berthier, says he is busy examining the contents of an intercepted letter-bag, and that "one despatch from Melas to the Aulic Council, dated Turin, 5th June, announces that Massena has capitulated."

Bonaparte in his memoirs blamed Massena. "Genoa," he said, "opened its gates when it was saved." When Cæsar besieged Alise he blockaded the place so closely that it could receive no news from without. When the date upon which the relieving army had promised to arrive was passed, the Gauls assembled under Vercingetorix: Critognat rose and said: 'You have no news of the army of succour; but does not Cæsar give you news every day? Do

you think he would work so hard at his entrenchments if he did not fear the approach of the army assembled by the Gauls? Persevere and you will be saved;' and, in fact, the Gauls arrived 200,000 strong and attacked Cæsar.

"The proposition made by General Ott and Lord Keith to allow the garrison to leave the city with its arms, was it not as good as an explanatory letter from Bonaparte announcing his approach?"

There is abundant proof to show that Genoa was reduced to the very last extremity when Massena capitulated. General Ott was not so anxious for a capitulation because he expected the place to be relieved, but because he wished to rejoin Melas; and Bonaparte had no intention of marching on Genoa until he had disposed of the Austrian army on the Po.

TO THE CONSULS OF THE REPUBLIC.

"TORRE DEI GAROFFOLI, 15*th June*, 1800.

"The news from the army is good. I shall be soon in Paris. I cannot say any more. I am plunged in the deepest grief by the death of the man I loved and esteemed the most.

"BONAPARTE."

Marengo had been fought and won. In his bulletin Bonaparte said that "the enemy passed the Bormida by three bridges and surprised our advanced guard. . Four times during the battle we had to retreat, and four times we advanced. . . More than sixty guns on each side, at different hours, were taken and re-taken. There were twelve charges of cavalry with varied success. At 3 P.M. 10,000 cavalry out-flanked our right in the superb plain of San Giuliano. . . The Grenadiers of the Guard stood like a granite redoubt, and could not be broken. After an obstinate resistance the enemy's left was checked, and our right carried the village of Castel Ceriolo at the bayonet. The enemy's cavalry then rapidly attacked our left, which was repulsed. The enemy

advanced along the whole line; the roads were covered with fugitives and wounded. The battle appeared lost."

At this critical moment Desaix arrived and changed the fortunes of the day. Desaix himself fell mortally wounded, and, according to the bulletin, had only time to exclaim, before breathing his last: "Go and tell the First Consul that I die with the regret of not having done sufficient for posterity."

It is curious that Bonaparte should have acquired more fame by Marengo than by any other battle he ever fought, and yet there is abundant proof to show that Marengo represented a series of military blunders. The extract we have given from Bonaparte's bulletin shows that the battle was won by dint of hard fighting, and not by generalship. The first fault committed by Bonaparte was venturing into "the superb plain of St. Giuliano" in presence of the Austrian cavalry, which was far superior to his own in numbers. The fact is that he was ignorant of the position of the enemy; he thought Melas had fallen back in the direction of Genoa, and he was not aware that the Austrians had thrown any bridges over the Bormida. Had it been otherwise, he would have displayed greater caution, and would never have detached the division of Desaix which had been ordered to Novi.

That Bonaparte was himself ill-satisfied with Marengo is shown by the care with which he doctored his own accounts of the battle, and the orders he gave for the destruction of all the original reports. Up to a certain point the campaign had been splendidly conceived and ably executed; but at Marengo itself Bonaparte had failed to place all the chances on his side, according to his own maxim, before going into action. The fact is that Marengo was a surprise, and that but for the rapid return of Desaix, the French army would have met with an overwhelming disaster. As for Desaix he fell shot through the heart, and his body was recovered only at a late hour in the evening. The words put into his mouth by Bonaparte were never uttered.

Jomini says: "Of all the battles gained by Napoleon there is not one of which he should have been less proud than that of Marengo. Unexpectedly attacked, as at Eylau, he was saved at both battles by a corps detached several leagues from the field of battle. . . A few battalions and 600 horse decided the fate of the Continent and changed the face of Europe."

The glory of Marengo certainly belonged to Desaix and to Kellermann whose cavalry decided the fate of the day.

The long letter addressed to the Emperor of Germany contained such paragraphs as these:—

"English cunning has marred the effect which my overtures should have produced in the mind of your Majesty. The war has taken place, and thousands of Frenchmen and Austrians have lost their lives. . I implore your Majesty to put an end to the misfortunes of the Continent. It is from the battle-field of Marengo, in the midst of suffering and surrounded by 1,500 corpses, that I supplicate your Majesty to listen to the cry of humanity. What reasons can be urged in favour of continuing hostilities? The interests of religion and of the Church? Why not declare war against the English, the Muscovites, the Prussians? They are further from the Church than we are."

England was accused of having instigated the war and of having seized on the commerce of the world and the empire of the seas; and the Emperor was informed that he had a large commerce and was interested in the liberty of the ocean. Austria, however, was not demoralised by Marengo. She had lost Italy before, and it was not in Italy that her fate could be decided, but in Germany. Austria accepted further subsidies from England, who was intent on securing the evacuation of Egypt, and pledged herself not to conclude a separate peace before February, 1801. An ambassador was sent to Paris to gain time, Comte de St. Julien by name.

In his bulletin of the 17th June, Bonaparte condescended to treat his army to such childish inventions as these:—

"The generals, officers, and soldiers of the Austrian

army are indignant with Thugut. They render justice to the good intentions of their Emperor, and appear convinced that we are fighting against each other to raise the price of English sugar and coffee. An Austrian general of great merit said at head-quarters: 'We shall have no repose or happiness until, by unanimous consent, we banish from the continent that venal and commercial nation which speculates on our blood for the extension of its commerce.' . . At Paris as at Vienna; in France as in Germany; in the French as in the Austrian army, every one desires peace. The intrigues and guineas of the English, the influence of the Empress, and the disgrace of the Archduke Charles alone prevent it." . .

In a second bulletin, dated the 18th June, Bonaparte said: "General Desaix brought from Egypt two little negroes given to him by the King of Darfour. These children wore mourning for their deceased master, after the manner of their country, and in an exceedingly touching way.

"The body of the general has been conveyed by post to Milan, where it will be embalmed. It is not yet decided whether the First Consul will send it to Paris or place it in a monument which is to be erected on the St. Bernard to commemorate the passage of the French army.

"General Desaix was the first European who carried the glory of the French arms beyond the Cataracts. He was adored by the inhabitants of Upper Egypt, who called him 'The Just Sultan.' He was greatly irritated by the bad treatment he received from Admiral Keith."

Then followed all kinds of accusation against the British admiral, "who invented so many ridiculous things while drinking punch off Genoa," and had forged a letter full of absurdities which the First Consul was supposed to have written to Massena.

Massena, by the way, has left a very different story of how he was treated by Lord Keith when he was forced to capitulate at Genoa. Bonaparte, when he arrived from

Egypt, refused to observe quarantine, and one of the principal grievances of Desaix was that he was obliged to submit to that precautionary measure before landing at Leghorn. *Inde iræ.*

TO CITIZEN CARNOT.

"MILAN, *20th June*, 1800.

"Write to General Kléber that when the news of the capitulation arrived, the Brest squadron was about to sail with 4,000 troops and war stores; that we have only just learned the capitulation has been broken, and that he has reconquered Egypt; that it will be impossible to send him reinforcements during the months of Messidor, Thermidor, and Fructidor, but that during the winter, if peace be not concluded, he shall receive powerful succour; that in all probability peace will be signed in six months.

"Send this despatch in cipher and make General Kléber understand that it is necessary for the interest and safety of his army, the glory of the French arms, and the prosperity of our commerce, *that he should keep Egypt.*

"BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"MILAN, *21st June*, 1800.

"I beg you will invite two of the best virtuosos to go to Paris in order to sing a duo in Italian at the fête of the 14th July. You will give them all that is necessary for their voyage, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

Another letter, dated the same day and addressed to brother Lucien, gives the names of the two virtuosos—Madame Billington and Madame Grassini. Bonaparte was so much smitten with the charms of the latter that he gave her a place in Josephine's household. Madame Billington (whose memoirs were translated by no less a person

than M. Thiers) had at that epoch married a French army contractor.

BULLETIN TO THE ARMY.

"MILAN, *23rd June*, 1800.

"A Turkish ambassador coming from Leghorn on board an English frigate has arrived at Genoa. He has informed Admiral Keith of the deplorable condition of the Grand Vizier who has been driven back across the desert.

"Generals Willot and Danican, paid by England, have despatched eight or ten agents to the south of France to *organise assassination and to pillage diligences;* these two wretches have fallen into the greatest contempt.

"General Pichegru was also destined to command a force which was to be landed in France. It is to be regretted that a man who rendered such great services to the Republic should have tarnished his glory by meddling in wretched intrigues. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte now determined to hand over the command of the army of Italy to Massena, and to return to Paris.

ORDER OF THE DAY TO THE ARMY.

"MILAN, *24th June*, 1800.[1]

"On leaving the army the First Consul congratulates it on the victories it has gained. The battle of Marengo will

[1] On the same day we find Nelson, who had evidently not heard of Marengo, writing an encouraging letter to the Pope thus worded:—

"LEGHORN, *24th June*, 1800.

"HOLY FATHER,—As an individual who, from his public situation, has had an opportunity of using his utmost exertions to assist in bringing about the happy event of your Holiness's return to Rome, I presume to offer my most sincere congratulations on this occasion; and with my most fervent wishes and prayers that your residence may be blessed with health and every comfort this world can afford.

"Your Holiness will, I am sure, forgive my mentioning a circumstance which, although at the time it was spoken of appeared impossible,

be celebrated in history. Thirteen fortified places, containing 1,000 heavy guns have fallen into our power, and we find ourself in a position to conclude a solid peace, or, should the enemy be blindly opposed to this, to commence a brilliant and decisive campaign for the repose of Europe and the glory of the nation, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

Negotiations for peace were opened at Luneville.

TO LUCIEN BONAPARTE.

"LYONS, *28th June*, 1800.

"I have received your letter, Citizen Minister. I shall arrive unexpectedly in Paris. It is not my intention to have triumphal arches or any kind of ceremony. I have too good an opinion of myself to care about such nonsense. I know no other triumph than public satisfaction.

"BONAPARTE."

On the 4th July Bonaparte put two questions to Talleyrand—

"1st. Are there any means of communicating with Constantinople?

"2nd. In the event of means existing why not employ them for making known the situation of Europe to the Grand Signor, and convincing him that he should labour under no apprehensions as regards Egypt, which will be

and yet the fact did happen. Father MacCormack, a friar, coming to the house of Sir W. Hamilton in September, 1798, to congratulate me on the battle of the Nile, said:—'What you have done is great, but you will do a greater thing—you will take Rome with your ships.' And although I do not believe that the father had the gift of prophecy, yet his guess was so extraordinary, and has turned out so exactly, that I could not in my conscience avoid telling your Holiness of it. I will now only trespass on your time by assuring your Holiness with what respect I am your most obedient servant,

"BRONTE NELSON OF THE NILE."

restored to him as soon as the Porte resumes its ancient relations with Frahce?"

It was only on the 20th June that Carnot had been told to order Kléber to hold Egypt, and had been promised reinforcements.

TO GENERAL MOREAU.

"PARIS, 11*th July*, 1800

"I congratulate you, General, on the brilliant results of your campaign. We are expecting every moment an answer from Vienna, and if it does not arrive in a few days we shall recommence hostilities in Italy.

"Although we are threatened with several invasions and although the English squadrons swarm along our coasts, a strong force of Batavians and Frenchmen are going to take up a position on the other side of Mayence.

"The organisation of the second army of reserve is actively progressing.

"BONAPARTE."

And in fact since Moreau opened the campaign he had gained five victories, and had inflicted a loss of 30,000 men upon Kray, who was driven back upon Ulm.

TO CITIZEN LUCIEN BONAPARTE.

"PARIS, 15*th July*, 1800.

"The Minister of the Interior will inform the members who wrote to him—

"1st. That there is no French Academy.

"2nd. That they ought to know that it was dissolved by a law of the Republic.

"3rd. That the Institute [of which Bonaparte was a member] represents the ex-Academies of Science, French, and *belles-lettres*.

"4th. That I do not, however, see any inconvenience in citizens uniting in order to form a literary society on the condition of its not assuming a name capable of recalling

abolished institutions, that its rules contain nothing contrary to the Republic, and that it resembles the Lyceum of Arts and other establishments of the kind.

"5th. As for the proposal that I should become a member of this society, you will cause it to be understood that I have more important affairs to attend to.

"6th. And if this society continues to take the ridiculous title of French Academy and to observe is ancient statutes, it is the intention of the Government to suppress it at once.[1]

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE CONSERVATIVE SENATE.

"PARIS, *18th July*, 1800.

"Senators, for the last two years the garrison of Malta has resisted the greatest privations. In taking the oath to the social pact the garrison of Malta promised to hold out to the last ounce of bread, and to bury themselves under

[1] The Academy, which was quite contrary to all ideas of equality was naturally abolished during the Revolution. The Academicians were regarded as belonging to a patrician order of letters. When calmer times came, the Institute, which had also been abolished, was re-established, and the French Academy became the second class of that body. In the year VIII. (1800) an attempt was made to re-establish the Academy on its ancient footing, and the idea was encouraged by Lucien Bonaparte, then Minister of the Interior. There were still fifteen Academicians alive, and it was proposed to complete the forty by electing Napoleon Bonaparte, his brother Lucien, the third Consul Lebrun, Talleyrand, &c., &c. Bonaparte, however, on his return from Marengo, disapproved of the scheme. It became repugnant to his feelings to be called *cher collègue* by the members of the Institute, and he had no desire to be elected a member of the Academy. Bernardin de St. Pierre, the author of *Paul and Virginia*, in his reception speech (1807), spoke of Napoleon as having, among other glorious actions, re-established the French Academy; and in 1810, on a similar occasion, Esmenard said that the Academy "buried under the ruins of the throne" had been "re-animated by the voice of a hero." As a matter of fact, however, the Academy was re-established only in 1816 by a Royal Ordinance.

the ruins of that impregnable fortress. The First Consul believes that he cannot give a greater proof of his satisfaction of the French people and of the interest which he takes in the gallant garrison of Malta than by proposing General Vaubois, who commands it, as a member of the Conservative Senate, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

It was only in September that Malta, which neither French nor Spanish fleets could relieve, was obliged to capitulate. Out of ten tartans[1] despatched to Malta in rapid succession, one only had run the blockade.

DECISION.

"PARIS, *20th July*, 1800.

"The Minister of War is authorised to pay the Citoyenne Beaufranchet, the mother of General Desaix, killed at Marengo, the sum of 3,000 francs by way of indemnity."

Madame Beaufranchet was also to have a pension of £120 a year, which was not much for the mother of a hero who had saved the country and whose bones were deposited on the summit of the Alps, especially if one takes into account the enormous sums lavished by Bonaparte on his lieutenants.

TO GENERAL MASSENA.

"PARIS, *22nd July*, 1800.

"I have received your different letters. . . . The contribution of Milan, that which you have imposed on Lucca, the extraordinary contribution which you have levied in Piedmont, and the million in gold which I sent you by Savary, ought to enable you to meet the wants of your army.

"It is necessary to make some examples. Plunder and burn the first village which revolts in Piedmont

"BONAPARTE."

[1] Boats with one mast and a lateen sail.

Bonaparte himself when campaigning in Italy managed to pay his troops and to send money home, but in 1800 Italy was well-nigh exhausted.

TO GENERAL SUCHET.

"PARIS, *24th July*, 1800.

"I received your letter of the 23rd Messidor. I am very glad that General Massena has given you the command of his centre. He has made the most favourable report of your operations. . . I see by your letter that you are zealous to acquire glory; this is the way to accomplish great things. Count upon my esteem and friendship.

"BONAPARTE."

Suchet was one of the most gallant and humane lieutenants of Bonaparte. We shall find him hereafter commanding in Spain, where his conduct formed a strong contrast to that of the other French marshals.

TO CITIZEN CARNOT.

"PARIS, *24th July*, 1800.

"The Consuls have been informed that the citizen Foissac-Latour has returned from Austria and dishonours the French uniform by wearing it. Let him know that he ceased to belong to the service of the Republic the day he basely surrendered the citadel of Mantua. . . . He is more accountable to public opinion than to the courts for his conduct at Mantua. The intention of the Government is to hear nothing more of that shameful siege which will long be a stain on our arms.

"BONAPARTE."

This gives one an idea of the authority usurped by Bonaparte at this epoch. Mantua had been surrendered in July, 1799, and Bernadotte, who was then War Minister, had ordered a court martial. The First Consul, however, without awaiting the decision of the court, took upon

himself to pronounce the condemnation of the general. Whatever may have been the merits of the case it is certain that Foissac-Latour obtained better terms from Souwarrow than Wurmser did from Bonaparte, and that he was allowed to march out with the honours of war. Bonaparte, however, held that good terms were equivalent to a bad defence.

"In order to be honourable," he wrote, "a capitulation ought to stipulate hard conditions for the garrison. There is always a presumption unfavourable to a garrison which marches out of a place over a bridge of gold."[1]

One of General Foissac-Latour's sons afterwards served on Napoleon's staff.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *28th July*, 1800.

"It is my intention to send General Berthier to Spain without any apparent diplomatic title. He will take a letter from you to M. Urquijo, and from me to the King of Spain."

Berthier was to negotiate the cession of Tuscany to the Duke of Parma (the son-in-law of the King of Spain) in exchange for Louisiana and twelve vessels of war.

2nd. He was to excite Spain to declare war against Portugal (the King of Portugal was the King of Spain's son-in-law).

3rd. He was to visit the naval ports of Spain, and report on her maritime resources.

4th. He was to send corn and other stores to Malta from Barcelona, or any other Spanish ports along the Mediterranean.

The feeble King of Spain, who had become irretrievably entangled in the meshes of the crafty First Consul was destined to pay dearly for that French alliance, which was productive of nothing but a series of cruel humiliations

[1] Vol. x. p. 204, *Military Correspondence of Napoleon I.*

and ultimate imprisonment and ruin. He was only at the commencement of his tribulations.

Great deference was shown at this period to the Czar and the King of Prussia. All the Russian prisoners in France received new uniforms and were sent home, and the Prussian monarch was assured that he enjoyed the peculiar esteem of the First Consul. Negotiations, however were dragging on very slowly with Austria.

At this critical moment an important change was made in the army.

TO GENERAL BRUNE.

"PARIS, 13*th August*, 1800.

"The War Minister will forward you an order to assume the command of the army of Italy, which is the principal army of the Republic in a military, and more especially in a political, point of view. This is the greatest mark of confidence I can accord you. . . . You will find the army in a tolerable condition, but embezzlement is at its height, and the individuals who are the most closely in contact with Massena are the most seriously compromised. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL MASSENA.

"PARIS, 13*th August*, 1800.

"The First Consul has just appointed General Brune to the command of the army of Italy. You will consequently hand him over the command of that army should he have reached your head-quarters on the receipt of this. In the contrary case hand over the command to one of your lieutenant-generals.

"It is the intention of the First Consul to employ your talents and your zeal in a different manner equally useful to the Republic, and he authorises you to come straight to Paris if you desire to do so, or to return home for a while in order to enjoy some necessary repose. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

It is suspected that Massena on this occasion was removed from his command on political grounds and not for larceny. His rapacity had not prevented Napoleon from employing his great talents before, and did not prevent him from having recourse to them again.

TO GENERAL MOREAU.

"PARIS, *24th August*, 1800.

"I have already informed you that you have been called by the esteem and confidence of the Consuls to the chief command of the forces in Germany. The modesty with which you refused to accept this important command has proved an additional motive for conferring it upon you. They anticipate that the delays of the Court of Vienna may render it necessary at any moment for the Government to break the armistice."

And in order to insure unity of action and energy the army corps commanded by Angereau was placed under the orders of General Moreau, who this time was allowed complete liberty of action.

It does not appear that Moreau refused the command; he merely objected, and this much to the annoyance of Bonaparte, to the plan of campaign drawn out for his guidance in Paris.

DECREE.

"PARIS, *6th September*, 1800.

"Art. 1st. A monument shall be raised to the memory of Generals Desaix and Kléber, who fell the same day, at the same hour, the one in Europe after the battle of Marengo, by which the arms of the Republic reconquered Italy, the other in Africa, after the battle of Heliopolis, which reconquered Egypt for the French.

"Art. 2nd. This monument shall be raised in the centre of the Place des Victoires" [where a statue to Louis XIV. stood, and still stands!] "The first stone will be laid by the First Consul on the 1st Vendémiaire. An orator shall pronounce the funeral oration of these two illustrious citizens.

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE COMTE DE PROVENCE.

"PARIS, *7th September*, 1800.

"SIR,—I have received your letter, and I thank you for the flattering things it contains.

"You ought not to desire your return to France; you would be obliged to march over 100,000 dead bodies.

"Sacrifice your interests to the repose and happiness of France. . . . (words omitted). History will not forget this.

"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family. . . . . (more words omitted). I shall contribute with pleasure to the pleasantness and tranquillity of your retreat.

"BONAPARTE."

It is much doubted whether Louis XVIII. ever wrote the letter referred to above. What is certain, however, is that Bonaparte wrote to Louis XVIII. when he was at Warsaw in 1803, offering him £80,000 a year if he would renounce his claims to the French throne, and that this proposition was refused with great dignity in a letter which was published in the *Morning Chronicle* on the 25th July, 1803.

TO LUCIEN BONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *10th September*, 1800.

"I beg you will send me a list of our ten best painters, our ten best sculptors, our ten best composers, our ten best singers, besides those on the stage, our ten best architects, as well as the names of artists in any other line who are deserving of public attention.

"BONAPARTE."

In spite of a certain desire to patronise art, the Napoleonic was certainly not an Augustan age.

TO CITIZEN CARNOT.

"PARIS, 13*th September*, 1800.

"Telegraph to Strasburg for a courier to take this despatch to General Moreau.

"The courier who was expected has returned from Vienna, bringing no positive answer. This proves that the Court of Vienna wishes to gain the winter. Inform the Austrian General that you are obliged to recommence hostilities because his Imperial Majesty has refused to ratify the preliminaries of peace signed by the Comte de St. Julien. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

And hostilities once more commenced. On the one hand Austria refused to negotiate without England, and on the other it is doubtful if Bonaparte really desired peace. Count Miot de Melito says he merely wished to persuade the French people that he was anxious to bring the war to a close. The maritime truce alluded to below was out of the question, as in accepting it England would have lost all the trouble and expense of blockading Malta and Egypt.

TO THE PUBLIC FUNCTIONARIES.

"PARIS, 23*rd September*, 1800.

"The preliminaries of peace were signed at Paris on the 9th Thermidor (28th July), between Citizen Talleyrand and the Count St. Julien, and ratified twenty-four hours afterwards by the Consuls. Citizen Duroc was charged to carry them to Vienna. The intrigues of the faction opposed to peace have induced the Emperor to refuse his ratification. This refusal was caused by a note from the King of England, who demanded that his envoys should be admitted to the Congress of Luneville conjointly with the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor. The Government therefore felt obliged to break the armistice so as not to

lose the rest of the autumn in vain discussions. . . . The Government have also informed the King of England that there will be no inconvenience to admit his envoys if he will consent to a maritime truce. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN LUCIEN BONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *24th September*, 1800.

"I beg you will give an employment at Marseilles to Citizen Garnier, a friend of General Dugommier, who for a long time has taken care of his daughter.

"BONAPARTE."

Dugommier was the gallant old officer under whose orders Bonaparte distinguished himself at Toulon, and he seems always to have remembered him with the most lively affection.

DECISION.

"PARIS, *26th September*, 1800.

"Art. 1st. Citizen Chappe must not, no matter under what pretext, transmit any order by telegraph which has not been signed by the First Consul. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Poor Chappe was not allowed the use of his own invention. A few years later, disgusted with life, he threw himself down a well and perished.

Having received an address on escaping an attempt made on his life, Bonaparte replied :—

"*16th October*, 1800.

"I thank the Tribunate for this proof of affection. I did not run any real danger. The seven or eight wretches, in spite of their desire, were unable to commit the crimes they meditated. . . I enter into details because it is necessary for France to know that the life of her first magistrate is never in danger.

"BONAPARTE."

The attempt referred to above is known as the Ceracchi-Arena conspiracy, in which Demerville, Topino-Lebrun, the Duke of Bonnelli, and the Prince of Santa-Croce were implicated. The plan of the conspirators was to assassinate the First Consul as he left the opera. It was afterwards suspected that this affair was got up by the police, and the fact is that the accused were never tried: not that this prevented several of them from being executed.

THE FIRST CONSUL TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, *on Presenting General Moreau with a Pair of Pistols Ornamented with Diamonds.*

"PARIS, 21*st October*, 1800.

"Have the names of some of the battles gained by General Moreau engraved on them; do not put all, for there would not be sufficient place for the diamonds. Although General Moreau does not attach a great price to them, the design of the artist ought not be too much interfered with.

"BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL LACNÉE.

"PARIS, 22*nd October*, 1800.

"General Brune writes to me that General Dupont has entered Tuscany and has beaten the insurgents who had invaded the Cisalpine. . . . . General Brune must disarm Tuscany as quickly as possible and make some severe examples.

"Inform the General also that the Government desire he will not touch the pictures and statues in the gallery of Florence. For the moment *he will merely send the statue of Venus de Medecis* by way of Lucca and Genoa. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

And a few days later General Brune was instructed to hold Tuscany; to despatch a vessel from Leghorn to

Alexandria with newspapers, muskets, and sabres for General Menou; to live in harmony with the Pope; to levy a war contribution of 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 francs on Leghorn in order to pay a month's arrears to the army, &c. And in the event of the Tuscans resenting these exactions and exhibiting a spark of patriotism, they were to be treated like brigands. They had done nothing to deserve these arbitrary measures, but Leghorn was a port much frequented by English ships, and Tuscany was required to enable Bonaparte to pay the King of Spain for Louisiana!

TO GENERAL MENOU.

"PARIS, 24*th October*, 1800.

"Rear-Admiral Ganteaume will hand you this letter. Peace has been concluded with America, Algeria, and Tunis. The separate negotiations with Austria, Russia, and England lead us to hope in the conclusion of a general peace. . . . The news received from Constantinople acquaints us with the disorganisation of the army of the Grand Vizier and the dissolution with which that vast empire is menaced. . . . All those officers and men who have returned to France in an honourable manner have received proofs of public esteem and gratitude. I pity those who have not sufficient virtue to second you in your noble resolution, and whose courage has failed them. They will find in France that contempt due to men who, no matter what their services, are deficient in the necessary amount of constancy.

"BONAPARTE."

It is almost needless to remark that this letter never reached its destination. The number of officers who, in imitation of Bonaparte, considered their presence necessary in France, and who found means to return home, was highly displeasing to the First Consul.

TO GENERAL BRUNE.

"PARIS, *4th November*, 1800.

"Citizen Dupard ought to have reached you with 2,500,000f. in gold. . . . I hope you have made a severe example of the inhabitants of Arezzo. When a town allows itself to be taken by assault it must pay the penalty. You must show no pity in such cases. If any revolts take place in remote corners, make severe examples. *All foreign people, but especially Italians*, require to be dealt with severely from time to time. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

On the 5th November, 1800, Bonaparte caused a note to be sent to General Toussaint Louverture, congratulating him on the end of the civil war in St. Domingo, and saying :—

"The happiness of the inhabitants of this beautiful colony interests the Government as much as even that of the inhabitants of France. . . . The First Consul will shortly write to you himself. He has already bestowed attention on an organisation for St. Domingo, which will convince you of the peculiar esteem in which he holds the gallant blacks. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE KING OF SPAIN.

"PARIS, *8th November*, 1800.

"Seeing the present state of Europe, I have thought fit to charge the Citizen Lucien Bonaparte, my brother, to represent to your Majesty the utility of the conquest of Portugal. Malta and Mahon have fallen into the power of our enemies, and even Louisiana is threatened.

"The greatest damage we could inflict upon English commerce would be to seize upon Portugal. Besides, this conquest would compensate Spain for her losses and expenses, and would illustrate the reign of your Majesty. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Then followed the usual invectives against England, and a promise of French troops should the king deem their assistance necessary.

TO REAR-ADMIRAL GANTEAUME.

"PARIS, *22nd November*, 1800.

"I send you the Citizen Jerome Bonaparte to serve his apprenticeship in the marine. You know he will have to be kept in order so as to make up for lost time. See that he performs all the duties of the career he has embraced with exactitude. . . . I need not say how impatient I am to learn that you have succeeded in your new mission. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

DECISION.

"PARIS, *4th December*, 1800.

"The Minister will treat this affair with Fulton, Volney, and others."

This was the abrupt note dictated by Bonaparte on the subject of the steamship *Nautilus*, which had been submitted by Fulton to the French Minister of Marine.

On the 14th December Bonaparte issued confidential instructions with the view of sending aid to Egypt. Citizen Miot de Melito, who has left us an account of his expedition, was to be dropped at Ajaccio. He was to proclaim Corsica *hors la Constitution;* to establish an extraordinary tribunal, and to judge and execute all the robbers, assassins, and persons guilty of provoking rebellion, detained in prison. He was to burn down the houses of the principal rebels, like the Quenzas and the Cesares, and to re-establish tranquillity in the island. The real destination of the naval force, which was commanded by Admiral Ganteaume, was kept secret. It was supposed to be bound for St. Domingo, and it was only when the squadron had passed the Straits of Gibraltar that a number of

coloured officers, who were under the impression they were going to serve under Toussaint Louverture discovered they had been misled.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *16th December*, 1800.

"I think that a letter written to the Grand Seignor, and sent through the channel of the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, might be useful under present circumstances. The situation of Europe should be laid before him in a suitable manner, and the fact that the English alone are opposed to the evacuation of Egypt; that we shall evacuate it only on the conclusion of a general peace, and that it is in the interest of the Porte to resume its ancient relations with France.

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN CHAPTAL.

"PARIS, *22nd December*, 1800.

"I wish you to send a company of French comedians to Egypt; the state of prosperity in which the army of the East finds itself, and its idleness in the great city of Cairo, render this matter, which at first sight may appear trivial, necessary, even from a political point of view. A sufficient number of artists might be found at Marseilles and Toulon. . . . I should not regret expending 40,000 francs in this affair. . . . "

"BONAPARTE."

On the same day Talleyrand was ordered to see that every vessel which tried to reach Egypt carried 1,000 muskets, 10,000 cannon balls, 250 pairs of pistols, 250 sabres, and medical stores.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *24th December*, 1800.

"I beg you will inform Citizen Belleville that according to all accounts received from England he showed too much

indulgence towards the neutral vessels in Leghorn, so that the English managed to save over 500,000*l.* which ought to belong to the Republic.

"BONAPARTE."

No letters are published for the 4th and 5th Nivose, a fact which may be attributed to the attempt made to blow up the First Consul on the 3rd, as he was on the way to the theatre to see one of his favourite actresses perform. On the 7th Nivose Bonaparte called for a report on this affair, the number of people wounded, and the amount of damage done. Thanks to the dexterity of his coachman, Cæsar, Bonaparte's carriage cleared the "infernal machine," and the First Consul and his party escaped unhurt.

The consequence of this attempt fell upon the innocent and the guilty alike. Ceracchi, Arena, Demerville, and Topino-Lebrun were at once condemned to death and executed.

A Cabinet Council was held on the 11th Nivose, at which a report by the Prefect of Police, Dubois, was read, enumerating the various attempts on the life of the First Consul. In addition to the Ceracchi-Arena affair and that in the Rue St. Nicaise, a man called Chevalier had formed a plan for blowing up Bonaparte. He and his accomplices were arrested on the 5th November, 1800. A plot was then formed to introduce several assassins into the Grenadiers of the Guard; but this conspiracy was discovered and frustrated. A French Brutus then appeared in the shape of one Metgen, who was to stab the tyrant at the Théâtre Français during the performance of *Britannicus*. The First Consul did not go to the play on the evening in question, and the attempt was adjourned. Gombault-Lachaise then invented a machine with which the First Consul was to have been slaughtered during the funeral ceremony in honour of Desaix and Kléber, but the decorations were in the way. A machine containing "Greek fire" was about to be tried, when it fell into the hands of

the police. All these and other attempts were laid to the charge of a company of tyrannicides.

Bonaparte determined to visit the attempt of the 3rd Nivose on the Jacobins, although soon made aware by Fouché that the guilty parties were Royalists. He selected 133 names from "his dictionary," the names of Jacobins who had opposed him on the 18th Brumaire; and a few days later most of these innocent victims were transported to Cayenne, from which place only two lived to return. It is related that the list was so carelessly made out, that it included not only people quite inoffensive, but several persons in the employment of the Government, such as Baudray, who had been acting as a judge at Guadaloupe for five years; and Pâris, who had been dead for six months when the explosion in the Rue St. Nicaise took place.

Before the end of Nivose the real authors of the crime of the 3rd were arrested. They were Carbon, a Vendean who had served under Bourmont, Timoléon, who had been chief of Bourmont's staff; and St. Régeant, a *Chouan*.

The attempt to blow up the First Consul resulted therefore in the execution of Ceracchi, Arena, Demerville, and Topino-Lebrun; of Chevalier and four of his accomplices; of Carbon and St. Regeant (Timoléon made his escape), and the transportation of 130 Jacobins.

On the 7th Nivose Bonaparte called for a report on this affair, from which it appeared that ten persons had been killed on the spot, or had died of their wounds, and that forty-six houses had been damaged. It was decided that the damaged houses should be pulled down in order to carry out improvements, which was turning the crime to some advantage.

CHAPTER VII.

THE YEAR 1801.

THE principal events of 1801 were—

The signature of the treaty of Luneville between France and Austria, by which the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics was guaranteed. Austria lost Tuscany, which was ceded to the son of the Duke of Parma.

The reconstruction of the League of Neutres under the auspices of Russia and Prussia.

The victory of Nelson in the Baltic.

The assassination of Paul I.

The dissolution of the League of Neutres.

England makes proposals of peace.

The coronation of the Emperor Alexander. Peace concluded between Russia and England.

Preliminaries of peace with France signed on the 21st October. England consented to restore the Cape of Good Hope, Guiana, Tobago, Martinique, St. Lucia, and Pondicherry, and to evacuate Minorca and Elba. Malta was to be given back to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, and Egypt to the Sultan. The preliminaries also stipulated the integrity of Portugal; the evacuation of the Papal and Neapolitan States by the French troops. General Lauriston, who brought these conditions to England was

received with every demonstration of delight; the horses were taken out of his carriage and he was drawn by the people to Whitehall.

By this treaty England gave up all her conquests with the exception of Ceylon, which had been taken from the Dutch, and Trinidad, which had been taken from Spain.

France sacrificed nothing but two islands belonging to her allies, and agreed to evacuate the Papal States. If she consented to withdraw her troops from Naples, that was owing to pressure on the part of Russia, which Power protested strongly against French interference, not only in the south of Italy, but in Piedmont, Switzerland, Bavaria, and Portugal.

In July the Concordat between France and Rome was signed, but owing to certain difficulties respecting the nomination of bishops it was not promulgated for more than a year.

In 1801 the King of Spain, who had been forced to make war on his son-in-law, the King of Portugal, signed the treaty of Badajoz.

Tuscany was erected into the kingdom of Etruria, and in exchange France received Louisiana from Spain.

A great many efforts were made by France to reinforce her army in Egypt, but they all failed, thanks to the vigilance of the British navy. An English force under Abercromby landed at Aboukir, and beat General Menou in March. In April the French, after the defeat of Canope, capitulated at Cairo and Alexandria, and in September they evacuated Egypt.

The Emperor Paul and Bonaparte had agreed to invade India. A force of 35,000 French soldiers under the command of Massena was to march to Ulm, thence to descend the Danube to the Black Sea, and to be transported on board a Russian fleet to Taganrog, to make its way to the Volga, and to be conveyed in boats to Astrakan, where the French were to be joined by 35,000 Russians and 50,000 Cossacks; this force was to cross the Caspian to Astrabad

and to push on for Candahar by way of Herat. It was calculated that Massena would be able to reach the Indus in 130 days. With the death of Paul, and the succession of Alexander, who, as a French writer remarked, referring to the coronation ceremonies, walked preceded by the assassins of his grandfather, followed by those of his father, and surrounded by his own, the scheme was abandoned.

Several camps were formed along the coast of the Channel with the view of invading England.

ORDER.

"PARIS, *4th January*, 1801.

"Art. 1st. The Minister of Marine will have Citizen Tallien placed under arrest for having left Egypt without a passport after having fomented troubles there.

"Art. 2nd. Citizen Gilot, apothecary, will be sent back to Egypt to be brought before a court-martial of the Army of the East on the charge of having left the army without leave.

"BONAPARTE."

In a letter of the 7th January, addressed to Talleyrand, Bonaparte wrote :—"Since the English appear desirous of attacking Egypt, the Republic must deprive them of the only ally which remains to them on the Continent," meaning Portugal.

TO GENERAL MOREAU.

"PARIS, *9th January*, 1801.

"I have received your letter, and thank you for what you say on the subject of the extraordinary event of the 3rd Nivose. I need not tell you with what interest I have followed your splendid and skilful manœuvres; you have again surpassed yourself during this campaign. These wretched Austrians are very obstinate; they counted upon the snow and ice; they were not yet acquainted with you.

"I salute you affectionately,

"BONAPARTE."

There was a good deal of rejoicing over the victory of Hohenlinden, which brought Austria to her knees, and almost completed the isolation of England on the Continent. Salutes were fired in honour of this important event, especially at Calais, with the view of announcing the defeat of our last ally of any importance; but the admiration expressed by the First Consul was hardly sincere.

When at St. Helena, Napoleon, in his "Observations on the Military Events of 1800 in Germany,"[1] said Moreau did not understand his plan of campaign, and that had it been possible for him to leave Paris he would have placed himself at the head of the army of the Rhine; that Moreau might have defeated and have captured half the Austrian army in a fortnight; that Moreau spread out his army and compromised it; that he remained inactive after the battle of Egen, and by his faal indecision rendered the blood shed there useless. "Moreau," wrote Napoleon, "three times in forty days repeated the same demonstrations without attacking; he only succeeded in rendering his enemy bolder, and in giving him an opportunity of beating his divisions separately. . . . During this campaign the French army, which was the more numerous, was always inferior in number on the field of battle. This is what happens to irresolute generals, who act without principles and without plans. This feeling your way, this *mezzo termine*, is fatal in war." Napoleon terminated a long criticism on the operations which terminated with the battle of Hohenlinden by saying—"No doubt the battle of Hohenlinden was very glorious for General Moreau and for the French army. It was one of the most decisive of the war, but it cannot be attributed to any manœuvre, to any combination, or to any military genius." Not a word is said of the manner in which Moreau's summer operations were hampered; nor is he accorded the slightest praise for his "skilful and splendid manœuvres" in December.

[1] *Napoleon's Military Correspondence*, vol. x., chapters viii. and ix.

On the same day, in a message to the legislative body, Bonaparte referred at some length to the situation in Egypt. He said El Arish had fallen into the hands of the Grand Vizier, thanks to the intrigues of the English and the discouragement of the French army. Kléber, he said falsely, had men and supplies sufficient to enable him to resist the forces with which he was menaced. "But our warriors had only one desire, one hope, that of returning to save their country. Kléber yielded to their impatience. The English deceived, menaced, caressed, and finally, by means of artifice, tore from him the capitulation of El Arish. The most courageous and skilful generals were in despair. The virtuous Desaix groaned on signing a treaty of which he disapproved."

Bonaparte then referred in violent language to the refusal of the British Cabinet to ratify the treaty of El Arish (of which he himself so highly disapproved), to which conduct, he said, France owes the finest of her possessions. It was this refusal, in fact, which enabled Bonaparte to assure Selim III. that he desired to evacuate Egypt, but that he was prevented from doing so by England. This was certainly turning a misfortune to the best account.

On the 13th January Bonaparte ordered the Minister of Marine to organise an expedition to the Cape of Good Hope, which was to be undertaken in connection with the Batavian Republic.

INSTRUCTIONS.

"PARIS, *14th January*, 1801.

"General Toussaint Louverture, in the midst of the storms and ravages of the Revolution, has managed, by his prudence and courage, to save France a large and important colony. His virtues have merited the confidence of all parties, and his successes the admiration of Europe."

And by way of reward, Toussaint Louverture was appointed Captain-General of the French part of St.

Domingo. At the same time, however, Citizen Lequoy Montgiraud was nominated Colonial Prefect, with special powers from the First Consul, who protested that he had no intention of interfering with the liberty which had been acquired, but merely of regulating its enjoyment, &c., &c. We shall presently see how the coloured general was rewarded for saving a large and important colony.

On the 15th January Bonaparte wrote to Abdallah Menou that the armies of the Republic were under the walls of Prague, Vienna, and Venice, and that the Army of the East, operating on the Red Sea, in Syria, and in Africa excited the hopes, the curiosity, and the solicitude of all; that the Englishman trembled and shuddered, being abandoned by all Europe and being at war with Russia, which had become one of the best friends of France. Hopes were held out of relief arriving from Ancona and other Italian and Spanish ports, as well as from Brest and Rochefort. The letter concluded: "Let the Army of the East remain worthy of itself; let it not be frightened at phantoms, and it will have rendered the Republic the most signal service."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *27th January*, 1801.

"I beg you will send a courier to Madrid, and inform the ambassador of the Republic (Lucien Bonaparte) that the Emperor of Russia has written me a very friendly letter with his own hand; that already the relations between France and the northern Powers are on the best footing; that the influence of France and Russia will decide Prussia, and that then England will be entirely cut off from the Continent; that France, Spain, and Holland should take advantage of this circumstance to strike a blow, and thus change the aspect of the war. . . . The naval forces of the three powers can undertake—1st, an expedition against Ireland; 2nd, against Brazil and India

(*sic*); 3rd, against Surinam, Trinidad, and the American isles; 4th, several expeditions in the Mediterranean." And the Spanish Government was to be asked to place at the disposal of France the fifteen Spanish ships of war lying in Brest; to send four ships of the line and two frigates, with 2,000 soldiers, to Trinidad; and to arm all the vessels it possessed at Cadiz, Barcelona, and Carthagena, in order to attack Mahon. "The King of Spain," concluded these long and elaborate instructions, "has ten frigates at Carthagena and Barcelona; he would much please us by selling, ceding, or lending us three or four.

"BONAPARTE."

The letter to which Bonaparte referred as having been written to him by Paul III., was in reality a very imperious note drawn up by Count Rostopchine. In this kind of ukase, as Lanfrey calls it, the Count informed the First Consul, not of the wishes, but of the will of the Emperor his master, and the conditions upon which harmony might be restored between the two countries. These conditions were—the restitution of Malta, the restoration of the King of Sardinia, the integrity of the states of the King of Naples, of Bavaria, and of Wurtemburg.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *4th February*, 1801.

"I beg you will send a courier to Madrid to acquaint the ambassador of the Republic with the nomination and departure of General St. Cyr, and to inform him that Admiral Ganteaume sailed from Brest on the 3rd Pluviose with seven ships of the line, two frigates, and 4,000 troops; that his destination is Egypt; that this must be kept secret. . . . The frigates *La Justice* and *L'Égyptienne* left Toulon on the 4th, with 500 men and supplies for Egypt. They must stir themselves at Madrid. . . . Make the

Spaniards feel how shameful it is for the Spanish monarchy that two vessels should blockade seven in the port of Cadiz. If they are no longer the proud Castilians who subdued the New World, at least let them not become the last nation in the world. . . . Reiterate my desire to see Mazarredo recalled; let him be given an honourable place in Spain; but he has neither the genius nor the heart for war. . . . Tell our ambassador to let the Prince of the Peace understand that instead of Tuscany it is Naples itself that we may give to the young Prince of Parma, a kingdom upon which he has incontestable claims. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The idea of giving Naples to the Duke of Parma was never seriously entertained, and was certainly never carried out. Ganteaume, after passing the Straits, was obliged to seek shelter in Toulon; while, after the battle of Algesiras, Saumarez blockaded Linois and the "proud Castilians" in Cadiz with a force, numerically speaking, only half as strong as that of the enemy.

On the 4th February we see by instructions sent to Murat and Berthier that the King of Naples was to be warned that, if he did not evacuate the Papal States and lay an embargo on English vessels, the French army would pay him a visit. On the same day the First Consul complained of the apathy reigning in French ports, and sent instructions to Rear-Admiral Villaret Joyeuse to sally out of Brest with twenty vessels every time the blockading squadron was reduced below eighteen.

On the 6th February Bonaparte issued orders for the reception of the new Russian ambassador, M. de Kalitcheff. Commandant Caffarelli was to go to the frontier to meet him, and was to accompany him to Paris. He was to be escorted by detachments of cavalry and gendarmerie, &c. This system of personal cajolery was frequently resorted to. Bonaparte had soon to complain of the ambassador and his instructions.

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.

"PARIS, 13*th February*, 1801.

"Peace has been signed at Luneville; it was such as the French people desired;"—Rhine boundary; liberty of Cisalpine, Batavian, Helvetic, and Ligurian Republics, &c.

"The King of Spain has been our faithful ally and has suffered in our cause. Neither reverses nor the perfidious insinuations of our enemies could detach him from our interests; he shall receive his recompense. A prince of his blood is about to seat himself on the throne of Tuscany. He will remember that he owes it to the fidelity of Spain and the friendship of France; his roads and his ports will be closed to our enemies and will become the asylum of our commerce and our ships.

"Austria—and this is a pledge of peace—Austria, separated henceforward from France by vast regions, will no longer suffer from that rivalry which for several centuries has caused so many troubles to two great Powers, and so many calamities to Europe."

These assurances were followed by the usual invectives against England, whose ambition was boundless, and who was arming against Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. The Message terminated thus:—

"The French Government will avenge with them an insult common to all nations, without, however, losing sight of this fact, that it should fight only to secure the peace and happiness of the world.

"BONAPARTE."

This last phrase was considered necessary because the French nation was most anxious for tranquillity, and had hailed the signature of the treaty of Luneville with unmistakable symptoms of delight. People, however, were beginning to regard with suspicion this continual fighting in order to secure the blessings of peace. They were

doubtless reminded of the sonnet in Molière's *Misanthrope*, ending—

"Belle Phillis, on désespére,
Alors qu'on espère toujours."

On the 9th January Talleyrand had declared that Tuscany should be restored to the Grand Duke, but on the 24th he informed Austria that she must for ever relinquish the possession of that country. Between those two days the Neutral League, under the auspices of the Czar, had been reconstituted, and Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia went over to the enemy. Austria was obliged to accept any terms, deeming it fortunate that Bonaparte did not carry out a threat to restore to Venice her ancient organisation. How Spain was rewarded for her fidelity will be seen.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 13*th February*, 1801.

"By a secret treaty concluded with Spain, she is to give us six ships of the line. . . . . As for Portugal, independently of the conditions inserted in the treaty, we must insist upon having 15,000,000 or 20,000,000 francs, and above all, the four ships of the line and the frigate which blockaded me at Alexandria. Make the Spanish ambassador feel the importance of this condition: it will be a lesson given to small powers to respect France. . . . . You will also inform the ambassador of the Republic at Madrid that we wish to preserve the portion of the island of Elba which belongs to Tuscany, and that we hope to be able to obtain that portion which belongs to the King of Naples. In settling with Naples we will arrange for the union of Piombino to Tuscany, in which case Spain must give us five out of the ten frigates lying out of commission at Barcelona. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte could never get over those Portuguese vessels which helped the English squadron to maintain the blockade of Alexandria. He constantly reverted to this subject, which evidently influenced the relentless policy he adopted towards the House of Braganza. It will be remarked that Portugal, instead of 8,000,000, was now called upon to pay from 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 francs. It becomes difficult to follow all the territorial combinations in which the First Consul indulged. He was constantly robbing Peter to pay Paul, and finally cheating both parties.

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY OF THE EAST.

"PARIS, *20th February*, 1801.

"Soldiers, the French people triumph in Europe: the Army of the East will never betray its destinies! It will defend that land, the object of so many hopes, the fruit of so many labours.

"You are numerous, you are brave, all covered with wounds, and escaped from the chances of a hundred fights. . . . If bravery is the first quality of the soldier, constancy is the second.

"To-day a European army, which has dishonoured itself in Batavia, at Ferrol, and at Cadiz, has joined the contemptible army of the Grand Vizier. It has been wandering for nine months on the ocean.

"The seas of Egypt have been fatal to our sailors; let them witness the shame and defeat of the English battalions; let all who disembark remain dead or captive; let the desert be the tomb of the Grand Vizier, and let so many lofty deeds attest to future ages the glory of a great people, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

Bad news had been received respecting the discipline of the army of the East, in which partial revolts had occurred, and in which suicides were rife. A little flattery was deemed essential.

On the 25th Bonaparte sent further urgent instructions to Admiral Ganteaume:—"Take advantage of the remainder of the bad season to fulfil your mission, for you must relieve the army of the East at no matter what price. If Admiral Warren has only four ships of the line and a few frigates, do not allow yourself to be blockaded by him."

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"PARIS, *27th February*, 1801.

"I have received your Majesty's letter of the 18th December. . . . .

"The arrogance and insolence of the English exceed all example. I am going to assemble, as your Majesty appears to wish, 300 or 400 gun launches in the ports of Flanders, where I shall concentrate an army. I have given orders for an army to be assembled in Brittany, which can be embarked on board the Brest squadron."

Bonaparte added that the ports of Naples and Sicily were closed to the English, and that a corps of observation at Bordeaux was forcing Portugal to close hers; he expressed the hope that the Emperor Paul would prevent all British commerce with the northern powers.

"The English," he continued, "are attempting to invade Egypt. The interest of all the Mediterranean Powers, and those of the Black Sea, is that Egypt should belong to France. The Suez Canal, which will join the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, is already traced; it is a work which could be easily accomplished in a short time and which would be of incalculable advantage to Russian commerce. If your Majesty is of the same opinion as before with regard to a portion of the commerce of the north passing through the south, you can attach your name to a great undertaking, which will exercise immense influence on the future of the Continent, by bringing pressure to bear on the Porte in the matter of Egypt. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The Czar probably failed to see how Russian commerce was to be benefited by the Suez Canal as long as Constantinople remained in the hands of the Turks.

Aides-de-camp were sent in hot haste to Brest, Rochefort, Toulon, Marseilles, Lorient, &c., touching the great expedition, and General Lacuée was to harangue the naval captains at Toulon on the immense interest which a favourable issue would have on the general peace.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *2nd March*, 1801.

"Send a courier to the Ambassador of the Republic at Madrid, and say that I attach great importance—1st, to see activity displayed at Cadiz, so that the Spaniards may have ten vessels in a month's time, either to intercept the English squadrons in the Straits, or to act with the French and Russian squadrons in the Mediterranean. 2nd, to obtain the six vessels which are owing to us. 3rd, you will authorise him to offer Lucca for the Duke of Parma, in addition to Tuscany; but on the condition of the Spaniards giving us three of the frigates at Barcelona or Carthagena, and six of the line of battle ships at the Havannah. 4th, if the King of Spain wants to avoid occupying one of the provinces of Portugal, he can do so on condition of the King of Portugal handing us the three ships which blockaded me at Alexandria, and that independently of other conditions. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

For the moment ships were absolutely necessary, and ulterior designs were to be temporarily sacrificed in order to procure them. It is not so clear where the requisite officers and crews were to come from.

On the 4th March, 1801, Bonaparte decided that there should be an annual exhibition held in Paris during the five complementary days, or the *sans culottides* of the Republican calendar. The objects to be admitted were

new inventions or manufactured goods very highly finished.

On the 6th March, Bonaparte sent several pages of instructions to General Schuguet who was about to embark for Egypt, and to take with him 200,000 francs in gold. He was to sail on board Admiral Ganteaume's squadron, which had managed to get out of Brest, and through the Straits, but alarmed by the appearance of a large English fleet had taken shelter in Toulon. Bonaparte was greatly incensed at this mishap. He wrote to Ganteaume saying :—

"Since you are not blockaded there can be no doubt that you fell in with Admiral Warren's squadron only. You missed a fine opportunity. You might have been at Alexandria by this time, and Egypt would have been saved. It now remains for you to make up for lost time. Admiral Keith will soon learn that you have entered the Mediterranean. . . . The English have only eighteen vessels of the line in the Mediterranean. Admiral Warren and the officers of the English navy know their duty too well not to blockade Toulon if they had ships at their disposal. . . . With promptitude, boldness, and skilful manœuvres you will able to throw a body of troops into Egypt. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Numerous were the letters and despatches now written on the subject of Egypt. On the 12th March, referring to the armistice between the French and Neapolitan armies, Bonaparte wrote to Talleyrand saying that he was in a hurry to conclude something with Naples in order to be able to send succour to the army of the East, "which is the principal motive of our conduct."

What Bonaparte wished and intended was to establish himself in the Gulf of Taranto, so as to be as near Egypt as possible.

TO CITIZEN FORFAIT.

"PARIS, 13*th March*, 1801.

"Order Brigadier-General Houdetot to start immediately for Rochefort. Give the same order to two or three officers who can fix public attention on the proposed expedition to India. "BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 14*th March*, 1801.

"The ambassador of the Republic at Madrid writes that the King of Spain has decided on giving us the three vessels at Cadiz, and a 50-gun ship, and two frigates which are at Carthagena. . . . "BONAPARTE."

On the 20th March, Bonaparte issued a pompous proclamation in which he announced that a glorious peace had terminated the war on the Continent. He was not then aware that the maritime confederation had experienced two fatal blows, and that the Russian alliance was at an end, owing to the death of Paul, and Nelson's victory in the Baltic.

DECISION.

"PARIS, 20*th March*, 1801.

"The First Consul consents to this arrangement"—an arrangement authorising the Minister of Marine to advance 10,000 francs to Fulton to enable him to terminate his trials with the *Nautilus* at Brest, and to give him certain sums by way of recompense.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 22*nd March*, 1801.

"I beg you will write to our minister at Rome telling him to inform the Pope that I regret to see the reception accorded to Cardinal Maury in his States, and the bad conduct of that prelate. "BONAPARTE."

Maury, of lamp-post fame, the inventor of the appellation *sans culottes*, was at that moment acting as agent for Louis XVIII. at the Papal Court. He soon afterwards became the devoted adherent of Bonaparte, and remained devoted until 1814.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, *25th March*, 1801.

"The English when in dread of an invasion had carriages constructed capable of transporting twenty-two men, which, drawn by four horses, conveyed them rapidly from one point to another.

"Circumstances constantly occur when similar carriages might be employed with advantage. I beg you will have one constructed. If it succeeds, you can have others built. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The interest of this letter lies not only in the fact of Bonaparte borrowing from us, but because when he broke up the camp at Boulogne some years later, he hurried a portion of his army into Germany in waggons, and thus caught Mack at Ulm.

On the 5th April, Bonaparte sent instructions to General Berthier on the subject of Soult's conduct in Naples. He was to maintain strict discipline; he was not to mix himself up with any revolutions; he was to go to mass on all *fête* days, with the military bands; he was to live on good terms with the priests, and the officers of the King of Naples. Efforts were to be made to get hold of the Isle of Elba. Murat was to take measures for occupying Porto-Longone and Porto-Ferrajo, and an expedition was to be directed against the island from Corsica.

Soult was also to be informed that—"We are so pressed for money, *owing to all our armies re-entering the territory of the Republic*, that we cannot send him a *sou*." Tuscany was to provide him with funds. Tuscany which had

recently been exchanged against Louisiana! The fact is that the "Exterior Receipts" which used to figure in the budget as a regular item, and which represented so much plunder, could no longer be counted upon. Hence the penury to which the French treasury was temporarily reduced.

Writing on the 7th April to Talleyrand on the subject of Parma Bonaparte said:—

"Tell M. Azara what measures have been adopted, so that he may acquaint his Cabinet with them. Let him know that we have no desire to take that country. The question is whether we shall unite it to the Italian Republic or to Tuscany. If Spain is in favour of its being united to Tuscany, she must give us Florida!"

Lucien Bonaparte having asked for the portrait of the First Consul, &c., for the Prince of the Peace, received this reply:—

"1st. The French Government gives presents only on the conclusion of treaties of alliance.

"2nd. None of the treaties mentioned enter into this category. The usual presents will be made on peace with Portugal being concluded.

"4th. I shall never send my portrait to a man who keeps his predecessor in a dungeon, and who adopts the customs of the Inquisition. I may make use of him, but I owe him nothing but contempt.

"BONAPARTE."

Urquijo, the minister referred to, had been confined at Pampeluna and then transported to the Philippine Islands for slighting the advances of the Queen of Spain and for attempting to suppress the Inquisition. Such was his hostility to the Church of Rome, relates Lord Holland, that, when *chargé d'affaires* in London, on hearing that General

Bonaparte, by the peace of Tolentino, had spared the Papal Government, he ran like a maniac for more than a mile along the Uxbridge Road and threw himself into a pond, out of which he was dragged in a state of insensibility.

TO CITIZEN JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *12th April*, 1801.

"The Emperor of Russia died on the night of the 24th March of an attack of apoplexy. The grief I experience at the death of a prince I held in such great esteem prevents me from entering into details. His eldest son, who has succeeded him, has received the oath of the army and of the capital.

"BONAPARTE."

It was probably at first repugnant to the feelings of Bonaparte to admit publicly that Paul had been assassinated. When Talleyrand brought him the news he said:—"The English missed me on the 3rd Nivose, but they did not miss me at St. Petersburg." And he afterwards caused it to be inserted in the *Moniteur* that "Paul met his death on the 24th, and on the 31st March the English fleet passed the Sound. History will unveil the connection which may exist between these two events."

The fact is that the alliance with Paul was of the most flimsy description, and would soon have come to a natural termination. Paul was the sworn champion of all legitimate sovereigns, and Bonaparte had determined to seize upon Piedmont and Naples. Paul could not bear to hear even of the revolution of heavenly bodies, and Bonaparte was engaged in revolutionising all Europe.

On this same 12th April the First Consul wrote several other letters and despatches, which show the little effect created on his mind by the tragedy enacted at St. Petersburg.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 12*th April*, 1801.

"I beg you will forward the inclosed note to Citizen Otto. You will let him know that after having presented it he must endeavour to have Dutheil and Georges arrested, or at least sent to America, should objections be raised to handing them over to the French Government.

"BONAPARTE."

INCLOSURE.

"The undersigned has received orders from his Government to present the following note to His Excellency Mr. Addington.

"Europe has resounded with the event of the 3rd Nivose. The attempt on the life of the First Consul, which compromised the innocent population of a portion of the city of Paris, bears a dreadful character, almost without example in modern history.

"The First Consul is far from thinking the late or the present ministry capable of having paid for, or ordered, a crime which would be disavowed by the least civilised hordes.

"However Dutheil and Georges are both in England, in the pay of the British Government; they ordered this and other crimes which have resulted in the death of several unfortunate persons. Two paid journals have publicly written, in London, an apology of this crime, and have expressed the regret that it did not succeed."

After blaming this protection accorded to monsters who dishonoured human nature, Bonaparte went on to say that if a similar crime had been perpetrated in London he would have handed over the guilty parties, and would have acted as Fabricius did towards the King of Epirus.

On the same date (12th April), in spite of the emotion caused by the death of Paul, Bonaparte wrote instructions

to General Berthier concerning the French troops in Piedmont, how they were to be reinforced, where quartered, how fed, and that they were to be paid out of the Sardinian treasury. He entered into minute details on military and civil administration, finance, judicial affairs, and police. He then wrote a long despatch to the War Minister, complaining of certain errors committed in the remount department.

"The commandant of the depot of Versailles," he said, "makes no mention of 1,226 horses inscribed in return No. 4 as having been delivered by the depot of Bec; of 209 horses delivered by the depot of Rouen; of 60 horses delivered by the depot of Vaugirard; of one horse delivered by the depot of Compiègne. . . . The depots of Bec should, according to the returns, have sent 2,235 horses to Milan, 700 to Turin, 884 to Pavia, 200 to the army of Italy," and so on for pages.

On the 13th Bonaparte, who appears to have been often better informed than his Minister of Police, wrote as follows to Fouché:—

"Here are some notes on the fidelity of which you can count: 1st, Georges has sent some money to Maine. 2nd, Chandelier is in London. 3rd, On the 20th Germinal, at 2 P.M., two individuals named Eward were met in the Rue de la Loi; they are brothers, satellites of Georges, and his usual emissaries. The elder is tall and slight; the younger small, with a full dark face. Although they have good sight, they both wear spectacles. The younger has long whiskers.

"A third *sabreur* of Georges was seen in Paris on the 20th Germinal at 7 P.M.; he goes by the name of *Sans Quartier.*

"Guillot, who goes frequently from Paris to Versailles, has recently received 15,000 francs from Hamburg. He is shortly to receive more. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN DUROC.

"PARIS, 24*th April*, 1801.

"You will start on the 6th Floreal (26th April) for St. Petersburg. You will pass through Berlin, where you can remain for two days. You will get presented to the king. You will seize a favourable opportunity to tell him that I have taken advantage of your passage through Berlin to congratulate his Majesty on the occupation of Hanover, and to reiterate my sentiments of esteem, &c. . . On reaching St. Petersburg you will ask permission to deliver the inclosed letter into the hands of the Emperor. You will get presented to the Empress and you will take care to speak to her of my esteem and attachment for her family, and that of the Margrave of Baden. . . Both at Berlin and St. Petersburg you will speak as if we are sure of being able to hold Egypt. You will speak of the King of Sardinia as pitying us greatly because the English fleets revictualled at Cagliari, and because large convoys supplied the army of Abercromby;[1] of the King of Naples as being on excellent terms with him, and decided to support him and to preserve the integrity of his states; of the English expedition to Egypt as a failure, adding, however, that should it succeed it will be a great misfortune for Europe; of Catherine as a princess who foresaw the fall of the Turkish Empire, and who felt that there would be no prosperity for Russian commerce until it passed through the South. . . . You will say that we always considered the interest which Paul I. took in some Italian princes as a personal and not a political interest. . .

"BONAPARTE."

[1] On the 13th, Bonaparte, in a letter to Talleyrand, said—"Tell Mde. Kalitcheff that I feel indignant at the little respect which the King of Sardinia has shown me during these negotiations. Besides, the Duke of Aosta, who is in Sardinia, never ceases sending corn to Malta, aiding the English, and fomenting disturbances in Corsica, &c."

Duroc was naturally to visit all the naval and military establishments and to see all he could see without exciting displeasure and uneasiness.

The paragraph concerning Paul and the Italian princes proves that Bonaparte had little idea of sacrificing his own political views to the caprices of his imperial friend, and that he was entirely ignorant of the views of Alexander.

TO GENERAL MURAT.

"PARIS, 24*th April*, 1801.

"The King of Tuscany has left Madrid and will arrive in Paris in twenty days. He will be at Florence in forty days, and I desire you will remain there in order to instal him. . . . I await with impatience the news of the occupation of the isle of Elba. Gauteaume has returned to Toulon; but he has no doubt sailed again by this. We are impatiently expecting news from Egypt. . . . Let me know if the Abbé Bonaparte of San-Miniato is still alive.

"BONAPARTE."

"P.S. I have authorised your wife (Sister Caroline) to go to Florence."

Two days later Bonaparte received anything but good news from Egypt. He learned the arrival at Toulon of a large number of officers and men who had been made prisoners by the English at the battle of Canope, and had been sent home on parole. He wrote to General Cervoni, who commanded at Marseilles, for information respecting this disaster and the capture of Aboukir.

In spite of promises concerning the integrity of the kingdom of Naples, Murat was ordered to fortify a position in the neighbourhood of Tarentum. "Give Murat to understand," wrote Bonaparte to Berthier on the 11th May, that the Government attaches the greatest importance to having a good port, and erecting fortifications

there, capable of resisting all the efforts of the kingdom of Naples; in a word, a kind of Gibraltar, giving us influence in the Adriatic and in the Mediterranean."

TO ADMIRAL BRUIX.

"PARIS, 16*th May*, 1801.

"I see with pleasure that you are ready to sail. Your arrival in the Mediterranean is all the more important because the English are preparing to reinforce their army at Aboukir. . . . Gauteaume has passed in sight of the isle of Elba, which is in our power, and has continued his voyage so as to throw reinforcements into Egypt. Admiral Villeneuve is at Tarentum arming three Neapolitan frigates, and he writes that forty ships of the line might take shelter in the roads. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Despatch after despatch followed in rapid succession on the subject of this attempt to relieve the army of the East, the First Consul doing all in his power to stimulate the zeal of Bruix, Gauteaume, Villeneuve, Rosily, and Linois. Lannes was sent to Toulon to encourage the crews of the vessels lying in that port; rumours were spread that the English had been beaten in a second battle, and that their sailors were exterminated with fatigue. Accidents, however, were always happening; now the Spanish contingent either could not or would not sail; again, a ship got aground; then an epidemic broke out; and the encounters with the English fleet were far from satisfactory.

TO CITIZEN CHAPTAL.

"PARIS, 22*nd May*, 1801.

"The prefects in the departments, owing to over zeal, have exceeded the honours to be paid to the Count and Countess of Leghorn. I beg you will inform the Prefect of the Seine that none of the civil authorities are to visit these travellers.

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN FOUCHÉ.

"PARIS, *22nd May*, 1801.

"The commissary-general of police at Bordeaux was stupid enough to allow couplets to be sung in honour of the King of Tuscany. As he is called Louis this gave rise to ill-natured allusions. I need hardly recommend you to see that no verses be either read or sung in the theatres or other public places.

"BONAPARTE."

The Count of Leghorn was the Duke of Parma, who had married a daughter of the King of Spain. The First Consul had made him King of Etruria; giving him Tuscany to reign over. Tuscany, as we have seen had been wrested from Austria at Luneville. It was made over to the son-in-law of the King of Spain in exchange for Louisiana, which Bonaparte afterwards sold to the United States.

The First Consul forced the royal couple to visit Paris, to see what reception Bourbon princes would meet with in France. At that time he had some idea of divorcing Josephine and marrying another daughter of Charles IV.

The Count and Countess of Leghorn were nearly frightened out of their lives on entering France; but looking at the above letters, their minds must soon have been set at ease. They expected to be guillotined, and met with nothing but adulation.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *28th May*, 1801.

"You will inform citizen Otto that the insinuations of Lord Hawkesbury, *that influential persons surrounding the First Consul desire peace*, should be regarded as anecdotes. Let him tell this Lord Hawkesbury that the French cabinet is *one;* it no doubt wishes for peace, but an honourable peace, founded on the equilibrium of the seas

and other portions of the world; . . . that neither the French nation nor the First Consul are to be intimidated; that the feelings of Alexander I. and his cabinet are ill known in London if it be supposed he will ever betray the cause of the continental Powers; that the French and Spanish armies have entered Portugal; . . . that as for the few assassins acting in the interior at the instigation of England, they are not very formidable, and that the Government would be wrong to repose much hope in their aid; that it is in the power of the English ministry to terminate negotiations in the course of a few days, and thus prove its love for humanity and the repose of the world. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The English cabinet was better acquainted with the intentions of the cabinet of St. Petersburg than was supposed. Alexander cared little for the grand-mastership of Malta, about which Paul had made a *casus belli*. Bonaparte was soon aware of the great change which had been operated by the haughty demands of the Russian ambassador, who threatened to leave Paris if the First Consul did not fulfil his five promises, which, in addition to the restoration of Malta to the Order, included the re-establishment of the King of Sardinia, and that the integrity of the states of the King of Naples, of Bavaria, and of Wirtemburg should be guaranteed.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 15*th June*, 1801.

"I send you a copy of the magnificent treaty concluded by our ambassador. I beg you will let him know by an extraordinary courier that this treaty is contrary to his instructions, contrary to the treaty with Spain, contrary to the interests of the Republic, and favourable to those of England; that the treaty has not been, and is not capable of being, ratified; that if the three provinces be

not immediately occupied by the French and Spanish troops *I shall not be able to answer for the restitution of the Spanish colonies.*

"That this treaty is an unexpected blow, which the First Consul regards as one of the most signal reverses he has experienced during his magistrature. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

This "magnificent treaty" was the treaty of Badajos, concluded between Spain and Portugal. In obedience to the orders of Bonaparte, Charles IV. had invaded the latter country, which was also menaced by a French force under Generals Leclerc and Gouvion St. Cyr. Under these circumstances the King of Portugal agreed to close his ports to England, to cede Olivenza to Spain, and to pay France 20,000,000 francs. This treaty was signed by Lucien Bonaparte, who was heavily bribed by the two contracting parties. The First Consul blustered in the most formidable manner, and swore that the last hour of the Spanish monarchy had sounded. Lucien was recalled, although the order to occupy the Portuguese provinces never assumed an absolute character.[1]

Fortunately for Spain and Portugal, continental affairs at this juncture wore so gloomy an aspect that Bonaparte was unable to put his threats into execution. His intention was to get possession of Portugal, to enable him to exchange that country against Malta or Egypt with England, and not that a treaty should be concluded.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *17th June*, 1801.

"I beg you will inform M. Azara that it will be necessary for him to write to the Spanish minister at Rome for the Pope to send a legate to Florence in order to compliment the King of Etruria, in conformity with time-

[1] *Vide* Despatch, March 2, 1801.

honoured custom. . . . It will be proper for the Batavian, Helvetic, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics to recognise the new monarch. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

It was only fitting that this puppet, who owed his crown to the eldest son of the Church, should be recognised by the Pontiff and by the lesser republics revolving in the French system.

TO CITIZEN FORFAIT.

"PARIS, 17*th June*, 1801.

"The sick are not well cared for at Toulon. The naval officers do not visit them frequently enough. They are nursed by convicts. Would it not be possible to establish Sisters of Charity at Toulon as at Brest?

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 7*th July*, 1801.

"You will see by the inclosed letters that the Prince of the Peace, who has captured nine fortresses and delivered I know not how many battles, assumes the tone of Suwarrow with our ambassador. Let me know your opinion on this subject as soon as possible. I am awaiting a reply from Otto. It appears as if we shall be able to settle matters with the Cardinal. It was necessary to address him a few observations. I had a second blister on my arm yesterday. It is a fitting moment to come to terms with the priests when one is laid up ill. News from Egypt, melancholy. The army, however, will be able to hold Alexandria for eight or ten months. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The Prince of the Peace seems to have compared himself rather favourably to Frederick the Great!

Concerning Egypt, Bonaparte had learned the defeat of Generals Friant and Lanusse on the 13th March; the more serious defeat of Abdallah Menou on the 21st March; the loss of Rosetta, the capitulation of Cairo by General Belliard, and the failure of Gauteaume's last attempt to succour the army of the East.

It was under these circumstances that the First Consul, a few days later, consented to the restoration of Egypt to the Porte.

On the 10th of July Bonaparte wrote a very long and comminatory despatch to be forwarded to Lucien at Madrid. The King and Queen of Spain were to be warned that if they followed the advice of the Prince of the Peace, who had been bought by England, they might consider the doom of the Spanish monarchy sealed. His Majesty was to be informed that any movement of his army in the direction of the French troops would be regarded as a declaration of war; that the First Consul would never ratify the treaty of Badajos, &c., &c.

Bonaparte then condescended to explain his reasons for furnishing the King of Etruria with a minister, and for not ordering his troops to evacuate the territory of the new sovereign, both of which acts infringed the conditions upon which Louisiana had been ceded to France.

TO CITIZEN JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *20th July*, 1801.

"I beg you will continue your conferences with Cardinal Consalvi and your other colleagues (on the subject of the Concordat):

"1st. To settle what appertains to the Constitutional clergy, and to make arrangements for the Constitutional bishops being as eligible as the others.

"2nd. Agree as to the wording of the Bull. I wish this Bull to be published in France as soon as possible, so that I may at once nominate bishops and archbishops.

. . . . Let it be understood that I attach great importance to this matter, and that I desire to see it concluded with celerity. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was doomed to experience many vexations in this matter, the machinery of the Sacred College not at all keeping pace with his own impetuosity.

The Concordat itself had been signed on the 15th July, but a Bull was still necessary to confirm the nomination of the new bishops. Bonaparte had several times given Consalvi to understand that he had abandoned the Constitutional clergy, but the legate in this, as in many other matters, had been deceived. The First Consul insisted upon having Gallican bishops, and would not hear of the Constitutionals retracting. Rome was powerless to offer any open resistance, but excuses were found for delaying the despatch of the necessary Bull, and it was more than a year before the Concordat was promulgated.

At the time the Concordat was signed there were 50 Constitutional bishops in France and 10,000 married priests.

NOTE TO BE HANDED TO LORD HAWKESBURY.

"PARIS, *23rd July*, 1801.

". . . The question divides itself into three parts: the Mediterranean—India—America. Egypt to be restored to the Porte. The Republic of the Seven Isles to be recognised. All the ports in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean occupied by French troops to be restored to the King of Naples and the Pope. Mahon to be restored to the King of Spain. Malta to be restored to the Order, and if the King of England deems it to be in conformity with his interests, as preponderating Power on the high seas, that the fortifications be demolished, this clause will be accepted. In India England to keep Ceylon. . . The other establishments, including the Cape of Good Hope, to be restored to the allies.

"In America everything to be restored to the ancient possessors. The King of England is so powerful in that part of the world that to desire more is to wish to be absolute master of America (West Indies). *Portugal to be maintained in all its integrity.*

"These are the conditions which the French Government is ready to sign."

Bonaparte added that France would never renounce Martinique, which had not been conquered. As the birth-place of Josephine, the First Consul was naturally anxious that this island should remain in the possession of France.

On the same day a note was forwarded to the above effect to Citizen Otto—a note in which, however, one finds that "*France may consent to England keeping Trinidad, but not Tobago.*"

It was in this way that Spain was to be punished for signing the treaty of Badajos; the Spanish island was to be ceded, and the French island retained.

During the alliance with Paul it had been agreed that 35,000 French soldiers under Massena should descend the Danube to the Black Sea, and be transported to Taganrog by a Russian fleet. Thence they were to reach the Volga and be conveyed in boats to Astracan, at which point they were to be joined by 35,000 Russian troops and 50,000 Cossacks. This combined force was to cross the Caspian to Astrabad, where large magazines were to be established. It was calculated that it would require eighty days to march from the French frontier to Astrabad, and fifty to march from Astrabad, *viâ* Herat, Ferah, and Candahar, to the banks of the Indus. Bonaparte considered this march perfectly practicable, and he more than once returned to the idea of commanding such an expedition, and seating himself for a while on the throne of Delhi. We shall have more to say on this subject when we come to General Gardanne's mission to Persia.

TO H.H. THE POPE.

"PARIS, 27*th July*, 1801.

"MOST HOLY FATHER,—Cardinal Consalvi has handed me the letter of your Holiness. I recognise in it those evangelical sentiments which distinguish you. Cardinal Consalvi will inform you of my desire to do all in my power to contribute to your happiness.

"It will depend only on you to find in the French Government the support which has always been accorded to your predecessors, *when they regarded it as their first duty to preach maxims of peace, morality, and obedience to the civil power.*

"It does not depend upon me to dry up the tears of Europe and to cause an era of peace to succeed wars and revolutions.

"On all occasions I beg your Holiness to count upon the aid of your devoted son.

"BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL MURAT.

"PARIS, 27*th July*, 1801.

"I have received your letter. . . Troops are stationed on the Adriatic in order to menace the Turks and the English. . . . Since you have not been to Naples I see no objection to your going there after you have arranged matters in Tuscany. *One never repents picking up local information.* Examine Capua and the other forts. You can return by Ancona. . .

"BONAPARTE."

The General little thought, at that epoch, that he would one day sit on the throne of Naples.

TO CITIZEN CHAPTAL.

"PARIS, 10*th August*, 1801.

"I beg you will give orders to the prefects of the five departments in which there are the largest number of Protestants, and to the Prefect of Geneva, to send, each of

them, to Paris, one of the principal ministers of the Protestant religion, taking care to select a man who is not fanatical, who is upright, sensible, enlightened, and who enjoys general esteem. You will inform the prefects that the despatch of these citizens should be made without noise, and that the object of this measure is to arrange means for maintaining order, liberty, and independence of worship. . .

"BONAPARTE."

After a long period of persecution Lomenie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse, in 1787, two years before the Revolution, laid before the Parliament of Paris a royal edict removing Protestant disabilities, and the Parliament did not for an instant hesitate to register the edict. Naturally, under the Revolution, the Protestants enjoyed freedom. When settling the bases of the Concordat with the Pope, Bonaparte, who was determined to tolerate no religious persecution, confirmed the privileges of the Reformed Church. It was hardly to be supposed that the First Consul would leave that Church entirely free; he gave it an official status which, at the same time, fettered and protected it. It was recognised by the Government, and subjected to the administrative machinery of local consistories, and provincial and general synods.

It is melancholy to think that the toleration shown by Bonaparte in 1801 should have brought down on the Protestants the most dire revenge when the Empire fell. After the battle of Waterloo the most terrible scenes were enacted in the south of France under the pretext that the Protestants were Bonapartists. Bonnechose says: "The Calvinists were massacred even in the prisons; their wives were outraged, and their houses and temples burned to the ground; and these atrocities remained unpunished. The Chamber of 1815 branded itself with infamy by calling Deputy d'Argenson to order with frantic transports, when he demanded an inquiry into those horrible crimes. The

cry of justice and humanity arose from a foreign tribunal; the illustrious Brougham invoked the intervention of his Government in favour of the Protestants of France, and in various places Austrian bayonets intervened between the victims and their persecutors."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *6th September*, 1801.

"You will find inclosed a despatch from Citizen Otto. I beg that before you go to bed you will send him a courier, stating in the most positive manner that the French Government will never consent to the demands of the English Government respecting Essequibo and Demerara.

"As for the prisoners, the governments will pay the different indemnities, inserting a clause that what France has expended for the prisoners of the Powers in the pay of England, such as the Russians, the Bavarians, and the princes of Italy, shall be carried forward by way of compensation.

"BONAPARTE."

The First Consul had excited the admiration, the gratitude, and the sympathy of the Emperor Paul by sending home the Russian prisoners in new uniforms; but it appears that, after all, England was to bear the expense of this extravagant fit of generosity.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *17th September*, 1801.

"You will find inclosed a letter from Citizen Otto. Reply that we will not cede Tobago. . . . It appears that we have come to terms as regards Demerara and Portugal. . . . The equinox is approaching; time is precious, and the First Consul, who is engaged in diplomatic negotiations with all the Powers of Europe, has adopted as a rule *never to give the slightest colouring of ill faith to any of his acts;* and, in his opinion, it would be an act of bad

faith to order the squadrons of Toulon, Brest, and Cadiz to sail [squadrons which, for months, had been unable to leave port], which, by their success or non-success, would change the state of the question.

"The preliminaries must be signed in the first decade of Vendémiaire (before the 1st of October) or the negotiations must be broken off.

"Citizen Otto will distinctly state that in addition to Trinidad the First Consul will not only refuse to cede Tobago but even a rock. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The above letter concerns the preliminaries of London which preceded the treaty of Amiens. It is interesting to see what the *Annual Register* for 1802 has to say on this matter. It commences by remarking that it was shrewdly suspected when the first article of the treaty was signed, "Egypt shall be evacuated," the French Government was aware of the capitulation of Alexandria and of the French army. Therefore this concession to England was in fact no concession. The *Annual Register* then relates how, after the signature of the preliminaries, other treaties were brought to light, adding—

"Among those treaties were one with Turkey and another with Portugal. In our treaty, as an equivalent for the vast colonial restitutions we made to France and her allies, we had expressly stipulated for the integrity of the territory of those two Powers, and the evacuation of the kingdom of Naples; but although the negotiation in London lasted a considerable time, and France expressly stated those cessions to our allies as equivalents for the cessions we had agreed to make to her and to her allies, yet, when the preliminaries were signed, and she had calculated that the English ministry would rather submit to be so imposed upon than recede from them, she produced the underhand, clandestine, and fraudulent treaties

that she had been making at the same time separately with our allies.

"By those treaties the Porte had engaged that the French should be on an equality with the most favoured nation throughout the whole extent of the Turkish empire, and consequently that the best of its allies should not, even in a commercial view, be more favoured than those who, without provocation, invaded and plundered its dominions."

As regards Portugal, the breach of faith was so flagrant that England insisted upon and obtained concessions, but for which, the congress at Amiens would have been broken up. The concession, however, which had been obtained from Turkey, *on condition of the evacuation of Egypt*, which had been evacuated when the Turkish ambassador signed the treaty, was not disputed.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *19th September*, 1801.

"I beg you will send a copy of the convention concluded with the Batavian Government to the Minister of War . . . mentioning at the same time that we maintain our rights on Flushing, and that secret instructions should be given to the French officer commanding in Batavia to this effect. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Thus after having forced the Batavian Republic to purchase a town which belonged to it, that town was to remain at the disposal of the French military commander!

On the 25th Bonaparte wrote to Talleyrand, begging him to ask M. Markoff for passports for Russia whither he wished to send Duroc (who was to have started on the 26th of April), in order to open up direct communications with the new Czar similar to those engaged in with Paul. On the same date he wrote a second letter to his Foreign Minister, saying—

"I beg you will write to Citizen Clarke, our minister at Florence, saying I have received the letters addressed to me by the King of Etruria; that I authorise Murat to withdraw all the troops not necessary for the internal and external safety of Tuscany."

Bonaparte went on to say that it would be necessary to keep at least 6,000 men in the country; that he desired the king *should be quite independent;* that the 6,000 men would cost 16,000*l.* a month, a considerable sum for Tuscany, but necessary for her interests. General Clarke was also to try and persuade his majesty to raise a Polish legion.

This was Bonaparte's manner of giving Tuscany in exchange for Louisiana. He everywhere pursued the same system of quartering troops on feeble states, and making them pay for them.

TO CITIZEN ABRIAL, *Minister of Justice.*

"PARIS, *30th September*, 1801.

"The criminal tribunal instituted by Citizen Miot (who had been sent on a mission to Corsica) has failed in its objects. He composed it of five jurisconsults of the most respectable character, but too old, and remarkably weak. Tell him to suppress this tribunal and to create a new one, which must reside at Ajaccio, and be composed of five judges, two of them being military men. The three jurisconsults must be French, foreign to the enmities of the island. If he cannot find these three men, let the court be entirely composed of moderate and enlightened officers.

"BONAPARTE."

Corsica was in a very disturbed state, but according to his own account, Miot de Melito, by a mixture of justice and severity restored order in the course of three months. His stories concerning the vendetta and other Corsican

customs are highly interesting, and are to be found in his memoirs.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *30th September*, 1801.

"It will be necessary to know what the courts of Vienna and Rome think of Hompesch. I beg you will instruct Champagny and Cacault to give those two courts to understand, in an off-hand way, the interest we take in him, and that if they are disposed to support him, we are quite prepared to lend them our aid.

"Let Citizen Cibou also know that I take an interest in Hompesch, and that I shall see him with great pleasure resume his functions of Grand Master; as I know he is in distress, authorise Citizen Cacault to give him 500 louis, *without a letter or anything ostensible.*

"BONAPARTE."

The last Grand Master, on the capitulation of Malta, had been conveyed to Trieste, after receiving 12,000*l.* for his plate and the promise of a pension, which was not paid. He consequently protested against his deposition, and made over his rights to Paul I., who accorded him an annuity. On the death of Paul, Hompesch found himself in reduced circumstances, and was no doubt glad to receive the 500 louis referred to above. He afterwards sent in a claim for 80,000*l.* arrears of pension, but was only granted 600*l.* He had been originally promised 24,000*l.* and a German principality, or 12,000*l.* a year, by the French, who also agreed to indemnify the other knights.

TO CITIZEN CHAPTAL.

"PARIS, *6th October*, 1801.

"The First Consul begs that you will have made the model of a sabre of moderate and commodious dimensions, to be worn by him on the occasion of great solemnities; it should agree with the usages and with the civil cut of

the consular costume, and be designed to receive for ornament the Regent and other diamonds of great price. The First Consul begs you will present him this model as soon as possible; his intention being to have that weapon for the 18th Brumaire, and to wear it at the Feast of Peace."

The preliminaries of London having been signed, we now come to a series of despatches relating to the St. Domingo expedition, to the Concordat, and to the Congress at Amiens, where Joseph Bonaparte and Lord Cornwallis met to discuss the conditions of a definitive peace.

TO H.H. THE POPE.

"PARIS, 10*th October*, 1801.

"The peace with England, Portugal, Russia, and the Ottoman Porte having been signed, I hasten to inform your Holiness of this fact, knowing the interest you take in the happiness and tranquillity of nations. The French are about to evacuate Southern Italy, and I beg your Holiness will let me know if you have made any arrangement with the court of Naples respecting the principality of Beneventum, and if you desire that I should take any steps to have it restored to you.

"Your Holiness should also think about organising a corps of troops as promptly as possible, in order to occupy Ancona. I beg also that you will use your influence with the different courts for the reorganisation of the Order of Malta, which is about to be reinstated in the island.

"BONAPARTE."

Ancona was one of those positions which Bonaparte had no idea of giving up; its strategical importance was too great. The Pope naturally requested the First Consul to aid him in recovering Beneventum, which the French Emperor afterwards seized for himself and presented to

Talleyrand. After the abdication of Fontainebleau the quondam Bishop of Autun restored the principality to Pius VII.

On the 10th October Bonaparte wrote several other letters; he wrote at considerable length to the Emperor Alexander. He said it had been agreed to restore Malta to the Order under the protection of one of the great Powers, and he asked the Czar, "whose august father was recognised as Grand Master," to let him know his wishes on this subject. In a letter to the King of Etruria he said that peace having been signed with England, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, he was prepared to give orders for the French troops to evacuate Tuscany. He then directed the Minister of the Interior to give 10,000 francs to the "*Buffons Italiens*," and to remove any obstacles in the way of their performing—"it being well to improve the taste of song in France, and advisable, in a political point of view, owing to our preponderance in Italy." In another letter he gave orders for the sum of 600,000 francs to be laid out in preparing St. Cloud for a consular residence. The furniture was to be taken from the national museums in Paris and Versailles, the tapestry from the Gobelins, la Savonnerie, and Beauvais, &c. The sixth letter, written on the 10th October, deals with Batavian finance. The next day Bonaparte despatched General Sebastiani to Constantinople with a letter to the Sultan Selim, in which he expressed the desire to see the ancient friendship which had endured for many centuries between the two states re-established.

"The expedition to Egypt," he added, "was not undertaken through any feeling of hostility towards the Ottoman Empire. But God willed that it should be the pretext for a rupture between the two nations, in order to convince both the one and the other that their true interests are union and peace. If your Highness shares the sentiments which animate the French Government, the past will be for ever forgotten, and a solid peace and reciprocal

commercial advantages will consolidate the prosperity of both nations."

On the same day the First Consul wrote a letter to Berthier on the subject of the return of the army of the East. This army was to be broken up, and Leopold Berthier was to thank the various corps in the name of Bonaparte for the gallant efforts they had made to preserve Egypt.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *12th October*, 1801.

"I beg you will send me back the minute relative to the Prince of the Peace, on the margin of which I wrote a note expressing my opinion concerning that prince.

"BONAPARTE."

The probability is that Bonaparte considered he might soon stand in need of the services of Manuel Godoi.

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, *14th October*, 1801.

"Lord Cornwallis is going to land at Calais in order to come to Paris. I beg you will give orders that he may be received with the greatest distinction. On his arrival at Calais a salute must be fired, and he must have a guard of honour to escort him on his journey.

"BONAPARTE."

Lord Cornwallis, who narrowly escaped shipwreck, was received with every demonstration of delight. There were public rejoicings and illuminations in Paris, and when he repaired to Amiens he was visited by all the local authorities, and treated with an amount of respect which soon aroused his suspicions concerning its sincerity.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 21*st October*, 1801.

"I beg you will desire Citizen Otto to inform Lord Hawkesbury without delay that the French Government intends sending the Rochefort squadron and a portion of the Brest squadron with 12,000 troops, to re-establish order at St. Domingo.

"It will be necessary to inform the court of Spain that it is essential for it to send some one with full powers to Amiens, *the English and ourselves being determined to arrange matters promptly*. . . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Spain was sorely tempted not to send an ambassador to Amiens, knowing the fate that awaited her, and the manner in which Bonaparte had determined to avenge himself for the over-hasty conclusion of the treaty of Badajos with Portugal. King Charles knew, in fact, that all his ambassador would have to do would be to consent to England keeping Trinidad.

It was a bold stroke on the part of Bonaparte despatching so large an expedition to St. Domingo before the conclusion of a definitive peace, but the prize was worth a considerable amount of risk. The French portion of St. Domingo before the war was more productive than all our West Indian possessions put together, and that portion was barely a third of the least fertile part of the island. Its annual exports were valued at 7,000,000*l*., giving employment to 1,640 ships and 26,770 seamen. It was not likely that Napoleon, with time and means at his disposal, should consent to leave so rich a prize in the hands of the blacks, without making an effort to secure its possession for himself.

The Spanish Government exhibited a certain amount of objection to take part in the expedition to St. Domingo in spite of the assertion of Bonaparte that it was "in the

interest of civilisation to destroy this new Algiers organised in the middle of America." Hence the following violent letter to Citizen Talleyrand :—

"I beg you will see M. Azara on the subject of the inclosed letter. You will ask him categorically if he has been authorised to take this step; you will say that the King of Spain never mentioned the matter; that his vessels are bound by treaty to serve us; that I shall force them to sail; that I shall never forget this proof of ill-feeling on the part of the ministry. If M. Azara has acted on his own authority, let him know that he exposes himself to nothing more nor less than the seizure of the Spanish fleet; for I am tired of dealing with an idiotic cabinet. I beg you will send me an answer to-morrow. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN FOUCHÉ.

"PARIS, *2nd November*, 1801.

"You will find inclosed fourteen decrees of *radiation* which I have signed. You will send passports to the persons concerned, and when they arrive in Paris you will hand them the decrees, but only after they have sworn fidelity to the Republic and have renounced all foreign naturalisation. BONAPARTE."

Being desirous of conciliating the Royalists, the First Consul struck a great many members of that party off the list of *émigrés*, allowing them to return to France, restoring to several their property which had been confiscated, and employing others in offices of great trust. The amount of ingratitude he afterwards encountered was perfectly disgraceful.

PROCLAMATION.

"PARIS, *8th November*, 1801.

"Inhabitants of St. Domingo, no matter what your origin and your colour, you are Frenchmen. You are all free and equal before God and before the Republic.

"France has been, like St. Domingo, the prey of factions, and torn by civil and foreign war. But everything is changed. All the nations have embraced the French and have vowed them peace and friendship; Frenchmen have also embraced each other and have sworn to remain friends and brothers. Come and embrace the French and rejoice yourselves with the sight of your friends and brothers of Europe.

"The Government sends you General Leclerc. He takes with him a large force to protect you against your enemies and *the enemies of the Republic.* If people say, 'These forces are destined to deprive us of our liberty;' answer, 'The Republic has given us liberty, it will not suffer us to be deprived of it!'

"Rally round the Captain-General. He bears you abundance and peace. Whoever dares to separate himself from the Captain-General shall be considered as a traitor to his country, and the wrath of the Republic shall consume him as the fire burns up your withered sugar-canes.

"BONAPARTE."

The inhabitants of St. Domingo naturally suspected the intentions of this mighty host which came to protect them against enemies which had no existence. St. Domingo itself was at peace, and had not all the nations of the world embraced France, and all Frenchmen embraced each other? Where were the enemies?

On the 13th November Bonaparte wrote to Talleyrand complaining of the suspicious manner in which England watched the St. Domingo expedition. Citizen Otto was to give the British Government all kinds of explanations, and to dwell on the incalculable benefits which would result for England in consequence of France preventing the sceptre of the new world from falling into the hands of the blacks.

In a long letter addressed to General Toussaint Louver-

ture, in which he announced the departure of his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, Bonaparte said :—

"He is accompanied by forces suitable to cause the sovereignty of the French people to be respected. . . . We have conceived esteem for you, and we are pleased to acknowledge and to proclaim the great services which you have rendered to the French people [helping them to drive out the English]. If their flag floats over St. Domingo they owe this to the gallant blacks. Called by your talents, and by the force of circumstances, to the chief command, you *destroyed* civil war, put a bridle on the persecutions of atrocious men, and re-established religion and the worship of God from whom all things emanate."

However, he was told that his constitution was at variance with that of France, and contained clauses contrary to the dignity and sovereignty of the French people. Bonaparte then expressed the hope that the gallant blacks would accept the authority of his Captain-General, as it would greatly distress him to have to punish rebellion.

The expedition to St. Domingo was undertaken not only on account of the value of the colony, but because Bonaparte, who feared Moreau, desired to get rid of the army of the Rhine which was devoted to that general.

On the 18th November, in a further letter to Toussaint Louverture, the First Consul said :—

"What do you desire? The liberty of the blacks? You know that we have given liberty to all the nations which were deprived of it."

What instructions were given to General Leclerc it would be difficult to say, for they have been suppressed in the *Correspondence*, but it is very improbable that Napoleon, who re-established slavery in Guadeloupe, Martinique, Tobago, St. Lucia Guiana, and the Mauritius had any idea of allowing the gallant blacks of St. Domingo to enjoy their liberty, and it was when this fact became apparent that Toussaint Louverture took up arms against the Captain-General and his host.

In a long message, dated 22nd November, 1801, Bonaparte announced that brigandage had been put down; that religious peace had been established and the liberty of conscience proclaimed; that the continental war had been brought to a conclusion; that the Government enjoyed the love and respect of the country, and had such confidence in public opinion that it had ventured to offer honours and hospitality to a prince sprung from a house which had reigned over France. The people had remained perfectly calm, and had forced the enemies of the country to acknowledge that the Republic had already attained the maturity of centuries in the hearts of Frenchmen.

After paying a tribute of praise to the army and the navy he declared that the soldiers of the army of the East had yielded rather to the force of circumstances than to the Turks and the English.

St. Domingo was to be entirely subjected to French law; slavery had been abolished in that island and in Guadeloupe, but it would be maintained at Martinique—"it having cost humanity too much to warrant a new revolution."

Finance, public instruction, public works, commerce, fine arts, hospitals were all dwelt upon, and it is astonishing to remark the vast impulse which this master mind gave to every branch of the administration.

Turning to foreign affairs, one perceives that Batavia had voted a new constitution, which had been recognised by France, but 10,000 French troops were to be quartered on the country.

The French troops had received orders to evacuate Helvetia, but 6,000 men were to remain behind.

The King of Tuscany, or Etruria, reigned tranquilly on his throne, but 4,000 French soldiers were to hold Leghorn.

Piedmont had been turned into the twenty-seventh French military division, "and under a milder *régime* is forgetting the misfortunes of a long anarchy."

The Holy Father, sovereign of Rome, possessed his states in all their integrity, but 1,500 French soldiers occupied Ancona in order to preserve communications with the army of the south !

"Paul I.," said Bonaparte, "loves France; he desires the peace of Europe and especially the liberty of the seas. His great soul is affected by the pacific sentiments manifested by the First Consul; 8,000 Russians were made prisoners fighting with the allies, but England refused to exchange them against French prisoners." [The proposition was made after Paul had receded from the alliance.] "The Government restored these brave warriors, abandoned by their allies, to their native country."

After referring to various other foreign states, Bonaparte then made the following perfidious remarks :—

"Portugal, which had become a province of Gt. Britain, alone remained to England. *It was there that Spain ought to have found a compensation for the restitution of the island of Trinidad.* But after a few skirmishes the Spanish minister ratified separately the treaty of Badajos. From that moment it was clear that Trinidad was lost for Spain, and in fact England regarded it henceforth as a possession acquired by her. . . ."

It would be difficult to crowd a greater number of falsehoods into so small a space.

After writing a letter to the King of England expressing the hope that, seeing the good faith which had been observed on both sides, a definitive treaty of peace would soon be concluded between the two countries, Bonaparte begged Talleyrand to send a certain inclosure to the French ambassador at Madrid.

"Tell him," he continued, "to procure an interview with the Queen, to show her the letter, and to let her understand that she will never be able to count upon the support of France as long as her lot remains bound up with that of the Prince of the Peace. Let him explain himself publicly and strongly respecting that prince, to

whom he should attribute the loss of Trinidad. Let him protest against the title of generalissimo by land and sea given to that prince, which tends to eclipse the King, and which reveals ambitious projects. Let him keep us informed of the opinions of their Majesties, those of the public, and the court intrigues. . . ."

Bonaparte, whose wrath was often manifested in the most grotesque manner, also wrote very strongly to General Gouvion St. Cyr, who had succeeded Lucien Bonaparte as ambassador at Madrid. He concluded his letter thus :—

"Tell the Queen and the Prince of the Peace boldly that if this system continues it will end in a thunderclap."

TO GENERAL MENOU.

"PARIS, *1st December*, 1801.

"I have received your letter. I am aware that it was no want of will on your part or of love for the fine countries of Egypt that this conquest did not remain to the Republic. Your long resistance at Alexandria was useful to the negotiations. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte had a strange liking for this incompetent general—a liking which sprang from the fact that Abdallah Menou thoroughly believed in him. Menou was never again employed in any active military capacity, but was made governor of an Italian province, and treated the inhabitants with unnecessary severity.

TO HAMUDA PASHA, *Bey of Tunis.*

"PARIS, *5th December*, 1801.

"ILLUSTRIOUS AND MAGNIFICENT SIGNOR,—I know that among the princes of Barbary those of the kingdom of Tunis have always been distinguished by their love of France, and that you interrupted that friendship with regret, to owing your habitual respect for the Ottoman Porte. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

And the illustrious and magnificent signor was informed that the First Consul was about to send him an envoy in the person of M. Devoise, who had already represented France at Tunis, and had been cast fettered into a dungeon when the war resulting from the invasion of Egypt broke out. At that period the Bey was on intimate terms with us, as the following letter from Nelson shows—a letter all the more interesting now that the French have seized on Tunis :—

TO HIS HIGHNESS THE BEY OF TUNIS.

"'VANGUARD.' PALERMO, 15*th March*, 1799.

"SIR,—I have received through the hands of Mr. Magra the very interesting letters from the French at Malta, for which I beg leave to thank your Highness, and return them by a vessel I have fitted out for that express purpose. The infamous conduct of the French during the whole war, which they have wantonly waged against all religion and civil order, has at last called down the vengeance of all true Mussulmans; and your Highness, I am sure, will agree with me that Divine Providence never will permit these infidels to God to go unpunished.

"The conduct of your Highness reflects upon you the very highest honour, and if any state has failed to exert its utmost abilities against the enemies of God and His Holy Prophet, I rely with confidence that they will be your enemies, as they will be of all good men.

"NELSON."

TO CITIZEN HAUTERIVE.

"PARIS, 26*th December*, 1801.

"You will inform M. Azara that the negotiations of Amiens are drawing to a close; that they have been delayed by Spain for six weeks; that France and England cannot possibly lose another day; that peace will therefore be promptly signed whether Spain participates in it or not; and that the First Consul, who has a personal feeling of

kindness and attachment for his Majesty the King of Spain, will sign in the name of his majesty, *not wishing that Charles IV. should be offended by finding himself constrained, in spite of himself, to agree to what is done.*

"That as the King of Spain is the most intimate ally of the Republic, the First Consul considers it his duty to act according to the domestic circumstances of that court; that the illness of the King, and of the Queen, and the extraordinary, not to say insane, conduct of the Prince of the Peace, oblige him treat the interests of the King of Spain like those of France.

"That the confidence of his Majesty Charles IV. will be better placed in the First Consul, and that his interests will be better defended by him than by his present minister. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

It is to be doubted whether a similar communication was ever before addressed to a power occupying the rank which Spain enjoyed at the commencement of this century, even by the most arrogant ruler. Bonaparte afterwards fell into a grievous error concerning the Spanish nation, but he made no mistake in his estimate of the Spanish court.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE YEAR 1802.

IN this year we find Bonaparte exciting the distrust of Europe by accepting the Presidency of the new Italian Republic, by concluding clandestine treaties with Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, by his violent interference in Switzerland, and his expedition to St. Domingo. In March the treaty of Amiens, after a long negotiation, which is said to have cost England 1,000,000*l.* a week, was signed. Ceylon and Trinidad remained in the possession of England; the Cape of Good Hope was restored to the Dutch, and Malta was to have a garrison of Neapolitan troops until a Maltese force could be raised to protect the island. This peace excited very little enthusiasm in England when proclaimed with great pomp throughout the cities of London and Westminster by Garter King-of-Arms at the head of a procession in which figured Rouge Dragon, Portcullis, and Rouge Croix, Norrey King-at-Arms, Horse Guards, beadles, constables, &c., &c. In April Bonaparte signed the Concordat with Rome, and in August he was invested with the consulship for life. In June General Andreossi came as French ambassador to London. He was represented as a man universally admired and esteemed, eminent alike for his learning and his urbanity. In October Switzerland took up arms to oppose the new constitution which Bonaparte wished to

force upon her, and the consequence was that on the 15th Ney entered at the head of 40,000 troops. A mild protest addressed to France by the British Government was received with the greatest indignation. The order of the Legion of Honour was instituted. Slavery was re-established in some of the French colonial possessions; it was the same with the system of the *marque*, and convicts were once more marked with a red-hot iron on the right shoulder.

On moving the Address in the House of Lords in October, Lord Bolton said: "It was a grand and magnificent triumph for England to make a peace when her navies and armies were everywhere conquerors, from the frozen seas of the north to the Pillars of Hercules, and from Africa to the remotest shores of Asia and America. When the unexampled achievements of that band of heroes, who had rescued Egypt from the invaders, were made only to restore it to its rightful owner, and the triumphs of our armies were only accessary to that spirit of moderation which dictated an appeal to arms. . . . ."

Mr. Fox, in the House of Commons, expressed himself delighted with the peace, but this enthusiasm was shared neither by Mr. Pitt, Mr. Wyndham, nor Mr. Sheridan.

One of the most beneficial measures of this year was the creation of Commercial Chambers in Paris and in all the principal towns of France.

To CITIZEN JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"PARIS, *7th January*, 1802.

"I am about to start for Lyons. . . . I believe that General Bernadotte [Joseph's brother-in-law] is at Amiens. I beg that he will let you know whether it will suit him to go to Guadeloupe as Captain-General. That island is prosperous; it is well cultivated; but Lacrosse having offended the inhabitants, and having only 500 whites with him, has been driven out, and a mulatto has been placed at the head of the colony. They were ignorant of the peace

Three vessels and four frigates, with 3,000 infantry are about to sail in order to disarm the blacks and to restore tranquillity. It is an important and agreeable mission. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Bernadotte naturally refused this tempting offer, being probably aware that it was made with the intention of getting rid of him. The command of the expedition was afterwards confided to the able lieutenant of Moreau, General Richpance, who tranquillised the island by exterminating the blacks. The mulatto leader, Pelagie, submitted, like Toussaint Louverture, but his fate is a mystery to this day.

At Lyons Bonaparte found the soldiers who had returned from Egypt.

This visit to Lyons formed part of a bold conception. While Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte were discussing at Amiens, Bonaparte was busy establishing his authority over the Batavian, Helvetic, and Cisalpine Republics. He forced a constitution down the throats of the Dutch in order to secure their independence; he behaved with great duplicity in Switzerland, so as to prevent the people having a popular government; and he treated the Cisalpine in this wise. He presented a constitution to that Republic, and, the constitution accepted, it became necessary to select the authorities. Napoleon was asked to make the necessary nominations. He consented, and directed the representatives of the Cisalpine to meet him at Lyons to arrange matters, thus obliging 450 notabilities to cross the Alps in the depth of winter. Matters went on smoothly until the question of electing a president came on. The Cisalpines had cast their eyes on Melzi, but on perceiving that Bonaparte desired to be chosen himself, they at once implored him to accept the post of chief magistrate. The offer was not rejected. The Cisalpine became the Italian Republic, and Napoleon Bonaparte became President.

TO THE CONSULS CAMBACÉRÈS AND LEBRUN.

"LYONS, 23*rd January*, 1802.

". . . All the officers of the army of the East whom I meet here confirm the reports made against several generals of that army. . . . I suppose that by this time M. Azara has left for Amiens. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

"PARIS, 16*th February*, 1802.

"I have received your majesty's letter of the 5th December. The tender interest which you take in the affairs of Helvetia is in every way worthy of the paternal character your majesty displays in the government of your own states, which causes you to be blessed by your people. I have great pleasure in acquainting your majesty with what I have done in order to restore the tranquillity of that estimable nation. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The French troops were to be withdrawn as soon as a definitive organisation had been adopted. Bonaparte also expressed the hope that the treaty of Amiens would soon be signed; that Malta would be handed over to the Grand Master; that direct commerce would be established between France and Russia by way of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, &c. At the same time the Czar was implored not to repose faith in evil rumours circulated by designing persons. M. de Markoff, the Russian ambassador, had been prying into the Sebastiani and other affairs, to the great irritation of the First Consul.

On the 24th February Bonaparte addressed two letters to Fouché. In the first he gave orders that Laharpe should be told to leave Paris within twenty-four hours, and to take up his residence in some small village at twenty-five leagues from the capital, where he was to

remain under the supervision of the police. As for Madame Champcentz and Madame Damas, those ladies were to be shown over the frontier. Bonaparte thus concluded his second letter, after dealing with a variety of brigands :—

"The re-establishment of peace with the Powers allowing me to pay more attention to the police, I desire to be informed at greater length of all that passes, and to do business with you at least once, and often twice, a day, when that is necessary. The hours which will suit me best are 11 A.M. and 11 P.M. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN JOSEPH BONAPARTE.

"LA MALMAISON, 11*th March*, 1802.

"It is 5 P.M., and the courier you announced has not yet arrived. However, the despatches from Otto and all the letters from England confirm the report of considerable armaments and the departure of successive squadrons. Lord Hawkesbury has informed Otto that Cornwallis has received his last instructions. . . . Let me know twice a day, morning and evening, all that is done and all that is said. It is clear to me that if peace has not been signed by this, or has not been agreed to, there must be a change of system in London.

"BONAPARTE."

Brother Joseph was then instructed to assure Lord Cornwallis that the First Consul had received the most flattering letters from Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and that those three Powers and all the princes of Italy had recognised the Italian Republic. Citizen Otto was directed to speak up, and to protest against the threatening tone adopted by the British Government, which could not be tolerated by a Power like France.

TO CAPTAIN GENERAL LECLERC.

"PARIS, 16*th March*, 1802.

". . . . France has learned with delight your successful commencement, which presages the return of St. Domingo to the mother country. The squadrons of Toulon, of Cadiz, of Flushing, and of Havre ought to have reached you. . . . Follow out *your instructions* to the letter, and as soon as you can *get rid of* Toussaint, Christophe, Dessalines, and the principal brigands, and that the mass of the blacks has been disarmed, despatch all the coloured men who have taken a part in the troubles to the Continent. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 18*th March*, 1802.

"I beg you will have the accouchements of princesses, and the deaths which are notified to us, inserted in the *Moniteur*, for I know that the courts pay particular attention to this publication. The elector of Bavaria and the princesses of Baden and Denmark are in this category.

"BONAPARTE."

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, 20*th March*, 1802.

"The Valais affair must be settled. You will perceive how I look upon the question. Have inquiries made, and draw me up a memorandum on the ancient organisation of that country. . . . Write to Citizen Verhinac that Helvetia, not being a French province, and having recognised its government, I ought to allow it to govern itself; what interests me is the affair of the Valais. Let Citizen Reding be informed that if he is not satisfied with the *mezzo termine* which I have taken he will lose all. . .

"BONAPARTE."

A great many of Bonaparte's negotiations were opened and carried on with the view of making persons believe that, while he was actuated by the purest and most philanthropic motives, it was quite the contrary with his opponents. As a curious example of this we may quote the following paragraph from a letter to Talleyrand, dated the 24th March, and dealing with the Malta affair during negotiations at Amiens :—

"As far as the Barbary Powers are concerned it must be inserted in a protocol, or a note must be presented setting forth how improper it will be for the Order of Malta, instituted to wage war against the Barbary Powers, to receive the ships of those Powers in their ports, from which they will be able to ravage the States even of the Pope. . . . That this upsets all received ideas, and is contrary to the nature of things. . . . At the sametime; after having remained firm, and above all, after having recorded the presentation of the note, or the insertion in the protocol, the French ambassador is authorised to waive the matter, and must not for a single hour delay his signature to the treaty on account of this article ; it will be sufficient for me to be able to show that it was England which desired this absurd injustice."

Neither before nor after this despatch did Bonaparte show himself a respecter of Papal territory.

On the 26th March Bonaparte informed the Pope that the peace with England had been signed, and desired to have his opinion with regard to Malta. On the same day the First Consul wrote :—

TO CITIZEN MELZI.

"PARIS, *26th March*, 1802.

"You will find inclosed the definitive treaty of peace with England. There is no question of the King of Etruria, nor of the Ligurian, Italian, or Helvetian Republics; but they will shortly be recognised in a suitable manner. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The Republics were not mentioned because it was felt on both sides that no agreement could be arrived at respecting them. From this fact alone it soon became clear that the peace was nothing but a truce.

ALLOCUTION TO CARDINAL CAPRARA, LEGATE A LATERE.

"PARIS, *9th April*, 1802.

"The apostolical virtues which distinguish you cause me to see you with pleasure the depositary of so great an influence over the consciences of the people.

"You will draw from the Gospel rules for your conduct; and in this manner you will contribute powerfully to the quelling of hatred and to the consolidation of union in this vast empire. . . . The result of your mission will be, for the Christian religion, which in all ages has done so much for mankind, a new subject of triumph, and you will receive congratulations both from the enlightened philosopher and from the veritable friends of men."

TO CITIZEN PORTALIS.

"PARIS, *9th April*, 1802.

"You will find inclosed a list of the ecclesiastical nominations. The First Consul desires that you will inform the citizens in question that their nominations have been definitively settled, although I cannot yet deliver them their brevets. . . . The First Consul begs you will settle with the Legate so that the archbishops and bishops nominated may be consecrated and receive canonical institution before the 27th. They will take the oath, in presence of the First Consul, on Easter-day."

The archbishops were to receive 15,000, and the bishops 10,000 francs each for preliminary expenses, but this matter was to be kept secret.

TO CITIZEN BARBÉ MARBOIS.

"PARIS, *17th April*, 1802.

"I beg you will select nine diamonds among those in the Public Treasury, suitable for rings for the archbishops, and have them mounted. Select a tenth for the Cardinal Legate of superior quality and greater value.

"BONAPARTE."

TO GENERAL BERTHIER.

"PARIS, *20th April*, 1802.

"I beg you will inform General Thurreau, while recommending him to treat the Valaisians well and to push on with the Simplon road, that the Government is aware of the obstacles thrown in his way, and is satisfied with his conduct.

"BONAPARTE."

Thurreau was the general who commanded the "Infernal Columns" in La Vendée, and the Valaisians soon became painfully aware that he was not to be trifled with.

WORDS PRONOUNCED IN THE COUNCIL OF STATE.

"PARIS, *4th May*, 1802.

"In all countries force yields to civil qualities. Bayonets are lowered before the priest, who speaks in the name of heaven, and before man, who imposes by his science. I have predicted to military men with *scrupules* that a military government will never take root in France unless the nation be besotted by fifty years of ignorance. All attempts will fail, and their authors will be the victims. It is not as a general that I govern, but because the nation believes that I possess civil capacity. . . . I knew what I was about when, a general in the army, I accepted the title of Member of the Institute; I felt sure of being comprehended by the smallest drummer.[1] . . ."

[1] This hardly tallies with what Bonaparte said about governing France booted and spurred, and with his making a soldier of Joseph as he might have been called on to succeed him.

In a message to the Legislative Body of the 6th May, 1802, Bonaparte thus referred to the Trinidad affair:—

"The Republic was bound by its engagements, and by the fidelity of Spain, to make every effort to preserve the integrity of that kingdom. This duty it fulfilled with energy as far as circumstances would permit. The King of Spain has acknowledged the loyalty of his allies, and in the interest of peace he has generously made a sacrifice which they fain would have spared him. He acquires by this new claims to the attachment of France, and a sacred title to the gratitude of Europe."

With regard to St. Domingo, the First Consul declared that that brigand Toussaint, with some other brigands like himself, was wandering about without men and without money.

ALLOCUTION TO GENERAL MENOU.

"PARIS, *7th May*, 1802.

"The fate of battles is uncertain. You did all in your power after the unfortunate day of the 30th [battle of Canope] which could be done by a man of heart and experience. Your long resistance at Alexandria contributed to the happy issue of the preliminaries of London. . . . . I know all that happened in your army. Your misfortunes have no doubt been great, but they have not made you lose my esteem, and I shall hasten to show this openly, in order that no public clamour may assail your conduct."

In the tenth volume of *Napoleon's Military Correspondence* the reputation of Abdallah Menou, as we have seen, is very rudely assailed. The whole collapse in Egypt was attributed to him. "His irresolution and want of talent," wrote Napoleon at St. Helena, "banished all hope and all confidence." But, for the moment, all this was to be kept dark, and everything was to be painted in the brightest colours.

ORDER OF THE DAY.

"ST. CLOUD, *12th May*, 1802.

"The Grenadier Gobain committed suicide through love. He was a very good fellow. This is the second event of the same nature which has taken place in the corps within a month.

"The First Consul directs that it be put in the orders of the Guard: 'That a soldier should know how to conquer the pain and the melancholy of his passions; that there is as much courage evinced in suffering with constancy mental pain as in remaining firm under a storm of grape. That to give oneself up to chagrin without resistance and to kill oneself is to abandon the battlefield before being conquered.'"

TO REAR-ADMIRAL DECRÊS.

"PARIS, *21st May*, 1802.

"You will order Major Hercules [who distinguished himself, with his trumpeters, at Arcola] to embark on the first vessel that sails. He will carry despatches to General Leclerc, and will serve on his staff. You will acquaint General Leclerc of all the succours which are leaving our ports. You will inform him that more shall be sent, and that the Government has full confidence in all the measures he may take to re-establish the metropolis in all its rights, and to subdue those African felons for ever.

"BONAPARTE."

Bonaparte was beginning to find out that the St. Domingo affair was more serious than he had anticipated, and that Colonel Vincent, who had warned him of the difficulties of the undertaking, was not mistaken.

In a letter to the King of Spain on the subject of the King of Etruria, who was in a precarious state of health and might soon leave his throne vacant, Bonaparte mentioned that—

"Admiral Gravina has rendered such signal services to the French army at St. Domingo that I beg your Majesty will accord him some special mark of favour. . . . I must thank your Majesty for the horses you gave me, which I ride every day. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Gravina endeavouring to recover for France a colony which she had wrested from Spain! What humiliation! But the unfortunate Admiral had not yet finished with Bonaparte.

TO H.H. THE POPE.

"PARIS, *24th May*, 1802.

"MOST HOLY FATHER,—I have left it to Cardinal Caprara to inform you of all that happened on Easter Day. You would have been greatly affected at the splendid spectacle offered by the entire Republic upon that occasion. . . . General Murat, who has arrived here, assures me that your Holiness is afflicted in consequence of some "constitutionals" having been nominated to French bishoprics. Your Holiness will perceive that I have also nominated a great number of ex-bishops, and the history of the Church clearly proves that schisms have never been terminated except by the reconciliation of parties. Your Holiness has, therefore, no cause for sadness. The whole of France has adhered to the Concordat, and astonished Europe admires a work which consolidates religion and re-establishes the Holy See upon bases which, for a moment, appeared to have been compromised.

"I send your Holiness a note, which has been handed to me, on the subject of a demand for a brief for the secularisation of Citizen Talleyrand. This demand is personally agreeable to me.

"I beg your Holiness to believe me, with all filial respect, the very devoted son of your Holiness.

"BONAPARTE."

Although the Concordat had been signed on the 15th July, 1801, it was not sanctioned by the French Chambers until May, 1802. To celebrate the reconciliation between Church and State the First Consul ordered a *Te Deum* to be performed at Nôtre Dame, to which all the authorities were bidden. The army alone made some show of resistance, Augereau, on the part of several of his comrades, requesting permission not to attend—a permission which Bonaparte refused. Delmas, having been asked what he thought of the ceremony, replied: "Very fine, General, but there are missing a million men who have perished in order to destroy what you are re-establishing." Delmas was exiled. Bonaparte had employed his usual perfidy in this matter.

Cardinal Consalvi relates in his memoirs how, when after much squabbling, the treaty between France and Rome had been drawn up and the copies made, he went to Joseph Bonaparte's house to affix his signature. What was his astonishment, on taking up his pen, to perceive that the document laid before him was the exact reproduction of the primitive proposals of the French Government which he had rejected. The Cardinal was highly indignant. Joseph declared that he was ignorant of the substitution, and the Abbé Bernier, who had brought the fraudulent copy, affirmed that he had received it from the hands of the First Consul. The question was re-discussed during nineteen consecutive hours, and the text previously accepted by Cardinal Consalvi was restored. This treaty Bonaparte tore in pieces, threatening, at the same time, to change the religion not only of France, but of Europe. "Rome," he added, "shall shed tears of blood." After a few slight concessions Consalvi signed the treaty, which, like many other treaties enforced by Bonaparte on negotiators who could offer but a feeble resistance, in no way answered the purpose for which it was concluded.

In signing the Concordat Bonaparte had several objects in view; he thought that he would be able to attach the clergy to the new order of things and to utilise them; that

they would become, as the saying went, his sacred *gendarmerie*, and that he would thus snap the last link which existed between France and the ancient régime, and would appease La Vendée, which, like Rachael weeping for her children, was not to be comforted. Bonaparte, as usual, wished to have the lion's share. At St. Helena Napoleon said that had he returned victorious from Moscow he would have made Paris the capital of the Christian world; he would have held *his* councils there, and the Popes would have been merely Presidents. As it was he forced Pius VII. to concede all he asked for the moment. His Holiness consented even to secularise the ex-bishop of Autun, who became his "very dear son," though he would never acknowledge Madame de Talleyrand. And what did he receive in return for his concessions? Neither Avignon, nor Carpentras, nor the Legations which he had been led to expect; nothing but a few spiritual advantages—the remains of Pius VI., and the image of Our Lady of Loretto which had been stolen some years previously from the Santa Casa.

TO CITIZEN TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *30th May*, 1802.

"It is indispensable for you to inform Citizen Alquier that the King of Naples must allow the Pope to enjoy the integrity of his States, and that Beneventum and Ponte Corvo should be placed on their ancient footing.

"BONAPARTE."

Soon afterwards Bonaparte seized on both these principalities, and gave the first to Talleyrand and the second to Bernadotte.

TO REAR-ADMIRAL DECRÈS.

"PARIS, *7th June*, 1802.

"A Barbary ship has been blockading a dozen Ligurian vessels at St. Tropez, and the Maritime Prefect has done nothing to disengage the port. It is a dishonour to the

Republic that these Barbary wretches should insult our coasts. Take measures to prevent any vessel, no matter to what nation it belongs, being blockaded or captured in our waters.

"BONAPARTE."

After having set forth all the benefits he had conferred on the Church, the First Consul ordered the following note to be despatched to Rome :—

"1st. At the epoch of the Revolution France possessed five cardinals, to wit, Cardinals Bernis, Larochefoucault, Rohan, Lomenie, and Montmorency. The two first are dead; the third is no longer a Frenchman; the fourth is dead; and the fifth is a rebel to the State and to the Holy See."

Then followed a demand that France should have seven cardinals, the same number as Austria, so that she might exercise an equal amount of influence with that Power in future conclaves.

TO THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC.

"PARIS, *1st July*, 1802.

"I hasten to lay before you the constitution of the Republic of the Valais, and to communicate to you my intention, as Président of the Italian Republic, to place that Republic under the protection of France and of the Italian and Helvetian Republics, so that the Republic of the Valais, guaranteed by three powers, may be sheltered from the vicissitudes of time, and be able to preserve a strict neutrality. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

A few days afterwards Bonaparte commenced a long note to his War Minister in these terms: "The independence of the Valais, with the exclusive faculty of the French to march their armies through it, will change the system of war in Italy." The independent Valaisians

were to keep the military roads in proper repair at their own expense.

In a letter to Captain-General Leclerc, Bonaparte gave a very brilliant account of the political situation in France at this epoch :—

"Affairs in Germany," he wrote, "have been settled to our advantage and to that of our allies. By our peace with the Turk we have obtained the commerce of the Black Sea. We have gained possession of the Isle of Elba, which has been united to France. Piedmont is definitively united to the Republic. The English have evacuated Malta, Mahon, and Egypt. Our colonies in Asia are prosperous, and so are Guadeloupe, Tobago, and Martinique. Rid us of those 'gilded Africans' and there will remain nothing for us to desire. . . . As for you, you are on the road to glory. The Republic will enable you to enjoy a suitable fortune, and my friendship is unchangeable."

There were several misstatements in the above extract. The English had not evacuated all the positions alluded to. As for Elba, we find the First Consul writing to Berthier on the 3rd July, to disarm the inhabitants of Porto-Ferrajo, to arrest a dozen of them and to send them on board a frigate by way of hostages. A government commissioner was to select a dozen of the most honest families in the island and to send their children to school in Paris so as to attach them to France.

This is the way in which Elba was treated by its future sovereign.

TO TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *7th July*, 1802.

"Write to Citizen Dubois-Thainville at Algiers that by order of the First Consul he is to demand the head of the *reis* who bastinadoed the French captain in the roads of Algiers ; that the vessel must be restored ; . . . that the Dey must be informed that should he listen to the counsels of Vekhil Hardgi, who is the enemy of France,

he will be ruined; that no one has ever insulted me with impunity; that unless he behaves well I shall punish him as I did the Mamelukes."

And the consul was to be instructed to speak imperiously to the Dey, and not to fear bringing about a rupture. No less a personage than General Hulin was to be the bearer of the following letter, which was to be backed up by three ships of the line:—

"PARIS, *18th July*, 1802.

"TO THE MOST HIGH AND MOST MAGNIFICENT DEY OF ALGIERS.

"May God preserve him in prosperity and in glory!

"I write this letter direct to you because I know that you are deceived by your ministers, who lead you to act in a manner which may be productive of great misfortunes."

And the Dey was called upon to give satisfaction.

The First Consul wrote three other letters on the same subject on the 18th, and declared to his Minister of Marine that unless the French flag were treated with due respect by Tunis and Algiers, he was to send ten ships of the line and five frigates to punish the Barbary Powers and to insist upon reparation being made.

On the 22nd July Bonaparte wrote to General Leclerc, saying—

"We await with impatience the arrival of Christophe and Dessalines in France. *The capture of Toussaint was extremely honourable to you*, and is a cause of tranquillity and hope for our commerce."

On the same day the following decree was issued:—

"Art. I. The so-called Toussaint Louverture shall be transferred to and detained as a prisoner in the fort of Joux. He shall be kept in solitary confinement, without the power of writing or of communicating with any one but his domestic.

"Art II. The Ministers of War and of Marine are charged with the execution of this decree."

Nothing could exceed the perfidious conduct of Bonaparte on this occasion. Toussaint Louverture had laid down his arms on the solemn promise of pardon, which was basely violated. He was never even tried, but was flung into a cold underground dungeon, where he did not long survive. The precise cause of his death remains a mystery. Christophe did not share the fate of his chief, but revenged him.

TO THE DEY OF ALGIERS.

"PARIS, *27th July*, 1802.

"GREAT AND MAGNIFICENT DEY,—An adjutant of my palace has been sent to demand reparation for insults to my flag. . . . I must also express my indignation at the demand for 200,000 piastres which your ministers have dared to make [because French subjects had been coral fishing on the coast of Algiers]. I have never paid anything to any one, and, thank God, I have imposed the law on all my enemies. I destroyed the Mamelukes because they dared to demand money after having insulted the French flag. . . . Before marching against you with land and sea forces I have communicated with the ambassador of the Sublime Porte," &c.

Bonaparte threatened the Dey with an army of 80,000 men, and the Dey threatened the First Consul with the horrors of war unless he were paid his 200,000 piastres, and there the matter stopped.

TO CITIZEN ABRIAL, *Minister of Justice.*

"PARIS, *21st August*, 1802.

"I have the honour to forward you the Papal brief which restores Citizen Charles Maurice Talleyrand to his secular and lay existence. I beg you will have the same inserted in the *Bulletin des Lois*.

"BONAPARTE."

The Bishop of Meaux, having asked permission to repair to Paris in order to have his eyes looked after—

DECISION.

"I shall see him with pleasure in Paris, where he will be able to attend to the affairs of his diocese.

"BONAPARTE."

Cazenove, Archbishop of St. Domingo, having asked what day he could take the oath to the First Consul—

DECISION.

"To be sent to Citizen Portalis, to ask him why he assumes the title of archbishop, and if he is one, who nominated him.

"BONAPARTE."

TO H.H. THE POPE.

"PARIS, *28th August*, 1802.

"MOST HOLY FATHER,—I have read the letter of your Holiness with the greatest attention. *I can but approve of the intention of your Holiness to nominate one of my subjects Grand Master of Malta.*

"I see with pain that your Holiness does not consider that you can conclude a Concordat with the Italian Republic. . . . . The cardinals I would propose to your Holiness are the Archbishop of Paris (de Belloy), the Archbishop of Lyons (Fesch), and the Bishops of Troyes and of Autun. Your Holiness knows the Archbishop of Paris. . . . Although ninety-three years of age his mind and body are still unimpaired.

"The Archbishop of Lyons, young and *less deserving*, is an ecclesiastic distinguished for the severity of his morality[1] and for the attachment I bear him, being my near relative. . . .

[1] No mention is made of the sums embezzled by his future eminence when he was acting as army contractor in Italy.

"I must inform your Holiness that I have just obtained from the Dey of Algiers the release of a great number of Christians, several of whom are subjects of your Holiness; this was brought about in connection with the arrangements made with the Dey to repair an insult offered to the French flag.

"I have caused the Holy Sepulchre, all the Christians in Syria, and all the churches of Constantinople to be placed under the protection of France. . . .

"I should like to give a fresh impulse to the missions in China, and I will not conceal from your Holiness that, independently of the general welfare of religion, I am actuated in this matter by a desire to deprive the English of the direction of those missions [which were somewhat commercial]. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

Sebastiani was to look after the Christians in the Levant, and other matters.

DECISION.

"PARIS, 30*th August*, 1802.

"Sent back to the Minister of the Interior. It is not proper that Vestris should leave. I desire that when he no longer performs he shall be granted a pension. The Minister will make a report on the subject of Vestris and his debts.

"BONAPARTE."

Vestris had asked permission to pass six months a year in England, where he had been offered 1,300 guineas for the season.

In a letter to the Minister of Marine Bonaparte said that he desired to make the Pope a present of two brigs, the *Speedy* and the *Colibri;* the names of these vessels were to be altered to the *St. Peter* and the *St. Paul;* on the poop of each was to be inscribed in letters of gold—

"Given by the First Consul Bonaparte to the Pope Pius VII.;" and they were to be "painted and carved internally in a manner analogous to their new names."

Many little facts of the above description show how times had changed. In 1796 General Bonaparte had levied "black mail" on the Pope, and had forced him to contribute 4,000,000 francs towards the expenses of the French navy! A year afterwards, when the General seized on Venice, he announced to the Directory that he had changed the names of the nine ships and the twelve frigates he had captured—vessels *ayant des noms de saints inconvenants.*

As a matter of fact none of the Venetian vessels were called after saints with the exception of the St. George!

It may be asked how it came that Bonaparte, who was intent upon levying ships from Spain and Portugal, should have presented even two brigs to the Pope. We know something of the *Speedy.* She had been captured by the squadron under Admiral Linois after a resistance so gallant that her captain had his sword returned to him. The captain in question was Thomas Cochrane, afterwards Earl of Dundonald. He described the *Speedy* as "the least efficient craft on the station." The probability is that the *St. Paul* was not worth much more than the *St. Peter.*

On the 5th September Bonaparte addressed a series of instructions to Sebastiani, who was to visit Tripoli, Alexandria, Cairo, Jaffa, St. Jean d'Acre, Jerusalem, &c., with what view is tolerably well known. He was to assure every one of the good wishes of France, and was to avoid compromising himself.

TO CITIZEN PORTALIS.

"PARIS, *6th September*, 1802.

"I send you a note which has been forwarded to me by the Inspector General of Gendarmery concerning the Bishop of Rennes. Write to him that all this must come to an end; that he makes me regret the confidence I

reposed in him; that he is culpable in removing a Constitutional priest; that a prelate who, after ten years of revolution and trouble, does not experience the necessity of peace is deserving of no consideration."

And the bishop, whose passions were not to be restrained by the morality of the Evangelists, was threatened with criminal proceedings.

The Bishop of Clermont was to be written in language less harsh, and told that his conduct was "the art of rendering religion odious and impotent." Other prelates, no doubt, on the report of the Inspector General of Gendarmes, were to be sharply reprimanded.

On the 23rd September Bonaparte, in a long letter to Talleyrand, said he had his eye on the Helvetian Republic, and that unless the terms of his proclamation were accepted he would send Ney into that country at the head of 30,000 men. He was determined, he wrote, to have a frontier to cover Franche-Comté; there was no middle course between *a Swiss Government solidly organised and friendly to France, and no Switzerland.*

On the 2nd October Bonaparte drew out an elaborate document on the organisation of the Isle of Elba, which was to have its Captain General, a Government Commissioner, a Council of Administration and Justice. No more young men were to be sent to the schools or universities of Tuscany. A French master was to be established in every parish, and the French language was to be used in the courts of law, &c., &c.

The Archbishop of Turin, having asked to be dispensed from coming to Paris owing to his great age, his ill-health, the requirements of his diocese, and want of means:

DECISION.

"PARIS, 11*th October*, 1802.

"The weather is about to become severe; it is necessary for him to hasten his departure. Send him 3,000 francs for his travelling expenses. "BONAPARTE."

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AMBASSADOR AT CONSTANTINOPLE (GENERAL BRUNE).

"ST. CLOUD, *18th October*, 1802.

"The intention of the Government is that the Ambassador at Constantinople shall recover the supremacy which France has exercised in that city for 200 years. He has a splendid residence and he ought constantly to occupy a rank superior to that of other nations; be surrounded by a numerous suite, and make a great display. . . . He must give it to be understood that if Russia and Austria have an interest in dividing the states of the Sultan, it is the interest of France to maintain the balance between those two powers. . . . If any events happen in the vicinity of Constantinople he must offer his mediation, and as a general rule the French Ambassador must seize every opportunity to attract attention. Acting upon this principle there will be no inconvenience in illuminating the French Embassy on the fête day of the prophet. . . . Care must be taken never to shock the habits and customs of the people, &c.

"BONAPARTE."

TO CONSUL CAMBACÉRÈS.

"ROUEN, *31st October*, 1802.

"I rode at 8 A.M. to visit the heights of Rouen. The Archbishop, who is much loved and esteemed here, was good enough to say mass, but he gave us neither holy water nor oraison. We shall take our revenge to-morrow, which is All Saints' Day. . . . The Grand Judge should not lose a moment in having the notary Petit arrested and confined in the Temple. The eight curés ought to be arrested at once and sent to Italy under safe guard. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE ARCHBISHOP OF LYONS.

"ROUEN, *2nd November*, 1802.

"I have been for the last three days at Rouen. I am highly satisfied with the people of this department, with

the feelings which animate the clergy, and especially with the archbishop.

"It is time for you to start for your diocese, you must keep up a handsome establishment, but without luxury; regulating it by the most considerable households in Lyons. You must act with dexterity, but you must in reality appoint as many constitutional priests as possible. . . . You must unite to this a great respect for the Pope. . . . I beg you will send me your pastoral before publishing it. You will greatly displease me, and you will damage the state if you say anything to offend the Constitutionals. . . . Do not forget that in the position where you have been placed you will be closely watched. Act with the strictest morality and decorum, and devote yourself entirely to your duties. Pretend not to meddle with politics, and if petitions are presented to you for me say that you are a minister of religion. Do not exhibit too much zeal even in the administration of the hospitals, or as regards the poor. . . . I should like you to take by the hand one of the most prominent bishops of the refractory party and one of those having the most weight among the Constitutionals, to bless them and to embrace them, telling them that union and fraternity form the fundamental basis of religion. Something striking in this line would have a good effect. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

The nephew evidently did not place unweening confidence in the Cardinal, and in this he showed the keenness of his perception.

On the 4th November Bonaparte wrote to Talleyrand evidently in reply to a despatch which had been forwarded from London by General Andréossy. In this letter the First Consul questioned the right of England to interfere with the affairs of the Italian, Ligurian, and Helvetian Republics, since nothing had been said about those Republics in the Treaty of Amiens. He expressed himself in a tone of irritation which boded ill for the peace of the Continent.

In several despatches Bonaparte speaks in glowing terms of the position of Alessandria from a military point of view.

DECREE.

"PARIS, *18th November*, 1802.

"Art. 1. The cathedral of Alessandria, which 'encumbers' the *place d'arms*, shall be demolished. The materials shall be employed on the fortifications.

"Art 2. The Ministers of the Interior, of Finance, and of War are charged with the execution of this decree.

"BONAPARTE."

TO THE KING OF SPAIN.

"ST. CLOUD, *27th November*, 1802.

"I have received your letter of the 18th October, and I beg you will present my compliments of condolence to the Queen on the death of the Duke of Parma. Your Majesty is well aware that the French Republic had a right to take possession of your states *two years ago* according to the treaty of *the 21st March*, 1801. . . . However, desiring to be agreeable to your Majesty, I did not press for the execution of the treaty. . . . Your Majesty will at present feel that it has become impossible for me to violate a treaty signed and ratified at my own instigation, and that Europe might see with jealousy and displeasure that while Prince Ferdinand[1] is deprived of his states, and while the King of Sardinia, in whom so many princes are interested, remains uncompensated for the losses he has sustained, his Majesty the King of Tuscany should obtain, independently of his kingdom, a considerable increase of territory. The French Republic is at the present moment in possession of the States of Parma, and several demands have been made by other Powers. However, I am willing to do anything your Majesty may desire; but this can never be accomplished without an equivalent compensation, of which Florida might form a portion. . . .

"BONAPARTE."

[1] Brother of the Emperor of Austria, the dispossessed Grand-Duke of Tuscany.

TO CITIZEN LAPLACE.

"ST. CLOUD, *26th November*, 1802.

"All that I have read of your work appears to me perfectly clear. I long to be able to devote a few weeks to finish reading it, and I much regret not being able to give it the time and attention it deserves. This affords me a new opportunity for bewailing the force of circumstances which have diverted me into another career where I find myself so far removed from the sciences. I thank you for your dedication, which I accept with pleasure, and I desire that future generations in reading your *Mécanique Céleste* may remember my esteem and friendship for the author.

"BONAPARTE."

In a letter to General Leclerc, dated 27th November, 1802, Bonaparte said that he took the greatest interest in the sufferings of the troops, and acknowledged that he had miscalculated the difficulties of the St. Domingo expedition. He concluded by saying:—

"I am highly satisfied with the conduct of Paulette. She ought not to fear death, since she would die with glory in dying with the army and in being useful to her husband. Everything passes rapidly upon earth with the exception of the mark we leave in history. I am well satisfied with your brother-in-law and your sister; when you read this letter she will have made an addition to her family."

General Leclerc had been dead a week when this letter was written. As for Paulette, who had been forced by her inexorable brother to accompany the expedition, she appears to have behaved with considerable resolution in St. Domingo. She exhibited great grief at the loss of her husband, and returned to France with his dead body. It is true, however, that she did not long remain a widow, and that she gave her hand to Prince Borghese.

In a letter to the Pope, on the 13th December, Bonaparte said:—

"The Legate has informed me that the Grand Master nominated by your Holiness has refused the post. I have advised the Legate to send him, on the part of your Holiness, who is his spiritual and temporal superior, an order to accept it, and to tell him that he was not created a Knight of Malta to run about the world amusing himself, but to support religion. . . .

"There are some small Swiss cantons containing a certain number of religious convents which during a portion of the war showed themselves favourable to England; they remain under the same influence without perceiving that everything has changed, and that it is not natural for Catholic monks to submit to English influence in preference to ours. I beg that your Holiness will write to the generals of their orders in Rome to enlighten them with regard to their duties. There is amongst others a Capuchin who wears the cross of a Protestant order which was given to him during the war by the King of England; this appears scandalous and contrary to the principles of Catholicism. . . .

"The Bey of Tunis having sent me an ambassador, I have concluded a convention with him by which Christians falling into his hands will no longer experience ill-treatment, and will be allowed rations. . . . ."

It is amusing to find Bonaparte appealing to the spiritual power to help him in his temporal designs, and tacitly acknowledging the supremacy of the Pontiff. It is not mentioned what cross was conferred on the Capuchin, and the wonder is that the First Consul did not say he had been invested with the garter as well.

END OF VOL. I.

R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, BREAD STREET HILL, E.C.

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on 15 October, 2018